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on
The Decline of the British Street Tramway Industry in the Twentieth Century
with Special Reference to South Yorkshire
The history of British street tramways is surveyed and contrasted with
other urban transport modes from 1860 to date and the generally accepted
reasons for the industry's decline summarised. These theories are then
tested, illlustrated and amplified by three case studies of tramways in
South Yorkshire, namely the small Dearne District, the medium-sized Don-
caster and the major Sheffield undertakings. The history of each system is
detailed with particular attention being given to later developments. In
each case contrasts and parallels are drawn with competing modes--either
motor buses or trolleybuses in this area--and with tramways in other parts
of the country. The Dearne District tramway was loss-making throughout, and
the reasons for inadequate receipts and/or excessive working and capital
costs are examined, particularly by contrast with the competing and profit-
able Yorkshire Traction bus company, which ultimately bought out the tramway
in 1933. The Doncaster tramways were more successful, alternating between
profit and loss, but after World War I were subject to severe external
restraints--such as stagnation in the local economic base and private motor
bus competition--and also suffered from rapid deterioration of capital
assets. Each of these difficulties is analysed and the eventual successful
replacement of trams by 1935 by (mostly) trolleybuses described and discussed.
Sheffield's tramways were financially viable up to and including World War
II, the reasons for this including the virtual elimination of private motor
bus competition, Sheffield's topography and the heavy traffic typical of a
city tramway; a particular contrast is drawn with Manchester, where tramway
abandondonment became policy much earlier. The financial and in particular
the planning reasons why Sheffield's policy changed after 1945 are then
examined. Tramway replacement was completed by 1960. The analysis is
supported throughout by detailed financial and operating data derived from
archive sources; a detailed bibliography concludes the thesis.
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PART I
THE DEVELOPMENT AND DECLINE OF THE BRITISH TRAMWAY INDUSTRY
2CHAPTER 1
THE HISTORY OF STREET TRAMWAYS IN GREAT BRITAIN
Introduction 
The history of tramways in Great Britain--which is here defined as
excluding Ireland' in all its parts and also semi-autonomous islands such as
the Channel Islands--is largely contained within the century 1860 to 1960.
For somewhat more than half of that period the tram was the dominant form of
urban passenger transport in this country. Horse buses were unable to
compete against the trams, and even the main-line railways experienced con-
siderable problems. From World War I onwards, however, trams faced increas-
ingly effective competition from first the motor bus and trolleybus and
then the motor car, with the result that by the end of 1962 there was but
one urban tramway remaining in mainland Britain, that linking the sea-side
resort of Blackpool with the port of Fleetwood. 2
 How this once ubiquitous
feature of the street scene became more-or-less a sea-side curiousity is the
subject of this thesis. The economic and environmental case against the
tram might seem so obvious as not to require comment, until it is realised
that the same process of decline did not occur at the same period or on the
same scale in many countries, particularly on the European continent, 3
 and
1. It is sometimes difficult to 'weed out' Irish figures from early
statistics; where these are included, the fact is stated.
2. For dates of
	 closure of tramways, see Appendix G5.
3. For instance, West Germany had 2,146km of tramway in 1906, 4,000km
1937 and 2,310km in 1966; see Wolfang Hendlmeier, Handbuch der deutschen 
Strassenbahngeschichte 1 (Munich, 1981), 80.
3in some cases has never done so. Today tramways, usually in modernised
forms, are experiencing a resurgence world-wide and may well return to
Britain's cities too. 1
 So although it is no purpose of this thesis to
provide a comparative study, knowledge of contemporary experience elsewhere
adds interest to the question here discussed, 'Why did tramways decline so
rapidly in Britain from World War I onwards?'.
This opening part is not original, relying as it does mainly on pub-
lished sources. It is intended to provide a brief survey of the history of
tramways in Britain, with an emphasis on economic factors; after that, the
reasons suggested in the existing literature for the decline of tramways are
described and discussed. The main body of the thesis provides a factual
basis by which to judge these theories, using as examples three tramway
systems in South Yorkshire.
Horses in the Street: Urban Transport to the 1880s 
The first attempt to offer a public transport service within a town is
generally credited to the French mathematician, Blaise Pascal, who intro-
duced a coach service in Paris as early as 18 Mar 1662. This was initially
popular with the upper classes, but had soon to be withdrawn for lack of
custom. It was too early for viable public transport since the wealthy had
their own carriages and the poor could not afford to pay a fare. 2
 It is
significant that the first successful mode of urban public transport, the
horse bus, relied very much on a middle class clientele. 3
As an alternative to their carriages, the rich could hire a sedan chair
a business which appears to have become organised rather like a taxi service
at an early period. In Berlin sedan chairs were working from three official
1. See for example, R[ichard] J. Buckley, 'The Sheffield Supertram--on
line for the nineties', Modern Tramway (hereafter, MT), 48 (Nov 1985), 362-6.
2. Charles Klapper, The Golden Age of Tramways (hereafter, Tramways)
(1961), 279.
3. John P. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys: the rise of urban mass 
transport in Europe (hereafter, Tramways and Trolleys) (Princeton, 1976), 12.
4stands in 1688 and in Leipzig a sedan chair company was formed in 1703.1
Chairs were used in London and some British provincial towns too, 2
 joined in
London from the early seventeenth century by hackney carriages--or Hansoms--
and four-wheel 'growlers', 3
 but these were still not 'public' in the true
sense.
By the eighteenth century long-distance road transport was provided by
stage coaches, which ran at fixed times and carried passengers between
stated places, usually inns, and several miles apart. 4
 Short-stage coaches
were in use in London by the early nineteenth century, accomplishing, for
instance, the five miles between London and Paddington at a fare of is.
5
6d. The next development was a vehicle which picked up or set down any-
where on the route. One such was a hackney coach inaugurated by a Man-
chester toll-keeper, John Greenwood, in 1824 or 1825. This ran at stated
intervals for a fare of 6d. and exploited the developing market of the
newly suburbanised middle classes.6
The first horse bus is generally ascribed to Jacques Lafitte, who
introduced eighteen-seat vehicles to Paris in 1819. 7
 The name 'omnibus'
itself derives from the service started by a M.Baudry in Nantes in 1826 and
so christened by him after the sign of a local hatter named Omnes which read
'Omnes Omnibus', or 'Omnes for all'. It appears to have been Baudry's 1828
1. Anon., Die Strassenbahnen in der DDR: Geschichte, Technik und 
Betrieb (Stuttgart, 1978), 9
2. In Torquay, for instance, where bath chairs and donkey carts were
also available for hire in the mid-nineteenth century; see Fisher Barham,
Torbay Transport (Falmouth, 1979), 7.
3. T. C. Barker and C. I. Savage, An Economic History of Transport in 
Britain (hereafter, Transport in Britain) (3rd ed., 1974), 125.
4. Edward Gray, The Manchester Carriage and Tramways Company (here-
after, Manchester Carriage Company) (Rochdale, 1977), 7-8.
5. Barker and Savage, Transport in Britain, 125-6; decimal price
equivalents are given in Appendix Cl.
6. Gray, Manchester Carriage Company, 7-8.
7. Klapper, Tramways, 279.
5Paris service which was imitated in England. 1
 This was in 1829 when George
Shillibeer started London's first bus service between Paddington and Bank. 2
In view of the earlier activities of men such as Greenwood, it is doubtful
whether Shillibeer quite deserves the prominence he has been given in trans-
port history; and it is anyway the case that both men soon found themselves
faced with numerous competitors. 3
 This had certain beneficial effects, in
that it forced fares down and the standards of vehicles up. Shillibeer had
initially charged is., but London fares fell progressively to 6d.,3d. and
even to 2d. and id. stages, thereby generating even more traffic.4
Early Manchester buses seem to have seated only eight inside, 5 though
Shillibeer's first bus crammed in twenty people. This was later reduced to
twelve, with three more on top beside the driver, and finally increased
again to a total of twenty-two passengers by the use of top-deck seats. 6
The latter ran along the sides of the vehicle and were very awkward to reach
which, combined with the uncomfortable accommodation inside, explained
why the new designs proved formidable competitors. Greenwood's son was
challenged by a Scottish firm which arrived complete with new three-horse
buses seating forty-two, seventeen inside and the remainder on back-to-back
seats along the middle of the top deck, an arrangement known as a knife-
board. The greater comfort made these buses popular and the higher cap-
acity allowed fare reductions to 3d. inside and 2d. outside. 7
Competition must have made life uncomfortable for the proprietors, so
the result was usually agreement between them to divide routes 8
 or to
1. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, 10.
2. Klapper, Tramways, 280.
3. For Greenwood, see Gray, Manchester Carriage Company, 9
4. Barker and Savage, Transport in Britain, 126.
5. Gray, Manchester Carriage Company, 10.
6. Barker and Savage, Transport in Britain, 126.
7. Gray, Manchester Carriage Company, 13.
8. Ibid., 14.
6amalgamate into larger concerns such as the Manchester Carriage Company, of
which Greenwood 1
 was one of the founders in 1865. They had ninety-one
buses, 2
 but in the capital the London General Omnibus Company (hereafter
LGOC) had 610 buses out of the 810 running at the time of its formation in
1856. 3
 The process of improvement and renewed competition continued though,
stimulated in the metropolis by the London Road Car Company, which in 1880
introduced garden seat buses, 4
 of which it had 275 by the 1890s.5
Turning to horse tramways, the first in the world is generally taken to
have been the New York and Harlaem Railroad which opened for traffic in
November 1832. 6
 American sources do mention a line in Baltimore as early as
1828, 7
 but little appears to be known of this. As a matter of fact the
first passenger carrying railed vehicle in the world ran on the Swansea and
Mumbles Railway--which certainly in later years was very much akin to a
tramway--in 1807, but this was not on the street. 8
 Undoubtedly street
tramways themselves came to England from America, 9 brought thence by an
entrepreneur with the somewhat appropriate name of G. F. Train. He opened
experimental lines in various parts of the country and in the capital, but
I. Bringing with him, incidentally, an early form of tramway which he
had established in Salford in 1861. This involved ordinary horse buses run-
ning on flat metal plates, the vehicle being kept on the 'track' by a small
guide wheel running in a central grooved rail. See ibid., 16-21,27 and
29-30.
2. Ibid., 22.
3. Barker and Savage, Transport in Britain, 127-8.
4. i.e. with top deck seats facing forward as on modern buses.
5. Barker and Savage, Transport in Britain, 128-9.
6. REchard J. Buckley, A History of Tramways: from horse to rapid 
transit (hereafter, History of Tramways) (Newton Abbot, 1975), 9.
7. Frank Rowsome,Jr., Trolley Car Treasury, technical ed. Stephen D.
Maguire (New York, 1956), 20.
8. Buckley, History of Tramways, 8.
9. Though a Mr. Curtis had started running road/rail vehicles on the
harbour railway at Liverpool the year before; see J. B. Horne and
T. B. Maund, Liverpool Transport 1830--1900 1 (hereafter, Liverpool Trans-
port 1) (1975), 19-22.
7only two had a permanent existence, including the initial 1860 route in
Birkenhead. Tramway development thereafter was slow, the only really
important advance coming at the end of the decade with the start of the
tramway system in Liverpool. A private bill was necessary to authorise a
tramway and real growth was not possible until the passage of a general
enabling act, the Tramways Act 1870. Lines in London opened in that same
year and by the 1880s all large and many smaller towns were equipped with
horse tramways. 
1
By 1890 these employed 27,719 horses and 3,801 cars run-
ning on 948 miles of track and had an income of nearly £3.25 million.
Many problems were experienced with the design of an effective rail
compatible both for trams and for other road traffic, but the grooved girder
rail still used today was generally employed after about 1880. The typical
British horse tram was double-decked, earlier versions having the knifeboard
and later ones the reversible garden seats on top; single-deckers were
3
used as well.
Generally speaking, where horse buses preceded horse trams, the former
gave way to the latter. In Hull, for instance, horse buses were running
three services along Anlaby and Beverley Roads and Springbank by 1871. The
tram system was started in 1875 and completed in 1877; by the end of 1878
serious bus competition was eliminated by the failure of the Hull General
Omnibus Company, whose assets were purchased by the tramway company.
The reason for the economic success of the horse tram was that rails
provided a much better surface than the unpaved or setted streets of the
time, whilst the low rolling resistance of metal wheels on metal rails
5
meant that horses could cope with greater loads.
1. Buckley, History of Tramways, 11-12.
2. Figures from D. Kinnear Clark, Tramways: Their Construction and 
Working (hereafter, Construction and Working) (2nd edition, 1894), 24-5;
Irish totals included and also some lines or cars not horse worked.
3. Buckley, History of Tramways, 13-16 and 19.
4. Rlichard] J. Buckley, 'Horse Tramways in Hull--1', Tramway Review
(hereafter, 11) 14 (Autumn,1982), 204, 205, 209 and 210.
5. Buckley, History of Tramways, 7.
2
4
8The three-horse forty-two seat buses used in Manchester seem to have
been exceptionally large, certainly by the closing decades of the century.
From the 1880s London bus companies re-equipped with new garden seat buses
with proper rear staircases and platforms, but with a capacity of only
twenty-six.' The same two horses could haul a forty-six seater tram, 2
 the
higher capacity of which was also assisted by two features of its design.
Trams had brakes, whereas buses usually relied on pulling up the horses,
which meant trams were safer for heavier loads. Tram wheels were also
small enough to go under the body, giving extra width inside. The result
was that more people could be carried per vehicle and the fares could be
lower, which in turn created more traffic, helped the outward spread of
towns and cities, and thus stimulated traffic and revenue still further.3
A comparison can be made between the North Metropolitan Tramways
Company--the largest in Britain with forty-nine miles of route 4--andthe
LGOC. In 1891 the North Metropolitan earned 13.74d. per car mile run and
its direct running expenses were 9.55d., leaving a surplus of 4.19d. If
other expenditure such as rates and licences is added, the total was 10.27d.
per car mile, still leaving a surplus of 3.47d. The LGOC, on the other
hand, took only 8.49d. per car mile in the first half of 1891, whilst its
expenses were 9.16d., resulting in a deficit of 0.67d. Clark states that
expenses were particularly high in 1891 due to a rise in the price of for-
age, an increase in wages and to unfavourable weather. 5
 No doubt this acc-
ounts for the LGOC's deficit, but the point to be drawn is that trams could
bear this, whereas buses could not. For whilst horse buses cost only
slightly less to run than trams, their earning power was much less, reflect-
1. Chas. S. Dunbar, Buses,Trolleys and Trams (1967), 32 and 34.
2. Klapper, Tramways, 280-1.
3. Buckley, History of Tramways, 8.
4. Clark, Construction and Working, 52.
5. Ibid., 56; it is probable that he underestimates the buses'
expenses, for there appears to be no equivalent to the rates etc levied
on the tramways.
9ing, of course, the latter's much smaller capacity.
The North Metropolitan was undoubtedly one of the most successful horse
tramway companies, though back in 1880 the Glasgow Company had been earning
even more at 14.47d. per car mile. However the twelve mile South London
Tramway Company's system was probably more typical of smaller ones else-
where; their receipts for 1891 were 10.42d. per car mile, expenses were
9.86d., leaving net receipts of only 0.66d. Clark also quotes the inevit-
able exception, which perhaps proves the rule; again in 1891, the Birming-
ham Central Tramway Company's buses were taking 11.33d. per vehicle mile and
its horse trams only 9.24d. The explanation is probably that the latter
were a very small part of this Company's business, even as opposed to buses,
which ran 506,196 miles as compared to 131,528 miles for the trams in that
year. 1
Not all horse tramways were successful, of course. In fact, many
smaller ones never paid a dividend, such as the Ipswich 2 and Keighley
3
lines, though they may still have proved useful to the travelling public.
Nor was road competition entirely eliminated; the Ipswich Company had to
reduce its fares after the introduction of a new bus service in 1898, for
instance. 4 In one case at least road competition forced a horse tramway
company into bankruptcy, though it was done not by the heavy and lumbering
omnibus but by light one-horse wagonnettes which easily outpaced the trams
5
on the flat streets of Kingston-upon-Hull. Another well-known failure was
1. Ibid., 86, 74-5 and 80; the Glasgow results do not distinguish
between trams and buses, but there were only twenty-two of the tier as
against 178 trams.
2. R. Markham, Public Transport in Ipswich (Ipswich, [19711), ch.2
(n.p.).
3. J. S. King, Keighley Corporation Transport (hereafter, Keighley 
Transport) (Huddersfield, 1964), 14.
4. Markham, Public Transport in Ipswich, ch.2 (n.p.).
5. Buckley, 'Horse Tramways in Hull--2', TR 14 (Winter, 1982), 248.
10
that of the London-based West Metropolitan in 1894. 1
Economic difficulties were one reason why the search for a mechanical
alternative was begun at an early date. The main problem was the cost
of horsing. Each two-horse car needed an average of eleven horses to keep
it in service, five pairs to work in shifts and one spare in the stables. 2
Thus a huge number of horses was needed for a relatively small fleet of
cars--in 1898 the North Metropolitan, for example, had 673 cars and 7,167
horses. The latter cost from £20 to £50 each and lasted about four years in
service, six months less than a bus horse. Some companies attempted to cut
costs by reducing the horse:car ratio; for example, the Dewsbury, Batley and
Birstall cut it to 8:1, but the only result was an increased turnover of
horseflesh and a consequent rise in horsing costs to 69 per cent of total
expenditure as opposed to the average of 55 per cent. Anything which prom-
ised to reduce these high costs would be welcomed. In any case, horses were
unsuited to tramway work. They were subject to disease and in hilly dist-
ricts unable to cope with severe gradients, which often had to be left
unserved until the advent of mechanical alternatives. In the larger cities,
too, the horse tram had reached the limit of its range; given that people
would only spend, at most, one and a half hours each way a day travelling to
work, at the horse's six miles per hour this was a limit of nine miles. 3
Mechanical Marvels: Late Victorian Developments 
There were really only two successful mechanical alternatives to horse
tramways, steam or cable trams. Experimentation with the former began more
or less contemporaneously with tramways themselves, starting in Britain with
Grantham's car of 1873 which eventually inaugurated the first permanent
steam tramway at Wantage in 1876. Grantham used a combined steam motor and
1. Buckley, History of Tramways, 23.
2. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, 26, seems to underestimate this re-
quirement when he quotes only five to seven horses per car; of course,
where one horse, single-deck cars were used extensively, as they were
abroad, this might be true.
3. Buckley, History of Tramways, 24.
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carriage, but the more effective idea was a separate locomotive and car,
first introduced in 1876. Eventually there were some fifty steam tramway
undertakings in Britain, operating over 500 locomotives. Large double-deck
cars, usually roofed and seating some sixty to seventy persons, were used.
Considerable networks were built up in the area outside Manchester and
in the Black Country, though the largest system in one town was the
twenty-nine mile Huddersfield system. 1
Steam trams were clearly not an instant solution to the problems of
horse tramway operators. At their peak, in 1890, there were only 553 loco-
motives in service as opposed to 25,807 horses. 2
McKay puts the relative failure of steam down to two inter-related
factors. First, strict environmental controls were imposed, covering noise
and smoke emission, speed and protection from moving parts, all of which
could be dealt with successfully, but at a price, which in turn contributed
to the second factor; that, by and large, steam trams showed no definite
economic advantages over their horse-drawn competitors. 3
In 1891 some horse-worked tramways had the following percentages of
working expenses to receipts; 76 per cent on the North Metropolitan, 82 per
cent on the London Tramways and 74 per cent on the Edinburgh Street. At the
same time the Birmingham Central's steam trams were running at 70 per cent, 4
scarcely a conclusive advantage and certainly not enough to overcome the
environmental disadvantages of steam trams and their higher first cost.
Cable tramways worked on the principle of a continuously moving cable
under the street to which cars were attached or detached at will by means of
a gripper. The first such line was designed and built by Andrew Hallidie in
1. Ibid., 27 and 29-31.
2. Board of Trade (later Ministry of Transport) Return of Street and
Road Tramways (later also including Trackless Trolleys) (hereafter,Tramway
Returns), 1890; Irish figures subtracted from UK totals.
3. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, 30-2.
4. Clark, Construction and Working, 56, 63, 94, and 79.
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San Francisco in 1872. Although very successful in the United States,
where there were eventually sixty-two lines, cable tramways found little
favour elsewhere, there being but five in mainland Britain, two in London
and one each in Birmingham, Matlock and Edinburgh; only the last was a
city-wide system, the others being single routes. 1
The great advantage of cable was its very low running cost. The
Birmingham line had an operating ratio2
 of 50 per cent in 1891 and was
making a net profit per mile run of 6.50d. as against the same Company's
steam, horse and accumulator trams, which returned 4.68d., 1.23d. and 5.25d.
respectively. 3
 It might have been expected, then, that every man with
any financial acumen would have been reaching for his wallet to invest in
cable tramways. The difficulty was, cable tramways were extremely expensive
to build, which meant that though they might be laid in places where a
high traffic was expected, they were no good for more speculative ventures. 4
Nor, in fact, were their low working expenses as certain as all that.
Birmingham's working costs might have been only 6.32d. per car mile in
1892-3, 5
 but a line in Douglas, Isle of Man was costing 13.64d. per car
mile to run only four years later as against earnings of only 8.93d.; 6
 one
of the two London lines had gone bankrupt as early as 1899 too. 7
1. Buckley, History of Tramways, 36-7 and 39-40.
2. Throughout this work 'operating ratio' means working costs as
a percentage of traffic revenue. Thus any percentage below 100 indicates a
working profit, any above 100 a working loss. This was the convention at
the time, although the modern usage is to show revenue as a percentage
of costs, meaning that profit is shown by a figure above 100; for an example
of this, see a report on the tramways in Nantes in MT 49 (Jul 1986), 243.
3. Clark, Construction and Working, 82 and 85.
4. William J. Clark, 'Electric Railways in America: from a business
standpoint' (hereafter,'Electric Railways'), The Electric Railway Number of 
Cassier's Magazine of August 1899 (hereafter, Cassier's) (reprinted 1960),
521.
5. D. K. Clark, Construction and Working, 85.
6. F. K. Pearson, Isle of Man Tramways (Newton Abbot, 1970), 78;
strictly speaking this is outside the purview of this work.
7. Buckley, History of Tramways, 40.
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A great many other techniques were dreamed up over the years. Those
which at least worked included town gas, compressed air and, later, petrol
engines; those which did not included ammonia gas and clockwork propulsion.'
None was really commercially viable, however. There was one further altern-
ative, though, which continued to tease inventors with its possibilities--
electricity.
The Development and Establishment of the Electric Tram 
The 1890s to World War I 
The world's first practicable electric locomotive was demonstrated
by Werner von Siemens at the Berlin Industrial Exhibition of 1879, and two
years later the same inventor opened an experimental electric tramway in the
Berlin suburbs. The main problem with applying electricity to tramways was
how to transfer the current safely to the moving vehicle. All the pioneer
lines used live rails, so they could run beside the road, but not in it.
Such an early experimental electric line was Volks Railway along the sea-
front at Brighton, opened in 1893 and still running today. 2
To avoid the current supply problem many experiments took place with
accumulator-powered trams, but about the only long-term use of such cars in
Britain was along Birmingham's Bristol Road between 1890 and 1901. Problems
included the weight and smell of the batteries and lack of speed. 3
 More-
over, their early commercial promise was not borne out by results. The
Birmingham line started well with profits of 5.25d. per car mile, but in
each of the two following years there was a loss, of first 2.14d. and then
0.17d. per car mile.4
One of the very first practicable electric street tramways in the
world was opened at Blackpool in 1885. This used a central conductor laid
under the rails in a narrow channel known as a conduit. Later developments
elsewhere made this a most efficient mode of operation whose main advantage
was the avoidance of unsightly overhead wires. However the expense of
1. Ibid., 32-6.
	 2. Ibid., 46-9.	 3. Ibid., 52-3.
4. D. K. Clark, Construction and Working, 85.
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installation meant that few towns except the largest could afford to pres-
erve their amenities in this way. London was one, where the London County
Council (hereafter,LCC) eventually operated 123 miles of tramway on the
conduit system. About the only other example of its use in Britain was at
Bournemouth.
1
A variant to this open conduit was the so-called closed conduit or sur-
face contact system. In this case the underground cable was connected
to a series of studs in the road surface which were energised by a magnetic
skate carried on the tram. Hastings, Lincoln, Mexborough, Torquay and
Wolverhampton used variants of this device, but none were either safe or
effective, the last user being Wolverhampton in 1921.
2
The key to successful use of the overhead conductor wire was the
spring-loaded under-running trolley, an American invention and introduced
into England by the Thomson-Houston Company on an experimental line at
Roundhay, Leeds in 1891. Already operating horse or steam tramways then
started to be electrified, two of the earliest being the South Staffordshire
line between Walsall and Darlaston in 1893 and Bristol's in 1895.
3
D. K. Clark gives an interesting comparison between the South Stafford-
shire and other Midlands tramways, reproduced overleaf in Table 1. If
one compares the expenses of the North Metropolitan--8.34d. per car mile in
1890 4
--one sees that at last a worthwhile gap had opened up between the
operating costs of horse tramways and a powered alternative. The new South
Staffordshire line was running at nearly three pence a mile less than the
best steam tramway, far and away below the electric accumulator system, and
even a few decimal points below cable traction. The comparison is not
entirely fair, for a new electric system would inevitably have lower repair
costs than, especially, the old and worn out steam lines. But even given
1. Buckley, History of Tramways, 56-7 and 64.
2. Ibid., 63 and 65-6.
3. Ibid., 58-61.
4. D. K. Clark, Construction and Working, 56.
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that, the fuel costs presented later by D. K. Clark were surely conclusive;
the average cost of steam power was 2.00d. per car mile, of accumulators
1.76d, of cable 0.60d. and of electricity only 0.48d. 1
The cost advantage of electric traction had earlier been appreciated in
the United States. After noting that revenue rose after electrification,
W. J. Clark passed on to the 'remarkable and unexpected' fact that operating
costs fell at the same time. In fact, experience showed that if electric car
mileage were tripled, power expenses only rose by a factor of two. 2He quotes
the example of a small Eastern city.
TABLE 2
COMPARATIVE RESULTS OF HORSE TRAMWAYS AND ELECTRIC TROLLEYS
IN AN UNITED STATES CITY
Item 1888 1896
Gross Receipts ($) 145,780 521,673
Operating Expenditure ($) 112,647 321,585
Income from Operation ($) 33,133 200,088
Percentage of Operating Expenses to Gross Receipts 77.3 61.6
Miles of Track 18.4 60.21
Gross Receipts per Mile of Track ($) 7,923 8,664
Gross Expenses per Mile of Track (%) 6,122 5,341
SOURCE: W. J. Clark, 'Electric Railways', 522; amounts containing Cents
rounded to nearest Dollar.
Electrification took place between 1890 and 1893. Population increased
by one third between 1888 and 1896, track mileage by 327 per cent and car
mileage by 495 per cent (capacity rose by even more, taking into account the
larger size of the trolleys 3). Gross receipts went up by 357 per cent,
1. Ibid., 638.
2. W. J. Clark, 'Electric Railways', 521.
3. The American term for 'tram' is either 'trolley' or 'streetcar'.
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clearly less than car mileage, so receipts per car mile actually fell by
32 per cent. However net income rose by 560 per cent, a 'wonderful gain'
made possible by a 43 per cent fall in operating costs per car mile from
23.70 cents in 1888 to 13.64 cents in 1896. If however horse traction had
been used to cover the same number of miles in 1896, costs would have ex-
ceeded receipts. 1
The American experience showed that revenue was greatly increased upon
electrification. Because electric cars were twice as fast as horse cars,
they could run twice as far in the same time; doubling the diameter actually
quadruples the area so, in theory, four times the population could be
served. Larger and more comfortable cars also improved the service offered
at peak hours and were themselves inducements to optional riders to take
extra trips to the shops or to places of recreation.2 It is perhaps diff-
icult to appreciate why this was so today but, as McKay has said, the elec-
tric tramcar was revolutionary in that it signalled the change from the
walking and horse-drawn city to that of mechanised transportation. 3 It is
scarcely surprising, then, that people wanted to ride the cars, even purely
for the pleasure of the experience. This is best seen in the custom of
riding on open cars during the hot American summers,4 but Britain had its
joy riders too.	 For instance, Southport Corporation introduced a 'Grand
Tour' by toastrack tram in 1914; even in the wartime conditions of 1915 it
was taking nearly 30d. per car mile as opposed to the town routes' average
of only 10.84d. 5 So W. J. Clark concluded that the increase of gross rec-
eipts by electric cars over their animal-powered predecessors was caused by
two factors--the increased population able to be served effectively and
1. W. J. Clark, 'Electric Railways', 522.	 2. Ibid., 519-20.
3. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, 241.
4. W. J. Clark, 'Electric Railways', 520.
5. Henry B. Priestley, 'The Tramways of Southport', TR 16 (Winter,
1985), 107-8.
18
the increased facilities and inducements offered to potential travellers. 1
After taking both the increased receipts and reduced costs into acc-
ount, W. J. Clark concluded that he had made 'the case for electric tract-
ion in a nutshell'. 2 His advocacy was supported by the facts. From only
86 miles of electrified track in 1888, American street railways had grown to
914 miles by 1899, 3 that is, from 138km to 1,472km.4
The United Kingdom5
 made a promising start in the field of electric
traction too, having 71km of electric tramway in 1893, quite respectable as
compared with the earlier American figure and more than twice as much as
any other European country, except for Germany with 102km. By 1898 however
the UK's total had risen to 211km, but Germany now had 1,403km, France 488km
and Switzerland was close with 201km. 6
There were various reasons for this. Extremely high standards of con-
struction were demanded by the Board of Trade, which meant that first costs
were high. 7
 Contemporary American standards were much more liberal. For
instance, ordinary but light section railway track was often used, with
the sleepers covered with dirt or macadam 8
 (the road surface), and wooden
overhead poles were common; 9
 neither method was much used in Britain.
Nor was the British public as ready to welcome the street railway as their
American cousins, a reluctance partly tied up with a class perception of the
tram as 'the poor man's carriage', 10and partly with an aesthetic prejudice
1. W. J. Clark, 'Electric Railways', 520.
2. Ibid., 522.	 3. Ibid., 519.
4. Conversion tables for Imperial and Metric measurements are provided
in Appendix Gl.
5. Figures from this source include Ireland.
6. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, Table 5, 72.
7. Robert W. Blackwell, 'Electric Tramways in Great Britain',
Cassier's, 285.
8. Lemuel W. Serrell, 'Building an Electric Railway', Cassier's, 309.
9. Ibid., 311.
10, Blackwell, 'Electric Tramways in Great Britain', 302.
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against overhead wires. '
From the commercial point of view, British electrical suppliers were
less monopolistic than those on the continent and thus less able to exert
pressure on municipalities. The most important factor delaying electrific-
ation was the provision of the Tramways Act which gave municipal authorities
the right to purchase a tramway after twenty one years. This meant that
companies were unwilling to invest in new technology, whilst there was at
the same time a pressure towards municipalisation of public utilities. How-
ever, until 1896 Parliament prohibited municipal operation--an exception had
been made for Huddersfield, where no company was prepared to lease the
lines--so the delay and uncertainty was bound to continue until this policy
was relaxed. When it was, the stage was set for the establishment of munic-
ipal tramways, which became the norm in the British industry; by 1911, for
example, they carried four times as many passengers as the private companies
which had been the erstwhile monopoly carriers.
2
Electric tramway companies did, however, exercise something of a pion-
eering role, being free of certain municipal hesitations. One of the great-
est tramway entrepreneurs was J. Clifton Robinson, who was instrumental in
electrifying the Bristol, Middlesbrough and London United Tramways (here-
after,LUT). 3
 An even more important influence on local transport was brought
to bear by the British Electric Traction Company (hereafter, BET), formed in
1895 by Emile Garcke to build up the capital to take over existing tramways
and to promote and develop new ones. 4
Certain of the tramways acquired were purchased by local authorities,
but even so the BET eventually controlled and electrified the lines of
some thirty-seven tramway companies and had schemes, which were aborted for
1. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, 168.
2. Ibid., 168-9, 171, 173 and 184-5.
3. Blackwell, 'Electric Tramways in Great Britain', 285-6.
4. J. A. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction: early development (hereafter,
Yorkshire Traction) (Barnsley, 1982), 7; for a fuller treatment of the BET
see Roger Fulford, Five Decades of B. E. T. ( n.p., 1946).
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one reason or another, for many others. 1 In 1913 the BET was said to control
400 miles of tramways and light railways. 2
 It also owned some electric
supply companies, four overseas electric tramways and the Immisch Electric
Launch Company and had substantial interests in Raworth's Traction Patents
Limited and in the Brush Company. Many of the BET's subsidiaries were
wholly owned, but others only partially so. All shared the same registered
office in London, and the Company's executives were each directors of sev-
eral of the subsidiaries joined, in the case of partially owned concerns, by
local directors. One of the seven BET secretaries also served a number of
the subsidiaries. The British Electrical Federation Limited was formed in
1907 to enable member companies to purchase supplies in bulk, all the chair-
men and managing directors being on its council. 3
From the turn of the century there was a boom in electric tramways. In
1898 there were about 150 miles of electrified track and some 500 cars. 4
By 1903-4 the figures were respectively 1,462 and 7,132 and in the ten
years up to World War I they increased as indicated in Table 3.
The difference from the horse and steam era is even more remarkable, as
shown by Table 4 (also overleaf). One fact this shows and which supports
the American evidence is that far more people rode by tram in the electric
era. Whereas track mileage and fleet size increased more-or-less in step
(the number of cars per mile of track was 4.27 in 1878 and 4.94 in 1908-9),
each multiplying roughly tenfold, the number of passengers shot up by about
eighteen times. Looked at another way, the number of passengers per mile of
track nearly doubled, from 578,575 in 1878 to 1,081,600 in 1908-9, and the
number per car rose from 135,496 to 218,802.
1. Wingate H. Bett and John C. Gilham, Great British Tramway Networks 
(hereafter, Networks) (3rd ed., 1957), 192.
2. South Yorkshire Record Office (hereafter, SYRO), 8/UD28/3, Minutes
of Proceedings of the Light Railway Commissioners' Inquiry (into the Dearne
District application) 26 Feb--10 Mar 1914 (hereafter, Proceedings 1914), 628.
3. Bett and Gilham, Networks, 192-3.
4. Buckley, History of Tramways, 61.
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TABLE 3
GROWTH OF ELECTRIC TRAMWAYS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
(INCLUDING IRELAND) 1903-4--1913-14
Year Track Miles Cars
1903-4 1,462 7,132
1904-5 1,780 8,292
1905-6 1,994 9,276
1906-7 2,195 10,369
1907-8 2,286 10,908
1908-9 2,360 11,361
1909-10 2,429 11,749
1910-11 2,467 12,120
1911-12 2,518 12,435
1912-13 2,546 12,773
1913-14 2,595 13,196
SOURCE: Tramway Returns
TABLE 4
GROWTH OF TRAMWAYS IN BRITAIN
ALL FORMS OF TRACTION
Year Track Miles Cs Passengers
1878 237 1,012 137,122,364
1888 815 3,207 404,255,947
1898 938 4,850 802,060,275
1908-9 2,362 11,676 2,554,740,243
SOURCE: Tramway Returns
The increase in passengers carried was partly due to the factors noted
by W. J. Clark--the wider area served and the greater attractiveness of tram
travel--but also to two other changes to which he gave little or no att-
ention. First of all, the supply of transport was much increased by electr-
ification. This was due to obvious things like higher speeds and the larger
capacity of electric trams and to less obvious improvements, such as the
ability of electric trams to surmount hills too steep for horses. 1Second,
fares fell substantially, 2 for example in Sheffield, where the standard
1. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, 52-5.	 2. Ibid., 58.
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company horse fare was 2d. or 3d., but the Corporation electric fare was id.
until after World War I (2d. on some longer routes). '
 This meant that
less affluent groups of people were attracted to ride. In Great Britain
'schoolchildren who formerly walked now ride. The same is true of millions
of workingmen, as well as thousands of men and women whose only outing
is taken on the top of a car'. 2
 The electric tram had, in short, found
a new market.
The general picture of expansion is supported by the particular.
In January 1899 Liverpool had 45 electric trams, 15 of which were trailers;
only three years later the fleet was nearer 450. 3
 Earlier,in the horse era,
the annual ridership per capita was only 51; in 1913 it was 187, though this
was still a long way short of the 271 achieved in Glasgow. 4
 Sheffield's
first electric car ran in 1899 and its last horse car in 1902. Two years
later the fleet numbered 237, by 1910 it was 264 and by 1920 totalled 373• 5
Meanwhile, the ridership per capita in 1913 was 207. 6
Perhaps less significant in the long run than the expansion of the
big systems, but nontheless important, was the spread of tramways to smaller
and more scattered communities which had never had them. Appendix G5 lists
all British electric tramways, a total of 202. Of these, at least a third
had no horse- or steam-powered predecessors, so places such as Ayr, Bourne-
mouth or Norwich acquired the benefit of tramway services for the first
time. This was usually a matter for civic junkettings and some popular
enthusiasm. The small Kilmarnock system, for example, was inaugurated on
1. Kenneth Gandy, Sheffield Corporation Tramways: an illustrated 
history (hereafter, Sheffield Tramways) (Sheffield, 1985), 178.
2. F. C. Howe, 'Municipal Ownership in Great Britain', Bulletin of 
the Bureau of Labour, No.62 (Jan 1906), 52; quoted in McKay, Tramways and 
Trolleys, 202.
3. Horne and Maund, Liverpool Transport 1900--1930 2 (hereafter, Liv-
erpool Transport 2) (1982), 113.
4. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, 193.
5. Buckley, History of Tramways, 68.
6. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, 193.
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10 Dec 1904 with a luncheon, speeches and a procession of six cars which
later went into public service and took £53 for the day. 1
Some of the increase in tramway traffic was therefore due not to im-
proved or cheaper services on existing lines, but to their extension to ent-
irely new areas. This happened not only by the building of new tramway
systems, of course, but by the expansion of older-established ones as well.
When Glasgow Corporation took over the operation of the city's horse tram-
ways, there were but thirty-one miles of double track.
	 By 1909 this had
risen to ninety-five miles, no less than thirty-eight being outside the
city. A further ten miles had been added by 1922.2
The picture in the period up to World War I was thus one of steady--
even dramatic--expansion of tramway mileage, of the number of tramway sys-
tems, of tram fleets and of passengers. It was also, generally speaking,
one of prosperity, with the dominant municipal sector of the industry able
to pay large amounts out of profit towards the relief of rates. In this
period Glasgow Tramways Department was passing £30,000 or more annually to
the city's Common Good Fund. 3
 Nor was Glasgow alone, as Table 5 (overleaf)
shows.
The return on gross capital expended had improved--for all lines,
both company and municipal--from 3.97 per cent in 1879 to 6.38 per cent in
1898, reaching a pre-war peak of 7.50 per cent in 1911-12 as compared to an
average of 6.78 per cent between 1903-4 and 1913-14.4
Electric trams were clearly a success. They had spread widely, out
from the city centres into growing suburbs 5
 and into smaller towns and
districts where public road transport had been minimal or non-existent
1. Arlan) W. Brotchie and R. L. Grieves, Kilmarnock's Trams and Buses 
(hereafter, Kilmarnock's Trams) (Dundee, 1984), 11.
2. Charles A. Oakley, The Last Tram (Glasgow, 1962), 30, 56, and 71.
3. Ibid., 55.
4. Tramway Returns (UK, including Ireland).
5. For further discussion of the relationship between tramways and
urban growth see McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, 205-25.
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TABLE 5
ANNUAL PAYMENTS TOWARDS RATE RELIEF OR COMMON GOOD FUNDS
BY BRITISH MUNICIPAL .TRAMWAYS 1903-4--1913-14
Year Amount
(E)
1903-4 207,807
1904-5 209,881
1905-6 205,981
1906-7 297,456
1907-8 319,676
1908-9 217,263
1909-10 317,206
1910-11 361,018
1911-12 455,676
1912-13 519,715
1913-14 578,019
SOURCE: Tramway Returns.
NOTE: No amounts were applied to rate relief in Ireland
until 1909-10, so the earlier figures are for the UK as
a whole; thereafter Irish figures are subtracted.
beforehand; they were carrying vastly more passengers than any mode of urban
transport had done previously; and they were doing so at a profit and at a
reasonable rate of return on capital. Perhaps the archetypal picture ill-
ustrating the triumph of the tram is just that--the Edwardian picture post-
card. Every town which had a tramway was proud to see it portrayed on
local views; and those scenes frequently reveal a street devoid of all
except pedestrians and tramcars. If the latter had the road to themselves,
they obviously had the passengers to themselves too, a state of affairs
which seemed likely to continue, for there appeared to be no serious
competitor.
Competition and Financial Problems in the Golden Age 
This last, of course, is not entirely true. Tramways had already met
and largely matched at least two competitors, but both were capable of
a resurgence--the railway and the omnibus.
It is generally agreed that railways played little part in intra-urban
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transport in the Victorian period, except in London. Their managements were
not usually interested in the market for cheap suburban fares, and so their
lines did not greatly influence suburban growth. Granted, clerks and
tradesmen moved out from the cities and commuted by rail, but workmen's
travel remained small, with most working class people travelling only for
holidays and excursions. Tramways--even before electrification--provided
the most substantial of all contributions to the internal transport of Vict-
orian cities.
1
Where new electric tramways competed with suburban railways, the former
usually won. According to one authority, trams took millions of railway
passengers, who preferred the fast, cheap and convenient cars to walking to
inconvenient and drab stations and waiting for an infrequent and dirty
train.
2
 There are numerous examples of the effect tramways had on local
rail services. For example, the Nottingham Suburban Railway was opened in
1889 to Daybrook and Arnold Station with three intermediate stops. Even
then, housing development tended to follow the horse car tracks, and when
electric trams were extended to the outer terminus, the 'train service grew
smaller and beautifully less and ceased altogether in 1916'.
	 Even in
larger cities, railway traffic declined. In Birmingham, for instance,
suburban stations lost up to half their traffic in the period 1903 to 1914.4
In Manchester the railway to Altrincham lost £11,000 revenue in the first
year the tramways opened, £15,000 in the following year and £16,000 the
next. In 1913 takings were still £14,500 less than in 1909, when the tram-
ways opened. The Great Central Railway's Superintendant believed railways
were vulnerable over distances of up to five miles;
5
 the facts bear him out,
1. John R. Kellett, The Impact of Railways on Victorian Cities (here-
after, Impact on Cities) (1969), 365, 376, 94, 358 and 288.
2. J. Joyce, Tramway Heyday (2nd Impression, 1974), 78.
3. Klapper, Tramways, 159.
4. Kellett, Impact on Cities, 364.
5. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 653.
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for over longer distances, such as Birmingham to Wolverhampton, railways
kept their traffic.'
The railway companies attempted to fight back in two ways, one success-
ful, the other less so. On lightly-trafficked branches steam rail motors
-
-combined engines and carriages--were sometimes used, often in conjunction
with additional rail-level halts. 2 One such service, between Ossett and
Chickenley Heath on the Great Northern Railway, was itself withdrawn by 1909
because of tramcar competition. 3 Rail motors did not work because they were
-
-naturally--used on branches with scarcely sufficient traffic anyway.
Where the traffic was worth fighting for, railway companies adopted a bolder
and more successful strategy--electrification. Even in the capital the
London and South Western Railway had lost much of its traffic to the ener-
getic LUT. Partly to win this back, the railway inaugurated a new electric
service in 1916 covering LUT territory and by 1917 was carrying ten million
more suburban passengers than it had in 1915.4
This was a medium distance operation, but where inner suburban services
were concerned 'a mortal blow [was dealt] by electric trams during the
Edwardian era'. 5 But it clearly was possible for the railways to recapture
some, even a great deal of their traffic on certain lines; trams were not
likely to have it their own way for ever.
The victory of trams over horse buses was even more crushing. Horse
trams had usually driven horse buses off their routes. Electric trams, when
introduced in hithero tramless towns, naturally had an even more decisive
impact. Many horse bus operators probably imitated the example of the
1. Kellett, Impact on Cities, 364.
2. For a relatively long-lived example, see David Joy, The West Rid-
ing., Railways in Yorkshire No.1 (Clapham, Yorks., 1976), 57.
3. Ibid., 33.
4. J. Joyce, Town Transport in Camera (hereafter, Town Transport)
(1980), 37.
5. D. Fereday Glenn, Roads, Rails and Ferries of the Solent Area 
(1980), 34.
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Wakefield and District Omnibus Company, which withdrew its services prior to
the opening of the town's tramways)
There was one place, however, where horse buses continued unchall-
enged and which became a natural forcing ground for the development of the
motor bus--the West End of London, which was never served by trams at all. 2
An experimental motor bus service from Kennington to Oxford Circus was
introduced from 9 Oct 1899, but it lasted barely a year. 3
 In 1902 an outer
suburban service was started between Lewisham and Eltham and there were also
further experiments in the central area. The established firm of Thomas
Tilling started operations in 1904 and the LGOC followed suit in 1905,
as did the rest of their competitors. Development thereafter was rapid. At
the beginning of 1905 there were only 20 motor buses in London; by July 1908
there were 1,066, in which month the LGOC absorbed its two main rivals,
giving it a fleet of 885 petrol buses.4
In the provinces motor bus services were pioneered by the railways. The
very first of all was a service between Ilfracombe and Blackmoor station on
the narrow gauge Lynton and Barnstaple Railway; this began in June 1903. 5
It was not successful however, and the vehicles were sold to the Great West-
ern, who used them in the classic manner to test the market between Helston
and the Lizard, hoping thereby to avoid the expense of building a branch
line. The buses began on 17 Aug 1903, just three weeks before the North
Eastern's service from Beverley to Beeford. Obviously, given the fact
that they were testing marginal propositions, the success of railway bus
1. W. Pickles, The Tramways of Dewsbury and Wakefield (hereafter,
Dewsbury and Wakefield) (Broxbourne, Herts., 1980), 118.
2. Dunbar, Buses,Trolleys and Trams, 64.
3. Klapper, Tramways, 283.
4. Dunbar, Buses, Trolleys and Trams, 64-5.
5. Strictly speaking, the buses were not railway owned, being a per-
sonal venture of the railway's Chairman, Sir George Newnes; see John
Cummings, Railway Motor Buses and Bus Services in the British Isles, 1902-- 
1933 2 (hereafter, Railway Buses 2) (Oxford, 1980), 10.
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services was variable and some routes closed down fairly quickly. But
by 1911 the Great Western alone was operating some thirty-one services, '
including some long runs, like Oxford to Cheltenham. 2
Municipalities were generally slower off the mark than either the priv-
ate bus companies or the railways. This was true of the larger provincial
cities anyway. 3
 Smaller places which had not got round to installing an
electric tramway displayed more interest. In 1903 Eastbourne became the
first British municipal motor bus operator. 4
 Another place which introduced
buses in preference to a proposed tramway was Todmorden, starting in 1907. 5
However, motor buses were seen by established tramway operators either
as feeders to the tramways or as a means of testing a new service prior to
the building of a tram route. For example, Wolverhampton introduced buses
in the period 1903-5 to open up new routes; as early as 1909 they were re-
placed by trams. In Birmingham the first municipal buses connected the
Selly Oak trams to Rednal and Rubery. 6
 The Bristol Tramways Company started
bus services in 1906 to villages outside the city, but in each case running
from a tram terminal. 7
Although the LGOC standardised on petrol buses, their dominance was by
no means assured in the first two decades of the century. Steam buses were
used quite extensively in London; the National Steam Car Company operated up
to 1919 with a maximum fleet of 184. 8
A more serious contender was the petrol-electric bus, which had a
1. Geoffrey Freeman Allen, The Illustrated History of Railways in 
Britain (1979), 169-70.
2. R. T. Coxon, Roads and Rails of Birmingham 1900--1939 (hereafter,
Rails of Birmingham) (1979), 92.
3. Ibid., 94.
	 4. Bett and Gilham, Networks, 127.
5. Klapper, Tramways, 285.	 6. Coxon, Rails of Birmingham, 94.
7. A. W. Hallpike, 'The Development of Transport and Commercial
Vehicles in Bristol', paper presented at a meeting of the Institution of
Mechanical Engineers, 18 Jun 1952, 4.
8. Dunbar, Buses, Trolleys and Trams, 65.
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petrol engine driving a generator and thence an electric motor;
1
 most of
these were built by a firm called Tilling-Stevens.	 They were quite widely
used, had good acceleration and were reasonably fast on the level, but were
slow uphill because the combined weight of the engine, generator and motor
was more than that of the conventional clutch and gearbox transmission. The
great disadvantage was that the engine could not be used to retard the bus
downhill and reliance had to be put on the rear-wheel brakes which, when
2
used with narrow solid tyres, had a minimum braking area with the road.
Not that petrol buses were trouble-free either. The transmission was
particularly prone to failure because of the effect of dust and dirt from
the roads, brakes were inadequate and the solid tyres showed a distressing
tendency to part company with the wheels, a problem peculiar to driven wood-
en wheels.	 Keighley's experience of motor buses, which it introduced in
4
1909, is probably not untypical. After a year or so breakdowns became
frequent, the buses found hill-climbing almost beyond their powers, they
were noisy--especially because of the petrol engine's propensity to back-
5
fire--and they threw up dust in summer and mud in winter.
A considerable fillip to bus design was, curiously, given by the Metro-
politan Police, who in 1909 exercised their powers to issue regulations for
motor buses in the capital, including stringent weight limits. It was
feared that there could be no more double-deck buses, but instead the
designers produced new and effective lightweight versions including, in
1910, the famous LGOC B-type, which was light, silent, long-lived and cheap.
'Scotland Yard had put the bus business on its feet'.
6
 Most of these early
buses had open tops, as the trams had done before them; the first with fully
enclosed top decks were introduced by Wigan Corporation in 1909, this being
1. Like a modern diesel-electric locomotive.
2. Coxon, Rails of Birmingham, 96.
	 3. Ibid., 94-5.
4. King, Keighley Transport, 29.
	 5. Ibid., 35.
6. Klapper, Tramways, 284.
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another pioneer undertaking which never operated trams.'
The great advantages possessed by motor buses were their low capital
costs and high mobility, 2 which meant, of course, that they were ideal for
their chosen purposes of proving new routes, acting as tramway feeders or
operating services in small towns or in country areas where there was in-
sufficient traffic to support a tramway.
There was before World War I no idea of using motor buses to replace
tramways. 3
 Some of the reasons for this will be obvious, notably the un-
reliability of the early buses and the lack of passenger comfort. Another
problem was lack of capacity. Four—wheel single—deck trams built for the
Yorkshire Woollen District tramways in 1902 seated 30; 4 similar buses oper-
ated by Bristol tramways in 1906 seated 18. 5 Double—deck Woollen District
cars--typical small trams of the period--seated 48 originally, later 56; 6
London buses seated only 34.7
Another reason why motor buses appeared unattractive to municipal
authorities was the economics of their operation. For instance, between
1909 and 1912 Hull Corporation ran a bus service through Stoneferry, but a
major loss was made. 8 Bus operating costs were high and despite the low
capital cost overall, the vehicles themselvescostecimore than trams; double—
deckers costed respectively £850 and £650, 9 with the difference being even
1. 'Bus Services in Widnes', Modern Transport, 16 Apr 1949 (n.p.,taken
from a cutting in the files of C. T. Humpidge, for whom see below).
2. Klapper, Tramways, 287.
3. Ibid. This is not quite so; see the discussion following.
4. Pickles, Dewsbury and Wakefield, 73.
5. Hallpike, 'The Development of Transport and Commercial Vehicles in
Bristol', 4.
6. Pickles, Dewsbury and Wakefield, 75.
7. Dunbar, Buses, Trolleys and Trams, 72.
8. G. A. Lee, 'The Tramways of Kingston—upon—Hull: a study in munic-
ipal enterprise' (hereafter, 'Tramways of Hull') (Sheffield Ph.D., 1968),
105-6.
9. Joyce, Tramway. Heyday, 95.
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greater on a per seat basis. The unfortunate financial results of some
early undertakings may, however, have been due to the fact that they were
operating on too small a scale. Where a couple of buses on a tramway feeder
might not show a profit, a larger concern could. This was clearly so in
London, where the LGOC had a return of 18 per cent on capital. 1
The claim that bus operating costs in 1913 were as low as 10d. per
vehicle mile was ridiculed by Harry England, Manager of the West Riding
tramways. Undertakings like Widnes, Halifax and Keighley had costs from
is. 2d. to is. 4d., he said, 'so that from the point of view of regular
scheduled services I should never entertain buses under any consideration , . 2
This was not entirely true, for his Company had decided in 1913 that their
proposed tram routes to Alverthorpe and Ardsley could not pay and that, if
powers to abandon construction were obtained, they would run buses instead.
In 1914 they prepared even more extensive schemes for bus services and
ordered some buses, though these were not delivered due to the outbreak of
3
war. England said he was 'only sorry that I have got four on order that
will be delivered at the beginning of the month. I am not looking forward
to it . . . I do not like being called up at 2 o'clock in the morning to
4
fetch an old omnibus about two miles'.
Far from buses replacing trams, the 'received wisdom' of the day was
that, where trams were introduced on a bus route, the buses would be run
off the road. This was, of course, Harry England's opinion, 5 but it was not
his alone. A. L. C. Fell, the Chief Officer of the LCC Tramways, said in
1909 that in twenty years motor buses would be 'curios in museums'. But the
thought was already abroad that buses might achieve more. As early as 1905
Sir George Bartley, a member of the Royal Commission on London Traffic, said
it was 'at least an open question' whether buses would ultimately compete
1. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 514; exactly what is meant by 'return' is
not specified here.
2. Ibid., 386.	 3. Pickles, Dewsbury and Wakefield, 150.
4. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 418.
	 5. Ibid., 390.
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successfully with trams, but in any case trams should not be further ex-
tended in narrow streets 'until more experience has been gained as to the
future of motor omnibuses'. And in 1912 E. A. Pratt, a transport historian,
wrote that 'we have the question whether electric tramways have not attained
the height of their possible development, and whether they are not already
on their decline . . . local authorities who built them as though for etern-
ity are now faced by the rivalry of the motor omnibus ' . '
Such thoughts were beginning to be backed up by evidence. The Kidder-
minster and Stourport tramway in the West Midlands was facing severe motor
bus competition in 1913. To compete, more trams were run--mileage rose 20
per cent--and the ordinary 3d. fare reduced to id.
	
Partly as a result,
revenue plummeted by as much as 49 per cent, from 7.29d. per car mile to
only 3.13d. Mr.Chivers, the BET's Inspecting Officer, said that 'if these
motor buses continued to be run, the tramway could not live'. Fortunately,
by a combination of financial muscle and by putting on its own buses, the
Kidderminster Company's parent, the BET, was able to suppress the compet-
ition before it did any permanent damage, but the message was clear--even
where tram traffic was good, parallel motor bus services could do a lot of
damage. 2
That was a small tramway in a fairly rural area, however, not to be
compared with those running in large towns and cities. Here, the opinion
expressed in 1907 by Lewis Slattery, Manager of the Oldham tramways, prob-
ably still remained typical. While motor buses have come to stay, he said,
'and may be found useful as a feeder to existing tramway lines, their
unreliability, offensive smell, vibration and high operating costs prevent
them from being a serious competitor to a well-equipped tramway , .3 Even so,
the success of motor buses in central London proved that they could cope
1. The preceding three opinions quoted in Joyce, Tramway Heyday, 95.
2. This paragraph from J. S. Webb, Black Country Tramways, including 
Kidderminster and Stourport Tramways 2 (hereafter, Black Country 2)
(Walsall, 1976), 192 and SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 634.
3. Quoted in Joyce, Tramway Heyday, 95.
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with city traffic. Like railway electrification, here was more evidence
that trams would not remain 'king of the road' for ever.
There was one further contender for the tramcar's crown. This was the
trolleybus, which had been invented in 1881 by Siemens. Little more was
done to develop the trackless tram, as it was first called, until the turn
of the century, but in 1901 a public installation started work in Bielthal
near Onigstein in Germany. All early developments in Britain relied upon
continental technology. The main difference between the various designs lay
in the method used to collect current from the twin wires needed for trolley
vehicles, there being no return circuit through the rails as with trams.
The most widespread and successful system was the Schiemann, which used
under-running trolley poles of the same type as used on most trams. In 1908
the Railless Electric Traction Company (hereafter, RET) was set up to market
the design in Britain. A certain popularity was also enjoyed by the
Cedes-Stoll system, which used a four-wheel carriage running on top of
the wires.
On 20 Jun 1911 both Leeds and Bradford opened trolleybus routes, the
first in Britain and both of the RET type. The Bradford route was very
short and operated purely as a tramway feeder, the Leeds route somewhat
longer. The attraction was the reduced capital cost as compared to a tram-
way. The overhead at Bradford cost £1,734 per mile, at Leeds only £1,240
because single poles were used. The twin wires cost more to erect than
tramway overhead, but there was no track to lay. In Leeds the cost of
construction of the trackless was 20 per cent that of a tramway; the
vehicles cost the same.
The initial operating results in Leeds were quite promising too.
1. Owen, History of the British Trolleybus (hereafter, British 
Trolleybus) (1974), 18-19.
2. King, Keighley Transport, 40.
3. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 365.
4. Owen, British Trolleybus, 29.
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Receipts were 10.75d. per vehicle mile and costs, including interest and
depreciation, only 6.30d. Bradford, however, ran a small deficit, amount-
ing to £380 in 1912-13. 1
 Possibly the initial success at Leeds had been
due to the novelty value as by 1912 the receipts were less than Bradford's
at 6.75d. and, inevitably, there was a deficit; however the General Manager
was still speaking of it as a successful experiment and saying that powers
would be sought for new extensions. 2
Cedes-Stoll buses were introduced at Keighley in 1913, but were mark-
edly unsuccessful and subject to frequent breakdowns; to jump ahead a
little, in 1917 and 1918 there were times when only one out of the ten
buses was fit for service. 3
By 1914 there were only eight British undertakings using as few as
twenty-five trolleybuses. 4 All were municipally owned and operated 40,000
miles per annum carrying 153 million passengers. This compared with
255,810,000 miles run and 2,634 million passengers carried on municipal
tramways in 1913. 5 Clearly, trolleybuses were still in an experimental
phase and, so far as being a threat to established tramways, a cloud no
bigger than a man's hand.
Trolleybuses were believed to have similar functions to motor buses in
relation to tramways. First, they were visualised as feeders to tramways.
Rotherham's route, for instance, ran from Broom Road tram terminus for
a considerable distance out into the country to a mining village at Maltby. 6
In Keighley, one route penetrated the town centre, but the other two were
wholly rural and began at either end of the main cross-town tram route. 7
The early use of trolleybuses in rural areas was in complete contrast to
1. Owen, British Trolleybus, 29.
	
2. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 360.
3. King, Keighley Transport, 40 and 53.
4. Owen, British Trolleybus, 34.
5. Herman Finer, Municipal Trading: a study in public administration 
(hereafter, Municipal Trading) (1941), 54-5.
6. Bett and Gilham, Networks, 60. 	 7. King, Keighley Transport, map.
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their later role, when they were almost exclusively an urban transport mode.
It was often thought that such a tramway feeder route would be only
temporary and that once traffic built up it would be replaced by a tramway.
So the second use of trolleybuses was as a means of testing traffic on new
routes. As Sir Charles Nicholson M.P. said, 'If you are in any doubt as to
the amount of your custom it is rather a good thing to try it by a trackless
trolley because it saves part of the expense and it is useful for putting up
a tramway in the future ' . ' The process might, it seemed, be repeated end-
lessly, or so a report in Tramway and Railway World for 15 Jan 1914 implied.
Referring to Aberdare the article said that 'there is no doubt that in
the course of a comparatively short time the trackless trolley lines will
have been converted into tramways, and that the former will be re-erected
further afield, thus forming one of those systems of light lines of which
our continental neighbours have reaped the benefit for so many years past
,
.
2
These ideas rather begged the question as to what might happen if
the trackless route did not generate enough traffic to justify a tramway.
Was it then to remain permanently? In the case of the Mexborough and Swin-
ton Tramways Company (hereafter, M&ST), the experts advising on proposed
extensions agreed that tramways 'were absolutely out of the question' bec-
ause links between one or two small towns only were involved; they therefore
recommended a railless system. 3 The extensions would not pay as a tramway,
but they would as railless routes because of the latter's lower capital
cost. 4 The routes were planned to link with an existing tramway, and as
such they come into the category of feeders; but there seems to have been no
intention of ever replacing them with a so-called permanent rail system.
Generally tramways remained successful and profitable in the years
prior to 1914. There were, of course, one or two failures. Taking the
worst recorded year before World War I, 1909-10, there were then four
1. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 158.
2. Quoted in Owen, British Trolleybus, 32.
3. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 574.
	 4. Ibid., 52.
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local authority and eight company loss-making' tramways, whilst twenty-nine
municipal tramways needed aid from the rates--amounting to £64,215--to
pay their capital charges etc.2
Company tramways tended to be the obvious casulties, partly because
they did not have the resources of the rates to tide them over rough patches,
and partly because the structure of the industry was such that private
enterprise was left only the lean pickings. In 1911 for example the Scar-
borough Tramways Company revealed that it had lost money for the seven years
since service began and that the previous year's loss was £2,000; they had
suspended operations that winter because of the mounting losses.
3
 The
previous year the Carlisle Company had sold out, for though not making a
working loss, its profits were insufficient even to meet debenture inter-
4
est.
Quite a large number of local authority tramways had to go 'on the
rates' however, an example being Gloucester, whose £4,714 working profit in
1911-12 was converted into a loss of £2,317 after meeting all capital
charges. 5 The thing which linked all those tramways mentioned was their
small size or, in other words, that they were on the margin; any industry,
whether or not basically sound, must have such enterprises. The troubles of
small-town tramways did not necessarily sound the knell for Glasgow, Liver-
pool or Manchester.
There was one special case, however, where larger systems were in
trouble. This was in the London area, where motorbuses had developed early
and, by 1910, were estimated to have running costs and revenue comparable to
1. Defined as unable to meet working costs.
2. Tramway Returns, UK including Ireland; it does not follow that all
these were electric systems, of course, as a few non-electric lines still
hung on.
3. H. V. Jinks, 'The Scarborough Tramways', TR 11 (Autumn 1975), 87.
4. George S. Hearse, Tramways of the City of Carlisle (Corbridge,
Northumberland, 1962), 26.
5. Stanley E. Webb, 'Gloucester Corporation Light Railways-2', TR 15
(Spring 1983), 14.
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the LCC's tramways. Thus by 1914 the latter and most other London municipal
tramways were drawing on either reserves or the rates to meet charges. 1
One financial problem was of even wider concern--the fear that tramway
committees were not using the undoubted profits of their undertakings
wisely. The worry was that an insufficient proportion of profits was being
set aside as depreciation to cover the future necessary reconstruction of
the tramways. A survey carried out in 1910 concluded that only about thirty
cities were paying enough for depreciation. Other profitable undertakings
were paying too much out either as rate relief or to provide cheaper trans-
port, so not leaving enough for the future. Those earning small surpluses
or declaring a loss could not set money aside anyway. The future was being
mortgaged to the present, so giving a false impression of the municipal
tramway industry's true state.
2
The Eye of the Storm: World War I and its Aftermath 1914--1919 
World War I was the tram's time of glory and also the beginning of its
decline. The war meant that trams were called upon to carry unprecedented
levels of traffic. To give some examples, Glasgow's trams carried about
225 million passengers a year pre-war, 3 or 4.25 million a week. In 1917 the
weekly total had risen to over 8 million. 4 In Liverpool passenger journeys
increased by 26 per cent between 1913 and 1918, rising from 144.1 to 195.1
million per annum. 5 Such a contribution to the war effort was extremely
creditable and was profitable too, at least on paper. Glasgow--a partic-
ularly well-run tramway it is true--actually succeeded in extinguishing its
tramway debt during the war,
6
 whilst many smaller undertakings were able to
1. J. Sleeman, 'The Rise and Decline of Municipal Transport' (here-
after, 'Municipal Transport'), The Scottish Journal of Political Economy 9
(Feb 1962), 50.
2. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, 187-90.
3. Oakley, The Last Tram, 56.	 4. Ibid., 66.
5. Horne and Maund, Liverpool Transport 2, 32.
6. Oakley, The Last Tram, 56.
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make a profit for the first and sometimes also for the last time. Erith, a
struggling system on the edge of London, was one of these latter.' Profit-
ability was increased partly because the larger number of passengers was
usually carried on a reduced number of cars, so that each car was running at
nearer full capacity. In Liverpool, for instance, car miles fell 8 per cent
during the war.
2
 Further assistance was afforded by the fact that motor bus
services were generally reduced or eliminated. The Omnibus Act 1916 made
the opening of new routes or the provision of purely pleasure trips virt-
ually impossible, and petrol restrictions thinned other routes out. 3
Increased revenue was one thing, but problems were being piled up in
other directions. Military recruitment—often encouraged by tramway manage-
4
ments --left undertakings short of staff. Conductors and later drivers
could be replaced by women--as they were in Glasgow
5
--but maintenance and
engineering staff were more difficult to find. Together with restrictions
on certain materials--rails, for instance, could only be obtained on licence
from the Ministry of Munitions
6
 --this meant that only the most urgent rep-
airs could be carried out. Track and cars deteriorated; on the Liverpool
system the track and overhead in the neighbouring Borough of Bootle was in
particularly poor shape by 1917,
7
 and when the war ended 148 of the 598 cars
were stored as unserviceable.
8
When it became possible to undertake repairs and renewals again,
1. Alan A. Jackson, 'The Erith Urban District Council Tramways' (here-
after, 'Erith Tramways'), TR 3 (Nos. 22 & 23, 1957), 135.
2. Horne and Maund, Liverpool Transport 2, 32.
3. D. N. Chester, Public Control of Road Passenger Transport: a study 
in administration and economics (hereafter, Public Control) (Manchester,
1936), 3.
4. Glasgow's Manager raised a thousand-strong Tramways' Battalion in a
day, probably a record; Oakley, The Last Tram, 63.
5. Ibid., 65.
6. For example, see Borough of Doncaster, Minutes of the Electricity
and Tramways Committee (hereafter, E&TC), 21 Jul 1916, 530.
7. Horne and Maund, Liverpool Transport 2, 32.	 8. Ibid., 191.
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inflation had reached alarming proportions. Revenue had increased--on the
West Riding Tramways by over 100 per cent between 1913 and 1918--partly
because there were more travellers and partly because fares were raised (by
50 per cent on this tramway
1 ). But costs were also up by at least 100 per
cent at the end of 1919 2
 and maybe by as much as 150 per cent.
3
To meet the crisis special powers had to be given to raise fares above
the statutory maximum--generally id. a mile 4--through the Statutory Under-
takings (Temporary Increase of Charges) Act 1918 and the Tramways (Temporary
. . . ) Act 1920.5
Despite all the problems, most systems managed to effect repairs event-
ually. These were often delayed longer than they should have been--Waltham-
stow was not able to reconstruct its system until 1924-7, for instance
6
 --and
in the case of smaller undertakings were often no more than make-do-and-mend;
in Keighley, for example, one set of new points and new springs on the
cars seem to have been the extent of immediate post-war work.
7
 One or
two systems could not cope at all, Leyton, in East London, being one. Nine-
teen cars were unserviceable as late as 1921 and an agreement was made
for the LCC to work the tramways. Leyton was supposed to reconstruct the
track, but it was so bad that the LCC did it themselves.
8
Even so, no tramway system actually closed specifically because of
these wartime and post-war conditions. According to Sleeman, most returned
1. SYRO, 8/UD28/465, Brief for Applicants at the Light Railway Comm-
issioners Inquiry at Barnsley Town Hall, 21 Jan 1920 (hereafter, Brief
1920), 4-5.
2. SYRO, 8/UD28/467, Minutes of Proceedings, Light Railway Commission-
ers, Dearne District Light Railways (Amendment) Order, 21-22 Jan 1920 (here-
after, Proceedings 1920), 28.
3. Ibid., 84.
	 4. SYRO, Brief 1920, 5.
5. See John R. Day, London's Trams and Trolleybuses (1977), 101.
6. Rodinglea, The Tramways of East London (hereafter, East London)
(1967), 124.
7. King, Keighley Transport, 61.
8. Rodinglea, East London, 108-10.
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to prosperity within a few years, ' though some only returned from a brief
wartime prosperity to their usual insolvency; Erith was a case in point. 2
In a sense, the whole upheaval left matters much as they were, with the
large profitable tramways on the one hand and the small struggling ones on
the other.
The Storm Breaks: Competition and Decline 1920--1939 
There was one change brought about by the war which could not be rev-
ersed, however. The conflict had demonstrated the value of motor transport
beyond doubt,
3
 and when the War Office released a large number of trained
drivers and thousands of proven heavy motor vehicle chassis onto the market,
road transport began to be a real threat to rail.
4
The initial fillip provided by the 'hot-house' development induced by
wartime needs was rapidly followed by other improvements to the motor bus.
Over the whole inter-war period the vehicle changed almost beyond recogn-
ition. Early motor buses were based on the same flat-topped chassis as
lorries--bodies were even interchangeable--but from the 1920s improved bus
chassis were developed to provide a lower loading vehicle. Saloon width--
and hence capacity--was improved by replacing curved side panels by straight
ones. Slow four cylinder engines were superseded by six cylinder ones with
improved transmission, and the overall weight of vehicles was greatly red-
uced. The lower chassis enabled top covers to be fitted to double-deckers;
the driver eventually got a windscreen too. In the 1920s Leyland Tiger and
Titan and AEC5 Regent chassis were exemplars of this modern generation and
caused 'a revolution in the P.S.V. world. We now had a vehicle light in
weight, easy to operate and manipulate, with plenty of smooth power avail-
able, and a comfortable ride on pneumatic tyres. From those days the P.S.V.
1. Sleeman, 'Municipal Transport', 52.
2. Jackson, 'Erith Tramways', 135.	 3. Chester, Public Control, 3.
4. Cummings, Railway Buses 1, 6.
5. Associated Equipment Company, at first an LGOC subsidiary.
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has never looked back'.
1
One of the most important improvements was the pneumatic tyre. At
first buses used solid rubber tyres, then cushion tyres, with a soft core
inside a solid exterior, and only adopted pneumatic tyres from the mid-1920s
onwards. This improved riding and very greatly reduced running costs.
2
A later, and equally important change was the development of the high-speed
compression ignition--or diesel--engine for bus use. This was dependent on
the invention of a new type of fuel pump, which appeared in the 1920s; in
1930 the first experimental diesel-engined buses were put into service. The
engine really became established in 1933, when Scottish Motor Traction took
delivery of 250 diesel buses. Fuel consumption was half that of petrol
engines, so reducing running costs considerably, whilst the engine was rel-
iable and had the advantage of using non-flammable fuel.
3
Another necessary improvement was in braking. Early motor buses some-
times had only an upgraded horse bus brake acting directly on the rubber
tyre.
4
 Mechanical brakes were fitted later, but still acting on only two
wheels. Increased weights and speeds made these inadequate, so four-wheel
braking with power assistance became essential.
5
The size and weight of motor buses has always been regulated, during
most of the period under review by the Ministry of Transport. Weights for
double-deckers were 9 tons in 1927, 9.5 tons for those with pneumatic tyres
in 1930, 10 tons in 1931 and 10.5 tons in 1935. At the latter date dimen-
sions were 26 feet by 7.5 feet, remaining the same until 1945. These prog-
ressive relaxations permitted improvements such as extending the top deck
over the driver's cab and enclosing the rear staircase and, most import-
antly, expanding the seating capacity to fifty-six. To get more than this
some undertakings went in for six-axle buses which could be longer whilst
1. C. T. Humpidge, 'Development of the Public Service Vehicle as the
Complete Vehicle Concept' (hereafter, 'Development of the P.S.V!), Crompton-
Lanchester Lecture, 21 Oct 1966, author's draft, 2-3.
2. Ibid., 5.	 3. Ibid., 4-5.
	
4. Coxon, Rails of Birmingham, 95.
5. Humpidge, 'Development of the P.S.V.', 4.
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still meeting axle-weight limitations; sixty-six seats were then possible,
but the design was not popular, except for trolleybuses
Motor bus services during the inter-war period developed under three
main groups of operators--large companies, municipalities and small indep-
endent proprietors. The first were nearly all grouped under holding compan-
ies and were thus known as Associated Companies; one of the largest groups
was controlled by the BET and another by Tillings. These were the major
sector of the industry, controlling about 40 per cent of the buses and
up to 60 per cent of passengers by 1933. After 1928 the railways tended to
give up their generally small scale bus operations and to take holdings in
these major companies instead. Municipal fleets were often large, but
as a whole councils owned only 12.8 per cent of buses and carried 23.4
per cent of passengers in 1933. The small independents accounted for a
staggering 90 per cent of operators and 40 per cent of buses, but only for
15 per cent of passengers.2
Unfortunately the statistics for motor buses before the 1930s are
sparse, largely because buses were not subject to the same strict parlia-
mentary controls as their route-bound competitors. There is only one cont-
inuous series, supplemented for a few years only by more detailed figures
included in the Tramway Returns. These are reproduced as Tables 6 and 7
overleaf.
When the first reliable statistic for buses and coaches appeared in
1926, the total was already far higher than that for trams--40,000 as
against 14,000. 3 Each bus evidently carried a good deal fewer passengers
than the equivalent tram, however, an average of 126,625 passengers per
annum in 1934-54 as against 332,637. The higher capacity trams continued to
1. Ibid., 3-4.
2. H. J. Dyos and D. H. Aldcroft, British Transport: an economic 
survey  from the seventeenth centur to the twentieth (hereafter, British 
Survey) (Leicester, 1969), 339-4-0.
3. For tram figures, see Table 10 below. 	 4. Calculated from Table 7.
Year	 Vehicles (thousands) Vehicles (thousands)
1904	 5	 1922	 78
1906	 10	 1924	 94
1908	 15	 1926	 40 (a)
1910	 24	 1928	 46
1912	 35	 1930	 53
1914	 51	 1932	 47 (b)
1916	 51	 1934	 46
1918	 42	 1936	 49
1920	 75	 1938	 53
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TABLE 6
NUMBER OF BUSES AND COACHES IN BRITAIN 1904--1938
SOURCE: Brian R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British Historical 
Statistics (Cambridge, 1962), 230; only alternate years reproduced here.
a. Up to 1925 taxis were included in the totals; in 1926 there were
41,000 taxis, meaning that the earlier figures may be distorted by as much
50 per cent.
b. The fall here was due to the effect of the 1930 Road Traffic Act
in weeding out unsatisfactory operators and concentrating the industry in
larger units.
TABLE 7
NUMBER OF PUBLIC SERVICE VEHICLES AND PASSENGERS 1934-5--1937-8
Year PSVs	 Passengers (millions)
1934-5	 45,536	 5,766
1935-6	 46,440	 6,045
1936-7	 47,890
	 6,287
1937-8	 49,655	 6,828
SOURCE: Tramway Returns
carry a large number of passengers well into the 1930s, especially as a
majority of the buses and coaches would be employed in areas where trams had
never run. A more significant comparison is thus between municipal buses
and trams, shown overleaf in Table 8. This shows how in the 1920s the
huge majority of passengers travelled by tram, but that by the mid-1930s the
motorbus was rapidly closing the gap. In fact, if one adds municipal
trolleybus traffic, the gap between buses and trams almost ceases to exist;
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TABLE 8
PASSENGERS CARRIED ON MUNICIPAL MOTOR BUSES AND TRAMS
FOR SELECTED YEARS 1923--1936
Motorbus
	 Tram
Passengers
	 Passengers
Year	 (Millions)	 (Millions)
1923-4 122 3,976
1925-6 220
-
1927-8 359
1931 1,101 3,660
1932 1,199 3,447
1933 1,266 2,578
1934 1,414 2,479
1935 1,604 2,378
1936 1,797 2,319
SOURCE: Herman Finer, Municipal Trading: a study in 
public administration (1941), 54-5.
the total for bus traffic rises to 2,165 million '
 as against 2,319 million
for the tiams.
Municipalities which had invested considerable capital in tramways were
naturally rather slow to initiate motor bus services. 2
 Another reason for
delay was that until 1930 local authorities had no general powers to operate
motor buses and had to obtain a special Act to do so, whereas companies did
not.
3
 Some municipalities favoured the trolleybus as a half-way house
between trams and motor buses, one of the great attractions being the abil-
ity to retain a major customer for municipal electric power. 4
Pre-World War I trolleybuses had really only reached a prototype stage
and could not under any circumstances have taken over the traffic of any
but the smallest tramway. The name given them--trackless trams--was almost
1. Trolleybus traffic from Herman Finer, Municipal Trading: a study 
in public administration (hereafter, Municipal Trading) (1941), 55.
2. D. H. Aldcroft, British Transport since 1914: an economic history 
(hereafter, Transport since 1914) (1975), 46.
3. Chester, Public Control, 18 (footnote),
4. Doncaster Corporation Transport: 50 Years Jubilee 1902--1952 
(hereafter, DCT Jubilee) (Doncaster, 1952), 40.
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literally true, and a lighter vehicle designed for road use was needed. The
pioneer in this respect was the Manager of the small Tees-side Trackless
concern, who in 1922 adapted a Tilling-Stevens petrol-electric bus to run
either as a motor or a trolleybus. 1
 Whether following this lead or acting
independently, C. Owen Silvers, the Manager of Wolverhampton Tramways,did
likewise a year or so later; thereafter the trolleybus developed into an
electric bus rather than a trackless, with foot controls, 2
 a lightweight
body, pneumatic tyres and, usually, a six-wheeled chassis. 3
Various significant developments in the 1920s persuaded tramway man-
agers to look at the new vehicle seriously. In 1922 Birmingham was faced
with the need to renew the awkward single and loop tramway to Nechells.
Instead of doing so, the Manager opted for trackless, and when this first
conversion from trams proved successful,4
 it naturally attracted attention.
In 1924 Keighley converted its complete tramway system to trolleys. 5
 But
the great trolleybus advocate remained Owen Silvers, 6who replaced Wolver-
hampton's trams completely between 1923 and 1928; 7
 as a rather larger
system, this was of more significance than earlier conversions. When in the
early 1930s, the newly-formed London Passenger Transport Board (hereafter,
LPTB) decided on a complete changeover from tram to trolleybus, a further
great boost was given to the latter.8
Tramways experienced competition from the newer road transport modes in
two ways. First, existing systems faced competition along all or part of
their routes from motor buses operated by either the major companies or by
independents (known at the time as 'pirates', because of what larger oper-
1. Dunbar, Buses, Trolleys and Trams, 82.
2. On Birmingham's new trackless route of 1922 drivers needed one hand
on the wheel and the other on a tramcar-type controller; see Coxon, Rails of 
Birmingham, 128.
3. Klapper, Tramways, 270.
	 4. Ibid., 269.
5. King, Keighley Transport, 85.
	 6. Owen,
	 British Trolleybus, 101.
7. Ibid., 100.	 8. flapper, Tramways, 273.
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TABLE 9
MILEAGE, PASSENGERS CARRIED AND NUMBER OF VEHICLES AND UNDERTAKINGS
FOR BRITISH TROLLEYBUSES 1913-14, 1921-2 AND 1926-7--1937-8
Year Route Mileage Passengers Carried Vehicles No.of Undertakings
1913-14 20.52 1,960,141 31 8
1921-2 47.9 9,879,730 80 -
1926-7 87.04 50,382,193 253 (b) -
1927-8 111.34 80,112,970 319 (b) 21
1928-9 132.63 99,065,544 389 (b) 23
1929-30 168.76 127,461,837 492 (b) 22
1930-1 193.70 153,004,554 - 24
1931-2 255.99 184,373,190 - 24
1932-3 279.74 221,070,215 - 28
1933-4 (a) 330.98 254.323,260 - 31
1934-5 367.72 337,751,365 1,095 32
1935-6 442 446,000,000 1,510 33
1936-7 538 632,000,000 1,950 30
1937-8 644 865,000,000 2,585 33
SOURCE: Tramway (and Trolley Vehicle) Returns.
a. From 1933-4 LPTB trolleybuses are not included in the main tables,
so figures thereafter are obtained by summing the provincial Returns with
summary details provided for London in a separate table.
b. These figures from Owen, British Trolleybus, 37; probably origin-
ally from the Returns.
ators of both buses and trams considered unfair competition'). An important
feature of the 1920s' transport scene was that such competition was very
difficult to prevent, since although both tramway and trolleybus routes and
operators were very strictly controlled by Parliament and the Ministry, 2
motor buses were subject to a few central regulations coupled with local
authority licensing. The latter's powers were based on the Town Police
Clauses Acts of 1847 and 1889 which naturally related only to horse-drawn
vehicles when passed and did not in any case usually apply in rural areas. 3
There were 1,300 or more licensing authorities and a bus operator needed a
1. Dyos and Aldcroft, British Survey, 341.
2. For instance, Bradford's first trolleybus route had to be author-
ised by a Bill in 1910, whilst later routes were subject to Board of Trade
inspection like tramways; see J. A. L. Stainforth and others, The Bradford 
Trolleybus System (Huddersfield, 1972? ), 3-4 and 8.
3. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 21.
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licence from each area through which he passed. The usual reading of the
Acts was that only vehicles and staff could be licensed, not services,
whilst infringements were difficult to prove and carried such light penalt-
ies that operators could afford to ignore convictions.' The force of the
Victorian legislation was in any case much weakened by the Roads Act 1920
which gave wide powers to the Ministry of Transport to overrule decisions of
local licensing authorities without right of appeal of their part. 2
Local authorities owning tramways were naturally anxious to protect
them, and many attempted to do so by attaching conditions to the issue of
bus licences. But there was no guarantee that these would be upheld if
challenged, and smaller authorities particularly found it difficult to stand
out against either the large and powerful bus companies or the cheeky indep-
endents. For instance, Kircaldy Burgh Council 3 prohibited buses from pick-
ing up in the town,4 but when in 1928 someone broke this condition the Town
Clerk had to admit that the Council had no powers to impose such a rule and
the floodgates of competition were opened.5 In other cases, Councils seem
to have been able to get away with quite rigid conditions, but in practice
found that these were ignored with impunity. In 1923, for example, Don-
caster attempted to protect its trams by making bus operators charge higher
fares than the trams and forbidding them to pick up or set down passengers
on common sections; 6 yet as late as 1930 over 40 per cent of buses running
into Doncaster were either unlicensed or evading the law in some way. 7 Some
tramway departments even found other council committees frustrated their
1. R. Stuart Pilcher, Road Passenger Transport (1937), 333-4.
2. DCT Jubilee, 25. 
3. The legislation in Scotland was not the same as in England, but the
point is the same.
4. Alan W. Brotchie, The Tramways of Kircaldy (Dundee, 1978), 40.
5. Ibid., 43.
6. Doncaster Borough Council, Watch Committee, 21 Feb 1923, 50F/237;
50F/237 refers to a specific minute/page in the printed record.
7. DCT Jubilee, 35.
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efforts. South Shields Watch Committee was told by the Tramways' Committee
Chairman, 'If you want us to be bankrupt, all you have to do is to go on
licensing buses'; by 1929, out of 147 buses licensed, only 11 belonged to
the Corporation. 1
 This was the regular experience of the few tramway comp-
anies, to whom the local authorities felt little loyalty. In the Black
Country many authorities licensed all—comers, so making it virtually imposs-
ible for the tram companies to pay the rents on the tracks leased from the
self—same authorities. 2
There were on the other hand some authorities which managed to keep
competition at bay. Wolverhampton admitted to a transport monopoly in the
mid-1920s; over a period of a few years only two licence applications had
been made, and both were refused. 3
 How this was achieved is not revealed
and, in this particular case, it did not benefit trams anyway. Generally it
was the major authorities with large tramways who had the power to impose
conditions on both large and small competitors. Glasgow Corporation, for
example, were concerned at the number of private buses within the city
--962 of them in 1929--and were able to obtain parliamentary legislation in
1930 giving them monopoly powers for the city area; thereafter private buses
could only pick up passengers at specified points and only if their destin-
ation was beyond the boundary. Once more, it was largely 'the Corporation
bus that enjoyed the triumph. The Corporation tramcar hardly came into the
issue at all'. 4
The chaotic licensing situation was cleared up by the Road Traffic Act
1930, which transferred licensing to bodies of Traffic Commissioners. They
were able to protect existing facilities, including tramways, railways and
buses, from fresh motor bus competition by their powers to (1) refuse new
service applications and (2) limit existing bus services by not allowing
1. David Holding, A History of British Bus Services: the North East 
(hereafter, Bus Services: North East) (Newton Abbot, 1979), 116.
2. Webb, Black Country 2, 64.
3. Chester, Public Control, 23 (footnote).
4. Oakley, The Last Tram, 84.
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long-distance operators to pick up or set down within a local area l or
by making them charge higher fares. 2
 These arrangements certainly bene-
fitted the larger bus operators against the 'pirates', but may have done
little to improve the fortunes of tramways,3
 particularly since for the
first time local authorities already operating any form of road transport
were given freedom to introduce their own bus services.4
This draws attention to the second way in which tramways experienced
competition, that is from bus services introduced by tramway operators them-
selves. Tramways, particularly in the exposed private sector, had sometimes
found it necessary when faced by motor bus competition to put their own
buses on in self-defence. By 1924 in the Black Country trams were losing
traffic to small buses timed to run just in front of them. Their sister
bus undertaking, the Birmingham and Midland (later, Midland Red) was called
in to run in front of the competitors.5
 Of course, once that was done the
buses had to stay and the only logical conclusion was the withdrawal of the
trams themselves.6
Local authorities were less likely to adopt such schemes, but were non-
theless under great pressure to introduce motor bus services, in particular
to new or outlying housing areas; motor buses were also perceived as more
comfortable and faster. One authority which did compete directly with its
own trams was Manchesteroorlackintroduced express buses over the Altrincham
route in May 1929; the tramway was abandon‹.. in 1931. 7 But of course the
whole question was commercial at bottom. Would motorbuses or trolleys cost
less to inaugurate or run than trams? and would they earn more? If they
did, then the eventual result would not be in doubt and eventually market
forces would compel all or most tramway operators to convert, whether or not
1. i.e. the Glasgow solution.
2. Dyos and Aldcroft, Transport Survey, 357-8.
	 3. Ibid., 361.
4. Chester, Public Control, 20.
	 5. Webb, Black Country 2, 64.
6. Ibid., 85.
	 7. Pilcher, Road Passenger Transport, 243-4.
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they faced direct competition on the road.
Generally speaking, the answer to all the above questions was 'yes'.
Some qualifications can be made, but at the time the commercial case against
the tram was fairly generally believed to be established.
The capital intensive nature of a tramway is obvious. To take just one
example, in 1932 Barrow—in—Furness Council were considering whether to
modernise its tramways or not. To rebuild completely the main route and
to buy twenty new trams would have cost £127,000, eighteen buses cost
£31,700; so the last tram ran in April that year. '
The question of running costs is more problematic. The usual measure
used to compare operating statistics was pence per vehicle mile. On this
basis, trams were considerably cheaper to run than motor buses before World
War I. In 1915 in Keighley, for instance, buses cost 15.74d. per vehicle
mile and trams only 6.53d. 2 A similar comparison for Wigan in 1929-30
showed the above relationship to be reversed. Tramway working expenses were
13.39d., for motor buses 10.54d. and for trolleybuses 10.37d.
3
 It was a
matter of argument amongst transport professionals as to whether trolley—
buses always had the edge over motor buses or not; Pilcher, who was not a
trolleybus fan,
4
 produced a table showing that in fourteen undertakings
operating both types of bus, the motorbus was cheaper to run in ten.
5
Where the tram was concerned, though, this was an academic argument, as for
1. Ian L. Cormack, Seventy—Five Years on Wheels: the history of 
public transport in Barrow—in—Furness 1885--1960 (Glasgow, 1960), 35.
2. Calculated from figures given by King, Keighley Transport, 145;
incidentally, trolleybuses showed up much better, with operating costs of
only 6.35d., but equally the experimental 'trackless' of the time could not
have carried the trams' traffic.
3. E. K. Stretch, The Tramways of Wigan (Rochdale, 1978), 194.
4. See for example the conclusion to his chapter on trolleybuses in
his 1937 book, where he says that even if costs do favour trolleys, the
advantages of flexibility are with the motor bus and that such a mobile form
of transport is essential; see Road Passenger Transport, 153.
5. R. Stuart Pilcher, Road Transport Operation — Passenger (hereafter,
Road Transport Operation) (1930), 52.
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every mile run, either kind of bus was much cheaper.
However a more sophisticated measure was the seat instead of the
vehicle mile. This was important because at least on the larger tramways,
trams usually had more seats than buses. Motor buses seated 56 by the
early 1930s, but the average Glasgow tram in 1933 seated around 60 and some
new ones up to 68. 1
 So costs per seat mile might be less favourable to the
tramcar's competitors. In Wolverhampton, for instance, trams cost 24.579d.
per 100 seat miles in 1928, trolleybuses 24.375d. and motor buses 33.280d.
But the gap was closing. There had been over 7d. between motor buses and
trams in 1925, but by 1929 there was just id. difference. 2 By the 1930s,
Sleeman says, 'carrying cost (sic) per passenger on buses were comparable
with those on trams, instead of more than twice as high, as they had often
been around 1920'. 3
The third part of the commercial calculation was revenue. Perhaps
slightly to the surprise of operators, they found takings rising substant-
ially when trams were replaced. The LUT found their new trolleybuses were
earning 26 per cent more than the trams had, though, as the Company's hist-
orian mentions, this must partly have been due to the novelty value of the
new vehicles and to their comparison with thirty year old trams. 4 Pilcher
found the same was true for motor buses in Manchester, which took over 15
per cent more on average than the trams had done over the same routes. 5
The whole effect of these various competitive and commercial pressures
on tramways was that, first a trickle and then a flood were abandon eat as
the inter-war years went on. The very first tram system to succumb to motor
bus competition was Sheerness in 1917, 6 though this was scarcely the begin-
1. Oakley, The Last Tram, 87.
2. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 50-1.
3. Sleeman, 'Municipal Transport', 52.
4. Geoffrey Wilson, London United Tramways: a history 1894--1933 
(hereafter, L. U. T.) (1971), 175.
5. Percentage calculated from figures in Road Passenger Transport, 117.
6. Klapper, Tramways, 286.
52
ning of the end for tramways. The next closure was at Taunton, in 1921,
because the Company was unable or unwilling to pay increased electricity
charges.
1
 Keighley followed in 1924, but the peak of closures--thirteen in
one year--was not reached until 1929, 2
 and even then it was really only the
smaller tramways which were going. But by the 1930s larger undertakings
were deciding to dispense with their trams. Manchester's conversion of the
busy belt route 53 to motor buses in 1930 was so successful that other con—
versions quickly followed; 3
 in 1939 the city decided to replace all its rem-
aining trams within eighteen months. 4
 The giant LPTB system was marked down
for conversion to trolleybuses during the 1930s, beginning in 1935 with the
remainder of the ex—LUT and the Bexley, Erith and Dartford tramways. 5
By the outbreak of war some quite large towns had replaced trams completely,
places like Bournemouth and Nottingham in 1936,1  Birkenhead in 1937 and
Brighton and Halifax in 1939.
It will be seen from Table 10 below that the pruning of small systems
made very little difference overall until the early 1930s. Tram passengers
numbered about 4,600 million in both 1924-5 and 1929-30, even though about
450 miles of track and the same number of cars had gone. But from then on
the mileage and fleet fell rapidly, in the former case to less than half the
1924-5 total by 1937-8. Passengers fell by over 1,000 million, not as much
proportionately because it was generally the big city systems which were
still running.
Post—World War II, the decline continued. Obviously many of the pre—war
reasons still applied, but there were differences too, notably the increased
impact of the motor car, both as a traffic stealer and a cause of cong-
1. Ibid., 185.
2. For dates of closure of all British tramways, see Appendix GS.
3. Klapper, Tramways, 137.
4. Sleeman, 'Municipal Transport', 53.
5. Owen, British Trolleybus, 67.
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TABLE 10
MILEAGE, PASSENGERS, NUMBER OF CARS AND SYSTEM CLOSURES
FOR BRITISH TRAMWAYS (a) 1924-5--1938-9
Year Route Mileage
Passengers
Carried Trams
Number of Syst-
ems Closed (b)
1917ff - - - 2 (c)
1924-5 2,605 4,620,501,521 14,397 1
1925-6 2,602 4,668,812,206 14,434 2
1926-7 2,554 4,460,298,677 14,481 3
1927-8 2,508 4,705,842,932 14,403 7
1928-9 2,420 4,623,258,679 14,244 6
1929-30 2,323 4,613,526,659 13,922 13
1930-1 2,163 4,394,530,590 13,321 12
1931-2 1,976 4,107,673,072 12,767 12
1932-3 1,861 3,844,907,770 12,275 10
1933-4 1,766 (d) 3,777,901,644 11,708 8
1934-5 1,620 3,664,990,717 11,018 9
1935-6 1,485 3,526,000,000 10,447 10
1936-7 1,341 3,379,000,000 9,803 8
1937-8 1,183 3,059,000,000 8,875 10
1938-9 (e) - - - 2
1939-40 - - - 7
1941ff - - - 39
SOURCES: Tramway Returns, except for final column from Appendix G5.
a. Including non-electric lines except for the final column. However
these were a very small proportion by the 1920s, there being only 8.55 miles
of steam tramway and 14.87 miles of cable in 1926-7, most of the latter any-
way being a cable-worked underground railway in Glasgow.
b. Electric lines only; calendar not financial years.
c. i.e. Sheerness in 1917 and Taunton in 1921.
d. As with Table 9, national figures from 1933-4 onwards are obtained
by summing the Returns proper with summary data for the LPTB.
e. No further Returns were made until 1948-9.
-estion. 1
World War II caused the already agreed abandonment plans of many of the
remaining operators to be deferred 'for the duration'. In a few cases the
timetable was adhered to, for instance in Huddersfield, where the last tram
ran in 1940. 2
 Two systems closed after air raids, in Bristol and Coventry. 3
1. For these and other post-war factors in more detail, see J. Joyce,
Tramway Twilight (1962), 45-8.
2. Doubtless this was permitted because trolleybuses, which used
home-produced fuel, were being used in preference to motor buses.
3. Joyce, Tramway Twilight, 2.
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Even so, some 6,000 trams were still in operation after the war. '
 In some
cases, such as London, it was only a case of waiting until conditions per-
•
mitted their replacement. 2
 But a few 'tramway strongholds' were still
buiding new trams and even new extensions, notable among them being Aber-
deen, Blackpool, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, Sheffield and Sunderland. 3
In Glasgow, for instance, a class of 107 new cars was built, 4
 whilst in
Leeds a reserved track extemsion was completed as late as 1949. 5
 However,
all this was really only a last attempt to delay an inevitable replacement
6by motor bus--the trolleybus was by now really out of contention—and
one-by-one the last big-city systems closed down; Liverpool in 1957, Aber-
deen in 1958, Leeds in 1959, Sheffield in 1960 and, finally, Glasgow in
1962.
7
 That left, and still leaves, Blackpool operating a classical tramway
along its Promenade, the sole survivor from the great age of the tramway
industry in Britain.
1.	 Ibid., 3.	 2.	 Ibid., 12.
	 3. Ibid., 33.	 4.	 Ibid., 35.
5. Ibid., 36.	 6. Owen, British Trolleybus, 168-70.
7. See Appendix G5.
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CHAPTER 2
REASONS FOR THE INDUSTRY'S DECLINE
In describing how the tramway industry declined some indication as to
why has necessarily been given. But a great many other contributory fact-
ors, apart from the mere tram:bus nexus, must be brought into consideration.
The weight which is given to each has, in previous analyses, depended very
much on the writer's viewpoint or particular expertise.
Tramway enthusiasts have tended in the past to adopt what might be
called a 'conspiracy theory', in which various 'powers and dominions' range
themselves against an unjustly accused tram. For example, the historian of
the Brighton tramways writes that 'the council appeared to become obsessed
with a desire to rid itself of its very faithful servants, the trams, with
the greatest possible speed', some of which were to be replaced by 'a more
odorous form of transport, viz., the diesel bus',' the trams being 'ruth-
lessly scrapped , .
2
 Such emotive language has, happily, been generally re-
placed in more recent work by a broader appreciation of the commercial and
political environment in which closure decisions were taken, a good example
being the Black Country history by Webb cited above.
Those writing or speaking from the viewpoint of transport operators
naturally give full weight to the commercial considerations which are the
bricks and mortar of economic history, but they also pick out factors which
the more detached observer might miss. For instance Filcher, a prominent
1. R. M. Harmer and other, 'A History of Light Rail Transport in
the Brighton Area of Sussex--the Brighton Corporation Tramways', TR 6
(Summer 1966), 133.
2. Ibid., 135.
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transport manager, mentions as disadvantageous that reading is difficult on
a motor bus, ' and also spends some time on the relative abilities of trams
and buses to cope with fog, 2 apart from more obvious items such as seating
capacity. 3 Managers were aware, of course, that such factors affected rev-
enue and costs, and were thus of some importance. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that the judgements made and the evidence adduced by professionals
could be as emotionally biased as those of enthusiasts. Pilcher himself was
anti-tram, and though his writings appeared impartial, they were always
4
weighted against trams.
Economic historians may, on the other hand, miss some things others
notice by focussing on purely economic explanations. For instance, it is
transport historians who have made most of the--often real--opposition to
trams from various quarters.
In attempting to summarise the reasons for tramway closures, the centre
of the whole question would appear to be the competition between bus 5 and
tram. Various reasons for the success of the former have been dealt with
above, as follows: cost advantages, first respecting capital but also
increasingly revenue account; ability to earn more; technical improvements;
increased size; and lack of licensing restrictions.
Some further points may be made on these subjects before passing on.
The question of capital costs might, one would assume, not be an issue for
established tramways, or even to work against buses; why spend money on
buses when one had a perfectly good tramway? The trouble was, most manage-
ments did not. Tramways built in the boom years before World War I were
all wearing out at the same time, and unfortunately this was when prices
1. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 129.
2. Filcher, Road Passenger Transport, 120-3. 	 3. Ibid., 300.
4. Comment by Ian Yearsley in an unpublished lecture to the Sheffield
Area of the Light Rail Transit Association on 23 Feb 1981 and entitled,
"Bus and Coach" and the Anti-tram Campaign' (hereafter, 'Bus and Coach').
5. Understood in the remainder of this section to be motor buses
and, where appropriate, trolleybuses also.
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of construction and repair had soared. Before 1914 a single line of paved
tramway had cost about £4,500 a mile, but by 1919 it was up to £12,500--
15,000; 1
 even after the general prices had fallen almost to 1914 levels
again during the inter-war period, 2
 the price of a mile of track was still
almost twice what it had been, at £8,092. 3
 Many tramways were rebuilt in
the 1920s, but others, usually small ones, were only patched up. Eventually
the latter were faced with the need for total reconstruction, and if they
were to compete at all successfully with buses, with the necessity of intro-
ducing additional improvements such as double tracks and modern cars. It
simply was not worth it. 4
 Increasingly it was not worth it for the larger
systems either; for whilst the real capital costs of tramways remained at a
very high level, the capital cost of motor vehicles fell sharply. 5
A further dificulty was that municipal tramways were built on loans,
usually repayable in the early days over a period of forty years. Track,
however, lasted only twenty years. 6
 Whether this happened because of optim-
istic ideas about the track's durability 7
 or whether it was due to a delib-
erate attempt to get capital costs down to a reasonable annual figure, 8
 is
not clear. Later loans were usually given for shorter periods, twenty years
for track or cars. 9
 But the damage had been done, for when older tramways
found renewal necessary, they usually still had the millstone of unexpired
1. Joyce, Tramways Heyday, 97.
2. For price indices, see Appendix G4.
3. Pilcher, Road Passenger Transport, 112-3.
4. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 7.
5. S. Glynn and J. Oxborrow, Interwar Britain: a Social and Economic 
History (hereafter, Interwar Britain) (1976), 104.
6. Yearsley, 'Bus and Coach'.
7. Finer, Municipal Trading, 138 believes the redemption periods were
made too long because there was at the time no experience of the life of
such new assets.
8. DCT Jubilee, 9 implies this.
9. Finer, Municipal Trading, 134-5.
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debt still around their shoulders and, if the tramways were to be recon-
structed, with much higher repayments on any new loan. In Wigan, for
example, the debt was not due to be paid off until 1937, but it was decided
1
to run the trams only until the track wore out and then to replace them,
a process concluded in 1931.
2
 A case such as Glasgow's, which paid off its
tramway debt in the course of both World Wars,
3
 was indeed exceptional.
A new loan would not have been necessary, of course, had adequate
allowance been made for depreciation by building up a fund to pay for renew-
als as they came due. As already noted, this was by no means always done
even in the prosperous pre-1914 era. Even where it was, the value of such
funds declined in real terms after 1918.
4
 This meant that when reconstruct-
ion became necessary within the life of the old loans--as it usually did--
additional loans had to be raised to cover the new work. For instance,
Wigan carried out extensive renewals in the early 1920s by loan finance, the
costs being £48,258 for track and £42,402 for cars.
5
Finer, however, argues that depreciation provision over and above loan
redemption was not desirable, because (1) it placed an unfair burden on past
generations of ratepayers and (2) whilst in theory it provided a fund for
the complete renewal of capital assets at the end of a set period, repairs
and renewals were in fact required continuously. There does, however, seem
to have been some deliberate attempt to boost reserves in the post-World War
I period, for whereas municipal undertakings were only putting a figure
equal to 8 per cent of their debt aside as reserve in 1909, in 1925 it was
16 per cent, though this fell back again in the 1930s to reach 10 per cent
in 1937. 6
The general conclusion would seem to be that, when anything much more
1. Stretch, Tramways of Wigan, 138. 	 2. Ibid., 151.
3. Sleeman, 'Municipal Transport', 51.
4. Yearsley, 'Bus and Coach'.	 5. Stretch, Tramways of Wigan, 196.
6. Finer, Municipal Trading., 136-7 and 139.
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than normal repairs needed doing, fresh loans had to be sought. In the
case of tramways, these usually had to be added to the unexpired portion of
old loans. It was natural, therefore, that if a cheaper alternative to
tramways was available, it would be very attractive, particularly if motor
buses could earn sufficient profits to provide for their own depreciation
over five to six years, as Pilcher claimed they could; at the time this was
slightly less than the life of a bus at six and a half years. 1
Although capital costs included cars, overhead etc as well as track, it
seems to have been the condition of the latter which most often impelled the
decision to close or convert a tramway. Coxon describes the track in West
Bromwich to Dudley and Wednesbury in the mid-1930s. It had not been relaid
since 1903 and was 'in fearful and dangerous condition; check rail missing
for yards at a time, rail tread split, wheels running on the bottom of the
groove most of the way, rails out of alignment and deeply sunk, and a cloud
of yellow dust ground from the granite setts following the tram along'.
These routes did not close until as late as 1939, but other Black Country
tramways succumbed much earlier. The Dudley and Stourbridge Company began
closures in 1926, partly because of the need for track renewals and a lack
of finance to do this, whilst Wolverhampton's decision in the mid-1920s to
convert all its trams was largely also due to the cost of replacing worn-out
track.
2
 Examples could be multiplied from the rest of the country.
The technical improvements to buses mentioned in the previous chapter
meant that by 1930 they were (1) physically able to compete with the tram
for city traffic and (2) able to do so at an equal or lesser cost per mile.
Mention was also made of the increased revenue earned by buses. Some of the
reasons for this are given by Filcher as follows: the buses ran faster than
the trams, 3 service levels could thus be increased, the vehicles were modern
and attractive and kerbside loading encouraged travel by the old, women and
1. Pilcher, Road Passenger Transport, 118.
2. Coxon, Rails of Birmingham, 132-3, 82, 72 and 79.
3. 11.0 m.p.h. versus 8.6 m.p.h. in service conditions in Manchester.
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children.
1
Pilcher was making the case for motor buses and is thus not entirely
fair. He himself reports a test run between a bus and a tram when the
latter was on reserved track off-street, and here the two ran at 14.84 and
14.19 miles per hour respectively, not a large difference. He also admits
modern trams might achieve increases in revenue too, but immediately qual-
ifies this by saying that in Manchester passengers still preferred buses
despite some trams being fitted with high-speed motors and upholstered
seats.
2
 In fact, Manchester's trams were never really modernised in the
as
same sense Asome in, say, Glasgow. Tinkering with old cars may have produced
genuine improvements, but trams needed to look modern to compete with new
buses. This undertakings such as Glasgow, where just over 150 streamlined
'Coronation' cars were produced between 1937 and 1941, 3 or Liverpool, which
built 313 streamliners in the years 1935-8,
4
 at least partially achieved.
Such new cars did stimulate traffic, just as new buses did. For instance,
the progressive LUT's comfortable new 'Feltham' trams ran at an average ser-
vice speed of twelve miles per hour--faster than Manchester's buses--which
resulted in an increase of tram passengers over the previous year. 5
Coupled with new trams, undertakingswkakwere prepared to invest in
their tramways modernised their older cars as thoroughly as possible. Glas-
gow reconstructed or reconditioned over 300 by 1930, making them faster,
more comfortable and safer. 6
 Lord Ashfield, Chairman of the LUT's parent
company, said in 1932 that after their speed and comfort had been improved,
trams showed themselves capable of attracting more passengers. 7
Even if faster trams were used, however, traffic congestion kept their
average speed down; this was ten miles an hour on the three London company
1. Pilcher, Road Passenger Transport, 116-17.	 2. Ibid.,117.
3. Scottish Tramway Museum Society, Glasgow Tramway and Railway Roll-
ing Stock (Glasgow, 1958), section 8 (no pp.).
4. Klapper, Tramways, 90.	 5. Wilson, L. U. T.,
6. Oakley, The Last Tram, 82.	 7. Wilson, L. U. T., 166.
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tramways in 1930. 1
 So better tracks were also needed, like the grassed res-
erved tracks pioneered by Liverpool in 1914. 2
 The Board of Trade wa,s will-
ing to sanction 20 miles per hour on such lines even then, 3
 whereas their
normal limits ranged from 8 to 16 miles per hour. 4 By the late 1930s the
Ministry of Transport was prepared to allow 30 miles per hour on wide and
straight street tracks,
5
 but how often these ideal conditions occurred is
debatable.
Such tramway modernisation as there was, however, was too limited. In
the first case, only a few systems were involved, such as Glasgow, Liverpool
and a handful of others. A number of other towns tried a few or even just
one modern tram, but the result was predictable. Bradford built a fast
single—decker, but then decided modern trolleybuses were a better prospect.
Many tramways, for a variety of reasons, scarcely advanced at all. Bradford
had to keep open balconies on its double—deck cars to the end because of
Ministry of Transport restrictions on narrow gauge trams on steep hills. 6
Other smaller systems ended much as they had begun, presumably because it
was never possible or worthwhile to spend money on the trams; no double—deck
trams in the South—west ever had a top cover, for example.
Even those tramways that did modernise never completed the task.
After World War II Glasgow had about 250 modern trams, but more than 500 of
the rest were forty—five years old or more. Nor were reserved tracks as
much use as they should have been when trams still had to run through con-
gested central streets. Plans for a tramway tunnel in Liverpool in conn-
ection with a scheme to run trams through the Mersey Tunnel might have shown
1. Ibid.	 2. Horne and Maund, Liverpool Transport 2, 93.
3. Ibid., 94.	 4. Klapper, Tramways, 222.
5. Pilcher, Road Passenger Transport, 102-3.
6. A. E. Jones, Trams and Buses of West Yorkshire (hereafter, Trams 
and Buses) (1985), 25-7.
7. P. W. Gentry, The Tramways of the West of England (hereafter, West
of England) (2nd edition, 1960), 5.
8. Oakley, The Last Tram, 112.
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the way, had this come to fruition.' In the event, London's Kingsway Sub-
way
2
 remained unique. The only tramway which was really thoroughly modern-
ised with a new fleet on reserved track was Blackpool's Promenade line, for
which 116 new trams were delivered between 1933 and 1937; 3 it is surely no
coincidence that this is the sole surviving British tramway.
The above has assumed the commonly accepted view--held by most of
today's enthusiasts and at least some managers at the time--that if tramways
had been allowed to compete by being fully modernised, more than one of them
might have survived. In particular, it is argued that the poor showing of
old trams against new buses was given the lie by the success of those few
modern trams which were built; if other systems had adopted them, or those
which did had done so more enthusiastically, the tram might have been ret-
ained in favourable conditions.
Ian Yearsley takes a more radical stance, saying that in fact no truly
modern trams were ever built in Britain. Improvements made were purely cos-
metic, and no radically new inventions were made which either reduced costs
or increased revenue. The last real tramway advance, he says, was the Brush
low-height double-decker in the 1920s, which made it possible to replace
single-deckers in certain situations. In contrast to what he sees as the
technical stagnation of tramcar design, buses benefitted from numerous dev-
elopments, most of which have been mentioned above; an additional one is the
introduction of tar macadam road surfaces. By these means buses overtook
trams in terms of cost, capacity, speed and comfort.4
A point made much of in favour of--usually--motor buses was their flex-
ibility or mobility. This could cover a multitude of virtues, including
1. Horne and Maund, Liverpool Transport 2, 71-3.
2. C. S. Dunbar and others, London's Tramway Subway (n.d.), passim.
3. County Borough of Blackpool, 75 Years of Electric Street Tramway 
Operation (Blackpool, 1960), 6.
4. Yearsley, 'Bus and Coach'.
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manoeuvrability in traffic, '
 ability to switch quickly from route to route, 2
a limited facility to avoid traffic congestion by diverging over several
city streets or termini 3
 and the ease of serving new traffic objectives
without the need for expensive infrastructure. 4
The key matters highlighted by the flexibility issue were traffic con-
gestion and the need for route extensions. Trams were seen in some quarters
from as early as the turn of the century as 'the principal obstruction to
the free passage of other vehicles . . . and the main cause of any insuffic-
iency of road accommodation which at present exists , . 5
 Twenty or thirty
years later the problem was much worse, and trams attracted a tail of motor
vehicles which were unable to overtake and which formed a danger to passen-
gers boarding or alighting. 6
 Lee, in one of the few detailed academic
studies of a tramway system, quotes the Hull Manager's opinion that haz-
ardous loading was an important reason for disposing of the city's trams. 7
Lee himself regards the traffic problem as decisive. Increased motor
traffic was causing congestion, but the trams monopolised the crown of the
road, leaving only one lane (if there was no parking) for other vehicles, as
well as holding up the traffic as they moved slowly onwards with frequent
stops. Passengers had to cross the road to board or alight, causing incon-
venience or danger, which could only be alleviated in a few places by ref-
uges or reservations. The cause was the inadequate scale of development of
British cities in the nineteenth century. 8
 The LPTB also put congestion as
a major reason for tramway replacement. 9
The judgement of the time was not entirely fair--the trams had been
1. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 182.
2. Pilcher, Road Passenger Transport, 300-1.
	 3. Ibid., 292.
4. Finer, Municipal Trading, 283.
5. Departmental Committee on Highways 1903, quoted in SYRO, Proceed-
ings 1914, 66.
6. Joyce, Tramway Heyday, 108.
	 7. Lee, 'Tramways of Hull', 217.
8. Ibid., 274.
	 9. Wilson, L. U. T., 177.
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there first after all--or even justified. The LUT's Manager tried to def-
end trams against the charge of obstruction, ' and even Filcher had to admit
that they were the most economic users of road space. 2 It was quite poss-
ible to argue the contrary point, in fact, that other road traffic held up
the trams. Finer mentions Birmingham's attempts to stem losses on its trams
by using bigger and faster cars; the policy failed because of traffic
hold-ups, the only change for the trams being a large increase in current
consumption. 3 True though this might be, however, the sight of a tail of
motor vehicles following a tram was sufficient to ensure that the latter got
the blame.
Whilst on the subject of congestion, a related point was that tram
routes themselves could become congested, usually because the layout was
inadequate. For instance, the Kidderminster line needed doubling to deal
adequately with the traffic, but there was not the money to do it. 4 And
Pilcher's famous route 53 conversion was made necessary by and to a large
extent was successful because of low bridges and single track sections along
5
Before moving on to the question of extensions, some other inadequacies
which affected tramways, and which therefore invited competition or substit-
ution, may be noticed. One was the isolation of many municipal undertakings
This was sometimes due to unfortunate decisions on tramway gauges. For
instance, Bradford's 4ft gauge trams met both Halifax's 3ft 61n and Leed's
4ft 81in tracks; 6
 a journey from Bradford to Huddersfield involved two chan-
ges, from a Bradford to a Halifax and a Halifax to a Huddersfield car, the
latter running on tracks 4ft 71in apart intended to accommodate railway
wagons (which never actually did run). 7
 The result was that through ser-
1. Ibid., 164.	 2. Filcher, Road Pasenger Transport, 289.
3. Finer, Municipal Trading, 282.
	 4. Webb, Black Country 2, 201.
5. Klapper, Tramways, 137.
6. C. T. Humpidge, unpublished lecture notes (n.d.), 7.
7. An unique dual gauge service was however run between Bradford and
it.
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vices were difficult to achieve and private bus operators took advantage of
this and established themselves on the interurban routes. ' It is true, as a
later writer says, that it is easy to criticise the gauge differences with
hindsight and that local authorities did not at the time envisage further
growth of towns or the need for an alternative interurban transport to rail-
ways.
2
 But this lack of foresight probably was 'a contributory factor in
the cessation of tramway development and the commencement of the decline'. 3
In other cases, municipal jealousies were clearly to blame. Bradford and
Keighley, for example, could not agree on inter-working arrangements; other
authorities, like Halifax and Rochdale, opposed the running of other munic-
ipal transport through their areas.
On the other hand, in other places inter-running was the rule, the best
example being South-east Lancashire. 5 Even here, though, negotiations at
the end of the 1930s failed to achieve the desired objective of a joint
transport board.	 It is perhaps significant that although much is made in
the literature about the evils of not co-operating,
6
 even in an area where
trams did inter-work successfully, the life of tramways was not noticeably
prolonged.
A problem which 'let in' bus competition or made buses a more attract-
ive alternative to trams in some cities was an inability to run cross-town
services. London's 'tram gap' in the City and West End has already been
mentioned above; Birmingham had a similar problem with no through cross-city
routes and a series of termini on the fringe of the central area,
7
 a fact
and Leeds from 1909 until towards the end of World War I using special cars
with adjustable trucks; Bradford's trams also met those of the Yorkshire
(WD), which were standard gauge. See Bett and Gilham, Networks, 47-9 and 51.
1. Humpidge, unpublished lecture, 7.
2. Jones, Trams and Buses, 7.
	 3. Bett and Gilham, Networks, 47.
4. Humpidge, unpublished lecture, 7.
5. Finer, Municipal Trading, 280.
6. See ibid., 278-82 for a discussion of this point.
7. Bett and Gilham, Networks, 78.
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which may have hastened closure. 1
In some sense all the above tramway deficiencies could be seen as
soluble by the much-vaunted mobility of the motor bus. So could the most
serious problem of all, the need for extensions. Electric tramways were
themselves, of course, often extended versions of old horse or steam tram-
ways. The new trams were regarded by many major municipalities as instru-
ments of social policy which could assist in moving the population out of
the city centre slums to better housing on the outskirts; Glasgow is a case
in point, Manchester another, whose Housing Committee opined in 1904 that
the modern electric tramway will come to the rescue'. 2 Experience seemed
to bear out this view, though imperfectly, as with all human endeavours. In
Manchester as tramway traffic grew in the years before World War I, so the
heavily built-up area expanded from a radius of around two miles to four,
with less dense housing developments spreading to meet the surrounding
towns. 3 When tram routes are superimposed on a population map for Man-
chester in 1913, the two are shown to match fairly well. 4
But Britain ended World War I still with severe housing shortages, and
to meet these municipal building was encouraged. 5 In one way, the resultant
estates were ideally related to tramways as new purpose-built reserved
tracks could be laid to serve them; Leeds did this with their Middleton
estate in the 1920s, last extending the line as late as 1948-9. 6 But in
other ways estates were not good tramway territory. The population was not
well off and could not afford frequent trips to town, so the estate was
self-contained with its own shops and entertainments. As a result, there
were periods of peak demand in the morning and the evening, and not much in
1. Klapper, Tramways, 242.
2. Kerry Hamilton and Stephen Potter, Losing Track (1985), 72 and 75;
quotation on the latter page.
3. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, 217.
	 4. Ibid., 218, map.
5. A. Winstone Bond, The British Tram: History's Orphan (hereafter,
History's Orphan) (Hartley, Kent, 1980), 46.
6. Hamilton and Potter, Losing Track, 79.
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between. 1 Even then, social policy sometimes dictated that subsidised fares
should be offered to those who had moved out from the central areas, 2
 which
only made the public transport provision even more uneconomic.
Other new housing--the leafy crescents and ribbon development of
suburbia--was even less attractive to a fixed link form of transport like
trams which depended on dense traffic for its profitability. Meanwhile, as
people migrated from inner areas, trams lost just that short-distance
traffic they had once relied on. 3 In Manchester inner and intermediate
wards lost 61,363 people between 1921 and 1934, whereas outer wards gained
99,291. 4 In a parallel process, trams lost traffic as the traditional
northern industrial areas declined and people moved south, where tramways
were never as important. 5 If the dreams of Edwardian garden city planners
had been fully turned into reality, these new towns might have had their own
tramways, as Letchworth should have done; the reservation was actually prov-
ided, but ended up as a pedestrian walkway. 6
Moreover the need for new transport facilities came just at a time when
tramways were physically run-down after World War I and were having to fight
unrestricted motor bus competition. Money for extensions was often unavail-
able. 7 So Aberdeen Council decided in 1920 that, due to the cost of rehab-
ilitating the tramways, all new routes should be bus operated. 8
Thus for every city or town which extended its tramways, there were
more which did not. As an extreme example, Bristol tramways built no new
lines after 1908. 9
 In places like Birmingham, buses were often used to
serve the new estates, originally as feeders to existing tramways, but later
1. Bond, History's Orphan, 47. 	 2. Joyce, Tramway Heyday, 106.
3. Ibid., 101-2.	 4. Pilcher, Road Passenger Transport, 298.
5. Joyce, Tramway Heyday, 101.
6. Hamilton and Potter, Losing Track, 77-8.
7. Bond, History's Orphan, 47.
8. Klapper, Tramways, 230; two short lines were built later.
9. Joyce, Tramway Heyday, 102; most smaller systems were the same.
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running in along them and taking their traffic, with the inevitable result
that those routes themselves would become uneconomic to re-equip when the
time came. 1
Tramway operators were faced with other pressures, apart from purely
commercial ones, the chief of these being a number of legal or quasi-legal
restrictions. Most of them stemmed from the 1870 Tramways Act and though
they bore most severely on private companies, municipalities were not imm-
une. Under the Act, when a tramway was promoted any local authority con-
cerned had the right of veto over the proposals. It was possible to circum-
vent this by a private act, but this was difficult--Paisley's is the only
significant case--and local authorities used their power not usually to for-
bid, but to exact danegeld in the form of street improvements, bridge recon-
struction etc. The LUT, which was asked for huge sums, is the most often
quoted example.
2
The most disliked feature of the 1870 Act was the obligation to repair
the road surface between the tracks and for eighteen inches on each side,
perfectly logical in the case of horse tramways, but far less so for their
successors, particularly when the road surface was worn out by the tram's
Thei  problem was naturally worst on the busiest streets, and
it was here that trams were otherwise most economic.
4
 Tramway operators
compared this high charge to the relatively insignificant road tax paid by
bus owners. 5 Incidentally, the complainant in this case was a municipal
operator, for although in theory the trams' contribution to road repairs
merely relieved another municipal department which would have had to do the
job anyway, the transport department were still saddled with an item which
1. Bond, History's Orphan, 49.
2. G. B. Claydon, '100 Years of the Tramways Act' (hereafter, 'Tram-
ways Act'), MT 33 (Aug 1970), 282; for other legislation, see Appendix G3.
3. Ibid., 281.	 4. Finer, Municipal Trading, 282.
5. SYRO, 8/UD28/545, Reports of the Clerk to the Joint Committee (of
the DDLR) 16 Nov 1923--21 Jul 1932 (hereafter, Clerk's Reports), 9 Jul 1924,
1; there is no serial numbering in this volume, but each report is numbered
internally, and so is cited by date and by individual pagination.
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put their own costs up; the natural course was to seek for ways of cutting
these.
Equally a matter of municipal book-keeping except where companies were
involved was the obligation to pay full rates on a tramway; 1 buses, of
course, paid none for their right-of-way. To point the contrast, in 1933
Birmingham's buses had 50 per cent more traffic than the trams; yet the
latter paid £50,602 in rates as against £13,595 for the buses. 2
The reason why there were so few operating companies was the 1870 Act's
proviso that local authorities could take over a line after twenty-one
years. The surviving companies were still faced with this threat, rein-
forced by court decisions in the 1890s that only scrap value was to be paid
for their assets. Companies were then most unwilling to invest, the most
glaring example being Bristol, whose 1895 tramcar fleet was virtually un-
changed for forty-six years. 3 Webbs feels that insecurity of tenure was a
major factor in holding back further development and in hastening the
break-up and closure of the Black Country system. 4
Private enterprise in the tramway field was thus trammelled from the
start; even municipal operators found the Act's financial burdens irksome,
particularly since they were often competing with bus companies which had no
comparable restrictions. It was true that the Light Railways Act 1896 rem-
oved or reduced many of the Tramways Act's worst features. Rates, for
example, were cut by 75 per cent and local authorities lost their veto. So
though intended for rural light railways, the Act came to be used for purely
urban lines, such as those in Walthamstow, which was at least of benefit to
new entrants into the industry. 5 Nontheless the mileage involved was not
great, only about 350 miles by the end of World War I
6 
out of a total of
1. Claydon, 'Tramways Act', 282. 	 2. Finer, Municipal Trading, 81.
3. Claydon, 'Tramways Act', 282.	 4. Webb, Black Country 2, 85.
5. Claydon, 'Tramways Act', 282-3.
6. W. K. Davies, Light Railways, their rise and decline (hereafter,
Light Railways) (1964), 54.
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2,569.1
Not exactly a legal restriction, but a real competitive disadvantage,
was the fact that tramway wage rates were generally higher than those paid
to bus men. 2 In Hull, for example, private bus drivers worked up to 104
hours a week for a little over half a tram driver's wage.
3
From some points of view this might have been regarded as a moral
obligation, and so no doubt, in origin at least, was the legal requirement
to offer workmen's fares on tramways,
4
 usually at half the standard fare.
5
Since this again did not apply to buses, there was a great temptation on the
operator to dispense with trams. 6
This was one reason why tram fares seem generally to have been too low
for the operators' own good. Joyce says that there is no evidence of any
substantial rise in fares from the inception of tramways to 1938, except for
an increase and subsequent reduction around World War I. 7 Other reasons why
fares remained low were deliberate municipal subsidy and, though he does
not mention it, competitive pressures. 8 This would not have mattered had
not running costs risen from 7d. a mile in 1914 to is. id. by 1930, and if
the need for expensive renewals and extensions had not been so urgent. The
end result was an undermining of tramways' financial strength. 9
Operators' troubles may have been partly of their own making in another
way too. Lee lays great stress on managerial divisions as a cause of Hull
tramways' problems. Early on responsibility was divided between three
1. Tramway Returns, excluding Ireland; the Light Railways Act itself
applied only to Great Britain (see W. J. K. Davies, Light Railways, 282).
2. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 182.
3. Lee, 'Tramways of Hull', 205.	 4. Finer, Municipal Trading, 352.
5. Joyce, Tramway Heyday, 120.	 6. Finer, Municipal Trading, 352.
7. Joyce, Tramway Heyday, 121.
8. Dunbar, Buses, Trolleys and Trams, 74 and 76; in the 1920s both the
LCC and Glasgow introduced ultra—cheap fares to counter competition.
9. Joyce, Tramway Heyday, 123-4.
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officers, 1 a situation only resolved in 1919 when the Manager and Electrical
Engineer were sacked for fraud and a proper General Manager appointed.
2
 Un-
fortunately during the 1920s there were great dissensions between him and
the Committee Chairman. 3 Dover was another town where responsibility was
split, in this case between the Tramways' Manager and the Borough Engineer,
who was responsible for the track. 4
Tramways did not operate in a vacuum of course, but were affected by
economic and political influences external to transport itself. Obviously
tramways were always susceptible to changes in the local economy. For
instance, the Kidderminster line went through a period of falling receipts
and traffic from 1905 onwards due to a depression in the local carpet trade;
the Company's receipts did not pick up until there was an upturn about
1911. 5 In this period tramways were not under competitive pressure, and so
usually survived. When the same sort of thing happened after World War I,
they might not. For example, the Cambourne and Redruth tramway was killed
by the depression in Cornish industry, 6 and many tramways were hit hard by
the General Strike and its aftermath; the Lanarkshire tramways, for example,
had to curtail operations after 1926 and promoted an abandonment bill in
1929, 7 whilst the Kidderminster line, having survived its pre-war troubles,
also closed in 1929, following years in which its profits were as low as £19
(1925) and £99 (1926), partly a result of the industrial troubles which had
preceded the 1926 strike. 8
A more domestic issue pointed out by Ian Yearsley is that Britain had
no strong tramcar manufacturing industry. Major operators tended to build
their own trams, so after the boom years the car industry virtually coll-
apsed, helped on its way by the fact that their products were so long-lived.
The few remaining manufacturers just fulfilled what orders they could get,
1. Lee, 'Tramways of Hull', 96-7. 	 2. Ibid., 143.
3. Ibid., 186-7, 191 and 212-14. 	 4. Klapper, Tramways,
5. Webb, Black Country 2, 185,190 and 192. 	 6. Klapper, Tramways, 185.
7. Ibid., 219.	 8. Webb, Black Country 2, 200-1.
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usually on traditional lines, and had no incentive to design and sell new
models for which there was going to be little demand. Bus manufacturers
hardly needed to sell their products; there was no alternative. '
A final economic point before moving on to more political matters is to
note the obvious parallel between the problems of tramways and those of the
railways. The rise in railway costs during World War I marked the begin-
ning of the maladjustment of costs and charges which has plagued the ind-
ustry ever since, a point already noted about tramways themselves. Rail
lines were also, like tramways, concentrated in old and declining industrial
areas. The impact of road competition is obvious, but a particularly impor-
tant point is that as railway traffic fell the operating ratio grew worse.
This is because rail systems have a high proportion of fixed assets with
concomitant costs inescapable in the short term; thus unit costs vary
inversely with the volume of traffic. 2 One would expect tramway costs
to behave similarly.
Taking politics in its widest sense to include both bureaucratic and
pressure groups as well as elected forums, trams seem to have attracted pol-
itical opposition from a very early date. Joyce traces this back to Train's
trams, which were strongly opposed because of the use of step rail 3 and
which, though unintentionally, because identified as a lower class vehicle,
4
an impression reinforced later by the way trams often ran through grim ind-
ustrial landscapes. 5 Electric tramways were opposed in turn because of the
overhead wires. 6 However once established, the new trams often became a
source of genuine civic pride. 7
Later opposition was more serious than aesthetic or classprejudice,
and came principally from government, the press, town planners and motoring
organisations. Joyce says that the press were generally hostile to
1. Yearsley, 'Bus and Coach'.
2. D. H. Aldcroft, Transport since 1914, 23 and 31-42.
3. Joyce, Tramway Heyday, 2.	 4. Ibid., 4.	 5. Ibid., 57.
6. Ibid., 30.
	
7. See Oakley, The Last Tram, 70 for a tram jubilee.
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trams) TheTh  most virulent opposition came from Bus and Coach, a magazine
founded by a fanatical anti-tram campaigner in 1929 and which provided a
platform for men like Pilcher and Owen Silvers. Horace Wyatt, the founding
editor, used captions like 'Beauty and the Beast' with illustrations of
buses and trams, and though this might seem ludicrous the professional con-
tributors were very influential. 2
The point has already been made above that physical restrictions in
towns often made them unsuitable for trams. Up to the 1920s town planners
often suggested the reconstruction of cities to accommodate trams; this
was done in a report for Sheffield in 1924. 3 Laterottitudes changed, and
the same planner was recommending the removal of trams elsewhere in South
Yorkshire to ease the traffic flow. 4 The difficulty of fitting trams into
post-World War II plans was even greater, of course. 5 The whole effect was
to make trams seem dated and in the way, aspects of the past better cleared
off the streets.
Automobile organisations were naturally glad to support such notions
and had been early opponents of tramways. The committee which produced the
1903 report on roads cited above 6 was said to include the Chairman of the
Automobile Association amongst its members with others interested in the
motor industry. 7 Later, when West Ham wanted to put a clause in a bill
prohibiting driving past stationary trams, the motor lobby ensured it was
dropped . 8
There is some argument about whether changes in local political control
influenced tramway closures. One writer says that trams were scrapped in
1. Joyce, Tramway Heyday, 111. 	 2. Yearsley, 'Bus and Coach'.
3. Patrick Abercrombie with R. H. Mattocks, Sheffield: a Civic Survey 
and suggestions towards a Development Plan (hereafter, Civic Survey) (Liver-
pool and London, 1924), 55 and 60.
4. Patrick Abercrombie and others, The Sheffield and District Regional 
Planning Scheme (Liverpool and London, 1931), 35 and 79-80.
5. Joyce, Tramway Twilight, 47-8.	 6. See above,43
7. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 67.
	 8. Rodinglea, East London, 145.
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Leeds, Sheffield and Edinburgh when the anti-tram party gained office,' but
this was not so in Edinburgh 2 nor in Sheffield, where what had happened was
that the party in almost continuous control since 1926, Labour, had changed
its mind. 3 Local political pressure may have operated in other ways, how-
ever, as when local interests combined with the Ministry of Transport in the
inter-war years to force Bradford and Leeds Watch Committees to give bus
companies licences to run into their areas. 4
What is unquestionable is that central government--which here really
means the mandarins--had a negative attitude towards tramways from at least
1931, when the Royal Commission on Transport dismissed trams in one para-
graph; 'Tramways . . . are . . . in a state of obsolescence . . . cause
much unnecessary congestion and . . . danger', they wrote, recommending that
'(a) no additional tramways should be constructed, and (b) that . . . they
should gradually disappear and give place to other forms of transport'. 5
This judgement had no practical or immediate effect, but it made it more
difficult for go-ahead boroughs to justify expansion or retention of their
tramways. 6 By 1949 the Ministry was saying that fixed tracks should be
eliminated as soon as possible. 7
Glasgow provides a clear case of political pressure influencing events,
for in 1951 a government committee recommended that the city should give up
its out-of-town services and scrap its trams in return for railway electrif-
ication; from then on Glasgow was under continuous pressure to adopt the
report. 8 It took eleven years, but when the last Glasgow tram ran between
Dalmuir West and the delightfully-named Auchenshuggle on 1 Sep 1962, 9 an
1. Philip Webb, 'The View from Toronto', MT 43 (Nov 1980), 370.
2. John S. Wilson, 'The View from Edinburgh', MT 44 (Mar 1981), 85.
3. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 97.	 4. Jones, Trams and Buses, 17.
5. Quoted in Joyce, Tramway Heyday, 99. 	 6. Ibid., 100.
7. Julian Thompson, British Trams in Camera (1978), 12.
8. Dunbar, Buses, Trolleys and Trams, 116.
9. Joyce, Tramway Twilight, 104.
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era in British street transport was almost at an end, just over a century
after it had begun on Merseyside.
Amongst the reasons suggested for the general decline of British tram-
ways up to 1939 and their almost complete disappearance after 1945, the
first essential was the emergence and development of competitors able to do
the tram's work more cheaply. Other advantages of buses were that they
could serve necessary new extensions more economically than trams and also
proved able to earn more revenue; this was partly the attraction of their
modernity, and whilst trams could be modernised, the process was at best
half-hearted or even, in the view of some commentators, never really under-
taken at all, except for basically cosmetic improvements. Tramways found it
difficult to withstand motor bus competition because there was no effective
statutory protection. At the same time as competition was intensifying,
tramways were faced with the need for reconstruction, often within the
original loan periods and without adequate renewal funds. Their revenue was
also affected by fares which were too /ow and by genera/ economic trends.
Negative factors holding tramways back included legal restrictions on them,
municipal isolation, poor tramway layouts, and inadequate managements.
Political pressure of one kind or another may have affected local transport
policies and so, increasingly, did traffic congestion, which trams were
certainly impeded by and were also believed to cause.
These are general points. In seeing how they apply to particular towns
in one area of the country, South Yorkshire, it is worth recalling Finer's
point referring to transport undertakings, that each area is 'an eccentric
1
economic entity'. The general factors governing the decline of tramways
may thus be present in different degrees in different areas; other quite new
causes may even be found. The remainder of this thesis is designed to
show how typical or otherwise South Yorkshire's tramways were.
1. Finer, Municipal Trading, 282.
PART II
THE DEARNE DISTRICT LIGHT RAILWAYS
THE SMALL TRAMWAY
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CHAPTER 3
THE HISTORY OF THE LINE
There were six tramway systems within present-day South Yorkshire, four
in the towns of Barnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham and Sheffield and two con-
necting smaller places, the Mexborough and Swinton Company line and the mun-
icipal Dearne District.' The Dearne District Light Railways 2 formed the
last complete electric tramway system to open in Britain. It had been prop-
osed and authorised just before World War I, but could not be opened until
1924, by which time motorbuses were already deeply entrenched. The already
dated vehicles, layout and operating practices were no match for the more
flexible motor bus and the line closed again in 1933, making it one of the
shortest-lived tramways in Britain. The goodwill was sold to the competing
Yorkshire Traction bus company.
The Preparatory Period 
The river Dearne flows through Barnsley to join the Don at Denaby. In
this section of the valley are the townships of Bolton-on-Dearne, Darfield,
Goldthorpe, Wath and Wombwell. 3 In 1913 the Urban District Councils
4
 of
Bolton (which included Goldthorpe), Thurnscoe (a little to the east of the
places mentioned), Wath and Wombwell combined to promote a tramway to con-
1. For brief details of these, see Bett and Gilham, Networks, 58-63.
2. Hereafter, DDLR; though promoted under the 1896 Light Railways Act,
the line was indistinguishable from a street tramway.
3. Ordnance Survey, 1:50,000, 2nd Series, Sheet 111.
4. A pre-1914 local government area, hereafter UDC; see Appendix G2.
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nect the area with Barnsley)
The population of the four authorities was 42,119 2 in the 1911 census.
3
If Barnsley and Worsborough are added, this rises to 105,496. The main
industry was—and is--the mining of coal from the Barnsley and Silkstone
seams.
4
 By 1870 there were 108 mines in the South Yorkshire Coalfield as a
whole5 with some, such as Manvers Main, also associated with coke ovens and
by-products plants. 6 By 1913 the other two employers in the area were the
railways and the glass industry. 7
The existing transport network in the Dearne valley included the Dearne
and Dove Canal, dating from 1798,
8
 various fairly recent road transport fac-
ilities and the railways. The Midland had a station at Wath, 9 which also
had two other stations. One was the terminus of a Hull and Barnsley line
serving Hickleton & Thurnscoe en route, 10 the other on the Great Central
route via Wombwell and Stairfoot to Barnsley. 11 The Midland had a separate
station at Wombwell and also ran a joint line via Bolton with the North
Eastern Railway. 12 The small Dearne Valley Company had opened to passengers
only in 1912, 13 and had halts at Great Houghton, Goldthorpe & Thurnscoe and
1. A. S. Denton, D. D. L. R. The Story of the Dearne District Light 
Railways (hereafter, D. D. L. R.) (Bromley Common, Kent, 1980), 6.
2. SYRO, 8/UD28/1, Brief for Applicants 26 Feb 1914 (hereafter, Brief
1914), 1.
3. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 645.
4. G. G. Hopkinson, 'The Development of the South Yorkshire and North
Derbyshire Coalfield 1500-1775' (hereafter, 'Yorkshire Coal Industry'), in
Studies in the Yorkshire Coal Industry, ed. J. Benson and R. G. Neville
(Manchester, 1976), 1.
5. G. D. B. Gray, 'The South Yorkshire Coalfield', in ibid., 31.
6. Ibid., 41.	 7. SYRO, Brief 1914, 5.
8. Charles Hadfield, The Canals of Yorkshire and North East England
2 (Newton Abbot, 1973), 283.
9. Denton, D. D. L. R., 4.
10. C. T. Goode, Railways in South Yorkshire (Clapham, Yorks., 1975),
42-3.
11. Ibid., 14.	 12. Denton, D. D. L. R., 4.
13. Goode, Railways in South Yorkshire, 94.
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Harlington (for Adwick-on-Dearne). 1 Railway services were widely criticised
locally for unpunctuality, inadequate services and the unsatisfactory loc-
ation of stations; 2 this was undoubtedly one of the major reasons why the
tramway was promoted in the first place.
Electric tramways had already been built at either end of the valley.
The first was owned by the Barnsley and District Electric Traction Company
(hereafter, B&DETC), a BET subsidiary, 3 dated from 19044 and ran 3.06 miles 5
from Smithies in the north via the railway stations to the twin Worsborough
Bridge and Dale termini. 6
At the other end of the valley, in 1907, the Mexborough and Swinton
Tramways Company (hereafter M&STC) opened a line from Rotherham--where it
connected with the Corporation tramways--to Denaby via Swinton and Mexbor-
ough, originally on the Dolter surface contact system and later using normal
overhead. 7 The M&STC was one of the five tramway subsidiaries of the Nat-
ional Electric Construction Company (hereafter NECC). 8 In 1912 the Company
proposed to build trolleybus routes out from its tramway, but determined
opposition from the Dearne local authorities ensured that only two were app-
roved, from Denaby to Conisbrough and Mexborough to Manvers Main; 9 service
began in 1915, but did not become regular until 1922. 10
There were horse buses " and wagonettes 12 in use in the area, and the
1. Denton, D. D. L. R., 4.	 2. SYRO, Brief 1914, 6.
3. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 7.
4. Crilas3. C. Hall, 'A History of the Barnsley, Dearne, Mexborough &
Rotherham Tramway Conurbation' (hereafter, 'Conurbation History'), TR 7
(Winter 1967), 75.
5. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 645.
6. Hall, 'Conurbation History', TR 7 (Autumn 1967), 59.
7. Ibid., (Spring, 1968), 111-13. 	 8. Bett and Gilham, Networks, 193.
9. Hall, 'Conurbation History', TR 7 (Autumn 1968), 147-8.
10. C. T. Goode, The History of the Mexborough & Swinton Traction Com-
pany (hereafter, M&STC History) (IHulli), 1982), 20-1; 'Traction' from 1929.
11. From Mexborough to Goldthorpe, for example; see ibid., 21.
12. SYRO, 8/UD2/3, Wombwell UDC Minutes, Highways and Buildings Comm-
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first motor bus service may have been started in Darfield by the brothers
Camplejohn as early as 1905. 1 By 1913 numerous proprietors were running
buses and charabancs on the West Melton to Barnsley road, 2 which was also
chosen by the B&DETC for one of its pioneer motor bus routes opened on 3 May
1913; another Dearne valley route served Goldthorpe. 3
Despite these fairly extensive transport facilities, they linked the
local communities in the valley either badly or not at all. A need for
improved transport was still clearly felt, 4 and the local authorities too
may have wanted to put forward a scheme as a counter to the M&STC plans. 5
Various abortive proposals for tramways had been made between 1901 and
1906, 6 but it was not until much later that the local authorities--at first
including Darfield--combined to produce a plan for a circular tramway and
branches to serve their area. 7 Darfield withdrew at an early stage, 8 and
other voices were raised in support of municipal buses. Bolton and Wath had
actually planned a joint motor bus service, but the idea was dropped on
expert advice, 9 and by 1913 Bolton seems to have wanted trolleybuses. 10
However in 1913 an extended tramway scheme was applied for under the
Light Railways Acts 1896 and 1912. The main line was to go right through
the valley, starting by a junction with the Barnsley tramway (railway 1) 11
ittee, 3 Jun 1913, 98. The particular Wombwell Minutes consulted consist of
two volumes containing only committee minutes (8/UD2/3-4) and eight includ-
ing full council minutes as well (8/UD1/11-18), these of course being part
of a longer series. References are to volume, meeting and page.
1. Denton, D. D. L. R., 4.	 2. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 465-6.
3. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 12.	 4. See SYRO, Brief 1914, 6-7.
5. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 542.
6. See Hall, 'Conurbation History', TR 7 (Autumn 1967), 56; (Winter
1967), 58 and 77-8; (Spring 1968), 116.
7. Ibid., (Autumn 1968), 148. 	 8. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 544.
9. SYRO, 8/UD28/9, Proofs of Evidence given before the Inquiry 21 Jul
1914, 8-9 (hereafter, Proofs 21 Jul 1914, document preceding page, as 9,8-9).
10. Denton, D. D. L. R., 6.
11. For legal reasons tramway or light railway proposals were not made
for complete systems or lines, but for separate sections known as 'railways'
or 'tramways', sometimes as short as a few furlongs.
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FIGURE 1
(reproduced from Hall, 'Conurbation History', TR 7 (Winter 1968), 181)
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and passing through Ardsley (2), Worsborough and Wombwell (3 and 4), Bramp-
ton (5), West Melton and Wath (6 and 7) with a deviation in Wath (6a) to
Adwick (8) and Manvers Main to join the M&STC line in Mexborough (9).
Branches were proposed from Wath to Stonyford Bridge (10), the Darfield
boundary; from Wath to Swinton, again joining the M&STC line (11--12a); from
Wath to Thurnscoe (13--17); and from Bolton to rejoin the main line at
Adwick (18--19a). 1
 About fifteen miles of line were proposed, 2of standard
gauge and mostly single track. 3
The DDLR4
 was promoted as a light railway, 5 and so the application was
heard by the three Light Railway Commissioners in a quasi-judicial form with
applicants and opponents being represented by barristers (twenty one of
them). 6 The inquiry was held at Barnsley in the period 26--28 Feb and
resumed in London over 2--10 Mar 1914; the minutes run to 778 pages. 7
Each side produced expert witnesses. The main ones for the proposers
were Stephen Sellon and Harry England. Sellon's firm had drawn up the
scheme and he himself was a senior figure in the tramway world--consulting
engineer to many tramways and the builder of some 800 miles of line, former
member of and witness to various government committees, Vice-President of
the Tramways and Light Railways Association. 8 Sellon made particular use of
his experience as Engineer and Managing Director of the Weymss and District
tramway, 9 a line which had many similarities to the proposed scheme. So did
the Wakefield tramways, of which Harry England was General Manager. 10
1. SYRO, Brief 1914, 1-3.	 2. Ibid., 4.
	 3. Ibid., 16.
4. The planned name was Dearne Valley Light Railway, but this was alt-
ered to suit the local railway company; see Goldthorpe Library, DDLR Joint 
Committee Minutes 1 Sep 1913--13 Jul 1923 (hereafter, JC Minutes), 37.
5. See Appendix G3/1 for the advantages of this procedure.
6. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 1-2. 	 7. Ibid., 249 and 778.
8. SYRO, Proofs 21 Jul 1914, 11/1.
9. Alan W. Brotchie, The Wemyss and District Tramways Co. Ltd., Tram-
ways of Fife and the Forth Valley--Part 3 (hereafter, Wemyss) (Dundee,
1976), 11 and 27.
10. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 379 and 778.
83
The main opponents of the scheme, who were the existing transport oper-
ators and a vociferous group of ratepayers, also had their expert witnesses,
chiefly an official of the BET and Mr. Cownie, Managing Director of the NECC
and a Director of the M&STC. 1
There were two main points at issue in the inquiry. First, were exist-
ing transport facilities adequate or not? As well as criticising the rail-
ways--who admitted they would lose traffic to a tramway--the promoters had
put forward a traffic census showing heavy potential demand.
2
Second, was a tramway the best means of satisfying this demand? Other
actual or potential transport undertakers put the case for their vehicles,
largely based on their lower capital costs. 3 Most of the argument was about
whether or not a tramway would pay. There was a difference of about £10,000
between Sellon's estimated profit of £4,750 per annum4 and the loss forecast
by Mr. Chivers of the BET. 5
After all the evidence had been heard, the inquiry was closed to await
the decision of the Commissioners. If an Order was granted it needed only
to be confirmed by the Board of Trade, 6 whereas under the Tramways Act parl-
iamentary approval was needed. 7
The Commissioners decided to grant the application, except for Wath to
Bolton (railways 13 and 14) and Manvers Main to Mexborough (9), where the
M&STC already had trolleybus powers; railway 8 could not be built without a
bridge over Wath Staithes level crossing, and a bridge was necessary for the
same reason at Elsecar. 8 Whilst accepting the latter,
9
 the DDLR Joint
Committee decided to appeal to the Board of Trade over the Bolton line. 10
1. Ibid., 1-2, 628 and 573.	 2. Ibid., 666-7 and 382-3.
3. See, for example, the M&STC's case for trolleybuses; ibid., 52.
4. SYRO, Brief 1914, 11.
5. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 644; for full details, see Appendix Dl.
6. Davies, Light Railways, 53.	 7. Claydon, 'Tramways Act', 280.
8. Hall, 'Conurbation History', TR 7 (Autumn 1968), 150.
9. Goldthorpe Library, JC Minutes, 40.	 10. Ibid., 39.
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However, although an inquiry was held at Bolton on 21 Jul 1914, 1 some corn-
plex legal action by the Great Central and Midland Railways led to the
appeal being ruled ultra vires. 2 Thus when the Order finally appeared in
19153 it was as outlined above, with the addition of a deviation railway for
the bridge at Elsecar. 4 Powers would lapse if construction was not com-
menced within three years or an extension of time were not granted by the
Board. 5
The Committee, advised by Sellon, were still unwilling to accept defeat
and made a new application to substitute railways 13 and 14 for 18 and 196
by means of an amending order. 7 A draft order on these lines was actually
published, 8 but the Commissioners deferred the local inquiry9 and the Com-
mittee itself decided to suspend all expenditure until the war's end. 10
In 1918 the Board of Trade granted an extension of time and the Com-
mittee decided to proceed with the draft order, 11 which would now need alter-
ing to increase the capital, fares etc in line with post-war prices. 12
Without the amendment, and without a bridge at Wath, the railways would be
in two halves; 13 given this, it was still believed they would be viable. 14
The opposition, taking into account the two to two-and-a-half times rise in
capital and running costs since 1914, 15 disagreed; one experienced witness
1. SYRO, 8/UD28/4, Light Railway Commission, Proceedings 21 Jul 1914.
2. Goldthorpe Library, JC Minutes, 70.
3. SYRO, 8/UD28/14, Dearne District Light Railways Order 1915 (here-
after, Order 1915).
4. Ibid., 6-11.	 5. Ibid., 21.
6. Goldthorpe Library, JC Minutes, 72. 	 7. Ibid., 80.
8. SYRO, 8/UD28/345, DDLR (Extension and Abandonment) Order 1916,2.
9. Goldthorpe Library, JC Minutes, 95. 	 10. Ibid., 96.
11. Ibid., 116.	 12. SYRO, Brief 1920, 6.
13. SYRO, Evidence of Arthur Richard Hoare (hereafter, Evidence
A. R. Hoare), 1; bound with above, but with separate pagination.
14. Ibid., 8-9.
15. SYRO, Proceedings 1920, 43.
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was the first to forecast an actual working loss.1
A draft order was then drawn up amending the route and doubling the
authorised capital and fares. 2 Further opposition was brought to bear to try
to prevent its confirmation by the new Ministry of Transport. 3 More signif-
icantly, an official told the Committee that tramways would inevitably be
loss-making4 and that motor buses alone might break even. However the law
only allowed existing tram operators to obtain municipal bus powers, 5 so
he recommended coming to terms with the B&DTC6
 to provide extra services. 7
8	 .
Mr. Hoare, senior partner in Sellon's firm since the latter 's death in
1919, 9 not unnaturally insisted that only a tramway could meet the traffic
demands; 10
 and, though somewhat imprecise on financial details at first, 11
by 1921 was forecasting a surplus of over £5,000 after capital charges. 12
Even though the Committee took Hoare's advice and obtained the confirmation
of the Order in 1921, 13 two years later some members were still uneasy and
Hoare had to assure the meeting that 'the statement as to Revenue, Working
Expenses etc was a very safe one'. 14
1. Ibid., 75.
2. SYRO, 8/UD28/474, DDLR (Amendment) Order 1920 (hereafter, Order
1920).
3. For example, SYRO, 8/UD28/476, Objections of the Motor Legislation
Committee to the Confirmation of the Order.
4. SYRO, 8/UD28/482, Notes on the Speech of Mr. Stanley of the Minis-
try of Transport . . . 15 Dec 1920 (hereafter, Stanley 1920), 5.
5. Ibid., 7.	 6. Ibid., 8.
7. The B&DETC dropped the 'Electric' from its title in 1919 and so is
hereafter abbreviated as B&DTC; see Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 18.
8. SYRO, Evidence A. R. Hoare, 1.
9. Goldthorpe Library, JC Minutes, 119.
10. SYRO, 8/UD28/484, Statement by Mr. Hoare . . . 3 Jan 1921, 3.
11. Ibid., 4-6.
12. SYRO, 8/UD28/488, Brief for Applicants at the Inquiry . . . into
the Confirmation of the . . . Order . . . 1921 (hereafter, Brief 1921), 7.
13. SYRO, 8/UD28/495, DDLR (Amendment) Order 1921.
14. SYRO, 8/UD28/544, Minutes of the Joint Committee 30 Aug 1922--15
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The tender of the Consolidated Construction Company was accepted ' and
work began at Thurnscoe in May 1923. It was later decided to build the
Swinton (Woodman Inn) branch along a different route in Wath, 2 this being
approved by another Order. 3 The completed sections were inspected by Major
Hall from the Ministry of Transport on 9 Jul 19244 and opened five days
later from Barnsley to Thurnscoe and Manvers. 5 The Woodman branch followed
on 29 Sep 1924, 6 but the Darfield branch and the outer end of the Manvers
Main line were not proceeded with at the time. 7 The total capital expended
to date was £279,215, of which £274,142 was loaned. 8
The Operating Period 
The DDLR was controlled by a Joint Committee comprised of represent-
atives of the four participating authorities. 9 The first Chairman was
C. H. Oxley, 1913--20, followed by A. E. Allott, 1920--1, M. Nokes, 1921--32
and G. Probert, 1932ff.1° Policy could also be debated by any of the UDCs
and major decisions were sometimes thrashed out at joint conferences of the
Councils.' 1 The Clerk to the Committee was Joseph Ledger Hawksworth, who was
also Clerk to both the Bolton and Thurnscoe UDCs and Accountant for the Wath
and Bolton Gas Board; 12 he kept all the Committee's minutes and accounts and
Dec 1932 (hereafter, JC Minutes), 26 Jan 1923. These minutes are bound in
date order but only numbered in series up to 9 Apr 1925 (p. 127). Minutes
of individual meetings are numbered internally, but erratically, so in these
circumstances citations are made by date of meeting only.
1. Ibid., 2 Feb 1923.	 2. Denton, D. D. L. R., 7.
3. SYRO, 8/UD28/496, DDLR (Amendment) Order 1924.
4. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 9 Jul 1924, 1.
5. SYRO, JC Minutes, 4 Jul 1924.	 6. Ibid., 26 Sep 1924.
7. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 1 Feb 1924, 2.
8. Denton, D. D. L. R., 7.
9. Goldthorpe Library, JC Minutes, 3.
10. From Goldthorpe Library and SYRO, JC Minutes, passim.
11. For example, see SYRO, JC Minutes, 27 Nov 1930.
12. SYRO, Proofs 21 Jul 1914, 9/1.
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normally attended all delegations etc.
Day-to-day control was in the hands of a General Manager, first Major
Fred Coutts, 1
 who had held a similar position at Paisley, 2
 and then when he
resigned in 1925, 3 his son Ronald.4
 Many staff accompanied Coutts down from
Scotland, where Glasgow Corporation had recently taken over the Paisley
system. 5
 Probably because of this influx and because the depot was rather
isolated, it was decided to take the unusual step of building a small estate
to house the staff6
 in Broomhead Road, now one of the few remaining relics
of the tramway.
Standard tramway track was laid upon a thick bed of concrete and paved
with stone setts, but most of the DDLR's track was laid on wooden sleepers
and paved in tarmacadam; there was also a short length of unpaved 'railway'
track near Bolton, 7
 which was equipped with signals. 8
 This construction was
adopted for economy and also for ease of repair in case of subsidence. 9
Most of the line was single track with passing loops, but there was double
track in the centres of Wath and Wombwel1.10
 Sections 8, 10, 12a and 18a
were never built, nor was the authorised connection made with the Barnsley
system. 11 The only alteration which may have happened was the lifting of
the final loop in Thurnscoe. 12 Current supply was from the mains via a DDLR
1. SYRO, JC Minutes, 30 Aug 1923.
2. Ian M. Coonie and Robert R. Clark, The Tramways of Paisley and Dis-
trict 1885--1954 (Glasgow, 1954), 12.
3. SYRO, JC Minutes, 11 Dec 1924.
	 4. Ibid., 27 Jan 1925.
5. Denton, D. D. L. R., 10.	 6. SYRO, JC Minutes, 18 Jan 1924.
7. SYRO, 8/UD28/501, Short Statement of Facts and Evidence . . . 1933
(hereafter, Statement 1933), 16-19.
8. Denton, D. D. L. R., 8.
	
9. SYRO, Proceedings 1920, 29.
10. Denton, D. D. L. R., 8.
11. SYRO, 8/UD28/510, Agreement as to the Abandonment of Light Railways
and Substitution of Omnibus Services 1932 7 (hereafter, Agreement 1932), 1.
12. SYRO, 8/UD28/546, DDLR Works Committee Minutes (hereafter, DDLR
Works Committee), 2 Jun 1926; cited by date of meeting only forsimilar reas-
ons to 1 JC Minutes'.
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TABLE 11
DEARNE DISTRICT: REVENUE ACCOUNT SUMMARY 1924-5--1933-4
Working Surplus
	
Working Deficit
Year	 (Pounds)	 (Pounds)
	
1924-5	 3,530
	
1925-6	 1,647
	
1926-7	 -	 2,458
	
1927-8	 4,196
	
1928-9	 1,102	 -
	
1929-30	 1,225	 -
	
1930-1	 -	 812
	
1931-2	 -	 2,054
	
1932-3	 -	 3,632
	
1933-4	 -	 1,4-35
SOURCE: SYRO, 8/UD28/558-67, DDLR Financial Statements,
passim, rounded to the nearest pound. These figures
agree with those in the Tramway Returns except for the
years 1926-7 and 1933-4; allowing for rounding errors,
the discrepancies are due to the omission of £65 bank
interest received in 1926-7 and of a proportion of the
payment for rates, taxes etc in 1933-4
substation and the standard overhead wires. 1
The depot, always known American-style as the Car Barns, was on Bramp-
ton Road, just outside Wombwell. 2
 There were thirty single-deck trams, in a
red and white livery and built by the English-Electric Company. 3
The main line from Barnsley to Thurnscoe took about ninety minutes to
traverse; the Manvers and Woodman lines were usually operated as branches,
though the cars normally ran to and from West Melton. 4 In 1932 every alter-
nate car was running through to the Woodman; there were four cars an hour in
the mornings and six in the afternoons5 plus, of course, any special workers'
or scholars' cars. 6 Fares were set at 11d. a mile and ld. for workmen, 7
but generally the latter only was charged with further discounts offered to
1. SYRO, 8/UD28/608, List Apparatus and Materials for Disposal 18 Aug
1933 (hereafter, Disposal 1933); no pagination.
2. Denton, D. D. L. R., 7.	 3. Ibid., 12.	 4. Ibid., 14.
5. SYRO, Statement 1933, 15.
6. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 15 Oct 1925, 6.	 7. SYRO, Order 1920, 4-5
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workers.1
It will be obvious from Table 11 that the financial situation of the
tramway was never good, and that it worsened considerably in later years.
However even notional 'profits' shown above were turned into losses when
interest and repayments on the massive capital debt were taken into account.
These losses, shown in Table 12 below, were borne by the constituent author-
ities.
TABLE 12
DEARNE DISTRICT: STATEMENT OF REVENUE CHARGES ALLOCATED TO THE VARIOUS
AUTHORITIES FROM 31 MAR 1925 TO 31 MAR 1933
Year
Profit
(Pounds)
Loss
(Pounds)
Loan Charges
(Pounds)
Net Charges
(Pounds)
1925 3,609 - 3,776 167
1926 1,462 - 12,137 10,676
1927 - 2,404 13,394 15,798
1928 4,196 19,155 14,958
1929 1,102 - 18,386 17,284
1930 1,225 - 18,159 16,935
1931 - 475 18,063 18,538
1932 - 2,054 17,952 20,005
1933 - 3,628 19,464 23,092
SOURCE: Table (same title) SYRO, 8/UD28/604; rounded to the nearest
pound. At present no explanation suggests itself for the sometimes
wide discrepancies between some of the profit and loss figures and
those in Table 11; in any case, the positive or negative result remains
the same. The breakdown of charges between the four authorities given
in the original is omitted.
From first to last, therefore, the DDLR minutes record varying degrees
of concern about the financial plight of the undertaking, and the efforts of
the Joint Committee were principally directed towards solving or mitigating
the problem. Their almost inevitable failure in the face of such odds was
sealed by the closure of the line on 30 Sep 1933, the trams being replaced
by buses of the Yorkshire Traction Company.2
1. SYRO, 8/UD28/609, Report on Workers' Fares etc, 12 Apr 1932 (here-
after, Fares Report), 1; part of a file of miscellaneous papers.
2. Denton, D. D. L. R., 23; the B&DTC became the Yorkshire Traction
Company (hereafter, YTC) in 1928 (see Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 18).
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Appendix D1 presents the finances of the DDLR in historical context
by calculating the estimated and actual profit and loss account in constant
1913 prices. From these figures it will be seen that though the DDLR's rev-
enue never reached the levels forecast by the engineers, neither did it fall
as low as all its critics had feared. The problem in respect of the operat-
ing ratio was that working costs were higher in real terms than anyone had
expected, which produced results varying from small surpluses to larger def-
icits. This was much what the opponents of the construction had prophesied,
though the result was not always achieved in the manner they had imagined.
What nobody grasped sufficiently was the size of the capital debt, which
made surpluses inadequate and converted bearable losses into unbearable
ones.
Why did the DDLR fail? On the basis of these figures one could argue
that it was insufficient revenue, excessive running costs or the high level
of capital repayments. At the cost of some unreality, each is examined sep-
arately below. The assumption, of course, is the old economists' adage
ceteris paribus'. If one assumes costs to be so-and-so, why did revenue
not meet them? and so on. Naturally, the failure of the DDLR was due to a
combination of all three variables in the financial equation, but one must
first separate in order to synthesise.
91
CHAPTER 4
REVENUE
Although looked at from the standpoint of 1913 or even of 1920, the
revenue achieved by the DDLR was not unreasonable and might have been ex-
pected to result in at least a break-even situation, receipts were in fact
wholly inadequate. Taking the figures as they stand, one could say that
this was due not to low revenue but to rises in costs. But this begs the
question, why did revenue fail to keep pace with cost increases? At least
three reasons can be isolated--the nature of the DDLR and of the area it
served, competition, and the economic conditions of the period.
The Area and its Tramway 
The DDLR was of a type of tramway relatively uncommon in the British
Isles though much more prevalent on the European continent. That is, it was
a line which connected a string of settlements rather than a line or lines
confined within the limits of a single town or city. Some evidence was add-
uced at the inquiries into the proposals to show that such lines, at least
in certain circumstances, were less viable than more strictly urban tramways.
The first point made was that the DDLR would not attract the level of
ridership and revenue expected by Sellon because of the nature of the area.
An interesting comparison was drawn with the Rhondda tramways, like the
M&STC a subsidiary of the NECC. 1 The original route there was built about
1902 and then served a population of 132,000. About 9 million passengers
were carried, so the population was carried 67.8 times per annum. In 1910
1. Bett and Gilham, Networks, 193.
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the line was extended to the top of the valley and by 1913 the population of
the whole area was 157,951 and passengers were 11,200,000, so the carrying
ratio had risen to 71 per annum. The point was that the Rhondda area was
exceptional, in that it was almost 'one continuous street of eighteen miles'
and densely populated. 1 The legally permitted maximum fare of id. was not
enforced and the id. fare encouraged traffic. 2 It was not believed that
these results would be repeated in the Dearne valley, 3
 where Sellon was
prophesying a carrying ratio of 80. 4
The basic reason why the Rhondda results would not be repeated was the
lack of pick-up traffic on the planned route. The crucial importance of
this was admitted by Harry England; tramway competition to the railways as
regarding through traffic from Thurnscoe to Barnsley would not be severe, he
said, 'it would be pick-up traffic which would be the important thing on
this line'. To put it the other way, according to a Wombwell resident who
opposed the scheme, it would take one-and-a-half hours by tram from Thurns-
coe to Barnsley; these passengers would travel by rail and the tramway
would not receive the higher long-distance fares, a point with which the
Chairman of the inquiry concurred. 5
The bulk of the revenue on the Rhondda tramways was received from
short-distance passengers, as shown by the analysis of tickets sold shown in
Table 13 overleaf. The very small number of long-distance fares in the
Rhondda was partly accounted for by railway competition along both branches
of the tramway. This was compensated for, however, by the high demand from
short-distance travellers. In the DDLR's case, it was submitted, this would
not occur, as the proposed line had no population at all on 50 per cent of
its route. The only pick-up traffic would be between Barnsley and Wombwell,
possibly also in Wath. 6
1. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 504-5; the opening dates given here con-
flict with those in Bett and Gilham, Networks, 96.
2. Ibid., 578.	 3. Ibid., 579.	 4. Ibid., 267.
5. Ibid., 578, 406 (quotation) and 567.
6. Ibid., 579, 577 and 580.
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TABLE 13
ANALYSIS OF TICKETS SOLD ON THE RHONDDA TRAMWAYS
WEEK ENDING 19 FEB 1914
Ticket
Value
(Pence)
Number
Sold
Receipts
(Pounds)
7 66 0.04 2 0.21
6 299 0.19 7 0.74
5 961 0.61 20 2.12
4 3,052 1.95 51 5.40
3 9,084 5.81 114 12.06
2 37,518 23.98 312 33.01
1 105,461 67.42 439 46.46
156,441 100.00 945 100.00
SOURCE AND NOTES: ticket sales from SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 579;
receipts and percentages calculated for this table, the largest
percentages being rounded up to make 100 per cent; the id. fares
include workmen's fares.
A comparison between the ticket sales of the two concerns whilst the
DDLR was operating is not possible because the ticket analysis books, at
least of the DDLR, have not survived. However it is possible to compare the
operating results.
TABLE 14
DEARNE DISTRICT: OPERATING RESULTS COMPARED WITH THE RHONDDA
TRAMWAYS 1927 -8 --1932 -3
1927-8 1928-9 1929-30 1930-1 1931-2 1932-3
DDLR
Income per route mile (E) 2;466 2,321 2,386 2,085 2,029 1,731
Passengers (ditto) 298,718 258,186 267,843 243,869 231,159 209,748
Operating Ratio (%) 88.45 96.65 96.38 102.60 107.13 114.21
RHONDDA
Income per route mile (E) 4,215 4,172 3,956 3,860 3,422 3,007
Passengers (ditto) 515,765 501,131 510,485 538,597 437,024 377,660
Operating Ratio (%) 90.18 86.41 91.33 92.06 95.52 98.43
SOURCE: Tramway Returns; passengers per route mile calculated for this
table from the figures in the Returns for passengers and car miles.
Even though the Rhondda tramways were clearly in decline by the 1930s,
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they still out-performed the DDLR in terms of revenue and passengers per
route mile by, in the case of passengers in 1930-1, more than 100 per cent.
If neither line had many long-distance passengers, then clearly there were
many more short-stage passengers in the Rhondda than in the Dearne valley,
exactly as the witnesses had indicated in 1914. The operating ratio of the
Rhondda Company was positive throughout and better than the DDLR's, except
in 1927-8 when the DDLR experimented with low fares. '
 The difference between
the two undertakings is somewhat reduced by the early 1930s, however, which
argues that, whilst the DDLR was a likely loser even in 1914 terms, small
tramways in general were facing harsher conditions twenty years later.
Whilst the lack of pick-up traffic could be shown to affect the partic-
ular prospects of the DDLR, the general point was also made that tramways
where the length of line was high in relation to population served would
show reduced receipts per car mile as opposed to those where the ratio of
line to population served was lower. Whilst this might theoretically apply
to an over-extended urban system, the most obvious cases were interurban
2
tramways.
3
 The example of Stalybridge was often quoted at the DDLR inquiry.
There a population of 92,000 was served by 21 miles of tramways with revenue
of 7.75d. per car mile; this was contrasted with Warrington, where 7 miles
served 86,000 people and earned 12.23d. The obvious reason was that rider-
ship per head of population would be about the same in both, but where this
was drawn out over a longer distance, the higher car mileage would result in
lower receipts per car mile. 4
Appendix D2 lists those electric tramways in Britain which could be
1. See below, 116.
2. 'Interurban' is not used in the American sense of a high-speed
electric railway, but of a street tramway outside city limits, more on the
European pattern once found in, for example, Belgium.
3. Though the BET, referring to the its Potteries' tramway, thought
that 'no lines paid better than those connecting towns' (Fulford, B. E. T.,
23). This however does not really contradict the points being made here,
for two reasons: (1) the Potteries was a fairly continuously built-up area,
more like the Rhondda than the Dearne valley and (2) the Dearne settlements
were more large villages than towns.
4. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 686.
95
classed as more than purely urban. If we compare the closure dates of
these with those for all tramways, the results are as follows.
TABLE 15
CLOSURE DATES OF INTERURBAN TRAMWAYS COMPARED TO THOSE OF ALL
ELECTRIC TRAMWAYS IN GREAT BRITAIN
All Tramways % Interurbans
Closed by 1930 46 30.26 16 44.74
Closed by 1940 117 76.97 33 86.84
Closed by 1950 136 89.47 35 92.11
Closed by 1962 151 99.34 37 97.37
Still open 1 0.66 1 2.63
Totals 152 100.00 38 100.00
SOURCE: All Tramways from Appendix G5 and Interurbans from
Appendix D2.
In the earlier decades there is quite a marked tendency for the inter-
urban lines to close at a faster rate. The percentage gap is gradually
reduced as the closure of all tramways accelerates and is in the end reversed
by the sole survivor, Blackpool. It is notable, though probably not signif-
icant statistically, that a number of the late survivors in the second group
were, like Blackpool, tramways with a heavy holiday traffic, such as Isle of
Thanet (closed 1937), Llandudno (1956) and Swansea and Mumbles (1960). The
DDLR was clearly not of this number.
One line in Appendix D2, the Sunderland District, provides an interest-
ing case study of a tramway which was very similar to the DDLR. Opened in
1906, 'the nature of the . . . system was essentially interurban, whereas
all successful networks were within towns, and its poor traffic, together
with local industrial troubles, was to be its undoing'. Bankrupted by a
Wearside shipbuilders' strike in 1909, the Company was in the receiver's
hands by 1913. In 1922 a national scheme aimed to cut tramwaymen's wages by
3s. a week, but the Sunderland District asked for 13s.; a proposal to break
1. Closure dates from Appendix D2.
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the resultant strike by blackleg labour was defeated by a threatened boycott
from the principal customers, local miners. The trams were by then vulner-
able to buses, particularly as the main route was indirect and Sunderland
Corporation had hindered the Company by refusing through running until 1921.
In 1924 the Company decided to substitute buses--the very year the DDLR
opened--which was done by summer 1925. 1
Both the general and the particular thus seem to support the contention
that interurban tramways were not particularly good investments in the
British context. 2 Some, like the Stalybridge and Sunderland systems, were
financial failures even before World War I; others, though successful at
that time, were also closing down by the inter-war years. Even against the
background of a general decline in the tramway industry, which became a
collapse in the 1930s, interurban lines disappeared at a markedly faster
rate.
Many of the doubts expressed at the original hearings into the DDLR
proposals could be rephrased as a belief that the undertaking was or would
be on the margin. This was so even in the relatively good environment for
trams in 1914. Looked at with hindsight, this was only to be expected.
Although no-one knew it at the time, the DDLR was destined to be the last
complete electric tramway opened in Britain; an undertaking constructed at
the end of a boom is more than likely to be marginal, all the better pros-
pects having been exploited first.
The marginal nature of tramways opened at a late date has been illus-
trated for West Germany in Figure 2 overleaf. None of the lines built after
1905 survived until 1980; and most of the survivors dated from 1876--1885. 3
1. Holding, Bus Services: North East, 52-3.
2. There are many examples of such lines being successful abroad,
certainly in the period under review.
3. A rather similar point is made in connection with Irish railways
in R. S. Joby, The Railway Builders (Newton Abbot, 1983), 97: 'over 800
miles of line had been completed by Dargan by the late 18500 , a quarter
of all the railways ever built in Ireland. The proportion of these remain-
ing in use today is nearer half, as the early lines were the key lines and
have so remained'.
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FIGURE 2
NUMBER OF WEST GERMAN TRAMWAYS OPEN IN 1926 AND 1980
31.12.
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SOURCE: Wolfgang Hendlmeier, Handbuch der deutschen Strassenbahngeschichte 
1, 45; this is evidently based on the opening and closing dates of all tram-
ways, not merely electric ones. The German words are as follows: Anzahl =
total; bis = up to; ErOffnung = opening; in Betrieb = in operation; still-
gelegt = closed.
Making a rough comparison with British experience, of the sixteen tramways
which survived after 1950, fourteenwere built in or before 1885, with only
the Llandudno & Colwyn Bay and the Grimsby & Immingham lines having been
built in the present century.1
The early criticisms made of the proposals for the DDLR thus seem to be
borne out in practice. The area did lack sufficient traffic to support a
tramway; interurban lines were risky ventures; and the whole scheme came too
late in the tramway era to stand much chance of viability.
External Economic or Legal Restrictions on Earning Capacity 
The economist's cover-all 'ceteris paribus' is a necessary assumption
when considering any one factor in the DDLR's troubles. The above section
has largely gone on the assumption, 'had 1914 conditions prevailed, would
the DDLR have proved a success?'. In this section the artificiality is to
1. See Appendix G5 for dates of closure, D8 for opening.
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ignore the existence of competition and to ask, 'what other external factors
affected the fate of the DDLR and how much?'.
The two basic restrictions on a tramway's earning power, assuming that
happy position of monopoly (which many effectively enjoyed prior to 1918),
were regulations to limit fares and the general economic climate in a part-
icular locality.
Maximum tramway fares were always fixed by the Act or Order which set
up the line. For many years these could not be altered without parliament's
authority, a fact which in itself clearly hampered tramways when dealing
with competition.
Under the 1920 (Amendment) Order maximum fares on the DDLR were set at
lid. a mile, but with a minimum of 2d. for any distance over half a mile.
Workers were to be charged id. and 11d. on the same basis. 1 Over most of the
line's history, however, the latter were the basic fares and workers were
offered a discount on these of about 40 per cent through the purchase of
twelve journey tickets at prices ranging from is. 6d. to 3s. 2
Clearly, the maximum fares in the 1920 Order did not restrict the DDLR
in themselves, because these fares were never charged. There are three
possible reasons why this happened: (1) because of competition along the
route; (2) because of the sharp fall in prices which started immediately
after the Order had been confirmed and which by 1933 had brought the whole-
sale price index down almost to its 1913 levelj 3 and (3) because the area was
economically depressed and the Joint Committee felt an obligation not to
overcharge.
As evidence for social conscience, the Committee did say in 1927 that
they had decided to increase fares to obtain a co-ordination agreement, but
only with reluctance, given the economic situation of the miners. 4
1. SYRO, Order 1920, 4-5; this draft Order was later confirmed, same
title and dated 1921, but only the draft exists in the archive.
2. SYRO, Fares Report, 1.	 3. See Appendix G4.
4. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 15 Mar 1927; where no page number is given,
there are none in the original.
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As well as working under legal maxima, tramways were also required to
sell workers' tickets at reduced rates. The DDLR actually fulfilled this
obligation by its basic fare tables, but still sold discounted tickets at
well below this rate. The manager would have liked to abolish such concess-
ions, or at least to reduce the discount to 25 per cent, but he certainly
felt unable to abolish the privileges entirely because of the need to retain
the goodwill of the public and because the YTC issued similar tickets on
their buses. 1 So it was not really social conscience which caused the DDLR
to offer such low fares, but competition.
The general tenor of the manager's statement was that fares were too
low. Much earlier a union representative had also referred to the 'unecon-
omic fares being charged , . 2 Though this was generally recognised therefore,
it was impossible to do anything about it, not because of legal restrictions
but because of competitive pressures on the tramway.
There was one legal obligation on the DDLR, however, which might have
made some difference. As well as workers' fares, they were also expected to
run workers' cars before 8.00 a.m. and after 5.00 p.m. 3 The early morning
cars were expensive to run, but the bus company had no such obligation.
4
However, though this may have marginally increased costs, it cannot
have been more than a very minor factor in the DDLR's difficulties. Legal
restrictions On fares charged were clearly not significant at all, because
commercial pressures and the generally falling level of prices made the
legal maxima unobtainable anyway.
The prospects of the DDLR were closely linked to those of the coal
industry. A table published in 1919 showed the works which would be served
by the proposed lines and the number of their employees. Only seven of the
twenty-one works were not collieries, and the latter employed over 91 per
1. SYRO, Fares Report, 1-2.
2. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 1 Apr 1925, 2.
3. SYRO, Order 1915, 62; provisions repeated in the 1921 Order.
4. SYRO, Fares Report, 2-3.
100
cent of the stated workforce)
Back in 1913 reference was made to the rapid population growth in the
area in the first decade of the century (as much as 72 per cent in Thurns-
coe) which, it was believed, would continue because of the increased output
of existing collieries and the development of new ones and of associated
industries all of which, it was said, 'were highly prosperous and constantly
increasing their demands for labour'. 2
The optimism with regard to the coal industry continued after the war
Hawksworth was to say at the 1921 inquiry that 'as the men are now being
quickly demobilised and in view of the developments at the collieries . . .
and the abolition of Coal Control, it is an acknowledged fact that the coal
output will be materially increased in the very near future'. 3
In fact there were already signs of an easing in demand for coal before
1913, but this was concealed during the war by the urgent need to maximise
production from a reduced labour force. By 1921 the post-war boom had
collapsed, signs of a long-term fall in demand had re-appeared and prices
fell catastrophically. There was a major strike by the miners against wage
cuts in 1921 and another, even longer, starting on 1 May 1926 with the Gen-
eral Strike. Both were unsuccessful, and towards the end of 1926 miners
gradually drifted back to work, having to concede a longer working day.
Throughout the inter-war years the industry remained weak, with high unem-
ployment and low wages, only 56s. a week on average in the last year of
peace. 4
The DDLR was thus built not in the prosperous environment foreseen by
the optimists of 1913 or 1920, but in a depressed area. The line had been
operating for only eighteen months before the 1926 strike began. Receipts
for the week ending 2 May 1926 were £593 5s. lid.; for the following week
1. SYRO, 8/1JD28/471, Table shewing Collieries etc . . . Aug 1919.
2. SYRO, Brief 1914, 11.
	
3. SYRO, Brief 1921, 6.
4. For the coal industry see R. S. Sayers, A History of Economic 
Change in England 1880--1939 (hereafter, Economic Change) (Oxford, 1967),
89-92.
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they were £84 8s. 8d. 1
 Over the eleven weeks prior to the dispute, the
average revenue was £651 us. id.; in the eleven weeks following it was
£390 19s. 2d., down by £262 lls. lid. Expenditure of £112 5s. 2d. was
saved, but there was still a net loss of £148 6s. 9d. 2 The receipts as com-
pared to the wage bill in the week ending 19 Sep 1926 were £431 18s. 9d.
versus £306 7s. 11d., 3 leaving precious little to meet other expenses. No
wonder that 1926-7 brought the first operating deficit.
4
The comparison with the Sunderland District is again interesting. That
line had been brought to bankruptcy in 1909 by a strike in the staple ind-
ustry, shipbuilding. However even after the Company abandon .alits trams
for buses, its troubles were not over, for the 1926 strike made it bankrupt
.5
again.
Minute after minute in the DDLR records continues to hark back to these
events in later years. Two years after the strike began it was said that
'the far reaching effect of the Industrial trouble in 1926 and the unfort-
unate position of the mining industry at the present time were to a large
extent responsible for the financial situation of the Committee'.
6
 There
was, it is true, quite a strong recovery in 1927-8, but after that it was
virtually downhill all the way, with a working deficit appearing again in
1930-1 and reaching crisis proportions in the following two years.
7
The fact that the coal trade in the area was severely depressed in the
early 1930s can be illustrated from the Quarterly Reports of the Manager of
the YTC. 8 In the first quarter of 1931 many mines were closing for periods
1. SYRO, 8/UD28/547, DDLR Finance Committee Minutes (hereafter, DDLR
Finance Committee), 13 May 1926 (date references as other minutes); of
course, the staff may themselves have been on strike in the first week.
2. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 21 Jul 1926.
3. SYRO, DDLR Finance Committee, 14 Oct 1926. 	 4. See Table 11 above.
5. Holding, Bus Services: North East, 52-3.
6. SYRO, JC Minutes, 3 May 1926.	 7. See Table 11 above.
8. YTC, Mr. Robinson's Reports to the Board, Dec 1929 to Nov 1937
(hereafter, Mr. Robinson's Reports); cited by date plus internal pagination
of the particular report.
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of up to eight days; people were managing with half pay and the dole. '
 By
March the following year 'the depression in the Coal Trade . . . was • • •
worse than at any period in our Company's existence'. 2
 In the quarter
July to September 4,750 miners had been discharged in the Thurnscoe, Womb-
well, and Doncaster areas, 3 and in the six months leading up to the end of
1932 out of 144 possible working days, collieries were idle for up to 66
days each. 4 The problem was the quota system, introduced by the coal owners
following legislation in 1930; this was a reasonably successful cartel arr-
angement to cut production and raise prices. 5 The trouble was it allowed
companies owning more than one colliery to concentrate on that with lowest
production costs, so the transport operator got reasonable business in one
sector and much less in another, but not to the extent that services could
be cut. So operating expenses remained high, whilst revenue fell. 6
 In the
quarter ending 31 Mar 1933 this resulted in even the YTC recording an oper-
ating deficit of £1,012, 7 the only time this happened during the period
1929--37. 8
It is fairly obvious therefore that the worsening position of the DDLR
in the early 1930s was partly due to the continuing troubles in the coal
industry. Table 16 overleaf summarises the DDLR's receipts and payments
account during its lifetime.
The major factor which caused the negative operating ratio in the period
1930-1 to 1933-4 was not any increase in operating costs; they in fact fell.
It was a sharp decrease in revenue, which collapsed from an historically not
unreasonable £33,000 in 1929-30 to only £25,000 in 1932-3, a fall of 25 per
cent. There were certainly other reasons for this change, but the state of
the coal industry was perceived then as the major cause. The reality of
1. Ibid., 31 Mar 1931, 1-2. 	 2. Ibid., 31 Mar 1932, 2.
3. Ibid., 30 Sep 1932, 2.	 4. Ibid., 31 Dec 1932, 3.
5. See Sayers, Economic Change, 91-2.
6. YTC, Mr. Robinson's Reports, 31 Dec 1932, 3.
7. Ibid., 31 Mar 1933, 1.	 8. Ibid., passim.
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TABLE 16
DEARNE DISTRICT: OPERATING RESULTS 1924-5--1933-4
Year
Receipts
£	 s d
Payments
f	 s d
Balance
f	 s d
1924-5 23,254 16 11 19,725 4 0 3,529 12 11
1925-6 33,866 2 5 32,218 13 0 1,647 9 5
1926-7 27,743 14 2 30,202 1 7 2,458 7 5
1927-8 36,204 13 9 32,008 1 10 4,196 1 11
1928-9 32,899 8 0 31,797 3 6 1,102 4 6
1929-30 33,838 8 0 32,613 12 5 1,224 15 7
1930-1 30,604 12 2 31,416 15 2 812 3 0
1931-2 28,788 5 11 30,841 19 0 2,053 13 1
1932-3 25,556 19 11 29,188 19 5 3,631 19 6
1933-4 12,067 12 0 13,502 18 1 1,435 6 1
SOURCE: SYRO, DDLR Financial Statements, passim; negative
balances underlined.
these difficulties is evidenced by the similar troubles affecting the YTC,
though being much larger and spread into areas like Huddersfield i not so
dependent on coal, it was able to survive relatively unscathed.
Having said all this, however, it remains true that even in its best
years, the DDLR was quite unable to earn enough revenue to cover its massive
capital debt. It is most unlikely that a booming local economy could have
reversed the situation, for there was a further and even more important
reason why the DDLR was unable to pay its way--competition.
Motor Bus Competition 
All the railway services mentioned earlier remained open throughout the
inter-war years, except for the former Hull and Barnsley branch to Wath on
which passenger services ceased on 4 Apr 1929, largely because of bus comp-
etition. 2 It is impossible to say how the remaining rail services affected
the DDLR, but usually tramways took traffic from railways, rather than
1. See map in Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 17.
2. Goode, Railways in South Yorkshire, 46.
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vice-versa. Both trains and trams were immensely vulnerable to the burgeon-
ing motor bus however.
Motor bus services in the Dearne valley followed the common pattern of
a multitude of small proprietors, often one-man, one-bus affairs, which were
later overtaken by a large 'Area' operator. The smaller businesses were
often very transitory and have left few records, except for those of local
authorities, who before the Road Traffic Act 1930 came into force in 1931
had to license vehicles and staff.
1
 Most pre-1914 buses seem to have run to
or via Wombwell, so taking this as an example, as early as 1913 the UDC had
licensed 24 buses or charabancs.
2
 A census taken in early 1914 logged 401
vehicles and 5,510 passengers at Wombwell Town Hall. 3
 A surprisingly large
number of buses continued to run during the war; 15 operators were licensed
by the UDC in May 1918
4
 and 5 more before the end of the year.
5
 By 1920
this total had risen to 31, running between them 63 vehicles. 6
 Though these
were small compared to modern buses, seating anything between 16 and 30
passengers,
7
 there were clearly a great many buses on the road well before
the DDLR opened; the other local authorities in the area would have lic-
ensed still more on routes not touching Wombwell, of course.
Very early on the B&DTC/YTC became by far the largest concern and oper-
ated over a far wider area than the Dearne valley alone. In May 1913 the
Company put five buses on the road
8
 on five routes; 9 by June 1931 they owned
202 buses used on local services ranging between Huddersfield, Pontefract,
1. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 18.
2. SYRO, Brief 1914, 8.
	
3. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 383.
4. SYRO, 1/11, Wombwell UDC Minutes, Finance and General Purposes
Committee, 7 May 1918, 24.
5. Ibid., 4 Jun 1918, 56; Council, 9 Jul 1918, 103; Highways and
Buildings Committee, 26 Sep 1918, 170. Note the random manner in which
the Council and various committees issued licences.
6. SYRO, 1/12-13, Wombwell UDC Minutes, passim.
7. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 36.	 8. Ibid., 36.
9.	 Ibid., 12.
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Doncaster and Sheffield, as well as long distance runs to Manchester, Birm-
ingham and London. ' By 1923 every DDLR destination and its entire route (to
be) was covered by the Company's buses. 2 A 1928 agreement to reduce or
eliminate bus services on the Thurnscoe and Woodman branches
3
 actually only
removed them from the short stretch from Wath to Bolton, the remainder being
covered by other services. The Wath to Bolton section was anyway used by
independent or 'pirate' buses, as was virtually every road of importance in
the area, except that from Wath to the Woodman. 4
On the direct road via Darfield Camplejohn Brothers had operated to
Great Houghton5
 and Thurnscoe since before 1920. The former service was
co-ordinated with others run by the B&DTC, S. McAdoo, L. Pepper and
G. White. 6
 Nothing further is known of Pepper; White first appears in the
Wombwell records in 1926 7
 and McAdoo, whose buses extended from Great Hough-
ton into Thurnscoe, was an old-established operator and had bought this
route from F. Oades in 1924. 8
 The other known operator in this direction
was F. Stewardson, who ran via Darfield and Goldthorpe and also from Great
Houghton via Thurnscoe and Goldthorpe to Doncaster. 9
 G. S. T. Deverew also
operated between Thurnscoe and Doncaster. 10
White also ran from Great Houghton down to Wombwell. 11 The Darfield
road was shared with a Camplejohn service to Wombwell which ran through to
Barnsley
12
 and the four members of the Darfield Bus Owners' Association,
Pickerill, Greenhow, Linley & Spencer and D. Smith running from Darfield to
1. YTC, The Yorkshire Traction Company Ltd., Return of Revenue and
Expenditure for the three months ended June 30th 1931 (hereafter, Quarterly
Returns, dated for end of period, no pagination); these returns exist from
this date to the quarter ending 31 Mar 1933.
2. See Appendix D3.	 3. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 27 Sep 1928, 2.
4. Denton, D. D. L. R., 18.	 5. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 65.
6. Denton, D. D. L. R., 16.
7. SYRO, 1/18, Wombwell UDC Minutes, Licensing Committee, 23 Feb 1926,
545.
8. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 66.	 9. Ibid., 56.	 10. Ibid., 18.
11. Ibid., 65.	 12. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 22 Nov 1927, 1.
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Wombwell only.1
From Thurnscoe or Goldthorpe down to Mexborough there were at least
four operators. In 1922 the M&STC introduced a motor bus to Bolton via Man-
vers Main.
2
 James Guest, trading as 'Blue Bus', had a network of routes in
the Mexborough area, one of which ran to Thurnscoe. 3
 Two small operators
also ran to Mexborough, Hollinshead & Stannard from Thurnscoe and, from
Goldthorpe, Mrs. J. Evans.
4
-
W. Cooper ran a bus from Brampton to Thurnscoe via Wath, at least from
1930-1
5
 and possibly much earlier. 6
On the Manvers branch R. Bates and later J. W. Frost ran one bus each
between West Melton and Mexborough. On the main line from Wath into Barns-
ley many of the small proprietors licensed earlier by Wombwell must still
have been running in 1923-4. Camplejohn ran through from Wombwell and
T. Burrows and Sons from Wath; their route was later extended from Barnsley
to Leeds and from West Melton to Rawmarsh. Various local buses also ran
between Stairfoot or Kendray and Barnsley only; 7
 one, Helliwell's, had
originally run as far as Wombwell, but was later confined to the shorter
distance.
8
Thus, by the time the DDLR opened the situation had changed radically
from 1914. Then motor buses had run little further than Wombwell and Dar-
field; now they covered the entire district, and the old idea of 'running
the buses off the road' was a far cry from reality.
This was evidently realised by the authorities and Wombwell UDC set
about a bold attempt to clear the road for the trams. From early 1924 they
1. Denton, D. D. L. R., 16.	 2. Ibid., 18.
3. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 55.	 4. Ibid., 57-8.
5. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 21 Sep 1931, 1.
6. A bus licence, without specifying the route, was issued to a
W. Cooper in 1920; see SYRO, 1/12, Wombwell UDC Minutes, Finance and General
Purposes Committee, 8 Apr 1920, 505.
7. Denton, D. D. L. R., 18; nothing more is known of Frost.
8. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 60.
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decided to try to restrict the number of bus licences issued. The B&DTC's
request to license eighteen new vehicles was turned down on the grounds that
there were already enough buses on the road and that congestion was caused
on Saturdays. '
 After some argument, the Company climbed down and agreed to
substitute six old licences for six new. 2
 By April both Wombwell and Wath
Councils3
 had decided to issue only short term licences to the B&DTC, to
expire in June when the trams would be running. 4
These temporary licences were later extended to September5
 as the open-
ing of the tramway was delayed; the same restrictions were applied to priv-
ate buses. 6
 In September the B&DTC and seventeen private operators appealed
to Wombwell against the expiry of their licences and the Council decided to
impose a new policy. They would issue no licences for the tramway route,
but only for four specified corridors leading to it; when buses reached the
tramway, passengers would have to change. 7
 Most smaller operators climbed
down and agreed to run a 'branch' service only--for instance, Aston to Jump,
Pickering to Low Valley 8--which accounts for the relatively small number of
firms running between Wombwell and Barnsley after 1924.
Had this arrangement stuck, it would have been a most sensible one.
German tramways have long been protected in this way. In Orzburg, for
instance, most tram termini include cross-platform interchange with suburban
and out-of-town buses, thus confining each mode to the job it does best
1. SYRO, 1/16, Wombwell UDC Minutes, Finance and General Purposes
Committee, 3 Jan 1924, 406.
2. Ibid., Highways and Building Committee, 26 Feb 1924, 503.
3. Bolton Council had also refused certain licences, so there was
probably a concerted policy by all the four authorities; the Ministry of
Transport held an inquiry into Bolton's refusal of licences in mid-1924. See
ibid., 1/17, Highways and Buildings Committee, 27 May 1924, 92.
557. 4. Ibid., 1/16, Finance and General Purposes Committee, 1 Apr 1924,
5. Ibid., 1/17, Highways and Buildings Committee, 24 Jun 1924, 149.
6. Ibid., 8 May 1924, 48.
	 7. Ibid., 16 Sep 1924, 305-6.
8. Ibid., 30 Sep 1924, 323.
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--buses to the lightly-trafficked outer routes, trams to the intensive town
services. ' Whereas in the very early days of motor bus operation this was
also done in Britain, it was later generally felt that the public would not
stand for a change of vehicle. In Sheffield, for example, the first motor
bus route of 1913 ran from a tram terminal; this system of feeder buses was
generally maintained up to 1925, but from then on buses were gradually ex-
tended through to the city.2
However in the Wombwell case the B&DTC and some of the larger independ-
ent operators appealed to the Ministry of Transport against the refusal of
licences; the Minister felt unable to support the Council in its outright
refusal to license competing buses,
3
 though he was prepared to enforce an
arrangement between all four UDCs, the B&DTC and other operators requiring
the latter to run to timetables, to co-ordinate their services with the
tramway and to fix their fares above those of the trams.
4
 Thus by 1926
though Wombwell and the other UDCs had succeeded in thinning out the number
of bus qerators on the main tramway and in obtaining some protection for
the trams, the B&DTC, Burrows and Camplejohn were still licensed to run
through to Barnsley.
5
A further problem was that small operators often ignored local author-
ity regulations altogether. In June 1925, for instance, two firms were rep-
orted to Wombwell for plying for hire without a licence;
6
 later in the month
four were fined, just £2 each. 7 Penalties were so inadequate that it was
often worthwhile for the 'pirates' to pay up and carry on. The problem was
1. Personal observation in 1983.
2. Sheffield Transport Department, A Brief History of the Progress of
Municipal Transport in Sheffield since 1896 (hereafter S.T.D., Brief Hist-
ory) (Sheffield, 1946), 15.
3. SYRO, 1/17, Wombwell UDC Minutes, Finance and General Purposes
Committee, 6 Jan 1925, 499.
4. Ibid., 1/18, Highways and Building Committee, 30 Nov 1925, 389.
5. Ibid., Licensing Committee, 23 Feb 1926, 545.
6. Ibid., Finance and General Purposes Committee, 3 Jun 1925, 83.
7. Ibid., Highways and Buildings Committee, 30 Jun 1925, 132.
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not really ended until the Road Traffic Act came into force in 1931 and
licences had to be obtained from the Traffic Commissioners instead. The
last unlicensed operator in the area was Mrs. Evans, who gave up when the
Commissioners refused her application. 1
The whole affair illustrates the general powerlessness of small local
authorities in the face of large and determined bus companies, or indeed of
many small and opportunistic ones. Local authority licensing powers dated
from the days of the horse and trap and were quite inadequate to deal with
motor vehicles.
2
 Whenever authorities tried to impose conditions beyond the
minimum conditions of vehicle safety etc, these were usually challenged and
found to be ultra vires. The difficulty experienced by Kircaldy Burgh
Council in keeping out competing buses has already been mentioned, and this
'undoubtedly hastened the end of both the Corporation and the Company
Demys0 tramways'. 3 The DDLR was faced with through bus competition from
the start, so this judgement must apply to it in even greater measure.
In a sense tramways, especially small ones, were drowned by the sheer
numbers of competing buses. This was not often due to the pirates alone,
because they were unco-ordinated and most local authorities made some effort
to control them. Where they did not, however, the results could be disast-
rous. The most famous case is that of the Potteries Company, where the
local authority, having no loyalty to a company tramway, licensed any and
every bus operator; at one time there were seventy, mostly running along the
eleven mile main tramway route. The Company whiek,faced with the uncertainty
of municipal policy, had not modernised their cars or layout, were totally
beaten and went over to buses themselves.
4
Pirate bus drivers were well known in the 1920s for their aggressive
tactics. When bus competition to the Wemyss tramway started two buses would
commonly run with each tram, one picking up passengers at the stop, the
1. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 58.	 2. Ibid., 21.
3. Brotchie, Wemyss, 51.
4. Dunbar, Buses, Trolleys and Trams, 76.
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other then passing to beat the tram to the next stop, and so on. ' Competit-
ion between bus companies was equally intense, with opponents cutting fares,
physically forcing other buses off the road, racing each other and even
resorting to ruses like painting vehicles to resemble those of competitors.
2
The DDLR seems to have been free of the worst excesses, but frequent
references are made to obstruction of the trams by buses, 3 a tactic which
could easily disrupt such a single—line tramway. Obstruction was still a
problem as late as 1931. 4 Tactics like those at Wemyss were also used. In
1926 the B&DTC was complaining that some buses 'run when it pays them to run
and . . . chip in immediately in front of the Company's buses and the
trams. 5
Area operators were in origin small firms themselves and only gained
their later semi—monopoly positions by means as ruthless as those of any
pirate, and B&DTC buses were amongst those obstructing the DDLR. 6 Most area
operators were, however, subsidiaries of larger groups. Most of the advan-
tages were financial, for instance economies derived from central purchasing.
7
Being part of a large concern, and also by operating over a wide area with a
big fleet, gave the financial resources to buy out competitors, which most
small operators could not hope to do. The YTC bought out most of the other
concerns in the Dearne valley, especially after the Road Traffic Act gave
the assurance that no new competitor could take the old one's place.
8
1. Brotchie, Wemyss, 48.
2. For examples of these practices, see R. C. Anderson, A History of 
Crosville Motor Services (hereafter, Crosville) (Newton Abbot, 1981), 10 and
15.
3. For instance, SYRO, JC Minutes, 18 Jul and 23 Aug 1924.
4. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 2 Apr 1931.
5. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 23 Nov 1926, 1.
6. SYRO, JC Minutes, 29 Aug 1924.
7. The BET formed the British Electrical Federation Limited in 1907 to
purchase stores in bulk; see Bett and Gilham, Networks, 193.
8. See Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 22 for one example involving a
purchase in the Penistone area.
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For instance in 1935 Bate's service from West Melton to Mexborough was pur-
chased for £4,250. 1 Being an area operator also meant that losses could be
sustained on one route by the profits earned elsewhere, so the large company
could usually outlast its rivals. This is just what happened with the DDLR.
In the first quarter of 1933 the YTC made a loss of £392 in the DDLR area; a
year later, after the takeover, this had been turned into a £1,660 profit,
even after paying £750 to the DDLR Joint Committee.2
Reference has been made above to the effect of through bus services on
a tramway. Those wishing to travel beyond the tramway would naturally use a
bus for the entire journey; the wide variety of destinations offered by YTC
buses in the Dearne valley must have taken many travellers from the tramway.
The Company was even able to deny the DDLR the centre of Barnsley, for the
intended and authorised connection to the Barnsley tramway was never made
and passengers--also including all independent bus passengers except those
of Burrows--had to get out at the inconvenient Doncaster Road terminus and
walk into the centre. 3 It had certainly been the intention of the Joint
Committee to build the junction, 4 and at first it probably was,' as Denton
believes, 5 the Company who turned this down. Certainly the matter went to
the Minister of Transport, 6 who presumably confirmed the DDLR's rights under
the 1915 Order. But later, to be fair to the Company, it appears to have
been financial stringency which caused the DDLR to defer the scheme,
7
 and in
1929 the Chairman of the YTC was even reported as being prepared to agree to
8
Many small tramways found themselves in a similar situation in the
1920s and 1930s, one of being surrounded by a larger bus operator whose
1. YTC, Mr. Robinson's Reports, 31 Mar 1935, 3.
2. Ibid., 31 Mar 1934, 2.	 3. Denton, D. D. L. R., 18.
4. SYRO, JC Minutes, 21 Sep 1923.
	 5. Denton, D. D. L. R., 8.
6. SYRO, JC Minutes, 12 Apr 1924.
7. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 6 Apr 1927.
8. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 18 Jan 1929.
it.
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through services reduced the tramway's revenue. Where the small concern
went over to buses on longer routes itself, it often managed to survive;
where it did not, it went out of business. 1 The Potteries Company, already
mentioned, is an example of a survivor; York Corporation Tramways of a
casuoAtr. Amongst the reasons for the latter's closure were the existence of
new housing estates beyond the tram termini and the fact that passengers
rode on private buses serving areas beyond the city. So in 1935 a Joint
Committee was set up with the West Yorkshire Road Car Company to operate
buses in York and the tramways were closed. 2
Apart from its somewhat half-hearted attempts to make the Barnsley
connection, the DDLR did make one serious effort to provide a service to
Rotherham, which was not served by a direct bus service. A connection had
been laid in at the Woodman with the M&STC tramway3 and grandiose plans for
through running with Rotherham and Sheffield Corporations were aired.
4
Typically, however, the matter was deferred. 5 Further moves were made in
1926, 6 but by the end of that year the M&STC had already decided to replace
its trams by trolleybuses and would have liked to extend the latter to
Bolton. 7 Possibly to keep its foot in the door for this, they did agree to
an experimental tram service, using their own cars. 8 A trial trip over the
DDLR as far as West Melton was made at 6.30 a.m. on 22 Jul 1927, 9 but public
1. Pilcher, Road Passenger Transport, 111.
2. M. J. O'Connor and G. J. Mellor, 'The Tramways of York', TR 3 (No.
19), 56-7.
3. Hall, 'Conurbation History', TR 7 (Spring 1969), 175.
4. SYRO, JC Minutes, 1 Aug 1924.
5. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 8 Dec 1924 (filed with, JC Minutes).
6. SYRO, JC Minutes, 18 Mar 1926.
7. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 11 Nov 1926.
8. Ibid., 6 Jul 1927. A DDLR car had been tried earlier over the
M&STC line, but had proved too long; see Hall, 'Conurbation History', TR 7
(Spring 1969), 175.
9. SYRO, JC Minutes, 18 Jul 1927.
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service did not begin until Tuesday 10 Apr 1928.
1
 Company cars were used to
provide the entire Woodman service, but operated by DDLR crews as far as the
boundary; one car an hour ran through. 2 The initial trial was to have been
for one month, 3 but for some reason the DDLR Manager discontinued it after
only one week. 4 In any case, the trams from the Woodman to Rotherham were
replaced by trolleybuses on 12 Mar 1929, 5 thus finally ending DDLR hopes of
any through services.
The kind of boundary disputes which stopped the link with Barnsley and
held up that to Rotherham until too late were all too typical of tramways in
general, and must have been a factor militating against them once buses
started running through. There were excellent examples of through running
in the tramway era; for instance Manchester had an arrangement with six
authorities for joint operation. 6 But in many cases the municipal boundary
was guarded jealously, particularly against encroachment by companies. But
municipal suspicions were often as strong. In the north-east, Wallsend
would not allow Newcastle's trams in until reassured that this was not the
precursor of absorption by the larger authority. 7 The old tramwayman's idea
that people would 'walk across the gap as they always do ,8 was all very well
when the tram had the road to itself; once buses filled the gap, passengers
had no need to use the trams at all when they wanted to make longer journeys.
The B&DTC route map in Figure 3 overleaf shows perfectly how motorbuses
filled the gaps between tramway services. Rather cunningly, the draughtsman
has not shown the Huddersfield tram service beside the bus route from Water-
1. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 5 Apr 1928.
2. SYRO, 484/Z1/1, Notice to Motormen, 1-2.
3. SYRO, JC Minutes, 20 Oct 1927.
4. Ibid., 19 Apr 1928; Hall believes the service ran on Saturdays
only for three weeks, but this seems wrong. See 'Conurbation History', TR 8
(Summer 1969), 195.
5. Goode, M&STC History, 24.
6. Finer, Municipal Trading, 281.	 7. Ibid., 282.
8. SYRO, Proceedings 1920, 29; A. R. Hoare's evidence.
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FIGURE 3
BARNSLEY AND DISTRICT TRACTION COMPANY ROUTE MAP 1924
SOURCE: Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 17; the DDLR is not shown because it was
not yet completed.
loo into town. But if, say, someone wanted to travel from Barnsley to
Rotherham they would take the bus via Chapeltown rather than use the DDLR,
when it opened, with changes at West Melton and the Woodman (marked '1' and
'2' on the map) on the way.
Some reasons for the ability of buses to attract passengers from small
tramways like the DDLR have been mentioned above. These include the large
numbers of competing buses resulting from weak legal controls, the thrusting
tactics of both small and large operators and above all the advantage of
being able to offer a lot of through services to places not served by trams.
Two other factors affecting the earning capacity of motor buses should be
mentioned--speed and comfort.
Before World War I the speed of a motor bus was restricted to twelve
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miles per hour. ' On 10 Oct 1928 this went up to twenty for all buses with
pneumatic tyres. 2 The B&DTC's first delivery of new buses with pneumatic
tyres took place at the turn of 1923-4, and since all older vehicles were
withdrawn by 1928, one may assume that the whole fleet was then fitted with
modern tyres. 3 Tramway speeds were fixed by the Ministry of Transport too,
but for each individual line or part thereof. The maximum speed on the DDLR
was sixteen miles per hour, but more often than not cars were supposed to
run at twelve, eight or even four miles per hour over particular stretches. 4
It was recognised at a meeting in 1928 between the YTC and the DDLR
that the raising of the bus speed limit had 'somewhat altered the position
and no doubt affected the relative position of the trams and buses , . 5 The
comment of Frank Collindridge, Chairman of the DDLR Finance Committee, is
worth reproducing in full:
The Joint Committee are faced with the fact that people show a preference
for the faster method of transport by the omnibuses than by the trams. I
have heard it said many times by people who are not hostile to the trams,
"It is a matter of getting a living with me, I have to get to and from my
work as quickly as possible and I must take a 'bus which gets me to my
journey's end more speedily.". (6)
It is not actually maximum speed which counts, but service speed. In
fact, the DDLR was not slow as tramways went, especially considering the
awkward single track layout. In 1930 its average speed was 8.35 miles per
hour, fifteenth fastest in the country and by far the fastest single line
system. The inevitable waiting at loops probably gave an impression of
delay,however, 7 and anyway buses were faster. In Manchester later in the
decade the average speed of trams was 8.6 and of buses 11.0 miles per hour,
a difference of nearly 28 per cent. 8 When the YTC scrapped their own trams
1. J. Graeme Bruce, A Source Book of Buses (1981), 18.	 2. Ibid., 26.
3. See Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 36 and Denton, D. D. L. R., 19.
4. SYRO, Clerk's Report, 9 Jul 1924.	 5. Ibid., 9 Nov 1928, 3.
6. SYRO, 8/UD28/501, Short Statement of Facts and Evidence . . •
(drawn up at the time of closure), 31.
7. Klapper, Tramways, 128.
8. Pilcher, Road Passenger Transport, 116.
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in 1930 the Manager said that the public much appreciated the change as the
time from Worsborough to Barnsley was reduced by as much as 50 per cent. '
Another point was that many destinations on the outer end of the DDLR
were served by direct buses on the top road via Darfield; it was obviously
much quicker for passengers from Goldthorpe or Thurnscoe to use the YTC ser-
vices in this direction than to go round via Wath on the tram. At a meeting
with DDLR representatives in 1930 Mr. Robinson put the latter's dilemma in
harsh terms--'if passengers are going to ride on the trams, they will have
to be forced to do so, especially in view of the fast moving vehicles of the
Traction Company and other omnibus proprietors , . 2
Apart from advertising campaigns, 3 public meetings, 4 and a short-lived
'Support Your Own Trams Movement' 5 backed by councillors and union members,
the Joint Committee made one bold and desperate throw to attract passengers.
Early in 1927 they decided to cut the fares drastically to a 3d. maximum, 6
which came into force on 1 Mar 1927. 7 Even though the B&DTC reduced its
fares to the same level, 8 DDLR passengers shot up to a record four million
in 1927-8, a year which also saw the best-ever working surplus. 9 Such unec-
onomic fares were still insufficient to meet capital as well as working
costs however, and in July agreement was reached with the B&DTC to raise
fares again to their 1926 levels. 10
The Committee also made an attempt to compete in terms of comfort.
Pneumatic tyres must have made a great difference to bus travel and in
addition, certainly by the time the DDLR opened, all buses had cushioned and
1. YTC, Mr. Robinson's Reports, 30 Sep 1930, 2.
2. SYRO, JC Minutes, 5 Feb 1930.	 3. Ibid., 22 Sep 1926.
4. Ibid., 8 Mar 1927.
5. SYRO, Clerk's Reports (n.d.; bound between 21 Jul and 22 Nov 1927).
6. SYRO, JC Minutes, 21 Feb 1927.	 7. Ibid., 24 Feb 1927.
8. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 18.
9. See Table 11, above.
10. SYRO, JC Minutes, 14 Jul 1927.
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sprung seats. Older buses in the Traction fleet were being replaced by mod-
ern ones too, such as the Leyland Lion with thirty comfortable seats, all
except one facing forward, modern lighting and a sleek appearance. By con-
trast the trams looked old-fashioned, and were indeed little different from
those built before the war. There were two wooden longitudinal seats down
either side of the saloon, whilst the internal decor and lighting gave an
impression which was less than inspiring.
1
In 1926 it was decided to put cross-seating in one car as an exper-
iment, 2 and when this proved a success to convert cars 26--30 inclusive.
3
Some short lengths of old seating were left in at each end for workmen in
dirty clothes, but the rest were replaced with transverse seats with polish-
ed wooden backs and cushioned seats; brighter lighting and a white ceiling
gave a much more cheerful impression. The modernisation was a great success,
but in the event only four cars were dealt with, 4 and when the Works Comm-
ittee proposed further 'additional seating' in the cars in 1931 the idea was
turned down as 'not opportune', 5 presumably on financial grounds.
Had the trams been palaces on wheels, they would scarcely have dented
the bus's hold on long-distance traffic. The replacement buses took only
fifty-five minutes from Thurnscoe to Barnsley; by tram, it had taken eighty
minutes. 6
The climate of thought in which the DDLR was proposed was one in which
trams had the road to themselves. Assuming for a moment that this had
happened, what would their revenue have been? Roughly, this should be the
total revenue of all road transport operators running over the line of route
--that is, the DDLR itself, the YTC and the independents.
The revenue of the DDLR is of course known. That for the YTC is given
1. Denton, D. D. L. R., 19, 12 and 14.
2. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 7 Jul 1926.
3. SYRO, JC Minutes, 18 Nov 1926.
4. Denton, D. D. L. R., 23; only 26--30 were suitable anyway.
5. SYRO, JC Minutes, 20 Aug 1931.	 6. Klapper, Tramways, 129.
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in various documents, but does not distinguish the Dearne routes precisely
enough. In 1928, however, when a revenue pooling arrangement was being dis-
cussed between the two, the YTC did give an estimate of their revenue.
TABLE 17
DEARNE DISTRICT: COMPARATIVE REVENUE OF THE YORKSHIRE TRACTION
COMPANY AND OF THE DDLR OVER THE TRAMWAY
Year ended	 YTCa	 DDLR
31 Dec	 (Pounds)	 (Pounds)
1926	 22,516	 26,887
1927	 23,296	 34,789
1928b
	
21,326	 32,477
SOURCE: SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 17 Dec 1928, 1.
a. YTC revenue included takings on most buses between
Barnsley and Stairfoot on routes diverting from the tramway at
the latter point and also on buses on the Darfield route as far
Wombwell Town Hall; see Clerk's Reports, 17 Dec 1928, 2.
b. Revenue for the forty-eight weeks ending 30 Nov 1928
was actually given; an average figure for the remaining four
weeks of the year has been added.
It is difficult if not impossible to calculate the revenue taken by
independent bus proprietors from the DDLR. This is partly because their
records have not survived, and also because their routes rarely followed the
tramway for their entire length. It is known that Bates's West Melton to
Mexborough service was taking £2,860 per annum in 1934; 1 perhaps half of his
route was over the DDLR Manver6 branch, so one might estimate a loss of
£1,460 to them. But this is the only definite figure for the independents'
receipts known. As a very rough guide, one might allow the same figure for
each of the following--Burrows, Camplejohn, Cooper and Frost--and also for
the groups of operators running between Barnsley and Stairfoot and between
Thurnscoe and Mexborough, which comes to £10,010 including Bates. This
still allows nothing for direct services to Bolton, Goldthorpe or Thurnscoe
via the top road, passengers on which, in the absence of buses, would have
1. YTC, Mr. Robinson's Reports, 31 Mar 1935, 3.
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had to go round by either tram or train, more likely the latter of course;
these services may therefore be ignored. Since prices fell considerably
between 1926 and 1934, the £10,000 must be expressed in the higher prices
current in the earlier period. This 'guesstimate' can then be added to the
figures for the other operators.
TABLE 18
DEARNE DISTRICT: ESTIMATED REVENUE ACCOUNT FOR THE DDLR
IN A MONOPOLY SITUATION
DDLRc
Working
YTCa Independent b DDLRa Total Costs Balance
Year (Pounds) (Pounds),, (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds) (Pounds
1926 22,516 14,227 26,887 63,630 52,853 10,777
1927 23,296 13,602 34,789 71,687 55,645 16,042
1928 21,326 13,477 32,477 67,280 57,072 10,208
SOURCES AND NOTES:
a. From Table 17.
b. Calculated as in the previous paragraph, corrected according to the
Wholesale Price Index in Appendix G4.
c. It is known that the DDLR's traffic was so low that it only needed
half its fleet in regular service (see Denton, D. D. L. R., 14). The total
revenue figures above are at least 100 per cent more than those actually
achieved and the DDLR clearly had some spare capacity to meet extra demand
without increasing its working costs much. However, costs would inevitably
have risen considerably in the long run through increased current consump-
tion, the employment of additional staff etc.; a seventy-five per cent rise
in working costs has been allowed over those actually recorded in the years
1926-7, 1927-8 and 1928-9 (from Table 16).
If the figures for all road transport operators are summed as in Table
18, this gives an idea at least of what the DDLR might have earned in the
total absence of the motor bus. It is obvious that the DDLR would have
been in a much better situation. However, in the years ending 31 Mar 1927,
1928 and 1929 the loan charges on the line were £13,394, £19,155 and
£18,386, 1 which in each case would have cancelled out the notional 'profit'
achieved above.
1. From Table 12.
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As a rough check on the figures, after the DDLR closed the YTC had an
arrangement with the Joint Committee to run the buses in the former DDLR
area on a separate accounting basis so the profits could be divided between
the Company and the Committee.
1
 In the last complete year of tramway oper-
ation the DDLR earned £25,557 versus working expenses of £29,189 2 over
744,200 cars miles. 3 In the first complete year of YTC operation, £52,080
was earned versus £40,614 expenses over 1,241,780 miles. 4 Taking £52,080 as
what the tramway might have earned without YTC competition and setting
against that working expenses at the same rate as that reported for the DDLR
in 1932-3 (9.41d5 ) for the higher mileage, a total of £48,688, one is left
with a working surplus of £3,392. This does not include an allowance for
the earnings of independent buses of course, but many of them had been taken
over by the YTC anyway by 1934, including the following of those 'allowed
for' in Table 18 (dates of takeover in parentheses)-- Guest (1928), Deverew
(1929), 6 Stewardson (1929), 7 Hollinshead and Stannard (1930), 8 Helliwell
(1933) 9
 and Mrs. Evans. 10 Even if something is allowed for the earnings of
such independents who remained on the road, like Burrows, it is evident that
the earnings of a virtual monopoly operator, as the YTC then was in the
Dearne area, were insufficient to pay the capital expenses of the DDLR.
It is evident therefore that even though motor bus competition was imm-
ensely significant in holding down the DDLR's actual earnings and in causing
its collapse, it was not the only factor. For as far as one can judge, the
DDLR would in no circumstances have been a financial success, given its
1. YTC, Dearne District Light Railway (typescript, 1950? ), 1.
2. See Table 16 above.
3. See Appendix D4, Ministry of Transport Returns.
4. YTC, Dearne District Operation 1950? , 1.
5. See Appendix D4, Ministry of Transport Returns.
6. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 56.	 7. Ibid., 57.	 8. Ibid., 58.
9. Ibid., 38 and 47.
10. Ibid., 58; ceased trading rather than being taken over.
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burden of debt.
In the real world of the inter-war years the DDLR had no hope of earn-
ing enough revenue to pay for its running and capital costs. Its actual 
revenue was low because of strong omnibus competition, aided by certain
inherent advantages of the motor vehicle, such as speed, comfort and mobil-
ity, and also by the inability of local authorities to control bus operation
at all successfully. The tramway was unable to compete adequately in terms
of speed or comfort, or to provide through services with the same ease as
buses could. However, even the DDLR's potential revenue in the absence of
bus competition would probably not have fully covered its capital outgoings,
and certainly left no reserve for later replacement of capital assets. This
was partly because of certain inherent disadvantages of the line and its
area, such as low traffic potential, a long and circuitous route and the
poor performance of the local economy. But it was also of course due to the
high level of the costs themselves. These costs will now be examined to see
how they affected the DDLR's position.
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CHAPTER 5
WORKING COSTS
The level of working costs incurred by the DDLR cannot be judged in
isolation. It must be measured against the hopes of the line's promoters,
against the general trends in prices in the inter-war years and against
costs incurred by other tramways and by motor bus operators.
The Pre-opening Comparison 
Appendix D5 gives a detailed breakdown of the DDLR's operating costs
during its working life. As has already been shown in Appendix D1, for the
two years there compared these costs were in real terms considerably more
than those prophesied by the line's promoters in 1913, though not as high as
later opponents of the scheme had feared. This means that either Sellon's
original estimates of running costs were inaccurate or that costs of oper-
ation rose significantly in real terms during the period between the plan-
ning and opening of the tramway.
Unfortunately Sellon was most imprecise about working costs and only
gives details for repairs and maintenance, for both the DDLR and the exist-
ing Wemyss tramway. Sellon was pressed hard on his estimate--given overleaf
in Table 19--and particularly in relation to the permanent way; comparison
with the actual costs for 1931-2 does indicate that this was one of two
areas where Sellon's figures were far too low.
His overall estimate of 5.97d. per car mile was supported by one of
5.5d. from Harry England, but an opposing witness could find only two
1. SYRO, Procedings 1914, 278-81. 	 2. Ibid., 387-90.
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TABLE 19
DEARNE DISTRICT: ESTIMATED REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE COSTS COMPARED WITH
ACTUAL COSTS FOR WEMYSS IN 1910 AND FOR THE DDLR IN 1931-2
IN PENCE PER CAR MILE
Item Sellon 1913a Wemyss 1910b DDLR 1931-2c
Permanent Way & Paving 0.30 0.243 0.53
Cars 0.45 0.63 042
e
Electrical Equipment 0.125 0.189
d
0.60 f
Buildings & Tools
SOURCES AND NOTES:
a. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 279.
b. Ibid., 281.
c. Figures from Appendix D5, converted to 1914 prices.
d. Includes 0.139d. for electrical equipment of cars, 0.030d. for
buildings and 0.020d. for workshops, tools and sundries.
e. This is assumed to be equivalent to 'Cars, mechanical' in accounts.
f. Includes all other relevant items in the accounts.
out of sixty or seventy tramways with costs as low as this, whilst the local
M&STC returned 7.4d per car mile. 1 Later evidence did mention the more
nearly comparable 6.4d. at Doncaster, 2 but this 1913 figure had risen to
3
7.72d. by the following year.	 In 1913 or 1914, then, these two near-by
tramways were turning in operating costs some 30 per cent above Sellon's
estimate for the DDLR.
Without as much evidence as one would like therefore, it seems reason-
able to suppose that Sellon was quoting figures which were just possible,
but which were unlikely to be obtained in practice, at least for any period
of time.
During World War I and afterwards the costs of tramway operation rose
alarmingly. When the inquiry was held in 1920 a doubling of money values
was evidently taken as a rule of thumb, for the promoters now expected rev-
1. Ibid., 510.	 2. Ibid., 684.
3. Calculated from the Tramway Returns for Doncaster, 1913-14; further
details for Doncaster will of course be found in Part III below.
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enue to be 20d. and working costs 12d. per car mile. '
 The latter did not
appear unreasonable when compared to other tramways in 1918-19; there were
twenty-one lines with working expenditure under 13d., including two similar
to the proposed DDLR, the Rhondda at 11.98d. and the Yorkshire Woollen at
11.00d. 2 The promoters even hoped expenditure would be less in the early
years when maintenance was low. 3
The problem in 1919-20 was that last year's priceswere little guide to
the current year's, and a distinguished witness for the opponents, Edward
Waller, believed costs should now be two-and-a-half times those of 1914 or
15d. per car mile. He also queried the wisdom of basing the estimate on the
early years of operation. 4
Figure 4 below shows that, when corrected for changes in money values,
the DDLR's costs in its first year of operation were actually below Sellon/
Hoare's 6d./12d. However the warnings given about basing the estimate on
the early years--even Harry England admitted 12d. was 'on the tight side,
and would definitely increase once the first two years of light repairs were
passed' 5--were amply borne out by the sharp rise in costs thereafter. It is
probable, therefore, that some of the discrepancy between the DDLR's pro-
jected and actual running costs can be attributed to a deliberate under-
statement on the part of the consulting engineers, whose opportunities for
profit lay in the construction rather than the operation of the line.
The Comparison with General Prices 
There are two main indicators of price trends in the inter-war years,
the Wholesale Price and the Retail Cost of Living Indices. 6 The former is
regarded as the more reliable,
7
 but although the DDLR was, for example, able
1. SYRO, Evidence of A. R. Hoare, 8-9.
	
2. Ibid., 21.
3. Ibid., 9 and Evidence of H. England (bound with Brief 1920), 7.
4. SYRO, Proceedings 1920, 84.	 5. Ibid., 47.
6. See Appendix G4.
7. Brian R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British Historical 
Statistics (hereafter Statistics) (Cambridge, 1962), 466.
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FIGURE 4
INDICES FOR COST OF LIVING AND WORKING COSTS OF BRITISH TRAMWAYS
AND THE DEARNE DISTRICT 1924-5--1933-4
126
to buy electricity at wholesale prices, most of its costs were closer to the
retail end of the market. It was, for example, the final purchaser of items
like tickets, uniforms and spare parts. So it is the Cost of Living Index
which is used as a yardstick in Table 20 and in Figure 4 which compare price
trends with the level of operating costs for tramways as a whole and for the
DDLR in particular.
TABLE 20
INDICES FOR THE COST OF LIVING, FOR BRITISH TRAMWAYS' OPERATING COSTS
AND FOR THE DDLR'S OPERATING COSTS 1924-5--1933-4
Year Cost of Living
Operating Costs
All Tramwaysc DDLR
d
1924-5 175.0 208.2 166.7
1925-6 176.0 201.6 186.1
1926-7 172.0 202.5 198.5
1927-8 167.5 191.5 178.4
1928-9 166.0 187.7 180.7
1929-30 164.0 185.9 175.7
1930-1	 , 158.0 185.0 168.8
1931-2 147.5 183.5 165.0
1932-3 144.0 177.6 157.6
1933-4 140.0 175•3e 149.7
SOURCES AND NOTES:
a. Calendar years 1924ff for Cost of Living and for Company tramways'
costs; for Local Authorities, including the DDLR, to 31 March the following
year.
b. Ministry of Labour Retail Prices (Cost of Living), reproduced in
Appendix G4; 1914 	 100.
c. Calculated from Gross Expenditure per car mile figures in Tramway
Returns; 1914	 100.
d. Calculated from Gross Expenditure per car mile figures in Appendix
D5; Sellon's 1913 estimate = 100.
e. 1933-4 figure is for Great Britain excluding London.
The high level of tramway operating costs post-war relative to the cost
of living is made plain in Figure 4, which is based on the data in Table 20.
The costs for tramways as a whole are far in excess of the Cost of Living
Index, and whilst those for the DDLR are less so, the variation from the
general price level is still wide and also much more erratic.
It is clear that the DDLR was not a high cost tramway. In fact, its
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costs were extremely low, being only 9.97d. per car mile' in 1930-1, which
compared with 12d. in London and 18.57d. in Colne. 2
 The DDLR's cost advant-
ages included single track--obviously cheaper to maintain than the usual
double--and the fact that it was eleven years newer than any other tramway. 3
It is unlikely that all DDLR costs moved at the same rate. Table 21
shows how the five main areas of expenditure moved in relation to gross
costs.
TABLE 21
INDICES FOR DDLR WORKING EXPENDITURE UNDER INDIVIDUAL HEADS
Year Traffic
General
Repairs &
Wtenance
Electrical
Power &
Energy Salaries
General
Expenses
Gross
Costs
1924-5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1925-6 102.9 150.3 100.8 93.2 132.9 111.7
1926-7 102.1 164.5 122.4 106.8 129.1 119.1
1927-8 98.1 161.3 83.8 93.8 141.7 107.0
1928-9	 , 100.2 158.7 90.5 95.4 121.5 108.4
1929-30 93.7 158.7 90.0 90.9 126.6 105.4
1930-1 92.9 149.0 86.3 95.4 107.6 100.2
1931-2 90.3 147.1 85.5 90.9 102.5 99.0
1932-3 89.5 120.6 83.0 93.2 111.4 94.6
1933-4 89.5 107.1 78.0 88.6 93.7 89.8
SOURCE: based on the figures in Appendix D5.
The final column obviously mimics the costs displayed graphically in
Figure 4; that is, a sharp rise to 1926-7 followed by a gradual fall except
for a further slight rise in 1928-9. The particular items of expenditure
which are most above average and most regularly so are Repairs and Mainten-
ance and General Expenses; the Power index also behaves somewhat erratic-
ally.
1. Figure quoted by Klepper, Tramways, 128. He does not specify the
year concerned, but he starts with 10.08d., which is the 1930-1 sum listed
in Appendix D5. From this he subtracts 0.11d. for the cost of housing,
which was clearly not a normal expense for a tramway.
2. Ibid.
3. Aberdare and the Notts & Derby systems both opened in 1913 and were
otherwise the final new tramways; see E. Jackson-Stevens, 100 Years of 
British Electric Tramways (Newton Abbot, 1985), 94-5.
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For these to have any significant effect, they need to be fairly large
components of expenditure; even a big index rise on an item contributing,
say, 5 per cent to costs would have little effect on the total. Table 22
shows that Repairs and General Expenses combined made up 23.53, 31.70 and
29.14 per cent of costs in the three selected years; a large, and except for
a fall in the Repairs percentage in 1932-3, 1
 a rising proportion.
TABLE 22
DEARNE DISTRICT: MAIN CATEGORIES OF EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGES OF
GROSS EXPENDITURE FOR THREE SELECTED YEARS
Year Traffic Repairs Power Salaries General Total
1924-5 47.81 15.59 24.20 4.46 7.94 100.00
1928-9 44.21 22.80 20.20 3.89 8.90 100.00
1932-3 45.31 19.82 21.24 4.31 9.32 100.00
SOURCE: based on figures in Appendix D5.
The actual effect of changes in the costs of Repairs/General Expenses
can be calculated by subtracting the actual expenditure under these heads
from gross costs, adding to this a figure representing constant 1924-4
costs
2
 and indexing the result. 3 This is done in Table 23 overleaf.
When drawn onto Figure 5 as revision (A) it will be seen that adjusting
for a nil increase in Repairs/General Expenses actually brings the DDLR's
costs below the cost of living for most years, thus demonstrating that the
initial increases and continued high levels of these expenses was the major
factor in keeping the tramway's operating expenditure above average prices.
It is noticeable, however, that the two peaks in 1926-7 and 1928-9 in
1. Probably due to a cut-back in maintenance because of the like-
lihood of closure or sale at that time.
2. Constant 1924-5 costs are not, of course, 2.34d., but this figure
corrected for inflation or deflation by the Cost of Living Index for the
year concerned over the base year's (i.e. 1924-5); for 1927-8 for example,
2.34 x 167.5+ 175
	 2.24.
3. The final index is produced using Sellon's 5.97d. as a base; for
1927-8 again, 9.27 x 100
	 5.97	 155.3.
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TABLE 23
DEARNE DISTRICT: ACTUAL WORKING COSTS IN PENCE PER CAR MILE ADJUSTED FOR
(A) CONSTANT REAL REPAIR AND GENERAL EXPENSES 1924-5--1933-4
(B) CONSTANT REAL POWER EXPENSES 1924-5--1928-9 AND
(C) CONSTANT REAL TRAFFIC EXPENSES 1928-9
Year
Actual
Gross Costs
Less Actual Plus
Notional	 Costs
Gross Costs	 1913
Index
.
Costs (A),
(B) or (C)
Indexed
1924-5 Costs
(A) Repairs and General Expenses
1924-5 9.95 2.34 2.34 9.95 166.7
1925-6 11.11 3.38 2.35 10.08 168.8
1926-7 11.85 3.57 2.30 10.58 177.2
1927-8 10.65 3.62 2.24 9.27 155.3
1928-9 10.79 3.42 2.22 9.59 160.6
1929-30 10.49 3.46 2.19 9.22 154.4
1930-1 10.08 3.16 2.11 9.03 151.3
1931-2 9.85 3.09 1.97 8.73 146.2
1932-3 9.41 2.75 1.93 8.59 143.9
1933-4 8.94 2.40 1.87 8.41 140.8
(B) Power Expenses
1924-5 9 .	 a95 2.41 2.41 9.95 166.7
1925-6 10.08 2.43 2.42 10.07 168.7
1926-7 10.58 2.95 2.37 10.00 167.5
1927-8 9.27 2.02 2.31 9.56 160.1
1928-9 9.59 2.18 2.29 9.70 162.5
(C) Traffic Expenses
1928-9 9.59 4.77 4.52 9.34 156.4
NOTE:
a. The figures in the remainder of this column are not Actual Gross
Costs but Notional Gross Costs from section (A).
the original curve are not entirely eradicated. Evidently certain other
costs were behaving erratically here. Reference to Table 21 shows that the
Power Expenses index rose in both of those years, so this may be the cause.
When the same calculation as for repairs etc is carried out and transferred
to Figure 5, revision (B), we see that Power Expenses do indeed explain most
of the remaining rise in operating cost for 1926-7, but not for 1928-9.
Again from Table 21, we see that the other costs which rose in 1928-9
were Traffic and Salaries. Discounting the latter as only a small propor-
tion of total costs and performing the standard calculation for Traffic in
1928-9 only, we get the result indicated in revision (C) on Figure 5; that
is, it was Traffic Expenses, added to Repairs etc., which caused the rise in
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costs that year. The reasons why these cost variables behaved as they did
are examined below.
The level of detail available in each category of expenditure differs
and gaps have sometimes to be filled by conjecture. Taking first the two
consistently above average groups, Repairs and Maintenance with General Ex-
penses, almost all the numerous items under the latter head are very small.
Only two made anything like a significant contribution to costs per car
mile--Fire Insurance and Rates, Taxes and Licences. Insurance was charged
at a fairly steady £550--600 mark over the life of the DDLR, though it was
lower in the first incomplete year and very low indeed in the last. This
fairly unvarying premium would tend to keep General Expenses up in cash
terms, and thus over the period to make them rise in real terms.
The same is true of Rates, Taxes and Licences which, again discounting
those untypical first and last years, rose from 1925-6 to 1927-8 and then
fell gradually from then until 1932-3, only in the latter year going below
the amount charged in 1925-6. Once more, given the general fall in the cost
of living, this would tend to cause a rise in real costs. The largest item
was rates. In April 1932 it was stated that £1,025 was payable to the var-
ious local authorities. Presumably this relates to 1931-2, when the total
of Rates, Taxes etc. was £1,130, all but £100 therefore being rates. This
clearly worried the Committee. In 1924 they succeeded in getting a reduc-
tion from £1,287 to £743, but later the sums must have gone back up. In
1928 it was hoped to reduce the assessment again. A meeting was held with
the Inspector of Taxes in Doncaster in June and, since the amount payable
for Rates, Taxes etc. does begin to fall from 1928-9, presumably the Joint
Committee was successful in reducing both the tax and the rating assessment,
1. Details of expenses in this section, where otherwise unacknow-
ledged, are from Appendix D5.
2. SYRO, JC Minutes, 16 Oct 1924.
3. Ibid., Special Committee, 27 Jan 1928.
4. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 11 Jun 1928.
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or at least in curbing their rise.
However the DDLR actually paid far less in rates than it would have
done had it been constructed under tramway legislation. Light railways were
allowed a 75 per cent reduction like main line railways, 1 much to the chagrin
of the latter. 2
 Moreover, rates were in one way not a real burden on the
municipally-owned DDLR. Taking the figure for 1932, only £111 of this went
to outside authorities, namely Barnsley, Rotherham and Swinton. 3 All the
rest was paid to the four owning councils, and since the DDLR was regularly
'on the rates' this might validly be regarded as a contribution towards its
own deficit. Even so, to the management rates were an outgoing and with
fire insurance combined to keep General Expenses at a high level.
Again taking full years of operation only, Repair and Maintenance was
below £7,000 only in the first two and the last of these. The initial rise
in repair costs has already been partially explained as a natural result of
the 'running in' of a new system. The marked fall in 1932-3, which would
have been continued in a full year at 1933-4 rates, was no doubt partly due
to falling prices, but more to the general acceptance that closure was inev-
itable. It was specifically said early in 1933 that there was to be no fur-
ther unnecessary expenditure on the track, 4
 whilst serious negotiations with
the YTC had been under way since 1932. 5
 It is thus probable that the mark-
edly lower maintenance expenditure from 1932-3 would not have happened had
continued operation been seriously envisaged. Table 21 shows that these
costs were almost the same in real terms in 1925-6 and 1931-2 and that be-
tween those dates they had risen and then fallen. Here again is 4factor cal-
culated to keep DDLR costs above the generally declining price level.
Appendix D5 shows that following the first year of low repair costs
1. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 617.
2. See ibid., 612-27, for long legal arguments on this matter.
3. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 21 Apr 1932.
4. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 2 Feb 1933.
5. SYRO, JC Minutes, Sub- (or Special) Committee, 14 Jan 1932.
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the more important components of this item all showed either a fairly con-
stant level of both gross and mileage costs (track, roadway and electrical
equipment of line) or actually rose (cars, especially mechanical). Against
the background of generally falling prices there can be two explanations-41)
that these particular unit costs were acting untypically or (2) that the
amount of work done, and hence of wages paid and materials used, was increas-
ing over time.
As to (1), there is some evidence that wages in the tramway industry
had a tendency to creep gradually up in the period up to 1932, in which year
some were reduced. In 1925 permanent way workers were granted an extra ld.
an hour or 3.8 per cent; the following year overhead linesmen's pay went up
to 60s. per week; in 1927 the permanent way foreman received an extra 5s. a
week; and in 1930 the electrician's pay rose by ld. an hour. ' So there was
a tendency for wages in the maintenance departments to rise, inevitably aff-
ecting costs.
In 1932 the National Joint Industrial Council for the Tramway Industry,
to which most tramways had belonged since 1917, 2 recommended wage cuts for
some tradesmen. 3 This would have been a further contributory factor in the
fall of maintenance costs from 1932-3.
So far as the costs of materials used for repairs are concerned, very
little specific information is available. The ledgers and minutes do not
give this level of detail. Comparing the costs of constructing the DDLR's
track with costs quoted later gives some idea of how prices of repairing,
rather than constructing track must have behaved. The capital cost of the
DDLR's permanent way was £139,453. 4 Taking the single track mileage as
17.98, 5 this works out at £7,756 per mile. This may be compared with
1. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 8 Aug 1925, 6 Jan 1926, 4 May 1927 and
3 Jul 1930.
2. DCT Jubilee,11.	 3. SYRO, JC Minutes, 17 Mar 1932.
4. SYRO, 8/UD28/609, Miscellaneous Papers re. Abandonment (hereafter,
Misc. Papers), Evidence of J. L. Hawksworth, 7.
5. Tramway Returns, Appendix D4.
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£15,776 per mile for double track about 1929; if we assume single track was
half this, the 'going rate' was £7,888. This undoubtedly conceals a fall in
costs, for the latter refers to a standard of construction far superior to
that of the DDLR; there was a seven inch concrete foundation, for instance,
and sett paving, 1 both absent over much of the DDLR's length.
About the only case where one can compare prices of materials from one
year to another bears out the idea that such prices were falling during the
DDLR's lifetime. In June 1927 the purchase of car tyres in the rough from
John Baker and Company was minuted at £3 is 3d. each, 2 by November 1930 the
same firm was quoting only £2 17s 9d., 3 a difference of 6 per cent. One
cannot build a case on one item, but it is at least an indication that
prices of materials were falling, and by almost exactly the same as the
cost of living, where the index fell by 9.5 points or 5.7 per cent over
the same period. 4
Taking wages and materials together, it would seem that wages rose
somewhat over the period up to 1932 whilst material costs fell. Without
having much more detail, it is impossible to say whether these 'cancelled
out' to produce
	
'no change',	 or whether unit costs of repairs
rose or fell. It seems certain, however, that they could not have fallen as
fast as the cost of living and would therefore have contributed towards
keeping overall repair costs up.
Going back to point (2) above, it is obvious that more maintenance
would be required as time passed. On the one hand, various items of equip-
ment had to be purchased out of revenue in the early days--for instance, a
tar boiler at £28 in 1925, 5 a welding plant for £91 in 1927,
6
 more welding
plant at £43 in 1928,7 oxy-acetylene cutting equipment at £16 in 1930 and
1. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 56.
2. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 2 Jun 1927. 	 3. Ibid., 6 Nov 1930.
4. See Appendix G4.	 5. SYRO, DDLR Works Committe, 4 Jun 1925.
6. Ibid., 1 Sep 1927.	 7. Ibid., 7 Jun 1928.
8. Ibid., 6 Mar 1930 (filed with, DDLR Finance Committee).
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a rail grinder and other apparatus from the YTC at an undisclosed price in
the same year.
1
Regarding repairs themselves, there does seem to be an increasing
amount of attention given to track and overhead as the years pass. Most of
the items are unfortunately not costed. In June 1925 the track and margins
2
were to be sprayed with tar; 3 this was probably an annual requirement. In
1931 a purchase of seventy tons of Shell spray and 400 tons of slag
4
 implies
that some resurfacing was now needed as well as spraying. In fact the Man-
ager said about this time that though the rails might have a life of twenty
years, resurfacing would be necessary once or twice in that time. 5 The
first major item of overhead maintenance is reported in 1927, when the
poles and standards were to be repainted at a cost of £150. 6 Apart from
regular maintenance, repairs and renewals were required from time to time,
sometimes due to subsidence. 'The occurrence most remembered took place on
Kendray Hill, near Barnsley, when, one morning, the rails were forced to a
height of seven feet or so in the air, taking both the sleepers and the tar-
mac with them'. 7 In other cases, alterations were made, often for reasons
unconnected with the tramway itself. For instance, in 1930-1 the improve-
ment and widening of Houghton Road, Thurnscoe necessitated resiting some
poles8 and changing the level of the rails9 at a cost of £245;10 and in I31
the track near Swinton Common was to be resited at the request of the West
Riding County Council (hereafter,WRCC).11 Work done in effect for the good
1. Ibid., 2 Oct 1930.
2. That is, the eighteen inch wide margin for which a tramway was res-
ponsible under the 1870 Act and also presumably applied to light railways.
3. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 4 Jun 1925. 	 4. Ibid., 2 Apr 1931.
5. SYRO, JC Minutes, 11 May 1931, Local Authorities' Conference.
6. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 2 Mar 1927.
7. Denton, D. D. L. R., 15.
8. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 3 Jul 1930. 	 9. Ibid., 2 Oct 1930.
10. SYRO, DDLR Finance Committee, 5 Feb 1931.
11. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 7 May 1931.
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of other road users was thus chargeable to the tramways' account. By this
time however 'wear and tear' was obviously becoming more of a problem; for
example in 1931 the Manager recommended the renewal of the rails on Stair—
foot Hill. '
There is rather less detail available on cars repairs and improvements,
though it is known that a few cars were fitted with a new seating arrange-
ment; this was costed at £25 exclusive of labour.
2
 However the rising
amount which would have needed spending to keep the fleet up to date is ind-
icated by the £5,550 which was estimated as required to meet motor bus
standards in 1933. 3 The purchase of items such as car tyres has already
been referred to above.
There is therefore enough evidence to show why Repair and Maintenance
costs rose over most of the DDLR's lifetime. It was partly because at least
some of the costs involved, and particularly wages, did not fall in line
with the cost of living, but more because the need for repairs naturally
grew as the equipment aged.
Turning to Electric Power, it had originally been intended that the
DDLR would build its own generating stations at Wath and Wombwell,
4
 but in
the event the Committee decided to buy from Barnsley within that Borough and
elsewhere from the Yorkshire Electric Power Company Limited. 5 Electricity
was first supplied by the former on 6 Jun 1924 and by the latter on 18 Jun
1924, 6 presumably for test running and driver training before the opening.
The agreements with the two bodies differed in that the one with the
Company was much more flexible in regard to price. The Barnsley agreement
was to run for seven years before a revision could be sought, 7 whereas the
other specified three years 8 and was also subject to variation up or down
1. Ibid., 7 May 1931. 	 2. Ibid., 7 Jul 1926.
3. SYRO, Statement 1933, 15. 	 4. SYRO, Order 1915, 15-16.
5. SYRO, JC Minutes, 9 Mar 1923.	 6. SYRO, Statement 1933, 2.
7. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 31 May 1929.
8. SYRO, 8/UD28/541, Copy Agreement: Conditions of Supply, 31 Dec 1923
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with the cost of coal and with peak load. ' The Barnsley current came at the
line voltage of 550v. d.c., 2 whereas the Company's supply was three-phase
a.c., which had to be converted to d.c. at the DDLR's Wath sub-station. 3
Appendix D6 gives the actual amounts charged by each supplier. The
Barnsley agreement was much the simpler, being based only on a charge per
unit used. A sliding scale starting at 1.7d. for the first 200,000 units
and then falling by 0.1d. for every additional 75,000 units caused the
first part year's charge to be high because consumption was low; thereafter
the charge settled down to around 1.65d. per unit until it fell sharply in
1932. As early as 1929 the Joint Committee had entered into negotiations
for a reduction in charges, even though the seven year period was not up.
In support of their case they said that Barnsley already charged the B&DTC
less and the Power Company charge to the DDLR was also less. 4 Agreement was
not reached until 1932, when Barnsley did cut their charges by, on average,
over 0.30d. per unit.
The Yorkshire Company's charging system was much more complex, being
made up of a charge of 10s. per kilovolt ampere (KVA) of maximum demand in
any one month, a charge of ld. per unit consumed and an adjustment up or
down for the cost of coal. 5 Even though a revision was possible after three
years, no change was ever made, presumably because the average charge per
unit fell by 15--20 per cent in any case. The reasons for this are a little
complex.
Since the KVA and unit charges remained unchanged, 6 one might have
1. Ibid., (later draft) 1 Oct 1924.
2. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 6 Oct 1931.
3. SYRO Misc. Papers, 18 Feb 1933. The electricity supply industry at
this period was in the hands of a mixture of private and public concerns,
like the public transport industry itself. Further details can be found in
Leslie Hannah, Electricity before Nationalisation: a study of the electric-
ity supply industry in Britain to 1948 (1979).
4. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 31 May 1929.
5. SYRO, Copy Agreement: Conditions of Supply, 1 Oct 1924.
6. Calculated from Appendix D6; see Table 24 overleaf.
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expected the unit price to remain the same also. However, two factors com-
bined to reduce it. First, the Coal Compensation Clause operated in the
Company's favour from 1924 to 1927, whilst thereafter it operated in favour
of the DDLR or was not applied. This was only a very small addition to or
subtraction from the price however. The really significant factor was a
fall in the gross amount paid in KVA charges, to 88 per cent of the 1925
charge in 1926, to 83 per cent in 1927 and to around the 76--77 per cent
mark thereafter. This did not actually result in a fall in the average
price per unit in 1926 because far less units were used, obviously because
of the effects of the industrial unrest; thus less units had to carry a
TABLE 24
DEARNE DISTRICT: VARIATIONS IN THE PRICE PER UNIT OF ELECTRICITY PURCHASED
FROM THE YORKSHIRE ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY
Year
Price
per
Unit
d.
Price
per
KVA
s./d.
Fall in Gross
KVA Charge
1925 . 100%
%
KVA Element
in average
price per unit
d.
Coal
Control
Clause
d.
Average
Price per
Unit (a)
d.
1924 0.5 9/6 - 0.55 0.07 1.12
1925 0.5 10/0 100.00 0.49 0.02 1.01
1926 0.5 10/0 87.76 0.50 0.05 1.05
1927 0.5 10/0 82.72 0.40 0.08 0.98
1928 0.5 10/0 77.06 0.38 0.01 0.89
1929 0.5 10/0 77.16 0.36 0.00 0.86
1930 0.5 10/0 74.84 0.37 0.00 0.87
1931 0.5 10/0 75.81 0.35 0.00 0.85
1932 0.5 10/0 76.10 0.35 0.00 0.85
'
SOURCE: calculated from data in Appendix D6.
a. The 1928 and 1930 figures are slightly higher than those in App-
endix D6, presumably due to rounding errors.
still large KVA charge. But thereafter the trend of consumption is broadly
up, and with more units used in the period 1927-32 than in 1925, except for
1928, the already lower gross KVA charge could be spread more thinly, so
giving a lower average price per unit; the amount per unit attributable to
the KVA charge is calculated above in Table 24.
One must assume that the KVA charge fell because of more economical
operation of the tramway. Because the KVA charge was levied on maximum de-
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mand in any one month, any reduction in that peak requirement would have the
effect of lowering the price, even on a larger overall consumption. This
may have been achieved by cutting the number of cars used at times of peak
traffic demand, 1 which may well have happened as traffic fell from its peak
of 42.5 million to only 29.7 million in 1932-3. 	 It is also noticeable that
in 1927-8 the amount of traction units consumed per car mile falls to a
lower level and then falls again between 1931-2 and the closure, this time
quite markedly. 2 This is the equivalent of miles per gallon on a motor
vehicle and could have been a deliberate effort on the part of management to
encourage economical driving. 3 On the other hand, falling consumption could
have been more directly related to falling traffic, for if less passengers
were carried in each car, the weight, and therefore the power consumption,
would also be reduced, again with the effect of 'trimming' the peak demand
and hence the Power Company's KVA charge.
There are several problems in assembling this data to give a correct
picture of the DDLR's electricity costs. First of all, the amounts paid to
Barnsley Corporation and to the Company have to be summed, together with the
costs of converting the latter's supply to d.c.. According to one source,
conversion costed 0.30d. per unit. 4
 When the calculation is made, however,
the resultant annual costs are far too high in relation to those in the
Tramway Returns. If, however, the cost of conversion is taken to be the
account entry for wages, 5 the sums work out more-or-less exactly, if allow-
ance is made for a second problem: the fact that the electricity charges
discussed above relate to calendar years, the DDLR accounts to years ending
1. In support of this, one car was taken off the road during the first
financial year; see SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 1 Apr 1925.
2. Tramway Returns, reproduced in Appendix D4.
3. For an example, see the Wrexham tramway company, which had a very
strict set of rules designed to encourage economical driving; H. G. Dibdin,
'The Tramways of Wrexham and District--1', TR 15 (Spring 1984), 144.
4. SYRO, Misc. Papers, 18 Feb 1933.
5. That is, sub-station attendants' wages; see Appendix D5.
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TABLE 25
DEARNE DISTRICT: POWER COSTS 1924-5--1932-3
Year (a)
'Cost of Power
bought from
Suppliers (b)
£
Ditto, from
DDLR Acc-
ounts (c)
£
Cost per Unit
from col.	 (2)
based on units
supplied (d)
d.
Ditto
based on
MOT
units (e)
d.
Ditto, from
col. (3) and
based on
NOT units
d.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1924-5 3,439 -4,773 1.41 1.05f 1.46
1925-6 7,090 7,034 1.27 1.41 1.40
1926-7 6,464 .7,514 1.32 1.49 1.74
1927-8 7,171 6,074 1.26 1.42 1.20
1928-9 6,389 6,418 1.17 1.31 1.32
1929-30 6,640 6,741 1.15	
.
1.25 1.27
1930-1 6,502 6,475 1.13 1.27 1.17
1931-2 6,556 6,451 1.13 1.29 1.27
1932-3 6,110 6,201 1.06 1.27 1.29
,
SOURCES AND NOTES:
a. Calendar years for data derived from Appendix D6; financial years
ending 31st March for DDLR Accounts or Tramway (i.e. MOT) Returns.
b. Cost of current supplied from Appendix D6 plus cost of conversion
(wages) for nearest equivalent financial year from DDLR Accounts (Appendix
D5); e.g. power costs for 1924 plus wages for 1924-5.
c. This does not exactly match the previous column because the figures
are for different periods; in particular, the 1924-5 figure is for approx.
six months in col. (2) and for nine in col. (3). As a check on the accuracy
of the calculations, if half the electricity cost (£1,421) for the six month
period in which the DDLR continued running in 1933-4 (not in the Table) is
added to col. (2) to make the periods covered similar, the totals of the two
columns are then £57,781 (2) and £57,681 (3).
d. That is, costs from col. (2) divided by units supplied from App-
endix D6.
e. The same, but divided by the number of units from the Tramway
Returns (Appendix D4).
f. Untypically low because it is based on six months supply divided
by nine months consumption; in this case col. (4) is more accurate.
31st March. Finally, if one sums the Barnsley, Power Company and wages
costs and divides this by the number of units supplied to get the cost per
unit, one gets a quite different result to that obtained by doing the same
using the units supplied quoted in the Tramway Returns. It can only be
assumed that there is some significance in the fact that the latter are
always carefully described as Ministry of Transport units, and that these
1. Calendar years for power, wages nearest financial year.
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are larger than the units normally used in the electricity industry. Table
25 above illustrates the conclusions.
The differences between columns (5) and (6) will largely be due to the
discrepancy of three months in the periods covered. Thus, for example, the
difference in the years 1926-7 and 1927-8 is shown to be minimal when the
two years are averaged, the result being 1.46 in column (5) and 1.47 in
column (6); evidently the price per unit must have continued to rise sharply
in the first three months of 1927, a fact picked up in 1926-7 in the siacznxi
column but not until 1927-8 in theScest.
Figure 5 and Table 21 above show that the amount paid per car mile for
electricity tended generally to decrease over time, except for a sharp in-
crease in 1926-7 and a smaller one in 1928-9. That in the former year was
evidently due to the rising price per unit shown in the final columns of
Table 25. Taking calendar years, though consumption and hence the gross
charge--column (2)--actually fell in 1926, this caused the KVA charge and
the costs of conversion to be spread over less units, so causing the price
per unit to rise. The high rates obviously continued into 1927, though
paradoxically this time because of increased consumption which would have
affected the peak load requirement and hence put up the KVA charge. The
rise in consumption in early 1927 would partly be due to recovery from the
strikes and partly to the DDLR's low fare experiments, starting in March,
which must have resulted in fuller and perhaps more cars.
The second 'price peak' in 1928-9 is not really significant, because it
is purely a function of where one puts the boundary, at December 31st or
March 31st. Whereas the latter shows a rise in both gross and unit costs,
the former shows the steady decline from 1926-7 is continuing.
The main effect of electricity charges on gross costs was thus to acc-
entuate the problems caused by the 1926 strikes and their aftermath, rather
than being a consistently inflationary factor like repairs.
Salaries and Traffic Expenses, the last two important categories in
Table 21, may usefully be coupled together since the major component of
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the latter was wages. ' Salaries were only a small proportion of expenditure
2
and did not vary greatly in cash terms. Indeed the Committee seized the
opportunity afforded by the appointment of a new manager in 1925 to cut his
salary from £600 to £450. 3 Many other salaries were extremely low, though
small rises were given from time to time; for instance, a new scale for
female clerks in 1927 ranged from £35 to £70, and at the same time some
other salaries were increased by between 2s. and 5s. a week. 4
Wages on existing tramways had risen sharply during and after the
war, but by the early 1920s a scheme of wage cuts in line with deflation
was being carried out. By 1924, however, the National Joint Industrial
Council was seeking to standardise and increase wages again. Undertakings
were to be grouped on the basis of size and of the cost of living in their
areas; there were four groups, group 1 including the highest wage-payers
in the most expensive areas of the country. Wages were to be the group
average plus 10 per cent. 5
The DDLR therefore opened at a time of wage stability. In fact, the
gross amount payable in wages varied very little from 1925-6 onwards, except
for 1926-7 when the strikes would have caused less hours to be worked;
the tendency of the payment per car mile to fall was due to the generally
rising car mileage. 6 It seems to have taken some time to establish which
group the DDLR should be in. Right at the start the Committee decided to
1. For example, in 1927-8 traffic accounted for 43.86 per cent of ex-
penditure, and wages alone were 33.42 per cent of total costs and equal to
the sum of the first three items on the expenditure side in Appendix D5.
2. 3.82 per cent in 1927-8.
3. For Major Coutts's salary, see SYRO, JC Minutes, 30 Aug 1923; for
his son's, ibid., 27 Jan 1925. Actually £450 was quite generous. In 1922
Great Yarmouth paid its new manager only £400; see T. Barker, Transport in 
Great Yarmouth 2: Electric Tramways and Petrol Omnibuses 1919--1933 (here-
after, Transport in Yarmouth) (Bristol, 1983), 19.
4. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 4 May 1927.
5. See T. Barker, Transport in Yarmouth 2, 1, 24, 30 and 42; by early
1919 the town was paying 20s. as a war bonus on wages.
6. See Appendix D5.
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pay full wages despite the fall in the cost of living, 1 but the maximum for
drivers was only 59s. a week. A deputation from the Transport and General
Workers Union wanted the group 1 rate of 63s 6d., 2 whilst the Committee
offered group 3, pointing out that the M&STC only paid group 2; 3 this was
the compromise level eventually agreed on. 4
In 1924-5 the wages of motormen and conductors had cost £6,969 over
about nine months of operation; in a full year this would have been approx-
imately £9,292. The first complete year at the new rates cost £10,291, a
rise in the wage bill of £999. This is reflected by the highest ever cost
per car mile in 1925-6. 5
Despite this, the DDLR wage bill was obviously fairly moderate, or its
general level of costs could not have been so far below that of other tram-
ways. Two actions of the Joint Committee probably helped to achieve this.
First, even before the wage rise, they were cutting back on staff numbers as
the disappointing traffic results became evident. The unions were complain-
ing that since the opening one car and two crews had been taken off the
road. 6 Second, the decision was taken very early on to employ conductresses
rather than conductors. 7 It is not quite clear if any men were employed,
but it seems probable they were as two conductors were in a union delegation
and their pay scale is also specifically mentioned, 53s. 6d. a week. 8 Den-
ton's recollection is however of girls only. 9 In a heavy industrial area
with little female employment, this made sense. But it also had the advant-
age of very low pay scales, rising with age from 25s. to 35s. a week for a
twenty-four hour week.10 A month later, when the Committee agreed to advance
1. SYRO, JC Minutes, 18 Jul 1924.
2. SYRO, DDLR Works Committee, 5 Mar 1925 (bound with Clerk's Reports)
3. Ibid., 1 Apr 1925.	 4. SYRO, JC Minutes, 9 Apr 1925.
5. See Appendix D5.	 6. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 1 Apr 1925.
7. SYRO, JC Minutes, 6 Mar 1924.
8. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 5 Mar 1925.	 9. Denton, D. D. L. R., 10.
10. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 5 Mar 1925.
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the motormen from group 3 to group 2, they refused any advance for the con-
ductresses,l probably reflecting the difference between a plentiful supply of
cheap female labour and the more scarce commodity of skilled drivers.
Various wage and salary awards were made over the next few years, but
these were generally small and involved only ancillary or office staff, not
the main body of employees on the traffic side. In March 1932 most wages
covered by the National Council were reduced, the majority by id. an hour. 2
So wages paid to motormen and conductresses fell from £10,389 in 1931-2 to
£10,189 in 1932-3, a drop of £200 a year.3
With these exceptions, however, once wage rates were established in
1925, they remained the same throughout the tramway's life. The rate per
car mile did tend to fall, but only because mileage was higher. Wages,
which were so large a proportion of expenditure, thus tended to keep costs
at a constant level in cash terms and thus, in a period of declining prices,
higher in real terms. The 1932 cuts were a recognition of this, but it was
obviously easier to raise wages regularly, as Yarmouth had done in 1919-20, 4
than it was to reduce them.
To sum up this section, if one takes the cost of living index as the
average, then it is evident that tramways were a high cost industry. 5
 It is
not surprising therefore that the DDLR's costs were above this average too,
even though they were lower than for tramways in general.
The sharp rise in costs per car mile up to 1926-7 against a background
of generally falling prices was due to two factors-41) the rise in general
expenditure and in repair and maintenance costs, in particular the latter,
and (2) the peculiar causes making electricity prices go up in 1926-7.
Thereafter gross costs fell at about the same rate as the cost of liv-
ing index, but having peaked so far above this were never again brought down
to the same level. The major factor keeping costs relatively high was the
1. SYRO, JC Minutes, 9 Apr 1925.	 2. Ibid., 17 Mar 1932.
3. See Appendix D5.	 4. Barker, Transport in Yarmouth 2, 2 and 8.
5. See Figure 4.
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increasing burden of repairs, which cancelled out much of the benefit of
falling costs elsewhere.
None of this would have mattered if the operating costs of competing
modes, especially motor buses, were the same. But they were not.
The Comparison with the Motor Bus 
The great commercial advantages possessed by even early motor buses as
compared to railed transport were their low capital costs and high mobility.
However these were not matched by either reliability or economy in oper-
.	 1
anon. Many bus ventures lost money and were quickly withdrawn. For
example, the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway started a service in Chorley,
Lancs., about 1907 but withdrew it in January 1911 after making losses. 2 On
the other hand, the LGOC was profitable, 3
 largely due to its development of
the reliable 'B' type bus which, its reputation enhanced by wartime service,
really established economical and reliable motor bus operation in London and
the provinces. 4
The YTC's offices were burnt out on 7 Dec 1929, destroying all traffic
records, 5 which means that detailed costs are available only for later
dates, 6 except for a summary record going back to 1928. 7
Table 26 overleaf summarises this latter source and contrasts it with
both the DDLR and the YTC's own tramway. The expenses of the latter are at
all times higher than those for the buses. The DDLR's costs were, as men-
tioned already, untypically low and the Barnsley tramway was being run with
minimum maintenance prior to closure. 8 So in normal conditions tramway costs
1. See above, 29 and 30-1.
2. Cummings, Railway Buses 1, 59-60.
	 3. See above,S1.
4. Humpidge, 'Development of the P.S.V. I , 1-2.
5. YTC, Mr. Robinson's Reports, 18 Jan 1930, 3.
6. In YTC, Quarterly Returns; figures go back to April 1930.
7. YTC, Mr. Robinson's Reports, passim.
8. Ibid., 18 Jan 1930,1; 31 Mar 1930, 1; and 30 Jun 1930, 1.
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would have been even higher. In Barnsley, with mostly double-deck tramsl
running on a short urban system, this could be compensated for by much
higher earnings per car mile than the buses; for the DDLR this became in-
creasingly impossible to do.
TABLE 26
REVENUE ACCOUNT FOR YORKSHIRE TRACTION BUSES AND TRANS AND FOR THE DDLR
1928--1937 IN PENCE PER CAR MILE
Year (a)
Buses	 (YTC) Trams	 (YTC) Trams (DD R)
Rec. Exp. Bal. Rec. Exp. Bal. Rec. Exp. Bal.
1928 10.71 9.87 0.84 14.07 12.94 1.13 11.16 10.79 0.37
1929 10.11 9.10 1.01 13.83 12.38 1.45 10.88 10.49 0.39
1930 (b) 9.75 8.59 1.16 14.47 12.94 2.92 9.82 10.08 0.26
1931 9.30 7.77 1.53 - - _ 9.19 9.85 0.66
1932 9.29 8.16 1.13 - - _ 8.24 9.42 1.17
1933 (c) 9.53 8.49 1.04 - - _ 7.99 8.94 0.95
1934 9.53 7.85 1.68 - - _ _ - _
1935 9.33 7.61 1.72 - - - - - -
1936 9.61 7.50 2.11 - - - - - -
1937 (d) 9.82 7.67 2.15 - - - - - -
SOURCES: YTC figures from Mr. Robinson's Reports, passim; DDLR figures from
Appendix D5.
a. Calendar years for YTC, March 31st the following year for DDLR.
b. YTC trams to closure on 31 Aug 1930 only.
c. DDLR to closure on 30 Sep 1933 only.
d. Eleven months only.
Appendix D7 makes a detailed comparison between YTC and DDLR costs for
the years ending 31 Mar 1931 to 1933. Precise comparisons between the two
modes are not always possible, 2 but with so wide a gap between them, this is
not too important. YTC running costs--those which varied directly with
mileage--are always at least 25 per cent lower than the DDLR's; the gap is
increasedto more than 50 per cent in 1932 when other--or overhead--costs are
added. In one particular the DDLR does not come too badly out of the comp-
1. Wringatej H. Bett and JEOhn) C. Gilham, The Tramways of South 
Yorkshire and Humberside (hereafter, SY&H Tramways), ed. J. H. Price (n.d.),
40.
2. Where does one put bus tyres, for instance? The YTC puts them under
running costs, whereas DDLR tramcar tyres are classed as car repairs.
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arison. Its costs were falling between 1931 and 1933 whereas those of the
YTC were rising. But this would have promised no salvation for (1) DDLR
revenue was also falling, (2) this is a comparison between a declining 'min-
imum maintenance' situation and an on-going operation and (3) the YTC's
costs also resume a generally downward trend in 1934.
To some extent the differences in costs will represent economies of
scale rather than absolute differences in the costs of running trams or
buses. There is, for instance, a wide discrepancy in office/administration
charges. There is no reason to suppose bus companies could obtain these
services more cheaply. 1 But whilst the DDLR employed a General Manager and
an office staff to operate thirty cars with an annual mileage of 748,125,
2
the YTC's staff supervised 185 vehicles over 7,808,585 miles. 3 Part of the
difference in car/bus maintenance costs may also be due to the relative size
of the fleets; whereas the YTC's Barnsley workshops dealt with all overhauls
and major repairs for its large fleet, the DDLR had to provide similar
facilities for its thirty trams, of which only half were in regular use any-
way.
4
 The size of the difference in costs per mile, however, makes it
obvious that buses enjoyed an inherent advantage over trams in respect of
repair costs.
Electricity was one area where the DDLR could buy in bulk, but the
difficulty in renegotiating the Barnsley agreement has already been noted.
The YTC, on the other hand, was able to reduce its fuel costs at the end of
1930, partly because of a general fall in petrol prices, but also because of
the 'very favourable contract' entered into with the supplier. 5 Even if the
1. Quite possibly the opposite in fact; one would expect the General
Manager and staff of a large concern to be paid more than those of a small
one. An indication that they were is that the DDLR's Manager happily acc-
epted a lower position with the YTC; see Denton, D. D. L. R., 23.
2. 1930-1 figures; see Appendix D4.
3. Also 1930-1; number of vehicles from YTC, Quarterly Returns, 31 Mar
1932 and mileage calculated as per data in Appendix D7.
4. Denton, D. D. L. R., 15.
5. YTC, Mr. Robinson's Reports, 31 Dec 1930, 1.
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DDLR had been a bus operator, its size would have made such concessions
unlikely.
Certain items in Appendix D7 are not easily comparable; bus tyres and
licences and tramway track and overhead have no direct equivalents.
1
 Con-
veniently, though, these can be regarded as the charge each mode paid for
the use of the road. Tramways were faced with the heavy burden of maintain-
ing their fixed equipment, plus the road surface up to eighteen inches on
either side of the tracks, a particular bone of contention when their com-
petitors were using and wearing out this road. 2 There had been early att-
empts to	 make bus operators pay a direct road charge--for instance, Womb-
well UDC wanted 2d per vehicle mile from the B&DTC for an extension to
Brampton in 19193--but such charges rarely stuck. The highways were thus
free of charge except for an annual vehicle tax 4 ; that is the sum for bus
licences in Appendix D7. Bus tyres can also be regarded as a road charge
roughly equivalent to tram track. It is notable that this item falls rapid-
ly between 1931 and 1933, from 0.44d. to only 0.24d. per car mile. It is
probable that the 1930-1 figure was exceptionally high due to the new Traf-
fic Commissioners, who insisted that tyres be removed when worn down to the
breaker band instead of 'the common practice of letting them wear down to
the canvas'. 5 By 1932 the problem had been overcome by regrooving the tyres
to give at least 3,000 miles more use 6 and thus a reduction in tyre charges.
This enabled the YTC to keep its costs well below the DDLR's, even despite
the low 'minimum maintenance' figures for the latter in 1932-3. Summing
these items over the three years, track etc cost 1.16d., 1.15d. and 0.86d.
1. Tramcar tyres, an inconsiderable item in comparison to the heavy
expenditure on rubber tyres, cannot be separated from car repairs.
2. Klapper, Tramways, 33.
3. SYRO, 1/12, Wombwell UDC Minutes, Finance and General Purposes
Committee, 2 Dec 1919, 327.
4. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 15 Oct 1925, 4.
5. YTC, Mr. Robinson's Reports, 30 Sep 1931, 5.
6. Ibid., 31 Mar 1932, 6.
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.	 1
and bus tyres and licences 0.78d., 0.64d. and 0.60d. per car mile; the
first two years are a fairer comparison than the last.
The marked difference in costs between electricity and petrol in 1930-1
and 1931-2 is somewhat surprising; the YTC was at a clear advantage. How-
ever special factors were behind this. First, as noted above, the DDLR's
costs were excessively high because of the difficulty in renegotiating the
Barnsley agreement; in 1932-3 this comes through as a small reduction in
overall costs for power. Second, the YTC enjoyed exceptionally favourable
petrol prices in 1931-2 because of a price war between suppliers. 2
 Later in
1932, however, fuel prices began to rise markedly, 3
 making it necessary to
cut services4
 and contributing to a working deficit in the first quarter of
1933. 5
 The advantage still lay with the buses though, and after the DDLR
closure petrol prices began to fall again. 6
 Had the tramway still been run-
fling, however, fuel costs would have swung decisively against it from 1935
when the Company's first oil-engined bus was delivered. 7
 In the early 1930s
diesel oil was much cheaper than petrol, and even more significantly the
engines did nearly twice as many miles to the gallon as equivalent petrol
engines. Thus in the first quarter of 1933, with an all petrol-engined
fleet, the YTC's buses were doing 6.88 miles per gallon, 8
 whereas a new
Gardner diesel engine tested in 1935 returned 12.7 miles to the gallon. 9
 It
is difficult to see how electricity consumption and charges could have been
reduced to meet this technological advance, even on the larger tramways.
The other major running cost is wages. Here the YTC enjoyed a marked
1. See Appendix D7.
2. YTC, Mr. Robinson's Reports, 31 Dec 1931, 7.
3. Ibid., 30 Jun 1932, 2. 	 4. Ibid., 31 Dec 1932, 4.
5. Ibid., 31 Mar 1933, 1-2.
	 6. Ibid., 31 Dec 1933, 2.
7. Ibid., 31 Mar 1935, 3. 	 8. Anderson, Crosville, 118.
9. YTC, Quarterly Returns, 31 Mar 1933.
10. YTC, Mr. Robinson's Returns, 31 Dec 1935, 8; the main comparison was
not with petrol engines but with the rival Leyland diesel engine, which per-
formed less satisfactorily.
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and invariable advantage. There are probably two or three reasons for this.
One is higher productivity in the bus undertaking. Buses ran as much as 50
per cent faster than trams; ' given equal capacity, which was roughly the
case between the YTC 2 and the DDLR, 3 the buses could be run at a correspond-
ing saving in working costs.
It is also the case that pay and conditions for company employees
tended to lag behind those of municipal concerns. The larger tramway com-
panies did join the National Joint Industrial Council in 1918, but they
seceded again in 1937 when it was proposed to include their bus employees
too,
4
 evidently because to do so would have meant improving standards. The
DDLR obviously employed its staff full-time,
5
 whereas the YTC discharged
some men after the summer peak, usually temporary men who could rely on
employment the following summer, but in particularly difficult times regular
employees too. 6 The very large discrepancy between total wages for drivers
and conductors 7 also argues that the Company operated some one-man vehicles,
which the DDLR did not.
Since wages were so important a part of running costs, the advantage
enjoyed by the buses over the trams, largely due to the former's higher
speed, was a crucial one.
When all running and overhead costs have been summed, the YTC comes out
with a clear advantage over the DDLR. Of long-term significance is the fact
that the DDLR was quite unable to set aside any money for eventual renewal
of assets. The YTC did make allowance for depreciation, which meant that
its fleet could be continuously renewed and modernised, 8 giving a growing
1. This relates to YTC buses replacing their own trams; see above
2. Not all were as large, but most single-deckers delivered new from
1928 had over thirty seats; see Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 37ff.
3. The original cars seated thirty-six, the four modernised ones five
less; see SYRO, Disposal 1933, 18 Aug 1933.
4. DCT Jubilee, 11.	 5. An argument from silence.
6. YTC, Mr. Robinson's Reports, 31 Mar 1933, 20. 	 7. See Appendix D7
8. See fleet list in Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 35-51.
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advantage over the increasingly archaic trams. And this financial husbandry
was possible whilst still earning a working profit, a happy state of affairs
denied to the DDLR management throughout. The motor bus was master both of
the present and of the future.
In almost all particulars, the YTC's operating costs were lower than
the DDLR's, most significantly in the cases of fuel, road staff wages, road
charges, vehicle repairs and administration. This may partly have been due
to economies of scale, but more importantly stemmed from certain inherent or
developed advantages of motor buses over trams--that is, the lack of road,
track or overhead charges; a lower price for fuel, especially after the dev-
elopment of oil engines for bus use; and higher productivity, giving lower
unit wage costs. The competition between the Company and the Joint Comm-
ittee was really very unequal.
This chapter has shown that whilst the DDLR did not have high costs
relative to other tramways, its operating expenditure was higher than ex-
pected, due partly to a--probably deliberate--understatement by the line's
engineers of the long-term burden of repairs and more significantly to an
obstinate refusal of these expenses to conform to the fall in the cost of
living. The main factor was the rise in repair bills, which were a signif-
icant sum and invariably higher in real terms than they had been in the year
of opening. There was, it is true, some decline in these payments over the
last two years of operation, but in an interesting document--probably writ-
ten to reassure the councillors that they had made the right decision to
sell out--J. L. Hawksworth admitted that because of the Committee's desire
to 'make end's meet' and perhaps because of the likelihood of ceasing to
run, the repair bill had been cut from £7,000 plus to only £5,785 in 1932-3;
had trams continued this would have been a 'veritable "Rakes Progress" and
against all considered opinion, which said that repair costs, particularly
on track, should peak after eight to ten years of operation. Really, he
said, expenditure in 1932-3 should have been the same as in the previous
year, which would have increased the loss on working from £3,627 to
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1
£4,979.
Other important variables in the costs equation were electricity prices,
whose erratic behaviour tended to accentuate the problems of the General
Strike and its aftermath in 1926, and wages, which were the largest item and
which, though not rising, did not fall either except marginally at the end
of the period.
It is significant that the YTC's motor buses were able to compete
successfully against what was in fact a very low cost tramway. Amongst
their advantages were economies of scale, lower fuel prices, slightly lower
wages and, more importantly, the lack of fixed equipment such as track and
overhead to maintain. The YTC was thus able to keep its costs well below
those of the DDLR and, though its earning power was little if at all greater
than that of the DDLR on a per mile basis, was able to earn a surplus to
meet both depreciation and a shareholders' dividend.
What is particularly interesting is that the YTC's working costs are
much lower than those being quoted elsewhere at the time. Pilcher gives the
costs per bus mile returned by ten municipalities. Their working costs vary
from 7.89d. to 12.258d. or, with capital charges added, from 9.057d. to
2
14.742d. Assuming any allowance was made for depreciation, it would pres-
umably come under capital charges, so if one compares the higher bus mileage
rates to those on the bottom line of Appendix D7, one sees that the YTC's
expenses were at least id. less than the lowest municipal one, itself about
1.5d. below the next. The point is that that out-of-town bus services could
evidently be operated even more economically than those in towns, thus in-
creasing their competitive edge over the tram and probably being the main
reason for the fact which Pilcher commented on at the beginning of his book:
that in rural districts 'it became clear that . . . it was cheaper and
quicker to travel by bus than by tram &ndi many of these undertakings have
1. SYRO, 8/UD28/604, Misc. Papers, Post-abandonment, incl., Review of
Statement as presented by the Clerk on December 18th on the comparisons
of years 1931 to 1934 respectively and 1935 . . . U935] , 1.
2. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 127.
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been abandoneet t . 1 The DDLR, like a sickly child born out of time, was soon
to follow them.
1. Ibid., 7.
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CHAPTER 6
CAPITAL COSTS
Sellon's original estimate of the cost of construction for the planned
eighteen mile network was £151,891 5s. Od. 1 This was deliberately cut to
the bone; as the Chairman remarked at the 1914 Inquiry, 'Mr. Sellon admits
fairly enough that his estimates depend on the low rate at which he can con-
struct this line., .2
The opposition naturally claimed that Sellon could not build the line
at the price stated. Amongst the detailed criticisms were that there was
insufficient allowance for building/altering bridges and that the estimates
for track did not allow for satisfactory construction. The overall cost per
mile was to be about £8,334, a great deal lower than most if not all other
tramways then built. For instance, Rotherham's had cost £11,413 and Don-
caster's £10,304 per mile. 3
A recurring criticism was that the period allowed for redemption of the
loan--forty years--was too long, as most of the assets would be life-expired
long before then. Track was given a 'book life' of thirty years in 1914,
cars fifteen, the average life of all assets being twenty-four years. 4
The point was that replacements would be needed well within the loan period,
so putting an additional burden of depreciation on the revenue. 5
 Hoare did
manage to find a few examples where a forty year period was allowed--York in
1. SYRO, Brief 1914, 4.
	 2. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 270.
3. Ibid., 258, 523, 522 and 684.
	
4. Ibid., 686.
5. SYRO, Proceedings 1920, 72.
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1908, for example, even Brighton in 1920--but the main reason for the long
time scale seems not to have been any rational assumptions about the life of
assets but, as Hoare said, because any shorter period would put a heavy bur-
den on the authorities. 1
After the war, of course, inflation pushed up costs vastly. In 1919
the engineers estimated it would cost £299,898 to build what was now only a
fifteen mile system; 2 that is, £19,993 per mile. Even as the debate went
on, costs were still rising, which the opposition was not slow to point out; 3
by the end of 1920 the total envisaged was up to £360,000. 4 Hoare however
believed that the peak of prices had been passed, 5 which was in fact correct.
It was not, however, only the gross costs that had risen, but the cost
of capital itself. Before the war the rate of interest had been 31 per cent
but in 1920 it was not less than 61 per cent. Hawksworth claimed that he
could get 5* per cent, having only borrowed £500 at 51 per cent that day,
making an easy target for the opposition, who pointed out that the govern-
ment had to pay 5* per cent and so did Birkenhead Corporation, whilst the
four Councils' was 'a name unknown on the money market rand they] could not
borrow at anything approaching these terms'. 6
The crux of the matter was that the increased costs of construction and
the higher interest rates meant that the DDLR would be paying larger capital
charges out of its revenue surplus (if any) than other tramways constructed
at pre-war costs/rates were doing, and even then these lines, which were
usually more remunerative than the DDLR was likely to be, were finding it a
struggle.
William Cash summed it up: 'The working results of these three 7 show
1. SYRO, Brief 1921, 10.
2. SYRO, Evidence of A. R. Hoare, 12.
3. SYRO, Proceedings 1920, 80.	 4. SYRO, Stanley 1920, 3.
5. SYRO, Brief 1921, 4.
	 6. SYRO, Proceedings 1920, 71, 64 and 70.
7. Rotherham, Birkenhead and Southampton Corporations, whose loans had
cost 3.3, 4.4 and 3.07 per cent respectively.
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that they just pay their way with an enormous traffic and a thickly popul-
ated area, and a population being carried a larger number of times than the
Promoters suggest will be the case here'.
1
 Even the perennially optimistic
Hawksworth had to admit the scheme might go on the rates. 2
In the event, the DDLR had to pay 6- per cent interest on its capital,
more even than had been feared in 1920, though interest rates did fall
slightly from 1929 onwards. 3 In 1924-5 the total capital expended was
£279,215; about £10,000 was added in the following year as the final bills
were paid off, and thereafter the amount rises slightly to £295,068 in
1930-14
 as further minor purchases/alterations are made. 5 Not all this
amount was outstanding at any one time, of course, as small amounts were
being repaid annually; according to the Returns, £261,396 was outstanding at
closure. 6
Since only 14.18 miles of route were actually built as opposed to the
15.11 authorised, 7 the total cost of construction per route mile was now
£20,809, almost exactly two-and-a-half times Sellon's estimate of £8,334 in
1914. The total is remarkably close to Hare's estimate of £299,898 in
1919-20, though one might have expected it to be slightly less since a mile
less line was constructed and prices were falling by the early 1920s. Gen-
erating stations were not built, but this is partially balanced by the cost
of the sub-station (which should properly include some of the cost of build-
ings) and of houses, whose construction was a late decision. 8 The cost of
cars did fall dramatically, especially when the five extra cars are taken
1. SYRO, Proceedings 1920, 71.	 2. Ibid., 63.
3. SYRO, 8/UD28/609, Statement setting out . . . the History of the
Undertaking . . . (n.d.); part of miscellaneous papers file (n.p.).
4. See Appendix D4.
5. For example, £351 was spent on track in Wombwell Lane in 1927-8,
£655 on a new tower wagon in 1929-30; see SYRO, 8/UD28/548, Ledger, 96
and 92.
6. See Appendix D4.	 7. Ibid.
8. SYRO, JC Minutes, 8 Jan 1924.
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TABLE 27
DEARNE DISTRICT: COST OF CONSTRUCTION IN POUNDS
Actual Costsa Estimated Costsb
Permanent Wayc 139,453 Permanent Way 127,582
Land 7,725 Road Widenings
including Land
7,676
Electrical Equip-
ment of Line
26,493 Overhead Electrical
Equipment & Cables
25,690
Rolling Stockd 42,003 Rolling Stock 47,500
Buildings 15,739 Depot 7,750
Sub-station Plant 4,918 Generating Stations 28,800
Dwelling Houses 13,861 - -
Preliminary Exp. 13,861 Preliminary Exp. 14,000
Interest during 8,019 Interest during 15,000
Construction Construction
Engineer's Fees,e 24,150 Contingencies 25,900
Parliamentary
& Legal Expenses,
Miscellaneous
Total 295,067 Total 299,898
SOURCES AND NOTES:
a. SYRO, Misc. Papers, Evidence of J L. Hawksworth, 7.
b. SYRO, Evidence of A. R. Hoare,12.
c. 14.18 miles actually built as against 15.11 planned in 1920.
d. 30 cars purchased as against 25 planned in 1920.
e. Sellon included his fee under Contingencies; see SYRO, Proceedings
1914, 258.
into account; this would also explain some of the increased cost of build-
ings, since a larger depot would be needed. The cost of constructing the
permanent way did rise, but overall costs were not excessive when compared
with the estimate.
The price paid by the local authorities was very high however. Table
12 shows the capital payments made from 1925 to 1933, 1 a total of £140,487.
After taking working profits and losses into account, this left an accumul-
ated deficit of £137,453. This was borne by the local authorities in the
1. See above,89 ; this excludes the final financial year of operation.
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following percentages--Wombwell 39, Wath 26.3, Bolton 24.5 and Thurnscoe
10.2.
1
 Table 28 shows how this worked out in 1931-2.
TABLE 28
PARTICULARS OF THE LOAN CHARGES BORNE BY THE CONSTITUENT AUTHORITIES
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 1932
Authority Interest
£	 s d
Repayment
£	 s	 d
Sinking Fund
£	 s	 d
Total
£	 s	 d
Wombwell 5,445 9 7 234 3 5 1,450 3 4 7,129 16 4
Wath 3,505 10 9 931 15 5 4,437 6 2
Bolton 3,296 4 2 40 14 5 1,119 15 5 4,456 14 0
Thurnscoe 1,451 0 6 476 18 11 1,927 19 7
Totals • 13,698 5 0 1,206 13 3	 3,046 17 8 17,951 16 1
*Loans repaid on an Annuity Basis [I4ote in original]
SOURCE: SYRO, Misc. Papers, Evidence of J. L. Hawksworth.
a. The clerk has evidently made 17d. equal to is. 7d. instead of the
correct is. 5d., an error transposed into the total.
As early as October 1925 it was feared that a 9d. rate might be needed
to meet the deficit, 2 but later on the amount of rateable income being spent
on the tramway was becoming insupportable, as Table 29 shows.
TABLE 29
DEARNE DISTRICT: CHARGES ON RATES FOR YEARS ENDING 31 MARCH
Authority	 1932	 1933
d.	 d.
Wombwell	 33.3	 35.7
Wath	 25.7	 29.0
Bolton	 24.9	 25.5
Thurnscoe	 14.3	 14.6
SOURCE: SYRO, Short Statement of Facts and Evidence, 31.
1. SYRO, Misc. Papers: Evidence of J. L. Hawksworth, 7.
2. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 15 Oct 1925.
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Charles Klepper writes that 'despite the change in circumstances after
the war . . . the sponsors went blindly on with the scheme'.
1
 It is true
that the Joint Committee had received plenty of warnings about the cata-
strophic effects the huge capital burden would have. They might conceivably
have dismissed the opinions of their opponents as special pleading; for
instance, in 1919 the railway companies were saying that the 'whole of the
works proposed could not be constructed except at an enormously increased
capital cost upon which no remunerative return can be anticipated'.
2
 But
other more independent witnesses were also ignored, such as Mr. Stanley from
the Ministry, who told the Committee that interest and sinking funds would
be 'the killing thing' 3 and that the scheme looked like 'a very serious bur-
den on the rates, and I think it is my duty to say SO'.
It is not entirely fair to say that the Committee went 'blindly on',
however. They clearly were rattled and frequently turned to Hoare for ad-
vice. In 1920 he strongly advised them to proceed despite the rises in
costs,
5
 and even after Stanley's devastating criticism was still claiming
that there would be sufficient surplus to cover capital charges and leave a
reserve.
6
 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Committee was
badly advised by a man who had an obvious pecuniary interest in the work
going ahead; it would have been wiser to employ a fresh outside consultant.
But it is not true to say that the sponsoring authorities went ahead without
thinking. An attempt was made on Wombwell Council in 1921 to suspend all
expenditure for a year because of the 'abnormal and unsettled conditions
prevailing at the present time'; this was amended to allow preliminary work
to continue, but construction was deferred. 7
 The following month one of
1. Klepper, Tramways, 127.
2. SYRO, 8/UD28/463, Objections to the 1919 Order, 2.
3. SYRO, Stanley 1920, 4.
	 4. Ibid., 5.
	
5. SYRO, Brief 1920, 10.
6. SYRO, Brief 1921, 7.
7. SYRO, 1/15, Wombwell UDC Minutes, Council, 30 Jan 1923, 423.
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Wath's representatives on the Joint Committee was expressing concern, '
 and
this time Hoare's bland assurances were not received so kindly. At the sub-
sequent meeting the proposal to proceed with tendering was lost on a motion
to adjourn and it was decided to ask the engineers for a new estimate. 2 At
the adjourned meeting Wath did actually ask for a report from an independent
expert, but this was rejected and the tender of the Consolidated Construction
Company accepted. 3 Wath were clearly unhappy, however, and so was Wombwell,
whose Council only passed the motion to accept the tender by 7:5. 4
Finally there was a dawning realisation on the part of the promoters
that a loss would be made after capital payments. Under cross examination
by Sir Lynden Macassey 5 at the 1920 hearing Hawksworth said that the Coun-
cils now agreed the scheme would be self-supporting 'taking into account the
development that will be brought about in the district': that is, the rather
dangerous assumption was now being made that the tramway would pay because
of the development it would stimulate, rather than on the basis of things as
they were, or that a loss would be worthwhile because of the development
brought about. Hawksworth went on, 'If it does not pay, then from their
point of view [the Councils'] they would be prepared to shoulder the bur-
den'. 6 The so-long held feeling that the line would benefit the community
was being allowed to take precedence over commercial sense.
The capital burden clearly made the Joint Committee's position unten-
able. To quote Oliver Hardy's immortal phrase, 'Now look at this mess you
got me into.'; who was 'you'? The engineers' estimate of the cost of con-
struction was accurate enough, but Hoare's firm, whose fees were calculated
as a percentage of expenditure, were clearly at fault in advising that a
1. SYRO, JC Minutes, 5 Jan 1923. 	 2. Ibid., 26 Jan 1923.
3. Ibid., 2 Feb 1923.
4. SYRO, 1/15, Wombwell UDC Minutes, Council, 30 Jan 1923, 423.
5. Clearly a lawyer specialising in tramway matters. For instance, he
was appointed to arbitrate on the sale price of the Grimsby tramways in 1924.
See J. H. Price, 'Great Grimsby Street Tramways--4', TR 16 (Summer 1985), 37.
6. SYRO, Proceedings 1920, 63.
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break-even situation was possible. The Committee itself, represented by
local officials like Hawksworth who were quite out of their depth, was un-
able properly to assess the assurances they received. When told by indep-
endent experts not to proceed, despite the doubts of many local councillors,
they foolishly went ahead. The failure at bottom was not economic but human.
The harsh facts revealed by the figures were that, in the real world of
the 1920s, the capital costs laid upon the DDLR could not be met except by a
massive recourse to the rates. Even, as discussed earlier, had the compet-
ition of the motor bus been miraculously removed, it is unlikely that the
DDLR could have made enough to pay its way on the stony ground of the
recession-hit Dearne valley.
162
CHAPTER 7
THE CONCLUSION
The main problem facing the DDLR's management throughout was how to
relate to the Traction Company. There are four distinct phases in that rel-
ationship.
Meetings between the two parties began as early as September 1924, 1
initially with the aim of co-ordination and protection. 2
 The YTC3
 quickly
agreed on an alternate fifteen minute service of trams and buses, but would
4
not agree to protection.
Bus operators could be made to protect tramways in one of two ways,
either by a prohibition on carrying local passengers over a tram route or by
the imposition of an excess fare on such passengers. 5
 It was the latter
which the DDLR wanted, 6
 and there was excellent precedent in the agreement
between another BET-owned company--the Birmingham and Midland--and Birming-
ham Corporation, where it was agreed to charge a double fare on buses within
the city limits. 7
 Official support for protection was forthcoming on the
grounds that it was unfair to penalise transport operators for having failed
to foresee the development of newer forms of transport and that large amounts
1. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 19 Sep 1924.
	 2. Ibid., 23 Feb 925.
3. For ease of reference the later 'YTC ?
 title is used throughout this
chapter, even though not always strictly correctly.
4. SYRO, JC Minutes, Co-ordination Sub-Committee, 19 Mar 1925.
5. Humpidge, unpublished lecture notes, 2.
6. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 23 Feb 1925.
7. Humpidge, unpublished lecture notes, 2.
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of still-useful capital tied up in tramways should not be discarded all at
once.
1
The YTC said, however, that their investment must be protected too, and
also made the point that whilst it might be usual to protect existing tram-
ways, this did not apply in the Dearne valley, for they were there first.
2
The Dearne authorities, though, felt they had a moral right to protection
since, in their view, the motor bus interests had used unfair tactics, in
particular by putting large numbers of buses on the road during the period
of construction. 3
There was another reason, apart from being built after buses had become
established, why the DDLR was in particularly acute difficulties. Usually
tramways only needed protecting on the short outer ends of routes, 4 but in
this case 'the whole of the route was . . . seriously threatened'. 5
The Minister of Transport was clearly swayed by the Committee's argu-
ments since he was willing to support Wombwell's refusal to license the YTC
buses until protection was granted6
 and also to up his own suggestion of a
id. protective fare7 to 2d., meaning that over each id. stage the YTC was to
charge 3d. However the agreement, to last for one year till 1 Jan 1927, did
not cover the route outside the four Councils' areas nor workmen's tickets. 8
It was felt that this slightly increased the tramway's revenue, 9
 but
1. Finer, Municipal Trading, 362-3.
2. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 19 Sep 1924. 	 3. Ibid., 26 Mar 1925.
4. This would apply to urban tramways, the outer ends of which may
have been vulnerable either because they were beyond the municipality's lic-
ensing area or because the further one went, the more the bus's speed told.
5. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 27 Jul 1925.
6. SYRO, 1/18, Wombwell UDC Minutes, Highways and Buildings Committee,
30 Jun 1925, 132.
7. SYRO, Clerk's reports, 27 Jul 1925.
8. SYRO, JC Minutes, 17 Dec 1925.
9. SYRO, JC Minutes, Emergency Sub-Committee, 22 Sep 1926; from this
time such ad hoc committees met fairly regularly with such titles as 'Emerg-
ency' or 'Negotiating' Sub-Committee, depending on how serious the situation
was. Future citations are simply to 'Sub-Committee'.
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the agreement was not continued after expiry because the Committee was dis-
satisfied with its execution, even accusing the Company of using it as a
front for 'acts of deliberate piracy'. 1 In March 1927 the fare-cutting war
broke out, 2 which was eventually settled by a new co-ordination and protect-
ion agreement drawn up under Ministry of Transport auspices; this was less
favourable to the DDLR in that only a id. excess fare was to be charged, and
once more workers' tickets and the Barnsley to Stairfoot section were ex-
cluded. 3
This arrangement appears to have lasted until the end, though it failed
to arrest the decline in either revenue or passengers, the latter evidently
preferring the faster buses at a premium fare. The agreement as it stood
had various deficiencies. One was that independent buses, which strictly
speaking were also meant to give protection, did not thishurt both the YTC
and Committee. Another was that workers' discount tickets were not included
at all; if they were Mr. Coutts believed the trams would recapture many
passengers, 5 but the Company had always refused such a concession.6
The main problem was that id. was simply not enough of a deterrent to
using the buses. This or even ld. was frequently imposed as a protective
fare, but as an academic commentator at the time noted, this usually needed
to be higher to be effective.7
Towards the end of 1928 the issue of protection began to give place to
that of pooling. The idea of this was that within a defined area the YTC
and the DDLR would run approximately the same mileage and pool the receipts,
each party to receive half after certain expenses had been met. 8
 Efforts
1. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 15 Mar 1927. 	 2. See above, 116.
3. SYRO, JC Minutes, 14 Jul 1927.
4. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 14 Jun 1928.
5. SYRO, Misc. Papers, Reports on Workers' Fares etc., 12 Apr 1932.
6. SYRO, JC Minutes, 14 Jul 1927.	 7. Chester, Public Control, 122.
8. Usually bus excess mileage expenses, the logic being that the
YTC had to run extra and unnecessary buses to compete with independents.
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would be made by both parties to reduce or eliminate private competition
either by licensing controls (local authorities) or by buying them out (the
Company).'
The details of this arrangement were the result of a long and hard neg-
otiation between the two parties. The idea first surfaced from the DDLR
side on 31 Oct 1928. 2
 The Company was favourable, but initially offered to
include only its receipts over the tramway and from direct buses from Thurn-
scoe and Goldthorpe to Barnsley, amounting to some £19,686 per annum. 3
This was considerably less than the DDLR's income and Coutts said that 'not
under any circumstances can I see any advantage to the Joint Committee under
the proposed pooling arrangements
,
.
4
 Eventually it was agreed that bus
receipts from a much wider area, including the four Urban Districts and some
areas outside them, should be brought in. 5
At a meeting at the Ministry doubts were raised about the legality of
such an agreement between a local authority and a private company, but the
Committee was told it was alright to go ahead as long as no payments were
made to the YTC until an Act had been secured. Pooling was due to begin on
8 Apr 1929, but the day before--a Sunday--the Company suddenly pulled out on
instructions from head office in London because of fears that the Committee
would be unable to pay any balances due. Legal opinion was sought, but in
the event the Company proved willing to start on 22 April without waiting
for a response. 6
Legal opinion when received was that the agreement was ultra vires.
7
 To
meet this the Joint Committee promoted the Dearne District Traction Bill in
1. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 28 Nov 1929 (bound with, JC Minutes).
2. SYRO, JC Minutes, 31 Oct 1928.
3. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 17 Dec 1928.
4. SYRO, JC Minutes, 17 Dec 1928.
5. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 7 and 9 Jan 1929.
6. SYRO, JC Minutes, 17 Jan, 21 Feb, 7 Apr and 18 Apr 1929.
7. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 3 Jun 1929.
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conjunction with the YTC; it would, incidentally, have given the DDLR bus
operating powers. 1 The Bill had to be deposited by 17 December, but--again
at the eleventh hour--Wombwell Council refused its support;
2
 they had done
so because they wanted a vigorous effort to make a go of the tramway by
speeding up the trams and encouraging public support. 3
It was hoped that at least some of the powers needed would be covered
by the new Road Traffic Bill, 4 but the Act did not do so, and an appeal to
the Ministry of Transport to amend it produced the frosty response that
1 they were not in a position to do anything more for the Committee
,
.
5
Despite a recommendation to terminate the pool, 6 it was continued until the
end of operation, 7 the bus mileage being so arranged that money would be due
from the YTC but not vice-versa. 8
The benefits to the DDLR were not great. The initial idea was that the
elimination of direct competition would reduce the mileage run9 and hence
costs; but mileage rose rather than fell from its 1928-9 leve1. 10 Hopes that
revenue might improve were dashed as the finances deteriorated still further
over 1929. 11 The best that could be said was that losses were mounting less
rapidly. Up to 21 Apr 1929 revenue had fallen by £74 3s. 8d. a week against
the same period the previous year; thereafter the decrease was less at
£27 8s. 7d., a 'saving' of £46 15s. ld.; 12 a year later this had become
1. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 28 Nov 1929 (bound with, JC Minutes).
2. Ibid., 19 Dec 1929.
3. SYRO, JC Minutes, 19 Dec 1929, Local Authorities' Conference.
4. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 19 Dec 1929.	 5. Ibid., 10 Dec 1931.
6. SYRO, JC Minutes, Sub-Committee, 2 May 1932.
7. Ibid., undated, but taking Pool Account to 4 Jun 1933.
8. SYRO, 8/UD28/534, Brief for the YTC, 3 May 1933, 6.
9. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 31 Oct 1928.	 10. See Appendix D4.
11. SYRO, JC Minutes, 19 Dec 1929, Local Authorities' Conference.
12. Ibid., Sub-Committee, 24 Jan 1930.
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£69 19s. 3d.. 1
There were two major disadvantages too. Firstly the YTC was building
up a balance owing to the DDLR--£4,369 16s. 9d. by June 19332--and used this
fact to help force a later agreement on closure.
3
 Secondly, the decline in
the trams' revenue was accelerated as the public accepted the idea that it
did not matter which form of transport they used. 4
By early 1931 the Committee, as one member remarked, had got to the end
of its tether. 5
 The brusque reaction of the Ministry of Transport in Decem-
ber of that year provided a psychological moment for the Company to re-
introduce the idea of a takeover, which the Sub-Committee started to con-
sider in January 1932. 6
 Sykes has an excellent summary of the options open
to the DDLR at that time:
(1) to carry on as they were;
(2) to double the track at a cost of at least £150,000;
(3) to replace trams by buses;
(4) to replace trams by trolleybuses;
(5) to abandon the light railways by,
(a) simply closing down;
(b) arranging for the M&STC to run trolleybuses over the route; 7
(c) selling out to the YTC; or
(d) ditto, but keeping the Joint Committee alive as a notional
partner in bus operations in the pool area, any profits after
deduction of expenses being shared. 8
1. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 15 Jan 1931.
	 2. SYRO, JC Minutes, undated.
3. SYRO, Misc. Papers, Meeting of Members . . . with YTC, 20 May 1931.
4. SYRO, Clerk's reports, 10 Dec 1931.
5. SYRO, Misc. Papers, Meeting of Members . . . with YTC, 20 May 1931.
6. SYRO, JC Minutes, 14 Jan 1932.
7. Actually they only showed interest in the outer branches from Wath
onwards; see SYRO, JC Minutes, Sub-Committee, 20 Jan 1932.
8. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 26.
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The Manager produced a detailed report on options (3) and (4), 1 but the
Committee seems to have done no more than to receive it. 2 One can certainly
see why the option of motor buses was rejected, for Coutts's figures showed
a maximum possible working profit of £9,375 per annum as against capital
charges of £9,434; there would have been nothing left to pay towards the
tramways' outstanding debt. Trolleybuses were a more attractive proposition
though, with the best possible option--cheap installation at maximum profit—
showing a surplus of £6,842; however £2,000 per annum was a much more likely
result, and even this was uncertain. 3
So far as the other options were concerned, modernising the tramway
does not seem to have been taken seriously--adding 50 per cent to the
already insupportable capital burden would not have been wise--and nor does
closing down without replacement. 'Going it alone', abandonCfts the pool
and actively competing with the YTC, was considered, 4 but when it came to a
vote was rejected. 5 The M&STC offer was not really practicable, being for
only part of the route, but was found useful as a bargaining counter. 6 This
left only a sell-out to the YTC as a viable possibility.
The Committee would not sell for a lump sum, because the amount offered
was too low, 7 so a long-term agreement was the only option left. There were
precedents for such a scheme. Ayr Corporation had sold out for £20,000 down
1. SYRO, Misc. Papers, Manager's Report on Substitution of Trackless
Trolley or Petrol Buses for Trams (hereafter, Manager's Report); there are
two drafts dated 4 and 12 Jan 1932, details being taken from both.
2. SYRO, JC Minutes, Sub-Committee, 28 Jan 1932.
3. SYRO, Misc. Papers, Manager's Report, 1-2 and conclusion.
4. SYRO, Misc. Papers, Additional Report to Sub-Committee, 28 Jan 1932
5. SYRO, JC Minutes, 18 May 1932.
6. SYRO, Misc. Papers, Final Recommendation of General Manager to
Special Sub-Committee, 15 Feb 1932.
7. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 2 Jun 1932; both Denton (D. D. L. R., 23)
and Sykes (Yorkshire Traction, 26) state that a lump sum of £75,000 was paid
for the undertaking, but this is almost certainly a mistake, as the lump sum
was the alternative to the scheme eventually decided on.
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and £2,500 per annum for ten years and then £500 for the next eleven years,
for example. '
The basis for negotiation was Coutts's estimate that a bus operator
could earn £4,000 per annum over the DDLR. 2
 The arguments were about how
much of this the YTC might reasonably be expected to pay. It was eventually
agreed that the Company would guarantee a fixed payment of £3,000 per annum
for the first five years and £2,000 after that; if higher profits were
earned, these would be divided 50:50. The profit was to be the balance
after operating costs of 10.125d. had been subtracted, these to vary only
with changes in the prices of fuel and tyres. 3
 The agreement was to last
for thirty-two years until the DDLR had paid off its debt; the YTC would pay
for the necessary Bill, buy any assets it required and pay over the pool
balance once buses took over. 4
This agreement was quickly accepted by the four Councils. 5
 Because
annual payments were still to be made, the Joint Committee had to remain in
existence until these were completed6
 on 4 May 1966. 7
 In effect the old
pool area was continued, and all fares taken within that were summed and
expenses at 10.125d. subtracted to arrive at the 'profit' to be divided
between the Company and the Committee. 8
 The Councils were precluded from
operating buses, 9
 but for many years retained a shadowy existence in the
public eye through the special tickets issued on buses in the prescribed
1. SYRO, Misc. Papers, Manager's Report, 5; it is not known whether
this involved Ayr Corporation a a nominal joint operator of the buses or not
2. Ibid.
3. The Company's wish to include wages was rejected; see SYRO, Misc.
Papers, Negotiations with the YTC . . . , 8 Jul 1932.
4. Ibid., Letter from the Secretary to the YTC, 9 Jul 1932.
5. Ibid., Letter from J. L. Hawksworth, 10 Aug 1932.
6. SYRO, JC Minutes, Sub-Committee, 10 Oct 1932.
7. SYRO, 8/UD28/510, Agreement as to the Abandonment of Light Railways
. . . , 17 Nov 1932, 2.
8. Ibid., 5-7.
	 9. Ibid., 11.
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area;
1
 these appear to have been overprinted 'DDP Div. „2
 presumably stand-
ing for 'Dearne District Pool Division'. However even this disappeared
later when the complex dual ticket system was replaced by agreed percentages
of receipts on routes passing through the area. 3
On 30 Sep 1933 the trams ceased running, without formality or notice. 4
As is usually the case in the real world, Goliath had triumphed over the boy
David.
Even after the various negotiations over protection, pooling and sale
had been brought to their inevitable conclusion, however, the YTC and the
DDLR were not done with each other, but entered upon a fourth, post-closure
phase in their relationship; for the first time, the details were specified
by law. 5
At one stage it had been hoped that the disposal of assets etc. would
leave at least a break-even situation. 6
 But although the sale of equipment, 7
car barns, houses etc. realised £16,080, the costs of breaking up the system
were much higher than expected with road reinstatement alone costing
E18,184 19s. Od. The shortfall amounted to £8,785 18s. 9d., but much of
this was covered by additional revenue accrued during the six months be-
tween closure and the end of the financial year, most of which must have
been from the first payments under the Act and the settlement of the pool
balance; a revenue 'profit' of £5,439 5s. Od. was shown, leaving the author-
1. SYRO, 8/UD28/593, Miscellaneous JC Minutes, 26 Jan 1949.
2. Letter from Wringate] H. Bett in TR 8 (Summer 1969), 42.
3. SYRO, Misc. JC Minutes, 26 Jan 1949.
4. Denton, D .D .L. R., 23.
5. SYRO, 8/UD281539, The Dearne District Traction Act 1933.
6. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 21 Jul 1932.
7. Five trams were sold to Falkirk and four to Lytham St. Annes and
the trucks and equipment of the remainder to Hull; see Bett and Gilham, SY&H
Tramways, 40. By a roundabout route some of the trucks later found their
way to Calcutta, where they are still in service, more than half a century
after the DDLR closed; see G. B. Claydon, 'Calcutta Revisited--2', MT 45
(Feb 1982), 74.
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ities only just over £3,300 to stump up to balance the books. '
Thereafter, except for small amounts of bank interest and other odd
items, the Joint Committee's sole source of income was the payments from the
YTC, virtually all of which was available for distribution to the authorit-
ies, except for a small amount for administration--usually about £100 per
annum—and a slightly greater amount payable to the YTC as interest on cap-
ital they had expended on buying other bus services, a move which would ben-
efit the receipts in the agreed area. From 1943 onwards income tax started
to be deducted from payments at approximately 50 per cent, which seriously
reduced the DDLR's income. 2 However it appears that the authorities them-
selves could reclaim the tax. 3
Annual capital charges on the authorities were approximately £7,155 for
Wombwell, £4,440 for Wath, £4,465 for Bolton and £1,940 for Thurnscoe. 4
 It
will be obvious therefore that the initial payments of £3,000 per annum did
not go far towards meeting these amounts. Nontheless this was better than
the previous situation. Wombwell, for example, had borne £1,174 of the
working loss in 1933, equal to a 5.59d. rate; in 1935 they expected to
receive £830 from the YTC, equal to a 4d. rate, the difference between the
two being a 9.5d. rate or £1,995. 5
The last payment of £3,000 was made in 1938 and the following financial
year the DDLR's share fell to only £2,669, 6 as the original agreement had
clearly envisaged when setting a minimum of £2,000 per annum. With the out-
break of war, however, earnings per bus mile rose sharply, partly because
1. SYRO, 8/1JD28/567, Financial Statement . . . Year Ending 31 Mar 1934
2. See SYRO, 8/UD28/568-82, Financial Statements . . . Years Ending
31 Mar 1935--49, passim.
3. SYRO, 8/UD28/605, Treasurer's Report to the Dearne UDC Finance
Committee; about 1937 or 1938 the Bolton and Thurnscoe UDCs were combined
into a new Dearne UDC.
4. SYRO, Misc. Papers, Evidence of J. L. Hawksworth, 8.
5. SYRO, Misc. Papers/Post Abandonment, Review of Statement.
6. Ibid., DDLR Joint Committee in Account with the YTC, 1934-49
(hereafter, JC Account).
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services were cut; 1
 but even after the war, though earnings per mile fell
back a bit, gross receipts continued to rise, from only £64,602 in 1939 to
2
£116,117 in 1949.
	 The catch--or opportunity, depending on one's point of
view--was that costs were still calculated as 10.125d. per bus mile plus any
variation in the costs of fuel and tyres. This took no account of the trem-
endous increase in labour charges nor of increased prices for almost all
other items, including buses. 3
 Thus the actual costs were far in excess of
those used to calculate the DDLR's 'profit'; in 1949 the 'agreement' costs
were 10.77d., 4
 but the real costs were 14.35d. per bus mile. The result was
that since 1943 the YTC had been paying over a grossly disproportionate per-
centage of its working profits, and by 1948 was actually paying more than
this--that is, it was showing a loss in the Dearne area, amounting to £2,188
in 1947 and to a staggering £6,412 in the first ten months of 1950.5
The result was that at least one of the local authorities was now mak-
ing an actual profit on the DDLR account. The Dearne UDC had been subsidis-
ing loan payments from the General Rate Fund throughout, but in 1949 and
1950 was able to pay in £650 and £4,437 respectively from DDLR receipts. 6
Failing a revision of the agreement, the YTC's only recourse was to raise
fares, but even this was a double-edged weapon, for higher receipts also
meant higher payments to the DDLR. In 1951, it was estimated, the actual
profit on bus operation in the Dearne area under the old fares would be
£748, but the payment to the DDLR would be £17,851. Higher fares would
1. YTC, The Dearne District Light Railways (hereafter, The DDLR), 3; a
statement made towards the end of 1950 to support the Company's case for a
review of the agreement.
2. YTC, The DDLR, Table attached to Report.
	 3. Ibid., 3.
4. SYRO, Misc. Papers/Post Abandonment, JC Account.
5. YTC, The DDLR, Table; the figures for Committee and Company are not
for precisely the same periods, because the DDLR worked on financial and the
YTC on calendar years.
6. SYRO, Misc. Papers/Post Abandonment, Dearne UDC Finance Department,
1 Dec 1950. Whether the other two authorities were in 'profit' at this time
or not depends on whether they had followed similar policies to the DUDC,
which had accelerated repayments from 1942 to save interest and by 1950 was
reaping the benefit of this.
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raise the profit to £11,748, but then the DDLR would get £23,081. The Com-
pany's subsidy to the DDLR would thus be cut from £16,833 to £11,333, but by
no means be eliminated. The position was serious for the YTC because in
January 1951 it made a loss on overall working of £4,554, increased by pay-
ments to the DDLR to £5,866. 1 Unfortunately available sources run out at
this moment, so it is not known whether or not the agreement was modified.
Certainly it was in the local authorities' interest not to do this, and the
Dearne UDC seems to have contemplated fare rises with equanimity, as the
increased revenue would have helped to reduce their debts. 2
Obviously, therefore, the tables were turned and, as in all good tales,
David had gained his victory over the giant.
One must conclude that the Dearne District Light Railways were a mis-
take, and very largely an avoidable mistake. This is so because even when
they were proposed and still more so when they were built, it was pretty
clear that they could never be an economic success.
As the arguments at the original hearing make clear, the main reason
why the lines were promoted was the perceived inadequacy of local railway
services. Even then, and much more so by the early 1920s, motor buses prov-
ided a viable alternative, making the expensive construction of a tramway
both unnecessary and increasingly risky. In short, the line was built under
out-dated assumptions about the role these various transport modes should or
could play. Perhaps someone should have taken note of the Chairman of LUT,
who is reported as remarking of his Company's 1908 results, 'with the advent
of motor buses the situation was quite altered. Any man who attempted to
build a tramway today under the conditions imposed by the Acts would be
insane' .3
It was also true, however, that even without bus competition, the DDLR
1. YTC, Dearne District; a paper outlining the various estimates for
1951 and giving the actual results for January 1951.
2. SYRO, Misc. Papers/Post Abandonment, DUDC Finance.
3. Wilson, L. U. T., 125.
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would have been at or below the margin of profitability. Interurbans, with
limited ridership spread out over long routes, were less likely than town
systems to earn enough to cover a tramway's necessarily high operating and
capital costs particularly, as in the case of the DDLR, when there was
little chance of concentrated short-stage traffic. The experience of the
Belgian Vicinal light railways was often similar. Though a lot of these
were commercially successful and a few are still running today, many of
those in less densely populated areas could not have continued without sup-
port from the parent organisation. For instance, a large group of steam
tram lines around Turnhout, in Antwerpen Province, was completed before
World War I, but even then 'several required an annual subsidy , . 1
That is on the revenue side. Where costs were concerned, most of the
witnesses at the original hearings doubted that operating costs would be as
low in the long term as the engineers had claimed, and also that revenue
would be sufficient to meet the capital burden. Both prognostications
were proved correct, with operating costs--and in particular repair costs--
first rising faster than and then falling more slowly than the general cost
of living.
Because of the vastly increased costs of construction after the war,
and the higher interest rates then ruling, the cost of repaying and servic-
ing the debt proved prohibitive. Even before the DDLR was opened other
tramway authorities were drawing the obvious lesson from increased capital
costs and the availability of less capital-intensive alternatives to trams.
In 1923 it was estimated that renewal of only two-and-a-half miles of single
line in Keighley would cost £35,500; to meet loan charges, maintenance etc.
on track alone would cost £6,150 per annum, clearly a sum which the under-
taking's previous annual surplus of £1,429 was inadequate to meet, so it was
sensibly decided to scrap the trams in favour of trolleybuses.2
1. W. J. K. Davies, 100 Years of the Belgian Vicinal, SNCV/NMVB 1885-
-1985 a century of secondary rail transport in Belgium (Broxbourne, Herts.
[19851), 51.
2. King, Keighley Transport, 75-7.
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Much of the foregoing was or could have been known at the time of prom-
otion or construction. Advice not to proceed, even from impartial sources
such as the Ministry of Transport, was ignored. Undue reliance was placed
upon Richard Hoare, the Engineer, and his assurances that despite changed
conditions, the line would be a paying one; he was proved particularly at
fault in his estimate of future working costs.
Not everything could have been foreseen, however. The tramway had been
planned to serve a booming and expanding mining area. The downturn in the
coal industry and the consequent long-term depression of trade could hardly
have been expected by those involved in planning the area's services. Un-
doubtedly this decline in the industrial base added to the DDLR's troubles,
even though it was probably not as significant as the management appeared to
assume at the time.
As has been shown, the DDLR would probably have been a loss maker even
if it had had the field to itself. In such a case, however, a relatively
small subsidy might have been justified to maintain an essential public ser-
vice. As it was, though, motor bus competition destroyed all possibility of
the loss being other than horrendous, and it was this factor which made the
DDLR completely unviable. The DDLR's revenue must have been at least halved
by the traffic lost to--or rather never gained from--the YTC and independent
buses. The DDLR could not charge fares high enough to cover its own costs
because of this intense competition, and though the YTC itself might have
preferred higher fares, it was able to survive even the price war on low
ones because of cross-subsidisation from other areas and because of its own
markedly lower costs; those of the 'pirates' must have been even less.
All attempts to control or mitigate bus competition by licensing of
routes, by protective fares or by pooling of revenue failed in their object-
ive of bolstering the DDLR's position. This was partly because local auth-
orities had insufficient powers to deal with private competition; protection
etc. could have been effective given the political will from central govern-
ment. But with the limited measures available, failure was inevitable for
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two reasons. First, bus travel was attractive to passengers as against the
slow and circuitous service offered by the DDLR. Buses were faster, more
comfortable and offered more direct services, so people did not mind paying
a slightly higher fare, particularly when pooling appeared to make loyalty
to the trams--if it ever existed--irrelevant. Second, no amount of legal
control could deny the economic facts. Motor buses were vastly cheaper to
inaugurate than trams and thus bore a correspondingly reduced capital charge.
Their running costs were also much lower, a fact which is particularly sig-
nificant in the Dearne where the buses were competing with a tramway which
was new and built for economical working. Few tramways could match the
DDLR's low operating costs, but even so the YTC was able to undercut these
consistently, and by a considerable margin. The YTC's running costs seem to
have been markedly lower, too, than those returned by bus undertakings in
other, probably more urbanised areas. If this was usual in semi-rural dis-
tricts like this, it makes a point of general importance about the viability
of tramways in such environments.
Quite possibly, as Denton says, the Dearne Committee might have had a
longer career as a transport operator had it gone in for motor buses at the
start. '
 Various other small municipal ventures were started in similar cir-
cumstances at about the same time. For instance, the Tees-side Railless
Traction Board started a trolleybus service in 1919, supplemented by motor
buses from 1924; Ramsbottam UDC did the same in 1923, and there were also
a couple of examples in South Wales. 'A common feature of these "pioneer"
efforts, some jointly between neighbouring Urban District Councils, akin to
the Dearne joint authorities, was that, unlike the latter, all steered well
clear of trams. Most only lost their independence with the 1974 local gov-
ernment reorganisation',2 a full forty years after the Dearne District Light
Railways Joint Committee lost its to the all-conquering Yorkshire Traction
buses, even if the DDLR did finally prove a rather indigestible morsel.
1. As the Ministry had recommended; see SYRO, Stanley 1920, 7.
2. Denton, D. D. L. R., 24.
PART III
DONCASTER CORPORATION TRAMWAYS
THE TOWN TRAMWAY
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CHAPTER 8
EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION 1899--1914
Introduction 
Doncaster dates back to Roman times and thereafter developed into a
market town serving a wide area; few considerable relics of this past remain,
apart from the eighteenth century Mansion House. Horse racing has been a
feature since at least the seventeenth century; the St.Leger classic started
in 1776. Doncaster's modern importance derives from its position as a
centre for road, rail and to a lesser extent water communication; from about
1910 it became an important coal mining area too.
The town became a Borough in 1194. Its boundaries were extended in
1914 and again in 1936, whilst in 1927 County Borough status was achieved.1
Even after 1936 certain places within the town's immediate economic orbit
remained municipally independent, the most important of these in the present
context being the UDCs of Adwick—le—Street and Bentley—with—Arksey; 2 these
were absorbed into the Metropolitan Borough with local government reorganis-
ation in 1974.
No full scale history of the tramways has yet been written, though var-
ious articles and booklets cover the subject in greater or lesser detail and
accuracy. There is a considerable body of primary material, mainly Council
minutes, letter files etc., as well as some documents held by the South
Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive, successor to the Corporation Trans-
1. For details of local government in the period, see Appendix G2.
2. Doncaster Official Guide (Doncaster, n.d.), 17-37, passim.
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port Department. 1 The most appropriate way of presenting this case study,
and especially in view of the lack of a detailed published history, is
broadly chronological.
Legal Preliminaries 1898--1903 
Modern Doncaster was really created by the Great Northern Railway,
whose line reached the town in 1849, 2
 andw6Aopened i:ts engine repair
shops there in 1852-3, so stimulating residential development in the suburbs
of Balby, Hexthorpe and Hyde Park3 and in turn creating a demand for local
public transport. 4
 Horse buses were introduced in the 1880s 5 operated by
three proprietors, Hodgson and Hepworth, J. Steadman and J. Stoppani. 6 Ser-
vices eventually ran to Wheatley, the Racecourse, Hyde Park, Balby, Bentley
and Hexthorpe. 7
A proposal for a tramway--almost certainly horse-powered--was made in
1878 and another in 1896; 8 it is not clear if the latter was that next
described, but probably was not. In 1898 the BET approached the Corporation
with a scheme9 for five miles of line to Bentley, Avenue Road, Balby and
1. See the footnotes and bibliography.
2. DCT Jubilee, 5.
3. P. Tuffrey, Doncaster's Electric Transport 1902--1963 (hereafter,
Electric Transport) (Doncaster, n.d.), Introduction; this photographic album
lacks page numbers, so references are to 'Introduction' or 'Captions'.
4. DCT Jubilee, 5.
5. Leslie Flint and Michael Fowler, 'Doncaster Corporation Transport,
British Bus and Tram Systems 29' (hereafter, 'Corporation Transport'), Buses
Illustrated 10 (March--May 1960), 78.
6. Tuffrey, Electric Transport, Introduction.
7. Doncaster Archives (hereafter, DA), AB9/TC3/A45, Light Railway Com-
mission, Minutes of Proceedings of the Inquiry into the Doncaster and Dis-
trict Light Railways, 15 Feb 1899 (hereafter, Proceedings 1899), 9. Indiv-
idual documents at DA may. have a distinctive number, but most are bound in
boxes or bundles with a common number, as in this case. The same code may
thus recur for several differently titled papers.
8. DA, AB9/TC3/A45, Mr. Crabtree's Evidence 1899 Inquiry , First
Draft, 4.
9. DCT Jubilee, 13.
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Hexthorpe. 1 The Company withdrew when the Corporation promoted their own
Order, but secured an informal agreement that if they should obtain powers
for an interurban connection towards Mexborough and Rotherham, the Corporat-
ion would grant running powers over their lines. 2
 The BET never moved in
this direction, however, but a new company which promoted a line later to
Mexborough and then to Barnsley3
 did receive the support of Doncaster Cor-
poration; 4
 the scheme was withdrawn before going to an inquiry however. 5
Within the Borough, though, municipal enterprise was felt to be prefer-
able, some of the justification for this attitude being that the Corporation
had a greater stake in the area than a company and would be more responsive
to local needs. 6
 The same approach applied across the board. The Council
had already dismissed at least three applications from electricity supply
companies, 7
 and a street lighting supply became available from the municipal
generating station late in 1899 and a public supply on 2 Apr 1900. 8
 To call
this tendency municipal socialism--a contemporary phrase--gives a slightly
false impression, for by 1900 the only Council to have had a Labour majority
was at West Ham. Pre-1914 councils were rarely strongly party politicised;
sitting councillors were often returned unopposed and though party labels
were used, once elected both Conservatives and Liberals tended to act as
individuals paying little attention to party allegiance when making their
1. DA, AB9/TC3/A52, Doncaster and District Light Railways Order 1899
(Draft), 3-4.
2. DA, Proceedings 1899, 247-8.
3. DA, AB9/TC3/A46, The Barnsley and Doncaster Light Railways Order
1902, passim.
4. DA, AB9/TC3/A47, Evidence . . . in support of the . . . above
Scheme (Draft), passim.
5. Ibid., manuscript note on title page.
6. DA, Proceedings 1899, 47.
7. DA, AB2/2/1/11, Town Council Minutes 1 Jan 1895--4 Apr 1912, 11 Aug
1897, 314-5 and 324. These manuscript minutes are in separate volumes for
Council, Committees etc., each having a specific reference code.
8. Tuffrey, Electric Transport, Caption.
182
decisions. 1
 Doncaster's Council was obviously of the type described. Of
six retiring councillors standing in November 1897, five were returned un-
opposed. 2
 Though most bore party labels, in many cases this was prefixed by
Independent'. 3
 A leader writer in a local paper said that elections were
chiefly fought on personal lines, with little bearing on public questions. 4
Where tramway municipalisation happened--as it usually did in Britain--
it was certainly not always or even generally a result of Fabian Socialist
principles as set out by Sidney Webb. 5
 In a number of important cities mun-
icipalisation seems almost to have been a rt.owuc4:04Lekt", happening in spite of
rather than because of firmly held principle. Leeds took over its tramways
because of the shocking condition of the permanent way and initially formed
a temporary sub-committee to run them, only making the arrangement permanent
when no suitable lessee could be found. 6
 In Liverpool the boot was rather
on the other foot. There the city owned the tracks whose condition was so
bad as to ruin the tram company's cars; rather than face the likelihood of
heavy compensation, the corporation bought out the company. 7
 If the motive
for municipalisation was positive, it did not have to be collectivist; the
Lord Provost of Glasgow said that municipal enterprise had spread so rapidly
in the north because it made good business sense to obtain cheap public
utilities . 8
1. Bryan Keith-Lucas and Peter G. Richards, A History of Local Govern-
ment in the Twentieth Century, The New Local Government Series No. 17 (1978),
111.
2. Doncaster Gazette, 5 Nov 1897, 6.
3. Of six councillors elected in 1898, three of the four with known
affiliations were independents of one sort or another; ibid., 4 Nov 1898, 6.
4. Ibid., 9 Nov 1900, 5.
5. Sidney Webb, The Course of Municipal Socialism in the United King-
dom, Labour Annual, 1894.
6. Brian Barber, 'Municipal Government in Leeds 1835-1914', in Munic-
ipal Reform and the Industrial City ed. Derek Fraser (Leicester, 1982), 90-1.
7. Horne and Maund, Liverpool Transport 1, 109.
8. To the Select Committee on Municipal Trading in 1903; see Finer,
Municipal Trading, 60.
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Some councils were getting more politicised, however, the most obvious
example being the LCC where municipal socialism was carried forward by the
Progressive party, a group not totally identified with either the Labour or
Liberal parties, but with close affinities to both. '
 Elsewhere
Liberal councils were most likely actively to favour municipal tramways. Of
eighteen Doncaster councillors (excluding Aldermen) in 1897, 2
 the party aff-
iliations of thirteen are given in the press in that and the following year,
eight being some kind of Liberal, only five being Conservatives, 3
 which may
help to explain what seems to have been a relatively uncontentious decision
to run the tramways themselves. Another factor was certainly the value of
tramways as a customer for the planned power station; 4
 when the trams opened
in 1902 the 1901 price per unit for electricity was reduced from 5d. to 3d.,
whilst for some years afterwards the trams bought half the output. 5
At the end of 1898 an application was made to the Light Railway Comm-
issioners6
 for powers to build lines within the Borough, to Balby and Hex-
thorpe within the then-UDC of that name, to Bentley and to Wheatley. 7
The hearing was held and concluded on 15 Feb 1899. The Corporation's
arguments included a recent population increase, the likely expansion of the
coalfield to the town, the development of Corporation-owned land outside the
Borough, expansion of their markets and benefit to the electricity undertak-
ing. The horse buses had proved the traffic, and a probable initial loss on
the light railways would soon be reversed by the growth of the district.
1. G. M. Trevelyan, English Social History: a survey of six centuries, 
Chaucer to Queen Victoria ( [2nd?3 ed., 1948), 583.
2. Doncaster Gazette Directory 1897 (Doncaster, 1897), 21.
3. Doncaster Gazette, 5 Nov 1897, 6 and 4 Nov 1898, 6.
4. DCT Jubilee, 14 and Tuffrey, Electric Transport, Introduction.
5. Tuffrey, Electric Transport, Caption.
6. Thus the lines were strictly light railways built under the 1896
legislation (see Appendix G3); however in Doncaster, as opposed to the
DDLR, this title was employed only legally, 'tramway' being the common usage.
7. DA, Town Council Minutes, 13 Dec 1898, 463.
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The main objection came, not unreasonably, from the Great Northern and other
railways over the plan to run trams over the Frenchgate level crossing on
the East Coast main line. After discussion, a compromise was agreed by
which the tram lines would stop either side of the crossing, leaving passen-
gers to walk through the existing subway. 1
 The only major point at issue
was thus settled, but at the expense of leaving the Bentley line detached
TABLE 30
DONCASTER: ORIGINAL ROUTES, LENGTHS AND COSTS
No. Route
Length
mi. f. ch.
Cost of Construction
s.	 d.
1 Station Road--Balby 1 4 8 6,533 19 7
la St. Sepulchre Gate, connecting 1 & 3 21 152 5 5
2 St. James' Church (1)--Hexthorpe 1 0 5 4,447 0 6
3 Station Road--Bentley 1 7 8 7,990 1 1
4 Joining (3) near baths to tram sheds 8 455 12 1
5 St. Sepulchre Gate/High Street (3)
--Avenue Road 7 81 4,131 10 0
6 Ditto--Racecourse 1 1 2 4,786 15 1
7 St. Sepulchre Gate (1)--Hyde Park 4 81 2,675 5 1
Other Items 7 4 01 31,172 8 10
Land and Buildings 3,327 11 2
Electrical Equipment:
Feeders etc 5,500
Overhead 7,000
Posts,Pillars etc 7,500
Single-deck Cars (15) 10,500
Contingencies 1,000
Engineering and Legal Costs 2,000
Cost of obtaining Bill 2,000
70,000
SOURCE: DA, AB9/TC3/A44, Estimate of Proposed Light Railways (slightly
adapted for brevity).
a. Miles, furlongs, chains; same abbreviations used in later tables.
1. DA, Proceedings 1899, 1, 7-9, 13-14, 106, 17-18, 215-16.
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from the rest of the system.
Modern accounts of the tramways fail to make it clear that the system
as suggested in 1899 was quite significantly different from that actually
built. The Hyde Park line was projected only to Jarratt Street 1
 and, as
Table 30 shows, two of the early routes--to Oxford Street and Beckett Road--
do not appear in the plans at all. The layout was simple to the point of
parsimony. All routes were single track, except where Railways 1 and 3 ran
alongside in Station Road, and passing places were provided only on the
Balby, Bentley and Hexthorpe lines. 2
 This layout allowed a twenty minute
service generally and a ten minute one on the three shorter lines. 3
For various reasons, this scheme proved inadequate and the Corporation
had to return to the Commissioners for further Orders, granted in 1902 and
1903. 4
 The first provided for a diversion of Railway 5--via 5a--to avoid
building a new road through the cattle market5
 and for a short extension
--6a--to take the Racecourse terminus a little nearer the stands. It had
also been agreed to double most of the latter line because of the need to
cope with abnormal traffic on race days, but this did not need to form part
of the application to the Commissioners, since the Board of Trade had power
to agree such alterations and had done so; the estimated cost was £5,000. 6
The other works were priced at £2,500, so an increase in borrowing powers to
£77,500 was requested. 7
This was the substance of the 1902 Order. The next was the result
partly of problems revealed by initial operations and partly of pressure by
various interest groups for further extensions. The 1902 scheme had left
the Racecourse route still with an awkward stretch of single track in High
1. DA, AB9/TC3/A45, Doncaster Corporation Light Railways Order 1899
(hereafter, Order 1899), 5.
2. One apiece, presumably mid-way along the route.
3. DA, Proceedings 1899, 87-8.
	 4. DCT Jubilee, 50.
5. DA, AB9/TC3/A45, Light Railways Commission, November 1901, Memorial
of the Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses . . . , 2-3.
6. Ibid., 4.	 7. Ibid., 6.
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Street, and after the first St. Leger's Day service in 1902 this was found
quite unworkable, '
 so an interesting scheme was drawn up to remove the
bottleneck by constructing a second track along Priory Place and Printing
Office Street as well as making the outer terminus a turning circle. In
this way, cars would be able 'to run in one continuous circle, the one after
the other, without changing the trolley pole'. 2
 At the same time an extens-
ion of the Hyde Park route to Childers Street was agreed. 3
 Meanwhile, pres-
sure was being put on from Wheatley--then still an independent UDC--for an
additional branch from the planned Avenue Road route to Beckett Road, 4
 and
this was agreed by the Doncaster Committee in September together with a sec-
ond line within the Borough to Oxford Street. 5
 The latter stemmed from a
residents' petition. 6
 Details are given below in Table 31. Except for
Oxford Street, these extensions were designed to serve developing districts
such as Hyde Park, where ten new streets had been built, mostly since the
passing of the 1899 Order. 7
 An inquiry into the proposals was held on
27 Jan 19038
 and an Order was granted later in the year. 9
As actual construction came closer, the usual problems had to be sorted
out with interested parties, particularly the road authorities, such as Hex-
thorpe UDC.10
 It also became clear that in some cases the planned layout was
inadequate, so various loops were lengthened 11
 and other new ones inserted. 12
1. DCT Jubilee, 16.
2. DA, AB9/TC3/A52, Doncaster Corporation Light Railways, November
1902, Mr. Crabtree's Evidence (hereafter, Crabtree's Evidence), 1.
3. DA, AB2/2/16/2, Tramways Committee Minutes 7 May 1901--13 Nov 1905
(hereafter, TC), 29 Sep 1902, 103P, 88; most minutes have a paragraph number
(viz. 103P), which is quoted before the page to give a precise reference.
4. Ibid., 7 Jan 1902, 136P, 45. 	 5. Ibid., 29 Sep 1902, 103P, 88.
6. Tuffrey, Electric Transport, Caption.
7. DA, Crabtree's Evidence, 1.
	 8. DA, TC, 12 Jan 1903, 145P, 110.
9. DCT Jubilee, 50.	 10. DA, TC, 13 Jun 1901, 47P, 13.
11. Ibid., 26 Nov 1902, 135P, 104; this was after using the line.
12. Ibid., 12 Aug 1901, 104P, 30; on the Balby line.
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TABLE 31
DONCASTER:	 EXTENSIONS ORDER 1903
No. Routea
Length
mi.
	 f. ch.
.bCost of Construction
E
6b From 6a along Racecourse Road to
Town Moor Avenue
Double: 51
Single line back: 1 31 1,300
7a From 7 along Carr House Road to near
Childers Street 1 5 1,000
8 From High Street via Priory Place
and Printing Office Street to
to St. Sepulchre Gate 1 31 850
9 From Nether Hall Road to Beckett Road 3 4 1,800
10 From St. Sepulchre Gate via Camden
Street, St. James' Street and
Oxford Street to Upper Oxford
Street/Green Dyke Lane 2 6 1,400
Other Items 1 2 71 6,350
Land and Buildings 350
Electrical Equipment:c
Feeders etc 950
Overhead 1,200
Posts etc 1,250
Double-deck Cars (5) for pass
engers and a water van 4,000
Contingencies 200
14,300
SOURCES:
a. DA, AB9/TC3/A45, Light Railway Commission, November 1902, Don
caster Corporation Light Railways (Extension).
b. Lengths and Costs of routes and land/buildings from DA, AB9/TC3/A52,
Doncaster Corporation Light Railways, November 1902, Mr. Crabtree's Evid-
ence, 1-2.
c. Electrical Equipment from ibid., Mr. Wyld's Evidence.
Again, such changes did not require a further Order, but merely the approval
of the Board of Trade. 1
 This is however running ahead of construction into
the operating period.
1. DA, Order 1899, 5-6.
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Constructing the System 
After getting the Order in 1899 the Town Council moved swiftly to app-
rove tenders, though initially leaving tramway matters in the hands of the
Electricity Committee. 1
 A Tramways Committee was not formed until May 1901
when Councillor Smith became the first Chairman. 2
 It was decided to leave
construction in the hands of the Borough Surveyor and Electrical Engineer
instead of appointing an outside engineer 3
 which, in view of later events,
might have been a mistake. No specific appointment of a Tramways Manager
was made, but the Electrical Engineer, Mr. Wyld, seems to have slipped into
the role by early 1902. 4
Because electric tramways were still quite novel, local councillors
tended to indulge in 'site visits' to choose equipment etc. An important
trip was made to Hull in May 1901, 5
 significant because Doncaster decided to
model its tramways on those of its larger neighbour, in particular by using
a rail with the groove in the centre instead of at one side. 6
 These were
the only two British electric tramways to adopt such rail and centre-flange
wheels, the idea being to afford smoother passage through points etc.; the
obliquely-cut rail joints used were supposed to assist the effect. 7
 This
non-standard rail might have been expected to push up costs, but the price
of £6 2s. 6d. a ton8
 compared well with the £7 a ton which Liverpool was
paying at about the same time. 9
 Fortunately for Doncaster, there was at
least one other system with the same type of track, and in later years
supplies were sometimes derived from Hull, 200 tie bars in 1920 being one
1. DCT Jubilee, 14.
2. DA, TC, 7 May 1901, 1; procedural matters like this lack paragraph
numbers.
3. Ibid., 1P and 2P, 1. 	 4. Ibid., 24 Mar 1902, 15P, 52.
5. Ibid., 21 May 1901, 12P, 4.
	 6. DCT Jubilee, 14.
7. Bett and Gilham, SY&H Tramways, 9.
8. DA, TC, 3 Jun 1901, 18P, 6-7.
9. Horne and Maund, Liverpool Transport 2, 80; granted, Liverpool's
rail was probably of a heavier section.
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example. 1
Doncaster was not, however, able to afford to build its track to the
same standards as Hull. In the larger city wood paving had been used,
but Doncaster had to be content with laying its rails in concrete. 2
 Writers
on the system seem to agree that this construction was 'unusual' 3
 and that
such poor methods contributed towards premature closure. 4
 Actually, the
above comment from the official history is meaningless as it stands, for the
concrete refers to the foundations and the paving to the actual road sur-
face. Hull had, presumably, used the then quite popular wooden blocks for
paving, but Doncaster was going to have macadam which, the Sheffield City
Surveyor said, was quite good enough for a town innocent of any paving at
all5
 except at the level crossing. 6
 The best form of paving at this time
and for some decades afterwards was stone setts grouted in pitch. 7
 Such a
watertight surface may well have been important for the durability of found-
ations, and to this extent the cheaper methods may have been less effective
in the long run.
Electric tramway rails themselves were not normally laid on sleepers,
as they had been for horse tramways, but were kept to gauge by steel cross
ties positioned, in Doncaster, every 10 feet.
	 Originally it had been
1. Borough of Doncaster, Minutes of the Proceedings of the Committees
of the Council as a Municipal Authority and as an Urban District Council,
Electricity and Tramways Committee, 12 Jun 1920, 146P, 623. Minutes from
November 1904 are held in the Local Studies section of the Central Library.
They differ from the earlier ones in the Archvives in being printed, bound
in annual (municipal not calendar years, usually starting in November) vol-
umes and by including all Council and Committee meetings under one cover.
After the first citation of a Committee or other meeting an abbreviated
reference is given and used thereafter; thus the Electricity & Tramways Com-
mittee becomes E&TC. The two Committees were combined from November 1905;
see Council-in-Committee (hereafter, C-in-C), 10 Nov 1905, 14M, 42.
2. DCT Jubilee, 14.
3. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 79.
4. Tuffrey, Electric Transport, Introduction.
	 5. Stone presumably.
6. DA, Proceedings 1899, 143.
7. See a list of materials in Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 56.
8. DA, Crabtree's Evidence 1899 Inquiry First Draft, 2.
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planned to use rail weighing 1081b. per yard,' but that actually laid was
901b. 2
 This was similar to that used on other small tramways at the time 3
and though later British Standard rail was usually a little bit heavier-
--from 961b4--the rail section used at Doncaster should not have been a par-
ticular problem.
A great weakness of early tramway track was always the joints, which
were fishplated on contemporary railway practice. Even when fully tight-
ended, set in concrete and supported by a sole plate, there was nearly
always a tendency for the hammering action of the car wheels to loosen the
joint and disturb the paving. 5
 As will be seen below, joints behaved pred-
ictably6
 in Doncaster.
References to track problems in the later literature, however, clearly
refer to the foundations. The Borough Surveyor described the planned con-
struction as follows. The rails were to be bedded on and surrounded by
Portland cement to a depth of six inches. 7
 After the site had been excav-
ated the holding down bolts and plates would be put in position, the rails
packed up, and the concrete filled in 'pudding fashion': once it had set,
the bolts would be screwed up. 8
 All this was routine. The key phrase was
this: the track would be paved with tarred macadam six inches deep on a bed
of concrete for the total width of the rails and verges, about eight feet. 9
This reads as though there would be a continuous concrete foundation beneath
1. DA, Proceedings 1899, 89.
2. DA, AB9/TC3/A45, Form of Tender for Rail (blank).
3. See for example, Brotchie and Grieves, Kilmarnock's Trams, 11.
4. Horne and Maund, Liverpool Transport 2, 86.
5. Frank E. Wilson, The British Tram (Hemel Hempstead, 1961), 25.
6. This is, of course, unfair; at the time nobody had any way of know-
ing how electric tramway track would behave over a twenty-year life span.
7. DA, Crabtree's Evidence 1899 Inquiry First Draft, 2.
8. DA, AB9/TC3/A50, Track Specifications, 3.
9. DA, Crabtree's Evidence 1899 Inquiry First Draft, 2.
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both track and paving, which was the best and most robust method of con-
struction. '
 However a diagram accompanying the tender for setts--reproduced
here as Figure 7--shows the concrete extending only below the rails them-
selves, the area between and outside these being covered in tar macadam on a
base of rough core.
2
If this diagram is correct--and it bears the stamp of the Doncaster
....._
Borough Surveyor's office--then the clue to the later problems may have been
found. That the early construction was of this type is borne out by later
plans for the experimental relaying of a section of track in 1915 to include
a ferro-concrete foundation; 3 the obvious implication is that there wasn't
one before.
An excellent parallel is provided by the Wemyss tramway, where street
track was laid on a longitudinal concrete 'sleeper' eighteen inches wide by
six inches deep; there was a line of setts down each side of the rail, the
rest of the road surface being simple waterbound macadam. Such methods made
the line one of the cheapest ever built at about £5,500 a mile as against an
average of around £7,500 elsewhere. However, evidence of deterioration
within a few months showed that cheap construction was not always the most
economical. 4
 The line opened in August 1906, 5
 but within only three years
considerable reconstruction became necessary. It was precisely the sections
described above which had given trouble, particularly where the base had
been affected by subsidence. Work to correct the faults began in February
1909. The concrete base was scrapped and replaced by wooden cross sleepers 6
1. E. Jackson-Stevens, 100 Years of British Electric Tramways (Newton
Abbot, 1985), 109 has a description of such track on the LUT.
2. DA, AB9/TC3/A50, Doncaster Corporation Tramways, Basalt Lava Setts,
London Basalt Stone Co.; the setts were laid either side of the rails to
stop other traffic, which tended to follow the newly-paved lines, from wear-
ing ruts in the road surface.
3. Doncaster Minutes, Highways and E&TC Joint Sub-committee (hereafter
H/E&TC Joint), 24 Nov 1915, 13P, 87.
4. Brotchie, Wemyss, 12-13.
	
5. Ibid., 21.
6. A common expedient in mining areas, as used later on the DDLR.
TM til A CA DA
Ifitouckli Go
Se. tti
a JCS.
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in most instances, though in one case a solid concrete base was laid. ' This
is clearly a highly significant example, if indeed Doncaster's track was as
described. Granted, severe problems did not occur there quite so soon, but
this may have had something to do with the fact that the mines were sunk
after the first tramways were built.
2
Another clue to Doncaster's problems is given by a comparison with the
Birkenhead tramways.
Firstly, it must be explained that the track in Birkenhead was laid dir-
ectly onto a concrete foundation which gave a rigid formation. As a res-
ult, the vibrations caused by the running of the cars rebounded back into
the trucks causing deterioration . . . and caused . . . damage to the
rigid track. (3)
A decision to retruck the cars was made as early as 1906, then some time
later an attempt to reduce the noise caused by the rigid track was made by
laying an experimental section with longitudinal wooden sleepers between
rail and concrete. 4
 Doncaster clearly came across the same problem at an
early date, for the later lines in Priory Place and Lower Oxford Street were
laid from new with longitudinal sleepers under the rails to reduce vibration
and to ensure smooth running. 5 This was, incidentally, the form of con-
struction used for the original track in Hull. 6 The advantage claimed for it
there was that it prolonged the life of the rails by reducing the gradual
loss of alignment at joints and the consequent 'hammering' by the car wheels. 7
That there was some truth in this is shown by the fact that major recon-
1. Brotchie, Wemyss, 35-6.
2. The expansion of the coalfield up to and beyond Doncaster was still
in the future at the time of the 1899 Inquiry; see DA, Proceedings 1899, 8-9.
3. Letter from T. A. Packwood in TR 16 (Spring 1986), 158. 'Trucks'
in trams means the frame holding the wheels, axles, motors etc.
4. Ibid., 158-9.
5. DA, Light Railways Committee: Letters 80/1, 19 Mar 1903 (two lett-
ers, one from solicitors). These letters are stored in boxes with identif-
ication numbers covering two periods, but without the contents being separ-
ated. So citations can only refer (hereafter) to 'Committee Letters', to
the box, date and originator (Town Clerk unless otherwise stated).
6. This clarifies the use of 'wood' and 'concrete' in the two towns
7. Lee, 'Hull Tramways', 98.
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struction in Hull did not start until 1919-20, twenty or more years since
the first lines had been laid down, 1 whereas Doncaster's track was to show
serious signs of decay during or even before World War I even though it was
a few years newer than the track in Hull. 2
The overhead was strung on a mixture of span wires and bracket arms and
erected for £7,383 by the well-known wiring contractor, R. W. Blackwell and
Company. They also supplied a tower wagon for overhead repairs. 3
Original plans seem to have included two town centre depots in part of
the old Wool Market and on Bathhouse Fields (Greyfriars Road); however wiser
counsels prevailed and it was decided to enlarge the latter instead, work
being complete by May 1902. The detached Bentley line required a temporary
shed at Marshgate, evidently a pretty flimsy affair because it blew down in
a gale at the turn of 1904-5 and had to be replaced. There was room for
three cars.
4
Fifteen cars were needed for the initial system. First thoughts were
of single-deckers, 5 but the specification was soon changed to double-deck
cars.
6
 After some indecision, it was decided to accept a tender from Dick,
Kerr and Company Limited. 7 The trams were typical small cars of the period
with open tops and reversed stairs rising in a clockwise spiral from the
open platforms. Cars 1--15 were delivered by rail early in 1902 and fitted
to their trucks at Greyfriars Road. 8 The livery was described as crimson
and yellow. 9
The newly planned extensions meant that five more cars were needed, to
1. Ibid., 162.	 2. See below, 258-9.
3. DA, TC, 29 Jul 1901, 81P, 20; 30 Sep 1901, 105P, 30; 14 Jul 1902,
69P, 73. Price for the planned 1899 system only.
4. DA, TC, 6 Jun 1901, 38P, 10; 12 Jul 1901, 63P, 16; 29 Jul 1901,
76P, 19; 22 May 1902, 46P, 64; 9 Jan 1905, 18P, 209; 13 Mar 1905, 27P, 216.
5. See Table 30 above.	 6. DA, TC, 3 Jun 1901, 26P, 7.
7. Ibid., 22 Aug 1901, 101P, 28-9.
8. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 78.
9. DA, TC, 15 Jan 1903, 154P, 113.
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cost £3,0001
 or £600 apiece; these would become 16-20. At about the same
time a water car--a works vehicle--was ordered, 2
 and this was later joined
by a salt and sand trailer rebuilt from an ex-York horse tram. 3
 Five more
passenger cars joined the fleet in 1903, 4
 becoming 21-5.
The Board of Trade inspection of the Balby and Hexthorpe routes took
place on Tuesday 27 May 1902 5
 and a formal opening on Monday 2 June when the
Mayor walked from the Mansion House to Greyfriars Road, where he was pres-
ented with a gold key; after the usual speeches, the routes were then in-
augurated with a procession of three cars. 6
 The remainder of the original
system opened as follows: Race Course 30 Jun 1902, Hyde Park 1 Aug 1902,
Bentley 27 Oct 1902 and Avenue Road 15 Jan 1903.7
Because the Bentley cars could only run as far as the level crossing,
it was decided to operate a shuttle car from Station Road terminus8 round to
Frenchgate at a fare of -yd. 9
 Passengers preferred to save their money and to
walk across Station Yard, however, 10
 and in just over a fortnight the car
took only £4 12s. Old. from 2,209 passengers; this compared to 17,823 pass-
engers on the Bentley service proper. 11
 The car was thus cancelled forthwith
on 12 Nov 1902 12and for over a year people were left to walk. Late in 1903,
however, a new trial was made on a rather different basis. This time the
connecting car was to run from the Guildhall 13
 and only on Friday nights and
on Saturdays after noon; a id. fare gave through travel to Bentley, 14
 so it
1. Ibid., 29 Sep 1902, 104P, 89.
	 2. Ibid., 14 Oct 1902, 116P, 93.
3. Leslie Flint, Doncaster Corporation Transport, Official Fleet Hist-
ory 1902--1974 (hereafter, DCT Fleet) (Doncaster, 1974), 1.
4. DA, TC, 8Jun 1903, 189P, 137.
	 5. Ibid., 22 May 1902, 47P, 64.
6. See, DCT Jubilee, 14 and 16.
	 7. Ibid., 50.
8. Only from Clock Corner according to DCT Jubilee, 16; this is prob-
ably a confusion with the later service, as the Minutes are definite.
9. DA, TC, 14 Oct 1902, 114P, 93.
	 10. DCT Jubilee, 16.
11. DA, TC, 12 Nov 1902, 125P, 100; 26 Nov 1902, 133P, 104.
12. Ibid., 12 Nov 1902, 127P, 100. 	 13. In Frenchgate.
14. DA, TC, 14 Dec 1903, 31P, 164; earlier accounts have missed this.
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was in effect a free service. A further month's extension was agreed at the
next Committee, '
 so the service must have been more encouraging than the
previous scheme. No more is heard about it though, so the probability is
that it lapsed after 1903-4.
When the '1899' system was completed, the contractors probably moved on
immediately to the extensions authorised under the later Orders. The Beck-
ett Road line opened in August 1903, 2
 but the Oxford Street line proved more
difficult for two reasons. First, the narrow streets caused constructional
problems3
 and, second, doubts were evidently surfacing about the route's
profitability. As a result the whole scheme was reconsidered on Committee
in June, but it was decided to finish the line because of the expenditure
already incurred and the cost of abandonment. 4
 The route finally opened for
traffic on 25 Nov 1903. 5
A couple of other details involved in setting up the system remain to
be noticed. The original eight motormen and conductors 6
 were expanded to
thirty-five crews by the end of 1902. Pay, which started at a lower level,
was a maximum of El 7s. Od. for motormen (6d. an
 hour) and El 2s. 6d. (5d.
an
 hour) for conductors. 7
 Other staff appointed were a traffic inspector (a
salaried appointment at £90 a year), a car shed mechanic, car cleaner, chief
clerk and office boy (at 8s. a week). 8
 Uniforms were supplied by the Don-
caster Co-op and had yellow piping. 9
 For some reason this was changed at an
early date to red, when the full list of items was as follows--cap, tunic,
1. Ibid., 11 Jan 1904, 37P, 167-8.
2. Precisely when is not clear. DCT Jubilee, 50 has 17 Aug, but DA,
TC, 10 Aug 1903, 2P, 148 records 2,210 passengers and receipts of £9 4s. 2d.
for the period up to 8 Aug. Judging by the next set of traffic figures
(ibid., 18 Sep 1903, 11P, 153) this is about three days' traffic, so the
opening must have been on 4 or 5 Aug, depending on if there was a Sunday.
3. Track problems have been noted above; see DA, TC, 18 May 1903, 183P,
134 and 8 Jun 1903, 193P, 138 for difficulties over the poles.
4. Ibid., 22 Jun 1903, 197P, 140. 	 5. DCT Jubilee, 50.
6. DA, TC, 24 Mar 1902, 15P, 51-2.
	 7. DCT Jubilee, 11.
8. DA, TC, 8 Apr 1902, 18P, 53.
	 9. Ibid., 1 May 1902, 39P, 60.
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trousers, overcoat, mackintosh and oilskins.1
Tickets were the then almost universal type which was punched to show
the stage boarded and hence the distance which the passenger was entitled
to travel. Originally in Doncaster the stages were named, but from 10 Apr
1928 numbered stages were substituted. 2
 The usual system involved hiring
punches at an annnual rental and, usually no doubt, buying tickets from
the same source. Doncaster took both from A. Williamson, Ashton-under-Lyne,3
a well-known ticket printer. Initially a flat fare of id. was charged, 4 but
411.. tickets would also have been needed for the short-lived Frenchgate car
and also for the various concessionary fares which were quickly introduced. 5
Thus in a period of just under eighteen months the complete system
authorised under the 1899, 1902 and 1903 Orders was put into use. This in-
cluded about eight and a half miles of route, two depots and twenty trams,
as well as hiring and training staff and the thousand-and-one administrative
details necessary to putting a new undertaking on its feet. No doubt the
Tramways Committee looked forward to the future with great hopes, but it was
to be a long time before even a modest prosperity was attained.
General Developments 1904--1914 
1904 may be regarded as a significant date in the history of the under-
taking because it was the first year in which all the originally planned
routes were in service. A further important change took place in January,
however, when Mr. Wyld moved to become Manager at Birkenhead. 6
 The Elec-
tricity and Tramways Committees appointed a sub-committee to consider a fur-
ther joint appointment of an Electrical Engineer and Tramways Manager, 7
1. Ibid., 12 Sep 1904, 82P, 198; the two items of rainwear would be
worn respectively by the conductors and drivers who, it must be remembered,
had little protection from the weather on early tramcars.
2. DCT Jubilee, 36.
3. DA, TC, 1 May 1902, 34P, 59; 14 May 1902, 42P, 61.
4. DCT Jubilee, 16.
	 5. See below,14041---57.
6. DA, TC, 26 Jan 1904, 42P, 170.
	 7. Ibid., 11 Feb 1904, 48-9P, 175
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their eventual choice being Mr. E. S. Rayner)
An important improvement to the system came in 1910 with the opening of
the new North Bridge and its associated tramway. 2
 A Bill had been deposited
in 19073
 and work probably began towards the end of 1908. 4
 As far as the
tramways were concerned, an economy could be effected by the closing of
Marshgate shed 5
 and, more importantly, a surprisingly large stimulus was
given to traffic on the Bentley route. Between 1909-10 and 1911-12 revenue
rose overall by 16 per cent, but to Bentley it increased by a massive 66 per
6
At the same time planning was going on for an extension at the outer
end of the Bentley line. First mentioned in 1908, 7
 the aim was to reach the
new colliery being sunk at Bentley. 8
 This actually opened in 1908 9
 and
evidently caused a build-up of traffic on the existing tramway, 10
 so two add-
itional passing places were put in hand immediately to allow a strengthened
service. 11 These, incidentally, were to be sett-paved for the whole width, 12
an improvement which was doubtless maintained for all new work thereafter. 13
1. DCT Jubilee, 51.
2. Doncaster Minutes, C-in-C, 7 May 1910, 121M, 321. The precise date
when the tramway opened is not clear, but probably lay between 8 and 12 May.
DCT Jubilee, 19 and Bett and Gilham, SY&H Tramways, 50 both wrongly say 1911.
3. Ibid., 18 Dec 1907, 42M, 53.
	 4. E&TC, 9 Nov 1908, 3P, 53.
5. DCT Jubilee, 20.
6. Calculated from Doncaster, Abstract of Accounts for the years end-
ing 31st March (hereafter, Doncaster Accounts) 1910 and 1912, Tramways Rev-
enue Account. 1911 is untypical because two routes were combined for a time.
7. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 14 Sep 1908, 60P, 421.
8. Ibid., 17 May 1909, 44P, 285.
9. Christine Heap, Mines and Miners of Doncaster (hereafter, Mines of 
Doncaster) (Doncaster, n.d.), 4
10. As shown by the revenue figures in Doncaster Accounts, Tramways
Revenue Account, 1909--1911.
11. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 9 Aug 1909, 6P, 27.
12. Ibid., 20 Sep 1909, 12P, 29.
	
13.. Such as North Bridge.
cent.
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The extension itself was not authorised until 1911 and work began in 1912. 1
The line opened on 20 Mar 1913, with a through fare of 11d.--the first time
the standard id. fare had really been exceeded--with two overlapping stages,
Guildhall to old terminus and Bentley Post Office to New Bentley. 2
Various other loops were extended or built new in this period, 3
 mostly
on the Balby route, but further town centre improvements proved very con-
troversial4
 and had to go up to the Council for a decision; the result was a
policy of masterly inactivity, since it was agreed that no central area line
should be built or improved at that time. 5
 The tramcars themselves were imp-
proved, however, most importantly by the fitting of top covers to sixteen of
the cars between 1907 and 1913; at the same time the stairs were altered
from the reversed to the direct type. 6
 All published sources have the dat-
ing wrong on this; one, for instance, lists all the covers in 1913. 7
 In
fact, the Committee visited Sheffield in May 1907 to see the top covers used
there
8
 and ordered the first four a month later. 9
 Four more were bought in
1909-10, another four--exceptionally from the Brush Company rather than the
Dick,Kerr associated United Electric Car Company--in 1911 and the final
batch in 1913. The cars receiving covers were 5--16 and 22._6.10
According to Joyce, before World War I it was possible to operate a
tram economically on the basis of the bottom deck alone, with the top deck
being regarded very much as a reserve for periods of peak demand. This was
all very well except when it rained, so bad weather could reduce earning
capacity by a half. 11 Granted, like most cars of the period, those used in
1. Ibid., 12 Aug 1912, 68P,
	 .	 2. Ibid., 19 Mar 1913, 58P, 287.
3. Ibid., 9 Jan 1905, 20P, 95; 12 Aug 1907, 59P, 407.
4. See for instance, ibid., 21 Apr 1913, 67-9P, 341.
5. C-in-C, 10 Jun 1914, 96M, 466.
	 6. For cars, see Appendix DN2.
7. DCT Jubilee, 20.	 8. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 23 May 1907, 42P, 307.
9. Ibid., 10 Jun 1907, 46P, 309.
	
10. See Appendix DN2.
11. Joyce, Tramway Heyday, 86-7.
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Doncaster had provision for keeping the seats dry, ' which would have con-
sisted of some sort of spring-loaded flap covering the seat after the pass-
enger rose,
2
 but even this wasKetmuch comfort when it was actually raining.
The problem was made worse by restrictive Board of Trade regulations on
standing passengers. Only eight were allowed, 3 and then only on Saturdays
after twelve noon, on Race days or holidays and in the case of inclement
weather. 4 Thus it was clearly to the tramway department's advantage to fit
covers. Incidentally, it was necessary to draw up a bye-law to stop passen-
gers standing on the steps, 'buffers' 5 etc. on the Racecourse route when
football matches were in progress. 6 Some cars were later fitted with slop-
ing fronts to stop this practice.7
A final pre-war improvement to the trams was the purchase of destinat-
ion indicators in 1911. 8 The names of termini were certainly displayed from
the first, 9 so this must refer to a plan to mount large route letters at the
ends and sides of the cars, although these were only used for a short time.
10
An interesting addition to the works fleet was a new tower wagon purchased
in 1912 and based on an Albion motor chassis)" 1 This replaced the horse-drawn
original and was one of the first motor vehicles in the country specially
built for the purpose. 12
1. DA, AB9/TC3/A50, Form of Tender and Specification, 4.
2. Similar to some ex-Bournemouth seats re-used on the tourist tramway
at Seaton in Devon; personal observation.
3. DA, TC, 9 Mar 1903, 168P, 123.
4. Ibid., 12 Jan 1903, 151P, 111-2.
5. Actually, on a tram, the fender.
6. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 13 Feb 1911, 29P, 217.
7. Tuffrey, Electric Transport, Caption.
8. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 12 Jun 1911, 56P, 419.
9. Photographic evidence in, for example, Tuffrey, Electric Transport.
10. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 79.
11. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 23 Oct 1912, 11P, 11. 	 12. DCT Jubilee, 20.
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Traffic Results 
Traffic and revenue in the initial nine months or so of operation were
quite encouraging, but in the next two years there was a large and growing
deficit after capital payments and, in 1904-5, an actual working loss.
After that there was a gradual and sustained recovery which brought the
undertaking into reasonable financial health by 1913.
2
 These changing for-
tunes are expressed in Table 32 below in terms of pence per car mile.
TABLE 32
DONCASTER CORPORATION TRAMWAYS: WORKING RESULTS
IN PENCE PER CAR MILE 1903--1914
Year ending
31st March Revenue Expenditure Balance
1903 6.08 3.60 2.48
1904 6.09 5.50 0.59
1905 6.09 6.37 0.28
1906 6.06 5.18 0.88
1907 6.01 4.78 1.23
1908 6.24 5.15 1.09
1909 6.46 5.23 1.23
1910 7.46 5.50 1.96
1911 7.88 5.82 2.06
1912 8.41 6.31 2.10
1913 9.41 6.40 3.01
1914 10.53 7.72 2.81
SOURCE: working results from Appendix DN1 divided by car mileage figures in
DCT Jubilee, 49. The Statistical Information appended to the Tramway Acc-
ounts has slightly different revenue and expenditure figures, but there is
no obvious reason why this should be so.
Initial relief was gained by a sharp reduction in working costs per car
mile from the high point of 1905. In one respect, costs were already except-
ionally low in that by 1904 conductors were paid only 3d. to 4d. an
 hour or
15s. to 20s. for a sixty hour week. Drivers on top rate earned a fairly
average 6d., but the only undertaking which paid its conductors less was
Lincoln, which had a flat rate of 15s. per week. Plymouth paid 4d. as well,
1. This is disguised in the 1904-5 published accounts by the account-
ing conventions then used, but if later methods are followed, a deficit of
£510 is revealed; see note (b) to Appendix DN1.
2. See Appendix DN1.
1
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explaining that its conductors were only lads; it is a reasonable assumption
that this was the explanation in Doncaster too.' Economies would not come
from depressing wage rates then.
As costs mounted towards the end of 1904 obvious efforts were made to
reduce them however. When complete, the system was operated at frequencies
of between ten and twenty minutes. 2 In 1904 the Racecourse and Avenue Road
services were cut from fifteen to twenty minutes, meaning only one car was
needed for each, and a further car was saved by running a through service
from Balby to Beckett Road. 3 Hexthorpe and Avenue Road were linked about
the middle of the 1904-5 financial year4 and, for just a short while, Bent-
ley and Bennetthorpe in 1911. 5
However real improvement depended not upon reducing costs, but on rais-
ing revenue. It is not without significance that the very years--1913 and
1914--when worthwhile profits were first earned were also those when costs
again exceeded the earlier peak in 1905. 6
 This reflects the fact that
rail-based transport systems have a high level of fixed costs, making it
difficult to reduce operating costs below a certain minimum. The only real
solution is to maximise the use of those fixed assets, taking advantage of
the fact that costs do not rise proportionately with mileage.
Between 1905 and 1913 the route mileage remained at about eight and a
half, give or take a few furlongs, except for the one and a half miles to
New Bentley added at the very end of the financial year 1912-13. In this
period revenue did not rise because the system was expanding therefore.
Fares did not go up either. In fact, due to various concessions, the aver-
1. DA, AB9/TC3/A54, County Borough of Croydon, Information obtained
from other Towns, December 1905 (hereafter, Croydon Survey), passim.
2. DA, TC, 18 Sep 1903, 13P, 153-4.
	 3. Ibid., 10 Oct 1904, 4-5P, 201.
4. Doncaster Accounts, 1904-5; DCT Jubilee, 17 dates all cross-town
services to 1911, but this is far too late.
5. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 11 Jul 1910, 71P, 414; 'Bennetthorpe' is
a district on the way to the Racecourse and was sometimes used of the route.
6. See Appendix DN1 and Table 32.
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age fare paid per passenger fell over most of this period, from 1.08d. in
1906 to a low of 0.922d. in 1912, then rising slightly to 0.962d. in 1913.1
Against this static background, gross revenue went up by 75 per cent
between 1906 and 1913. 2
 Passengers, paying less each, naturally increased
even more; in fact, numbers actually doubled. Part of this rise was prob-
ably due to an increase in the population served by the trams, up from
41,835 in 1906 to 50,000 in 1912, 3
 or by 19 per cent. Part again would be
due to the boost in the Bentley traffic resulting from the connection over
the North Bridge. This still leaves a large proportion of the rise in
traffic as 'pure' growth. The improvement can be seen in the change in the
average number of passengers carried per car mile; this rose from only 5.4
in 1906 to 9.81 in 1913, or by about 80 per cent.4
Though an initial loss had been expected, the actual deficits were more
than had been budgeted for. £1,000--1,500 had been quoted as a possible
loss when the tramways were first discussed, 5
 but, as shown in Appendix DN1,
the actual losses after capital payments in some early years were much
larger than this, more than £2,000 in 1904 and 1906 and as much as £4,550 in
1905. Nevertheless the acceptance that there would be some loss betokens
the Corporation's realisation that the riding habit would have to be stimul-
ated before the system could be expected to break even. Before the electric
tramway era working class people in particular had never made any signific-
ant use of public transport. People would tend to live near their place of
work, use local shops and seek entertainment near-by; it would take time to
break these patterns of life. Well into the present century, too, people
would regularly walk much longer distances than are normal today. For ex-
ample, in the 1920s two young women walked daily to and from their teaching
1. Statistical Information, published with Doncaster Accounts, 1905-6
--1922-3 (hereafter, Doncaster Statistics); not published outside these years.
2. Percentage derived from data in Appendix DN1.
3. Figures after 1912 will include New Bentley and not be comparable.
4. Data based on, Doncaster Statistics. 	 5. DA, Proceedings 1899, 1.
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posts from Highfields to Toll Bar, a round trip of several miles. '
Increasing use of the trams by working people was actively encouraged
by the provision of cheap fares and of special services. Workmen's cars
were a condition of the 1899 Order, but though fares of id. a mile were
specified, no less than id. per journey needed to be accepted. 2 The ordin-
ary id. flat fare presumably qualified, therefore, but there was early press-
ure for even cheaper fares. 3 In 1903 it was decided to run special cars at
a fare of 1-d. before 7.00 a.m. on all routes where there was already a ser-
vice at that time. 4 The following year experimental returns at id. each way
were issued on a workmen's car between Hyde Park and Hexthorpe, valid before
6.00 a.m., at lunchtime and after 5.30 p.m. 5
 Shortly afterwards, returns
at single fares were made available to all passengers before 8.00 a.m. and
after 5.00 p.m. MI the day of issue; 6 it was never really possible to dist-
inguish the 'labouring classes ,7 defined in tramway legislation from other
passengers, so the usual result was that all travellers at certain times
received the concession. Workmen's dinner returns therefore seem to have
become available on all cars by 1908 and were then extended to Saturdays
as well. 8
 There was intermittent pressure to get returns issued at all .
times, 9
 but the Committee wisely resisted this. Half fares for children
going to school were conceded in 1903 10and extended to those under twelve at
all times in 1906.11
 For a time discount tickets were sold at fourteen for a
shilling, 12
 but these were subject to abuses such as passengers exchanging
1. Reminiscence of Mrs. Alice Harris, Woodlands, Doncaster.
2. DA, Order 1899, 31.
	
3. DA, TC, 12 Nov 1902, 129P, 101.
4. Ibid., 8 Jun 1903, 187P, 137.
	 5. Ibid., 10 Oct 1904, 6P, 201.
6. Ibid., 9 Jan 1905, 19P, 209.
	 7. DA, Order 1899, 31.
8. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 11 May 1908, 38-9P, 311.
9. See ibid., 9 Nov 1908, 5P, 6 for an example.
10. DA, TC, 12 Oct 1903, 20P, 158.
11. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 12 Feb 1906, 29P, 154.
12. DCT Jubilee, 20.
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the tokens with the conductor for cash, so the scheme was ultimately judged
a failure. '
The general attempts to stimulate traffic by concessionary fares and
improved or special services were clearly successful however. Rides per
head of population rose from 60.28 per annum in 1906 to 97.54 in 1913. 2
This was way below giants like Glasgow with 271 per annum, 3
 but quite res-
pectable, even being higher than six of twenty-one German tramways listed by
McKay.
4
 From 1903 a small additional contribution was made by letting the
advertising rights, initially for £21 per annum per car. 5
All-in-all therefore, Doncaster's tramways appeared to be becoming est-
ablished as a valuable and financially secure undertaking by 1913. It was
even possible to start a Renewals Fund in 1911, re-named the Reserve Fund
the following year and receiving its first worthwhile balance in 1913. 6
Certain difficulties were already becoming apparent though and others lay
below the surface as a likely source of future problems.
Workmen's Traffic: profitable or not? 
The Croydon Survey of 59 municipal tramways made in 1905 revealed that
32 offered ld. fares, in four cases only for children. The remaining 28
gave rides of between 0.42 and 2.0 miles for id. Of these, 14 said that a
loss was definitely or probably made on such concessionary fares, a further
7 did not know either way and only the remaining 7 claimed a profit. Even
1. South Yorkshire Transport, Leicester Avenue Garage, Doncaster:
Letter Books (hereafter, SYT Letters), 3 Mar 1924, 147-8. This source con-
sists of a series of bound volumes of duplicate outgoing correspondence.
Volumes are available for most of the 1920s and 1930s, but do not appear
to exist for earlier dates. Volumes are not numbered, so individual letters
are cited by date and by the page they begin on. Each volume has 1,000
leaves, but some letters naturally take up more than one page, so there are
rather less than 1,000 letters per volume. All letters, with one or two
exceptions not quoted here, are originated by the Manager, Mr. Potts.
2. Calculated from data in, Doncaster Statistics.
3. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys, 193.
	
4. In 1910; ibid., 194.
5. DA, TC, 15 Jan 1903, 154P, 113.
6. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Net Revenue a/c, 1911-12 and 1912-13.
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that was doubtful in cases like Ipswich,trUckclaimed that no loss resulted
because Id. fares were only in use for a short time. West Ham put it pre-
cisely--average working costs were 0.52d. per passenger, so 0.50d. fares
naturally led to a loss. ' Doncaster was one of the towns surveyed and off-
ered one of the longest distances for I-d., one and a quarter miles; not sur-
prisingly the undertaking was definite about the result, a 'decided loss'. 2
It is very difficult to say whether the increased numbers thus encour-
aged to ride succeeded in turning the loss on half-fare passengers into a
profit by 1913. On average such passengers were not profitable even then,
for total working costs were 9.06d. and the number of passengers 9.81 per
car mile, the average fare being 0.962d; 3
 this would produce 9.44d. per car
mile, just enough for a small surplus. Early morning cars carrying only
half-fare passengers up to one and a quarter miles each might, theoretically,
have earned only 0.4d. per passenger per car mile; 23.6 passengers per car
mile would be needed to take 9.44d. 4 Full cars would easily achieve this,
but whether all cars between 5.30 a.m. and 8.00 a.m. were full--especially
in both directions--is open to question.
The experience of the LCC is instructive. They offered avowedly un-
profitable services as part of their progressive social policy. But even
though workmen's traffic grew rapidly, it remained unprofitable and, as
profits elsewhere fell towards the end of the pre-war period, the tramways
were forced onto the rates; that is, even full workmen's cars lost money.
The fall in profitability of the LCC tramways was caused by a rapid rise in
motor bus competition.5
1. And if account were taken of capital repayments etc., the economics
of reduced fares become even more dubious.
2. DA, Croydon Survey, passim.	 3. Doncaster Statistics, 1912-13.
4. This was one very good reason why lower decks only would not do;
both decks were needed to make a profit on workmen's services in winter.
5. Barker and Robbins, London Transport 2, 186-9. The LCC tramways
had a surplus of over £220,000 in 1911-12, the following year this was
reduced to less than £500 and by 1913-14 had become a deficit of almost
£90,000.
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It is true that an industrial and working class town like Doncaster
could do no other than attempt to build up workmen's traffic. On its own,
this is most unlikely ever to have been profitable, but there may have been
some 'loss-leader' effect. '
 For instance, by using the trams for work,
workers and their families would become used to travelling for other reasons
such as leisure and shopping; that is, the 'riding habit' would be encour-
aged. Also, cheap fares might tempt workers to live further away from their
places of employment and thus involve their families in longer trips for
shopping etc. There is no doubt that Doncaster's tramways did gain from
stimulating a growth in traffic, but an underlying weakness remained in the
form of a large group of passengers who were almost certainly being carried
at below cost price. If anything affected the profitable traffic, as it had
already done in London, there could be trouble.
Oxford Street 
The doubts about completing the Oxford Street line were amply justified
by events. Service began an 25 Nov 1903 2
 with the intention of running a
car every twenty minutes and every ten on Fridays and Saturdays. 3
 Results
were extremely poor, however--over most of January 1904 less than 3,000
passengers brought in under £12 4
--and in March the normal service was cut to
start at 1.00 p.m. only, except on Saturdays. 5
 This measure naturally did
nothing to improve revenue--which nearly halved by Apri16--and in May it was
decided to run only on Friday and Saturday evenings. 7
 By early 1905 less
than El was being taken over a four week period, 8
 and the inevitable decision
1. Specifically claimed at the time by Dover, who said that loss-making
services induced traffic during the day from outlying districts at higher
fares; see DA, Croydon Survey.
2. DCT Jubilee, 16.	 3. DA, TC, 18 Sep 1903, 13P, 153.
4. Ibid., 11 Feb 1904, 44P, 173.	 5. Ibid., 14 Mar 1904, 53P, 179.
6. Ibid., 9 May 1904, 59P, 184.
7. Ibid., 62P, 185; this is an interesting comment on a period when
public transport loads reached a peak on Friday and Saturday evenings.
8. Ibid., 13 Feb 1905, 22P, 213.
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could not be long delayed. According to one source, the route closed from
April, ' but the last traffic return is for the three weeks ending 27 July, 2
so the last run must have taken place on a Saturday earlier that month.
In April 1907 the Committee decided to try again and authorised a
month's trial of a twenty minute service, this time at a reduced fare of
ld. 3 There may have been a few more passengers as a result, but receipts
stayed at a disappointing £11 9s. lld, after six weeks, so it was decided to
stop the car once more after May 18th. 4
 After that the line remained dis-
used until in 1917 the Borough Surveyor was told to lift the rails for rep-
airs on the Balby route. 5
The line must have cost about £2,270 to build, made up of £1,400 for
track and £870 for overhead etc.; 6
 no allowance is made for a tram, because
it could be used elsewhere. Total capital expended by 1905 was £83,596 7 and
£2,270 is 2.72 per cent of that. Capital charges that year were £4,286, 8
the amount directly attributable to Oxford Street thus being £117. Only in
1912 would this have tipped the balance between overall profit and loss, but
even so this was a burden--some £4,600 over the forty year loan period--
which the undertaking need not have borne had wiser decisions been taken at
the planning stage.
Such mistakes were not uncommon. A short-lived tramway branch in East
London, South Africa, has been described as an 'economist's nightmare , , 9
whilst nearer home Erith had persistent problems with its Northend route and
1. DCT Jubilee, 16.	 2. DA, TC, 14 Aug 1905, 46P, 230.
3. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 8 Apr 1907, 32P, 245; as noted, such a low
fare was unlikely to pay.
4. Ibid., 13 May 1907, 38-9P, 307.
5. H/E&TC Joint, 30 Mar 1917, 49P, 251.
6. Track from Table 31; overhead a proportion of 1903 schemes.
7. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Capital a/c, 1904-5.
8. See Appendix DN1.
9. Brian Patten, 'Tramways in East London (South Africa)--1', TR 14
(Summer 1982), 174.
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finally closed it in 1910.1
Probably none of this was crucial to the fates of any of the tramways
mentioned, but it did show some significant facts:
1. that mistakes made when constructing a tramway were costly in the
long-term;
2. that it was difficult to use trams to 'prove' new routes; and
3. that certain areas could not be economically served by tram, all of
which might make more flexible modes attractive as and when they became
available.
Conclusions 
Given the need to build up the 'riding habit', Doncaster tramways' long
climb to prosperity is not all that surprising. If one looks at the balance
sheet presented in Appendix DN1, however, one can see that this prosperity
was not to last; in fact, the tramways' account was in deficit more than it
was in credit after World War I, just as it had been before. Post-war
losses were obviously not due to the need to attract riders to public trans-
port however, as the habit was well entrenched by then. But although most
of the difficulties of the post-1918 period were new ones, the weaknesses of
the pre-war era must clearly have exacerbated those of the next.
Three issues have been highlighted. First, the Oxford Street fiasco
had direct financial penalties as well as more general lessons for the fut-
ure. Second, the poor state of the track, both physically and in terms of
layout, would influence later events in two ways-41) where improvements
later became necessary, they would have to be paid for at much higher prices;
and (2) if the layout remained awkward and the track bad, the case for a
more flexible means of transport would thereby be strengthened. And third,
the large workmen's traffic was almost certainly unremunerative, which meant
that any possible loss of profitable traffic would hit the tramways hard.
1. Jackson, 'Erith Tramways', 131.
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CHAPTER 9
FURTHER EXPANSION AND STAGNATION 1914--1925
Wartime Challenges 
From here on it makes sense to depart from a strictly chronological
arrangement in favour of a thematic one. One of the most significant events
in this next period was of course the outbreak of war in August 1914. The
war had immediate and also more long-term effects upon public transport, as
it did on almost every other aspect of life. Before going any further, one
point concerning the tramway system must be briefly noted, which is that the
tram lines were extended twice during the war, to Warmsworth (from Balby) in
1915 and to Brodsworth along a completely new line in 1916. 1
So far as the direct impact of the war was concerned, an early casualty
was the traditional Sabbath. Committee and Council had always resisted run-
ning Sunday cars, 2
 but the Council issued instructions to institute a ser-
vice from 30 Aug 1914. This was doubtless in any case a commercially sound
decision, even given the fact that time and a quarter was paid to crews. 3
Sunday cars were not, of course, withdrawn after the war. Any immediate
gains made here were probably given away by another concession the Committee
felt bound to make--half fares for military personel, 4 many of whom were
quartered in the town. 5 This reduction was evidently found to be costly,
1. DCT Jubilee, 50; see the section on new services below for details.
2. As late as 1911; see Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 18 Sep 1911, 76P, 548.
3. C-in-C, 25 Aug 1914, 131-4M and attached ink note, 585.
4. E&TC, 1 Dec 1914, 3P, 100. 	 5. DCT Jubilee, 22.
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for fares were raised again at peak weekend periods in 1915 1
 and an attempt
made to rescind the concession entirely. 2
 It is interesting to note that
Lee believes the free rides offered to servicemen in Hull until 1917 (after
most other cities had given up the idea) were a severe burden to the under-
taking there. 3
 And of course as already noted, -id. fares were in all cases
probably offered at a loss; the fact that there was a strong minority in
favour of withdrawing them for servicemen is further evidence of this. Cer-
tain other related concessions were made from time to time. Towards the end
of the war wounded soldiers were allowed to travel free off-peak. 4
 After-
wards this was continued for those who had lost a leg 5
 and special id.
tickets were issued to reservists travelling to drills. 6
 Police on duty had
travelled free since 1910, 7
 but when finances got tight after the war the
Watch Committee agreed to pay 20s. per man per annum for the privilege. 8
 The
most contentious 'free travel' issue related to a 1915 proposal to give free
passes to all councillors; 9
 two months of argument resulted in a compromise
to limit these to council business only. 10
It is usually said that tramways experienced a vast increase in traffic
during World War 1.11 It is true that passengers per annum in Doncaster did
rise from 5,747,273 in 1913-14, the last complete year of peace, to 8,885,922
in 1917-18, the last complete year of war. This was an increase of 54.61
per cent over five years or 10.92 per cent per annum. However between
1905-6 and 1912-13 an increase of 101.13 per cent had been recorded, or
1. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 16 Mar 1915, 32P, 304.
2. C-in-C, 29 Sep 1915, 179-80M, 690.
	 3. Lee, 'Hull Tramways', 136.
4. Doncaster Minutes, C-in-C, 18 Jan 1917, 39M, 128.
5. E&TC, 9 Aug 1920, 155P, 686; this recalls the reserved seats for
war wounded found for many years on German trams.
6. Ibid., 12 Jun 1922, 142K, 434.
	 7. Ibid., 10 Jan 1910, 37P, 197.
8. Watch Committee, 16 Nov 1920, 26F, 87.
9. C-in-C, 1 Mar 1915, 75M, 289-90. 	 10. Council, 5 May 1915, 429.
11. See above,37.
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12.64 per cent per annum. '
 So the war actually slowed down the rate of
growth in traffic in Doncaster overall, although there were larger rises in
some of the war years. Nor was the rise entirely or even largely due to the
war. That in the financial year ending 31 Mar 1915 probably was; that is, a
9.66 per cent increase in revenue. 2
 The following year showed a 15 per cent
increase, but the whole of that disappears if the extra revenue earned on
the Balby route--extended to Warmsworth on 4 Feb 19153--and on the new Brods-
worth line4 is subtracted. The same pattern is repeated between 1915-16 and
1916-17; a 29.35 per cent rise in revenue is converted to only 0.15 per cent
if the first full year's results for Brodsworth are excluded. So what app-
ears to have happened is that the war gave an initial boost to traffic and
receipts, but that thereafter they would have tended to level out had it not
been for the expansion of the tramway system itself. The increase in pass-
engers between 1916-17 and 1917-18, when no new routes were opened, was only
5.63 per cent. 5 This rather contrasts with the great growth in traffic on
some other tramways, which commentators usually put down to the direct eff-
ect of the war. 6
 On the other hand some systems, such as those in seaside
resorts, suffered catastrophic falls in receipts. 7
 Doncaster seems to have
been a middle case, not greatly affected in traffic terms by the hostilit-
.	 8les.
The initial effect of all this was quite healthy. Revenue, working
balance and 'profit' all grew during the early years of the
1. Traffic figures from or based on, Doncaster Statistics, passim.
2. Revenue figures and percentages from or based on, Doncaster Accounts,
Tramways Revenue a/c; revenue, unlike traffic, is available for each route.
3. DCT Jubilee, 50. 	 4. Opened on 2 Feb 1916; ibid., 50.
5. 8,411,263 as against 8,885,922; see Doncaster Statistics, 1916-17
and 1917-18; revenue rose much faster (see Appendix DN1) after fare rises.
6. See Barker and Robbins, London Transport 2, 194-5 for London.
7. T. Barker, Transport in Great Yarmouth, 1, Electric Tramways 1902 
--1918 (Bristol, 1980), 74.
8. Though of course the urgent need to expand services to the mining
areas was a war priority.
213
war, and the £2,856 earned in 1914-15 was the best ever; so was the operat-
ing ratio of 66.3 per cent. The following year things took a sharp turn for
the worse, however. The operating ratio climbed again to 72.4 per cent and
the surplus fell to £757. 1
 The cause was not a fall-back in receipts, which
were rising faster than ever, but two problems which were hitting the under-
taking together. These were an even faster rise in working expenditure and
higher capital payments because of the extensions and improvements made to
the system. 2
 Table 33 shows that up to 1915-16 the rise in working costs
was still slightly behind that of revenue if a 1913-14 base is used. But if
the exceptionally low costs of 1914-15 are used as a base, it becomes obvious
that that expenditure was in fact increasing faster than revenue as early as
1915-16; by the following year both indices pick this up, though the second
indicates better the severity of the problem. 'Chasing from behind', as it
were, expenditure never catches up with revenue, but it would have done if
no remedial action had been taken.
The major elements of costs were repairs, power and traffic (mainly
wages). The first was actually less in cash terms in 1914-15 and 1915-16
than in 1913-14 and was a declining percentage of costs afterwards through-
out the war. 3
 The reason was obviously the reduction in maintenance caused
by shortages of labour and materials. 4
The cost of electricity was affected in two ways. First, the unit
charge crept up from 1.25d. in 1914-15 to 1.59d. in 1918-19. 5
 This was only
a 27 per cent rise however, and does not go far towards explaining a 100 per
cent plus increase in overall power costs over the same period. A more
1. Figures from, Doncaster Statistics and Appendix DN1.
2. The extensions are dealt with more fully below.
3. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Revenue a/c.
4. A reasonable assumption, based on the particular maintenance prob-
lems discussed below and on the experience in other towns during this per-
iod. For instance, Liverpool's tramways ended the war 'almost derelict';
see Horne and Maund, Liverpool Transport, 2, 57.
5. Calculated from power costs and mileages in, Doncaster Accounts.
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TABLE 33
DONCASTER TRAMWAYS: THE RELATIONSHIP OF REVENUE
AND OF WORKING COSTS 1913-14--1927-8
Year Ending
31st March
Gross
Revenue
Index
1914=100
Index
1915=100
Working
Costs
Index
1914=100
Index
1915=100
1914 23,209 100 - 17,027 100 -
1915 25,348 109 100 16,657 98 100
1916 29,349 126 116 21,274 125 128
1917 37,874 163 149 28,229 166 169
1918 44,519 192 176 33,069 194 199
1919 53,528 231 211 37,566 221 226
1920 60,193 259 - 56,607 333 -
1921 75,008 323 - 69,041 405 -
1922 72,295 312 - 62,537 367 -
1923 73,055 315 - 58,516 344 -
1924 66,484 286 - 52,337 307 -
1925 70,947 306 - 54,993 323 -
1926 71,434 308 - 54,592 321 -
1927 62,479 269 - 55,201 324 -
1928 72,586 313 - 53,605 315 -
SOURCES: Revenue and Working Costs from Appendix DN1; Indices calculated
for this Table.
important factor seems to have been a rise in the amount of power consumed
by each tramcar, which went up sharply in 1913-14 1 (from 1.32 units per car
mile to 1.51) and again in 1916-17 (to 1.88). 2 This rise is loosely related
to the growth in traffic and hence in passengers per car mile, which would
have caused greater power consumption through heavier loads and probably
also more frequent stops and starts. It is noticeable, however, that the
really significant jumps in current consumption coincide with the delivery
of new cars with 40 h.p. motors as opposed to the old 25 h.p. ones; seven
such cars were delivered in 19133 and four more in 1916. Thus only a part
of the increased power costs, and that probably the lesser, was due to war-
time inflation or to traffic increases; 4 the greater part resulted from mod-
1. Still peace-time, of course.	 2. Doncaster Statistics.
3. For fleet details, see Appendix DN2; h.p. = horse power.
4. Except that, of course, the argument is a circular one: new cars
were needed to cope with increased traffic, which could not have been carr-
ied without them . . .
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ernisation and improvement of the fleet, which would presumably have happ-
ened anyway.
Traffic costs rose by 150 per cent from 1913-14 to 1918-19, more if war
service allowances are included, and increased their share of total costs
also; 1
 traffic costs are thus clearly the key determinent of rising expend-
iture levels. The war forced up the wage bill in three ways. First, the
Council agreed to pay a proportion of the wages of any employee on active
military service; 2
 in the peak year, 1918, this cost the tramways £2,198. 3
Second, in an attempt to cover inflation, some existing employees were paid
a war bonus of 2s. a week for those not earning over 40s., 4
 later raised to
3s. 5
 Evidently few tramway employees came within this scheme, for the max-
imum payment made was only £450 per annum (in 1918-19). 6
 Most traffic
employees seem to have been protected by the third element, increases in
basic rates. The last pre-war maximum rates were 6td. for motormen and 51-d.
for conductors; the former was raised to 7d. in 1916 and conductors were
started at a higher minimum rate. 7
 Wage scales were also compressed in time,
so that the maximum was reached sooner. By this time only women conductors
were mentioned and some women were also driving. 8
 In the general mood of
patriotism, recruitment of staff was actively encouraged. In May 1915 the
Council appointed a sub-committee to interview all eligible men who had not
yet enlisted. 9
 T. Barker describes how the process worked in Great Yarmouth.
There was no conscription . . . at this time (not until 1916) . . . the
Government . . . therefore . . . resorted to little less than blackmail,
1. Calculated from Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Revenue a/c,1913-14--
1918--19, passim.
2. Doncaster Minutes, C-in-C, 18 Aug 1914, 124M, 585; 29 Mar 1915,
89M, 293.
3. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Revenue a/c, 1917-18.
4. Doncaster Minutes, C-in-C, 29 Mar 1915, 89M, 293.
5. E&TC, 11 Jun 1917, 85P, 327.
6. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Revenue a/c, 1918-19.
7. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 13 Mar 1916, 54P, 315.
8. Ibid., 11 Dec 1916, 23P, 102.
	 8. C-in-C, 26 May 1915, 116M, 431.
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exerted upon local authorities to provide workmen, the local authorities
in turn making it clear that they expected young, able-bodied men to
enlist . . . To refuse was to be a coward and in practice few did. The
Tramwaymen were affected in the same way as everyone else. (1)
The inevitable result in Doncaster as elsewhere was the decision to employ
women,
2
 who staffed most of the cars during the rest of the war. 3
Inflation was so severe in 1917, however--the retail price index rose
38.5 points in the year 1916-17 4—that the existing wage/bonus rates became
inadequate. Two unions called their members out on strike early in 1918,5
though it seems probable that only one, the National Amalgamated Union of
Labour, actually did come out. 6 It appears from traffic returns 7 that tram
services were suspended for a full week, from 22nd to 28th March, and after
arbitration8 up to 5s. extra was paid on the war bonus to the car shed men; 9
platform staff received a similar award in August.1°
These events illustrate a permanent change brought about by the war in
the climate of industrial relations. The Town Council had previously behaved
as a paternalistic employer, with its good points--such as reserving the
jobs of men in the forcesq-and its bad. Discipline was almost military. A
conductor, for example, was brought 'before the General Manager for being
intoxicated and failing to turn up for his Reliefs. He was booked on late
1. Barker, Transport in Yarmouth, 1, 66-7.
2. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 14 Jun 1915, 56P, 499. Amongst the larger
cities, Glasgow had been the first to employ women conductors in April 1915,
only grudgingly followed by London operators in November of that year; see
Barker and Robbins, London Transport, 2, 197.
3. Tuffrey, Electric Transport, Introduction.
4. See Appendix G4 for price indices.
5. Doncaster Minutes, C-in-C, 4 Mar 1918, 60M, 195; 6 Mar 1918, 72M,
197.
6. Special Committee, 18 Mar 1918, 105S, 225.
7. E&TC,	 Mar 1918, 62P, 256;
	 May 1918, 69P, 287.
8. Special Committee, 23 Mar 1918, 112S, 226.
9. C-in-C, 14 May 1918, 101M, 284. 	 10. E&TC, 12 Aug 1918, 88P, 410.
11. SYT, Tramways Department Employees Register and Record (hereafter,
Register), 1.
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turn for one week and warned'; ' in 1912 a driver was 'dismissed the ser-
vice , . 2
 Trades unions could be ignored so, for example, a union secretary
wanting to discuss a man's dismissal with the Manager was, in 1907, refused
an appointment. 3
 The shortage of labour caused by the war changed the bal-
ance of power markedly, and though discipline remained firm, things could
never be quite the same again.
Rising working costs alone might not have forced a rise in fares during
the war, though they certainly would after it, but a 63 per cent increase in
capital contributions by 1918-19 as opposed to 1913-144
 (due to the new ex-
tensions) caused revenue to be squeezed beyond the ability of pre-war fare
scales to cope. In 1917 most concessionary fares were withdrawn5
 and certain
other fares increased; 6 further increases followed in 1918. 7
 Revenue was
thus increased more-or-less in line with working costs, so the operating
ratio remained fairly stable, being 74.3 per cent in 1917-18 as opposed to
73.1 in 1913-14. 8
 So even after meeting capital charges there was still a
good surplus in both 1916-17 and 1917-18.9
Interestingly therefore the war seems to have had very little effect
in itself on Doncaster's tram system. It did not increase traffic in any
marked or direct way, and though wartime inflation and labour problems did
affect costs, other cost increases would have happened anyway, such as the
higher power consumption caused by larger cars and the rise in capital
charges consequent on the system's extension. The Council coped well with
1. Ibid., 5.	 2. Ibid., 29.
3. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 4 Nov 1907, 8P, 14.
4. Percentage calculated from Appendix DN1.
5. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 17 Sep 1917, 127P, 447.
6. Ibid., 2 Apr 1917, 54P, 252; C-in-C, 25 Jun 1917, 106M, 323.
7. E&TC, 8 Apr 1918, 66P, 257.
8. Doncaster Statistics, 1913-14. This source gives the later ratio
as 91.9 per cent, but figures in Appendix DN1 show this to be an error.
9. See Appendix DN1; though granted inflation had reduced the real
value of the surplus as opposed to pre-war.
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the financial problems of the period, although the war probably did have a
lasting effect on industrial relations in the town. The war left a legacy
in other ways too. In national terms the most significant 'hangover' from
the war was inflation and this compounded the more domestic concern of the
tramways' management—that is, the accumulated burden of essential repairs.
Services to the Coalfields: Tram or Motorbus? 
At the end of the nineteenth century coal mining had not yet reached
Doncaster. Between 1900 and 1920 many new and deeper mines were sunk in the
concealed coalfield to the east of the older mining areas such as the Dearne
valley and by 1935 Doncaster had become the most important mining centre in
South Yorkshire. ' The new pits were, for obvious reasons, not sunk in Don-
caster itself but around it, and by the early 1920s, according to the Trans-
port Manager, ten new mining villages had sprung up in the environs of the
town.
2
 He does not specify which places he means, but the most important in
relation to public transport were New Bentley, Armthorpe, Rossington, Hat-
field, Edlington, Woodlands, Carcroft and Askern; there were other pits at
more distant places, such as Haworth and Maltby.
3
These 'greenfield sites' developed into quite large communities--it was
planned to house over 10,000 people at Woodlands, for instance
4
--but were
still small enough to require close connections with a larger centre. 	 Don-
caster Corporation was thus faced with a fairly sudden and very extensive
requirement for increased transport services for which, before World War I
anyway, it was the only obvious provider.
The extension of the tramways to New Bentley, already described, 5
 was
1. Gray, 'The South Yorkshire Coalfield', 38.
2. T. Potts, Doncaster Cavalcade: the history of a successful and 
progressive municipal undertaking (hereafter, Doncaster Cavalcade) (reprinted
from Transport World, 8 Jan 1948), 5.
3. Heap, Mines of Doncaster, 4.
4. Brodsworth Main Colliery: Jubilee 1905--1955 (hereafter, Brods-
worth Jubilee) (Doncaster, [19553 ), 44.
5. See above, 198-9.
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the transport department's first response to the new demands made upon it.
It had been intended to apply at the same time for a line from Balby to
Warmsworth1
 to serve the new colliery village at Edlington. 2
 In fact the
proposed terminus was three quarters of a mile from the pit and a mile from
the village; why the gap was left is not recorded. In the event the applic-
ation was not made until 1912, by now in conjunction with a second line to
Brodsworth3
 (the name of the pit; the village was called Woodlands). The
delay was due to a prolonged dispute with neighbouring local authorities,
principally the WRCC, over road widths etc. 4
 A tender for the Warmsworth
line was finally accepted in April 19145
 and the route was opened on 4 Feb
1915. It was 1 mile, 2 furlongs and 71 chains long in single track with
loops and had cost £11,500 to build. The through fare was to be 2d., half
for workmen, with every alternate car running to Warmsworth. The cars would,
it was thought, be a great convenience for colliers, for country jaunts and
as a stimulus for residential development. 6
 The line ended in the middle of
the main road to Sheffield and concern was immediately expressed about the
dangers of this; 7
 approval for a short extension down Edlington Lane was
rapidly received, 8
 though the war caused construction to be delayed until
1919. 9
Meanwhile public pressure was building up for a tramway link to Wood-
lands,10 which is about four miles from Doncaster itself. Interestingly, one
reason for the hold-up was that councillors had become interested in the new
1. Doncaster Minutes, C-in-C, 12 Nov 1909, 43M, 117.
2. Ibid., 17 Nov 1909, 45M, 118.	 3. E&TC, 8 Jul 1912, 60-4P, 491-2.
4. See for example, ibid., 9 Oct 1911, 6P, 13.
5. Ibid., 23 Apr 1914, 50P, 356.
6. Doncaster Gazette, 5 Feb 1915, 5; the area was obviously still
fairly rural, a further report in the same edition of the paper mentioning
the 'pleasant rural charm' remaining over much of the route.
7. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 13 Sep 1915, 89P, 697.
8. Ibid., 13 Mar 1916, 52P, 314.
	 9. Ibid., 5 Aug 1919, 97P, 578.
10. See for example, Brodsworth Jubilee, 46.
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trolleybus systems at Leeds and Bradford and had visited the former soon
after its opening in 1911. 1
 A substantial minority of members on both the
Committee2 and in Council3
 favoured 'trackless trams' for the Brodsworth
route, but were finally over-ruled. 4
 This was ten years before trolleybuses
are generally believed to have been considered in Doncaster, 5 though the
Council were almost certainly right to go for tried technology in the form
of the tram at this very early date.
The Committee made its decision to build a tramway in 1912, most of it
on sleeper track on the roadside verge; 6 this must have been helpful as road
traffic grew after the war because the route followed the Great North Road
(Al) throughout. Yet further delay, however, led to the local authority for
the area--Adwick-le-Street UDC--proposing to license motor buses along the
route. 7 This led to a counter proposal from two Doncaster councillors that
they should buy some buses to run to both Brodsworth and Edlington, 8 but
once again the idea was rejected by the Council. 9 Early in 1914, however,
the Manager submitted a report on the development of tram and bus services
for the growing colliery districts 10 and it was later decided by the Comm-
ittee to recommend the Council to seek powers for motor bus routes from Don-
caster to Rossington, from Beckett Road to Armthorpe and between Bentley,
Bullcroft (the colliery at Carcroft) and Brodsworth? 1
 however the Committee
later reversed its own decision, 12
 reading between the lines, on Rayner's
1. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 6 Dec 1911, 10P, 133.
2. Ibid., 4 Jan 1912, 18P, 181.
	 3. C-in-C, 17 Jan 1912, 48M, 170.
4. Council, 1 Feb 1912, 219.
	 5. Owen, British Trolleybus, 139.
6. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 4 Jan 1912, 17P, 181; 8 Jul 1912, 64P, 492.
7. Sanitary Committee, 22 Jul 1913, 311N, 551.
8. Council, 6 Aug 1913, 557. Interest had been shown on the Committee
even earlier, in 1907; see E&TC, 12 Aug 1907, 58P, 406; 4 Sep 1907, 63P,
408; 14 Oct 1907, 6P, 13.
9. C-in-C, 27 Aug 1913, 119M, 558. 	 10. E&TC, 7 Jan 1914, 20P, 184.
11. Ibid., 13 Jul 1914, 1P, 11; most were to run from tram termini.
12. Ibid., 6 Nov 1914, 2P, 11.
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advice.
The Brodsworth tramway did get built in the end however and was finally
opened on 21 Feb 1916, 1
 bringing the route mileage to just over fourteen. 2
Fares from Frenchgate were fixed as follows--1d. to the railway bridge, 1-id.
to Pipering Lane, 2d. to Green Lane, 21d. to Highfields and 3d. to Wood-
lands. 3
In order to work the new extensions it had been necessary to buy addit-
ional cars. Six--cars 26-30--were broadly of the existing type but were
delivered ready fitted with top covers and had a more modern type of truck
known as the Peckham Pendulum. One--car 32--was similar but much larger,
with seats for seventy-four, and also had an experimental long-wheelbase
radial truck. These were all delivered in 1913. Four more--cars 33-6--were
supplied in 1916 and were mid-way in size between the earlier deliveries. 4
To accommodate the cars, the depot had to be enlarged as well. 5
After the war it was clearly intended to continue the policy of tramway
extension. The Council put such extensions fourth on their list of public
works priorities. 6 Schemes were laid for lines to Armthorpe, Hatfield and
Rossington7 and the plans for the last, starting from the Racecourse, were
well advanced by 1918. 8 Ten new trams, which became numbers 38-47 and were
the most modern on the system with, for the first time, enclosed driver's
vestibules, 9 were ordered that year. 10 To house them an additional tram
shed had to be built on the opposite side of Greyfriars Road, next to the
1. DCT Jubilee, 50.	 2. See note (b) to Appendix DN3.
3. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 2 Feb 1916, 35P, 264.
4. See Appendix DN2 for fleet details.
5. Doncaster Minutes, C-in-C, 21 Apr 1913, 82M, 333.
6. Ibid., 23 Dec 1918, 53M, 113.
7. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 100.
8. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 9 Dec 1918, 19P, 118.
9. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 101.
10. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 20 Nov 1918, 14P, 70.
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Electricity Works. 1
 The necessary application to the Light Railway Commiss-
ioners for the actual extensions was left too late for 1919, however, and it
was decided to let the matter stand over, 2
 with the obvious intention of
picking it up again later. But from that time onwards no more is heard of
further extensions into the colliery villages.
According to the Manager, Mr. T. Potts (who was appointed in 19193 ),
one reason for the change in policy was that the density of population in
the area was too low for revenue to cover the capital expenditure for new
tramways.
4
 The only empirical test for this claim is the Brodsworth route,
which was the only one of the semi-rural coalfield lines to be constructed. 5
More than half of this tramway, from the junction with the Bentley line as
far as Highfields, ran through countryside in the same way as, say, a route
to Rossington would have done. As noted in connection with the DDLR above,
pick-up traffic was usually the mainstay of a tramway, and that would have
been absent over such sections. It is surprising to discover from Appendix
Table DN3 therefore that the Brodsworth trams performed as well as or even
better than those elsewhere in the town, so in this particular case it seems
that short-stage traffic was not so important after all. 6
 In order to meas-
ure whether the Brodsworth line actually earned enough to cover its capital
costs, one needs to know the latter. Capital charges on the Doncaster tram-
ways as a whole rose by £1,651 in 1915-16, the year the Brodsworth route was
completed. The following year a further £240 was added, 7
 the total of
£1,891 probably being roughly the annual cost of the new line and of the
four cars purchased at the same time. Table 34 overleaf shows the likely
surplus earned between 1916-17 and 1922-3 by the Brodsworth trams. It dem-
onstrates that capital repayments were probably payable from revenue until
1. Ibid., 10 Mar 1919, 40P, 260.
	 2. Ibid., 14 Apr 1919, 52P, 319.
3. C-in-C, 9 Oct 1919, 2M, 6. 	 4. Potts, Doncaster Cavalcade, 5.
5. Both the New Bentley and Warmsworth lines were also new extensions
serving coal mines, but being prolongations of existing urban lines, they do
not really provide a suitable comparison.
6. See Appendix DN3.	 7. See Appendix DN1.
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1919-20; thereafter they were not. This argues that the scattered population
TABLE 34
APPROXIMATE OPERATING SURPLUS OF THE BRODSWORTH TRAMWAY
1916-17--1922-3
Year Ending
31st March
Traffic
Revenue
£
Working
Costs
£
Operating
Surplus
£
1917 8,451 6,374 2,077
1918 10,094 7,396 2,698
1919 12,410 8,484 3,926
1920 14,961 12,782 2,179
1921 16,301 15,589 712
1922 13,806 14,123 317
1923 13,462 13,213 249
SOURCES
a. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Revenue a/c.
b. Estimated by multiplying costs per route mile
from Appendix DN3 by Brodsworth route mileage (3.5).
and consequent lesser revenue mentioned by Mr. Potts were not, in the cond-
itions prevailing up to 1920-1, reasons for calling off the construction of
the extensions; up to that time, the capital could be serviced. Since the
Rossington application was allowed to stand over in April 1919, before the
decline in the viability of the Brodsworth route could have become apparent,
it was not fears about the ability of revenue to meet capital payments which
caused this. There is in fact no reason to doubt the official explanation
that the application for powers had not been submitted in time.
But what Table 34 does show is that by the time the matter was again
raised, the failure of the Brodsworth route to cover its loan charges would
be becoming obvious. Moreover, this was in relation to construction costs
and interest rates prevailing in 1916. By 1920 the Wholesale Price Index
had risen by 182.3 points. 1
 Such rapid inflation must seriously have aff-
ected the cost of constructing new tramways and hence the capital liability.
1. See Appendix G4.
225
The Brodsworth and Warmsworth extensions had together cost £37,218 to con-
struct; 1 the former was 3.02 and the latter 2.3 miles long, 3 so the cost per
mile for mostly single track was E7,022. By 1919 the DDLR, also single line
but probably built to cheaper standards, was estimated at £10,6454 per mile,
a rise in construction costs of 52 per cent. This would have pushed loan
repayments up by a similar proportion, whilst on top of that--as already
noted in connection with the DDLR5--the cost of borrowing had about doubled.
Very roughly, interest accounted for 65 per cent of the capital burden for
Doncaster in 1911,the rest being sinking fund contributions. 6
 If one takes
the actual annual capital cost of the Brodsworth extension (£1,891), 65 per
cent of this is £1,229; doubling that achieves £2,458. The loan repayments
themselves would be about 50 per cent more or £993, a total of £3,551. Only
in 1918-19 could such an amount have been met. So Mr. Potts's fears about
the insufficiency of revenue to cover capital payments would have been amply
justified by the time the question of extensions came up again in 1920.
If the brief prosperity of 1919 had continued, however, expansion of
the tramways might still have been a viable proposition. But post-war con-
ditions worked against this not only by pushing up the costs of construction,
but also by squeezing the 'profit margins' available to pay for such invest-
ment. Table 33 above shows that working costs continued to increase more
rapidly than revenue until 1921 and thereafter fell more slowly; an approx-
imate equality between revenue and costs indices was not obtained until
1. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Capital a/c, 19171-18; that is, basic-
ally track and overhead costs but not including cars.
2. See note to Appendix DN3; this is not the same as route length,
part of which was common with the Bentley service.
3. See above, 220.
4. Also track and overhead only; calculated from mileage and costs in
SYRO, 8/UD28/359-63, Estimate of Expenses, 24.
5. See above,155; of course, this was over a 1913 base, the increase
for Doncaster over a 1916 base might well have been less.
6. That is, £5,283 versus £2,818; see Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Net
Revenue a/c, 1918-19.
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1928. This meant that the surplus available for meeting capital charges was
reduced, so that even capital raised at the old levels and rates could not
be serviced, let alone inflated post-war loans. Thus whilst Doncaster tram-
ways' revenue in 1920 was three times that of 1913, working costs had gone
up by over four times, just about halving the balance available for meeting
capital charges; the result was a massive deficit of £4,572. 1 To undertake
new capital obligations under such circumstances would clearly have been a
folly.
Some of the discrepancy between revenue and costs was due to the diff-
iculty of raising fares to meet the latter. Tramways could only raise their
fares by going through official channels, in this case by applying to the
Ministry of Transport under the Tramways (Temporary Increase of Charges) Act,
1920. 2 There were two adverse results from this procedure. First, there
was a long delay between application and approval and, second, the increase
requested was not necessarily granted. Thus the Committee decided to apply
in March 1920 for an 100 per cent increase in fares; 3 an interim Order for
only a 50 per cent rise was granted in November, 4 after which an inquiry had
still to be held 5 before the final Order was made. 6 All this in a time of
rapid inflation meant that the cure was applied too late and so the 1921
deficit was even worse than that for 1920. 7
Doncaster faced special problems because the collapse of the post-war
boom hit the coal industry particularly hard. This had direct effects on
the tramways in 1921 when there was a bitter and lengthy coal strike. This
started on 31 Mar 1921 when the miners were locked out following notice of
severe wage cuts by the coal owners. Backing for the miners was not forth-
coming from other workers and they had to sue for peace; even so the agree-
1. See Appendix DN1.
2. Doncaster Minutes, C-in-C, 28 Jun 1920, 161M, 544.
3. E&TC, 8 Mar 1920, 77P, 350.	 4. Ibid., 11 Oct 1920, 6P, 14.
5. Ibid., 8 Nov 1920, 13P, 137. 	 6. Ibid., 14 Feb 1921, 39P, 287.
7. See Appendix DN1.
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ment to return to work was not signed until 1 July 1921. 1 Such a long dis-
pute caused obvious difficulties to industries such as electricity generat-
ion, and as part of this tramway services in Doncaster were curtailed and
there was also a sympathy strike by tramway workers. 2
 A much more serious
result of the coal industry's problems was a decline in passengers, which
must have been at least partly related to lay-offs, short-time working or
strikes at the pits. Passengers peaked at 10,210,984 in 1920-1, but then
fell back sharply to 8,251,449 in 1921-2, 3
 meaning that even with increased
fares, revenue also fell. 4
These industrial problems and the low population density mentioned al-
ready will have contributed to Doncaster's low place in the 'league table'
of tramway receipts. Revenue per track mile of line for Britain as a whole
in 1921-2 was £12,171, 5 almost two-and-a-half times larger than Doncaster's
average of £5,056 in the same year. 6 So far as working results were con-
cerned, to some extent this did not matter. A lesser patronage would need
fewer cars, less staff, less power etc.; that is, running costs would be
smaller than on a busier tramway and a working surplus might still be earned,
as it was almost every year in Doncaster. But within very broad limits, a
mile of tramway cost the same to build everywhere. So even if a similar
percentage surplus was earned on a small system as on a large one, it would
be very much less in cash terms and thus less able to cover capital outlay.
A final factor which would have made further expenditure on a fixed
track transport system most unwise was the arrival of motor buses on some of
the routes which were being considered for tramways. A bus had been licensed
1. R. Page Arnot, The Miners: Years of Struggle, a history of the 
Miners' Federation of Great Britain (from 1910 onwards) (1953), 296, 300,
329 and 331; other sections of this work deal with difficulties in the min-
ing industry at other times which also affected tramways in Yorkshire.
2. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 18 Apr 1921, 62-3P, 418.
3. Doncaster Statistics, 1920-1 and 1921-2. 	 4. See Appendix DN1.
5. Tramway Returns (excluding Ireland).
6. Revenue of £72,295 (Appendix DN1) divided by track mileage of 14.25
(Doncaster Statistics, 1921-2).
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for the Rossington route during the war ' and another shortly afterwards;
2
two months later a third came on the scene. 3 At this stage the number of
buses involved was not great, though some were also licensed for other
areas; Carcroft was a popular destination, for instance. 4 From 1920, how-
ever, the tramways' Manager said that he experienced a 'swarm' of small
buses descending on the Corporation's tram routes, putting their future in
doubt, 5 let alone any commercially shaky extensions which might be planned.
Under these circumstances it was natural that the Tramways Committee should
look for a means of serving the surrounding communities which involved a
lesser capital outlay than a tramway and which was also free of the straight-
jacket on tramway charges. Ideas for running motor buses to the outlying
districts had resurfaced by March 1920 6 and in April 1921 the Manager rep-
orted on the practicability of trolleybuses as well and it was decided to
apply for powers for both. 7 In the event the necessary enabling Bill in-
cluded motor buses only, to run to New Edlington, Carcroft, Rossington, Hat-
field and Conisborough. 8
It would be interesting to know how much this change of plan was in-
fluenced by the change of manager. Mr. Rayner had accepted tramway exten-
sions as policy, 9 but he left in 1919 to manage the Hull tramways. 10 After
an abortive attempt to appoint another joint Electrical Engineer and Tramway
1. Doncaster Minutes, C-in-C, 29 May 1916, 82M, 432.
2. Ibid., 26 Mar 1919, 119M, 253.	 3. Ibid., 19 May 1919, 144M, 371.
4. See for example C-in-C, 23 Jul 1919, 190M, 500; Watch Committee,
17 Mar 1920, 69F, 348. These applications related to three small independ-
ent operators; the two licensed in 1920 were going to run a 16 seat bus and
a 27 seat charabanc respectively.
5. Potts, Doncaster Cavalcade, 6.
6. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 8 Mar 1920, 76P, 350.
7. Ibid., 6 Apr 1921, 53P, 416.	 8. Ibid., 4 Oct 1921, 1K, 13.
9. Potts, Doncaster Cavalcade, 5.
10. KHCT 1899--1979: an illustrated history of Kingston-upon-Hull City 
Transport (Hull, 1979), inside front cover; DCT Jubilee, 51 is incorrect in
giving 1920 as the year of Rayner's departure.
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Manager,
1
 it was decided to split the two posts so an independent tramway
department could face up to the challenges posed by new transport modes and
to the need for a policy on extensions. 2 Mr. T. Potts, who had already
acted as Manager during Rayner's absence on war service, 3 was appointed.
4
As a transport man rather than an electrical engineer he may well have had a
more open mind on the relative merits of trams and buses and he certainly
saw himself as a new broom sweeping aside his predecessor's policies; the
tramways' 'prosperous fantasy', he wrote, 'had throughout been only a bank-
rupt reality'. 5 Without going into the matter at length, it is probably
true to say that a strong manager could hold up or influence the pace or
direction of change, but that he could not stand out against broad economic
or commercial trends beyond a certain time limit. Thus, in the case of Don-
caster, the new management may well have hastened the change in policy, but
such a change would in time have become inevitable in any case.
The first Corporation motor bus service, to Skellow, 6 began on 26 Oct
1922; six single-deck petrol buses seating thirty-two passengers each were
acquired from the Bristol Company. 7 Four more Bristols, including two of
smaller capacity, were ordered a month later 8 and further services were
inaugurated to Rossington and Hatfield--in 1922--and to Edlington in 1923. 9
The buses were evidently garaged at the tram sheds. 10
The new vehicles were quite successful. In a five week period they
earned £1,217 against the trams' £6,129, which was around £203 per bus as
1. Doncaster Minutes, C-in-C, 20 Aug 1919, 217M, 570; 27 Aug 1919,
226M, 571.
2. DCT Jubilee, 26-7; the joint committee arrangement remained though.
3. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 28 Jun 1917, 93P, 329.
4. C-in-C, 9 Oct 1919, 2M, 6.	 5. Potts, Doncaster Cavalcade, 5.
6. Next to Carcroft.	 7. DCT Jubilee, 30.
8. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 14 Nov 1922, 25K, 78.
9. DCT Jubilee, 50.
10. Doncaster Minutes, C-in-C, 16 Jan 1923, 16M, 206.
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against only £130 per tram. 1
 Moreover the capital expended on motor buses
by the end of 1925 was only £21,160, which covered 24.5 miles of route. 2
This compared to the 15 mile DDLR, built about the same time, but at a cost
of nearly £300,000. 3 In 1924-5 the bus side earned £29,072, which easily
covered both working and capital costs, and left a surplus of £5,959. 4 On
these facts, it is unsurprising that there was no more mention of extending
the tramways into the surrounding districts.
Possible Use of Motor Buses on Urban Services 
It might be thought that the introduction of motor buses outside Don-
caster would necessarily lead to their replacing the trams within it. But
this is to ignore the realities of contemporary bus operation. Granted, the
initial intention to use buses primarily as feeders to the trams5 --involving
the buses to Edlington and Carcroft starting from the appropriate car term-
inus--was quickly dropped in favour of through services, Doncaster to Car-
croft, for example. 6 But there were a variety of reasons why this action
posed no immediate threat to the tramways themselves.
The first was legal. The Ministry of Transport would not allow the
Corporation's buses to compete with their own trams. So, for example, the
through bus to Edlington could only carry passengers wanting to go beyond
Warmsworth. 7 The second was economic. Motor buses might be cheaper to
install than trams, but they were not, in the early 1920s, cheaper to run.
A request to reduce fares on the Skellow route was rejected because of the
high operating costs. 8 On a vehicle mile basis these seemed very reasonable
1. Revenue from E&TC, 12 Feb 1923, 82K, 227; number of vehicles from
DCT Jubilee, 49. Granted, there were too many trams, as ten had been pur-
chased for the very routes the buses were working.
2. SYT Letters, 26 Jan 1926, 353.	 3. See above, 156.
4. SYT Letters, 26 Jan 1926, 353.	 5. Ibid., 23 Sep 1921, 9.
6. Ibid., 13 Nov 1922, 919.
7. Ibid., 23 Nov 1925, 171; by a special concession, buses could take
inward passengers at tram fares since, it was argued, all long-distance
passengers were catered for once Warmsworth was passed.
8. Ibid., 18 Dec 1922, 969.
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1
in 1924, when the figure stood at 8.7d. in comparison to 15.17d. per car
2
mile on the trams. But this does not take account of the much higher cap-
acity of a double-deck tram as opposed to a single-deck bus nor, of course,
of the likely increase in costs as the buses grew older. By 1926 the pict-
ure was as follows.
TABLE 35
COMPARATIVE DATA FOR DONCASTER TRANS AND MOTORBUSES 1925-6
Trams Buses
Average Working Expenditure per car mile (d) 15.02 10.19
It	 Number of Passengers per car mile 10.50 3.70
Fare per Passenger (d) 1.82 3.70
Traffic Revenue per car mile (d) 19.31 13.80
Car Miles 871,860 570,186
SOURCE:	 SYT Letters, 17 Jul 1926, 898.
Comparing Table 35 with the figures cited in the previous paragraph,
where working costs are concerned the trams had slightly improved their pos-
ition whereas the buses were costing more to run. This may have had some-
thing to do with the fact that some of the buses were now about eighteen
months old, but another factor which would have pushed up working costs
would have been the introduction of double-deck buses on the Wheatley Hills
3
route in April 1925. But the motor side of the undertaking still enjoyed a
sizeable cost advantage over the trams when calculated in mileage terms.
However buses were not able to carry as many passengers as the trams did, so
there was an even wider gap between tramway and bus revenue per car mile,
this time to the advantage of the former. There is some evidence that this
was compensated for by charging higher fares on the buses. The Woodlands
1. Ibid., 19 Mar 1924, 194.
2. Ibid., 19 Jan 1926, 333; these two figures are for different years,
but the comparison is reasonably accurate as Table 35 shows.
3. DCT Jubilee, 50; further details of town bus services below.
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tram fare in the early 1920s appears to have been 5d.
1
 which, taking the
length of the route as 3.5 miles,
2
 makes the rate per mile 1.43d. In March
1923 bus fares were reduced as follows: to Skellow from 9d. to 8d., to Hat-
field from is. 3d. to is. and to Stainforth from is. to 10d. 3 As the crow
flies, the distance from Doncaster to the same three places is 5, 6 and 6.5
miles,
4
 so the respective fare rates (at the lower prices) would be 1.6d,
1.67d. and 1.85d, or an average of 1.71d. This does not tell the whole
story either, for cheap fares valid on the trams did not usually apply to
the motor buses, so when weekly passes were introduced later in 1923 5 only
tram passengers got the benefit. The large discrepancy between tram and bus
fares in Table 35 would also be due to the fact that travellers on buses
running outside the town would tend to travel longer distances than those on
urban trams. Despite higher fares, the buses were unable to achieve as high
an operating surplus as the trams in 1925-6, the respective figures being
3.61d. and 4.29d. per car mile. 6
Because of their low capacity, at this time motor buses were a high
cost mode when judged on a per passenger basis rather than the more usual
mileage scale. It is probably for this reason that Mr. Potts considered
them not to be suitable for heavy urban service, even though they were 'the
only economical vehicle today' for services up to aniincluding fifteen minutcs
7
kaitalmIAPutting it simply, if a service required only one bus, the cheaper
vehicle would be chosen. But if demand increased enough to require two
buses, it would be chaper to run one 'double size' tram.
8
1. It was cut to 4d. in 1924, whilst the highest stage quoted the pre-
vious year was 5d.; see Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 19 Feb 1924, 103K, 235; 16
Jul 1923, 183K, 488.
2. See Appendix DN3.
3. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 15 Mar 1923, 103K, 279.
4. Distances from map in Doncaster Official Guide.
5. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 16 Jul 1923, 183K, 488.
6. Calculated from Table 35.	 7. SYT Letters, 19 Mar 1924, 194.
8. A 'ceteris paribus' statement, ignoring capital/renewal costs etc.
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A third reason--which is really just another way of stating the above
point--why Doncaster's early buses could not have replaced its trams is
technological. The buses were too small to do the trams' work, and for a
variety of technical and legal reasons could not easily be sufficiently
enlarged. The figures of comparative costs used above are rather later than
one might wish, but the Committee made a policy decision in 1924 not to pub-
lish bus operating statistics, 1 so these are only intermittently available
from other sources. The point of mentioning this is that the comparative
advantage of trams was probably greater in 1922 than it was in 1926. At the
beginning of the 1920s there was therefore no question of using motor buses
to replace the trams. 2 But the town tramways could not remain unchanged
either. Quite apart from the need to replace rolling stock etc. from time
to time, the town itself was expanding and its transport network had to grow
with it. The population rose from 30,516 in 1911
3
 to 54,052 in 1921. 4 Much
of this must have been due to the 1914 extension of the Borough to include
Balby, Hexthorpe and Wheatley, 5 but there was obviously 'real' growth as
well, for by mid-1929 the total had risen again, to 59,890. 6
An expansion of the housing stock was obviously necessary to meet this
growth, whilst at the same time unfit property was being cleared. In 1929
for instance the Council envisaged the demolition of 305 houses over the
following five years, 111 of which were in clearance areas, and the con-
sequent displacement of 1,021 people; they themselves expected to build 997
houses and that about the same number of private dwellings would be built. 7
1. SYT, Letters, 5 May 1924, 304; so as not to assist competitors.
2. DT Jubilee, 27 does link the process of seeking bus powers in 1921
with a management decision to wind up the tramways as early as economically
possible, but contemporary evidence for so early a conversion plan is lacking.
3. Geoffrey M. Morris, Health and Housing in Old Doncaster (Doncaster,
n.d.), 4.
4. DCT Jubilee, 26.	 5. Morris, Health and Housing . . .  , 4.
6. Doncaster Minutes, Council, 15 Dec 1930, 157.
7. Ibid., 157-8; totals only for 'working class type' houses.
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Most local authority involvement in house building dated from the Housing
and Town Planning Act of 1909, though not much had been done before World
War I; afterwards the scarcity due to five years without new houses and a
great increase in the number of families meant that municipal housing became
much more significant as a proportion of the whole. ' Doncaster seems to
have followed this pattern, with some fairly minor developments taking place
before the war--thirty flats at Wheatley for instance2--but not advancing
major schemes until the inter-war period. The significance of this housing
boom from the point of view of the tramways was that the new municipal est-
ates tended to be on sites distant from the existing tram lines (though not
always). One major development in the 1920s was on the Warmsworth Road 3 and
thus presumably accessible via the Warmsworth tramway which, as noted above,
had run through a largely rural area when built. But in most cases develop-
ment naturally pushed beyond the tram lines which had more usually been laid
to suit the needs of existing residential areas. Lee makes the interesting
point in connection with Hull that council estates there tended to be built
away from the tram lines because the land was cheaper, so in this case the
Corporation itself caused a shift of passengers from tram to bus. 4
This was also the effect of housing changes in Doncaster, although it
may not have been intended at the time. Other estates built or begun in the
1920s were at Carr House, 5
 Woodfield Lane, 6 Wheatley, 7 and Intake. 8
 To
1. Sayers, Economic Change, 131-2.
2. Doncaster Minutes, C-in-C, 20 Jan 1913, 4211, 169; these were not
even built under the 1909 Act, but under the Housing of the Working Classes
Act 1903 and the Doncaster Corporation Acts 1904 and 1908.
3. Housing Committee, 31 May 1923, 334S, 403; 10 Oct 1923, 31S, 38.
275 houses were involved at this initial stage.
4. Lee, 'Tramways of Hull', 235-6.
5. Doncaster Minutes, Housing Committee, 20 May 1919, 218S, 403.
6. Ibid., 4 Sep 1925, 384S, 564.	 This was still only at the layout
stage in 1928; see ibid., 17 Feb 1928, 33, 326 (from about this time suffix
letters cease to be used for paragraph numbers).
7. DCT Jubilee, 34.
8. Doncaster Minutes, Housing Committee, 12 Jan 1928, 24, 259.
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provide access to the first of these Carr House Road was to be extended to
Bennetthorpe 1 after which it was intended to build a tramway along the new
road linking the Racecourse and Hyde Park termini. 2 Woodfield Lane estate
was fairly near the Balby tram route and might thus be assumed to have pub-
lic transport provision, though some houses would be at least a mile from
the main road. 3 Wheatley Hills was beyond the Avenue Road terminus, 4 whilst
the Intake estate formed a completely new area of the town and was without
any existing transport provision. 5
 This was a further pressure on the tram-
way department. Not only were the growing colliery villages demanding links
to Doncaster but, as Lee says in connection with Hull, the policy of another
municipal department was making additional transport services necessary
within the town itself. Clearly, the original intention was to meet these
needs through the tramways, either by building estates near a tram line--as
on Warmsworth Road--or by building a new tram line, such as that planned
along Carr House Lane. The latter was never constructed, however, and no
plans were ever made to serve any of the other estates by tram.
The reasons would not be quite the same as those which caused the aban-
donment of the 'out of town' schemes. For one thing, housing estates do
provide a fairly dense population, reasonably well suited to tramways. How-
ever, capital costs would be higher on urban lines than on semi-rural ones
because of the need to use fully-paved street track, which was a good deal
more expensive than the sleeper track which might have sufficed to, say,
Rossington. 6 Had the urban extensions been considered 'standing alone' as
1. Highways Committee, 24 Apr 1923, 199W, 347.
2. E&TC, 12 Apr 1920, 97P, 416. 	 3. Distance from current town map.
4. DCT Jubilee, 34. Wheatley Hills normally refers to private housing
in this area and the reference in the book to encouraging development of the
estate may well apply to this, though a council estate was also developed on
the other side of the main Thorne Road.
5. This greenfield site was bought in the mid-1920s from the Earl
Fitzwilliam; see Housing Special Sub-Committee, 30 Nov 1926, 89S, 134.
6. DDLR estimates per mile in 1919 were £8,960 for fully-paved track
and £6,610 for sleeper track; see	 SYRO, 8/UD28/363, Estimate of Expense.
236
new tramways, they would almost certainly have been rejected on building
costs alone as, at about the same time, all impartial advice insisted the
DDLR should have been. 1
It is, however, sometimes worth improving an existing capital asset to
prolong its life, even if it would not then be acquired as a wholly new item.
To some extent such improvements were made in Doncaster. In 1921 an applic-
ation was made for powers to build a town centre line--described as a circ-
ular route--from Station Road via Factory Lane and Trafford Street to North
Bridge Road; the Trafford Street part was to be laid immediately. 2
 The idea
was to relieve congestion at the foot of North Bridge by running cars in a
loop via St.Sepulchre Gate. 3
 However the missing link in Factory Lane was
first deferred 4
 and then abandonned, after which it was decided to use the
tracks in Trafford Street as a stub terminus. 5
 However the work to connect
it to the main line had still not been carried out at the end of 1924, 6
 so
it may have been 1925 before it came into use for Bentley and Brodsworth
cars. Rather more successful attempts were made to rebuild and double lines
elsewhere, mainly to Balby. 7
Meanwhile the new housing areas were being developed. The first few
houses went up on the Wheatley Hills estate just beyond the Avenue Road tram
terminus in 1919-20; 8
 the following year it was decided to build 113 more
9 
and in 1926 a further site was acquired, by which tihouses	 me housing or
1. See above, 85.
2. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 11 Jul 1921, 84-5P, 596.
3. Doncaster Gazette, 16 Sep 1921, 7.
4. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 21 Nov 1922, 41K, 81.
5. Ibid., 9 Jul 1923, 179K, 487.
	 6. Ibid., 16 Dec 1924, 66K, 114.
7. See for example, ibid., 5 Jun 1920, 76P, 441; 8 Jan 1923, 70K, 174;
the usual municipal haggling plus difficulties over road widening etc.
caused the scheme to drag on over a long period.
8. DCT Jubilee, 34.
9. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 12 Sep 1921, 113K, 737.
10. Housing Materials Sub-Committee, 13 Mar 1926, 211S, 283.
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planned housing must have extended well beyond the tram lines. The Avenue
Road service had probably always been unprofitable. Presumably for this
reason a small one-man car was bought in 1917 to run it, but this was (1)
inadquate for the traffic 1
 and (2) was always operated with a conductor, 2
possibly because of union objections. In 1922-3 the tram service earned
£2,391 per route mile. 3
 Over the whole system of about 14.25 route miles4
working expenditure in 1922-3 was £73,0555
 or £4,106 per route mile. The
Avenue Road route, with a restricted service on a single track, may not have
cost this much to run, but must undoubtedly have made considerable losses. A
likely reason was that the short section of route not shared with the Beck-
ett Road service went through a good class housing area consisting of large
detached houses and which would not have provided much demand for public
transport. Some confirmation of this is given by the fact that the Beckett
Road trams, whose route was almost exactly the same length but passed through
an area of fairly densely packed terrace houses, 6
 earned nearly £4,000 in
1922-37 probably enough in practice to take the service past the break-even
point so far as working costs were concerned; even here, however, there
would have been little to spare to meet capital charges. Thus in 1924 it
was decided to replace the Avenue Road trams by motor buses, which would run
past the old terminus to Wheatley Hills, though initially only for a three
month experimental period. Two double-deck buses, the first in the fleet,
were ordered at the same time. 8
 They took over after an official inaugural
1. DCT Jubilee, 20. 2. SYT Letters, 1 Mar 1922, 480.
3. These are the actual earnings from Doncaster Accounts, Tramways
Revenue a/c, because the line was almost exactly one mile long.
4. Doncaster Statistics, 1922-3.
5. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Revenue a/c, 1922-3.
6. Details of housing in this area, which appears to have changed very
little since the trams were running, from personal observation as compared
to photographs.
7. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Revenue a/c, 1922-3.
8. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, Special Sub-Committee, 10 Oct 1924, 2-3K,
636. In fact, three were purchased; see Flint, DCT Fleet, 6.
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run from the Mansion House on 28 Apr 1925; 1
 one source implies regular ser-
vice began the following day. 2
 The event was significant because it was the
first time a Corporation motor bus service had been instituted purely within
the Borough
3
 and also the first time one had directly replaced a tramway
service. If the experiment had proved successS.1,it would have shown that
motor buses had advanced sufficiently since the beginning of the decade to
take over the tramcar's traditional area of dominance in the built-up part
of the town itself.
The bus service was not in fact an unmixed success. By the end of 1925
it was clear that the buses were unable to cope with peak loads and it was
decided to reinstate a tram in the periods 1--2.30 p.m. and 5--7.00 p.m. 4
There was evidently a pro-tram group on the Council since a motion was put
early the following year requiring the reintroduction of a full twelve min-
ute tram service 5
 on top of the existing Wheatley Hills buses, but this was
referred back to the Committee, 6
 who decided to run a twelve minute bus ser-
vice for a trial period, 7
 which started on 8 Mar 1926 8
 and was given a fur-
ther month's extension from April. 9
The initial replacement of a limited tram service is not mentioned in
any of the existing histories, and it is not at all clear what happened
afterwards. The presumption must be that the tram was taken off again
'in March and that there was never a regular service to Avenue Road again. In
the autumn Mr. Potts wrote to a fellow manager, 'I have scrapped the Avenue
1. SYT Letters, 20 Apr 1925, 418.
	 2. DCT Jubilee, 50.
3. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 113.
4. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 17 Nov 1925, 33K, 67.
5. Presumably this was a tram service which was being discussed, and
not a strengthened motor bus service, although the former is not stated in
so many words.
6. Doncaster Minutes, Council, 3 Feb 1926, 210.
7. E&TC, 16 Feb 1926, 101K, 221.
	 8. SYT Letters, 2 Mar 1926, 496.
9. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 20 Apr 1926, 137K, 310. This hesitant
start to the first urban motor bus service, taking a full year to get into
its stride, shows how much of an experiment it was then seen to be.
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Road tram service altogether, and substituted with Motor Omnibuses'.
1
 But
to confuse the issue, a special tram was chartered in October to run from
Woodlands to Avenue Road 'or at any rate as near to that point as possible';
2
the implication is that the now disused tracks could only be negotiated with
difficulty.
Though the motor buses probably coped adequately with the traffic once
they got established--four more double-deckers were acquired in 1926 to
3
supplement the original three--they were not judged satisfactory for other
reasons. In a report to the Committee in 1926 Mr. Potts said that petrol
buses were expensive to operate on town services because of the frequent
stops
4
 and also because the vehicles had such a short life compared with
trams. For these and other reasons he believed trolleybuses were prefer-
able. 5
Conclusion 
As already noted what at first sight appears to have been the most sig-
nificant event in the period 1914 to 1925--World War I--did not affect Don-
caster's tramways very greatly at the time, indeed rather less than a curs-
ory examination of the facts would suggest. The problems of the next few
years were however partly a legacy of the war. These included inflation,
industrial troubles affecting local industry and the transport service it-
self, a deterioration in the physical condition of the tramways and the rise
of motorised competitors; these last two matters are dealt with in more det-
ail in the following chapter. Against this unstable background it was very
1. SYT Letters, 22 Sep 1926, 73.
	 2. Ibid., 10 Oct 1926, 120.
3. Flint, DCT Fleet, 7; two of these vehicles were ex-demonstrators,
one of which had seen service in Birmingham.
4. Causing high fuel consumption presumably.
5. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 114. This is said to be
part of a report to the E&TC in 1926, though oddly no such details can be
traced in the minutes. Mr. Potts's preference for trolleybuses is well
known, however, and he said at the time that he would have preferred to use
them on the Wheatley service from the start had a suitable turning place
been available; see, SYT Letters, 22 Sep 1926, 73.
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difficult to justify the extensive programme of tramway construction that
would have been required to serve (1) the outer ring of colliery villages
and (2) newly developing housing estates in Doncaster itself. In the case
of the former, it quickly became cleat that motor buses were a much more
viable means of serving these areas. The situation in the town was less
clear-cut, in that the motor bus was not self-evidently capable of super-
seding the tram, and also less urgent because the earliest housing estates
on Carr House and Warmsworth Roads were on or near existing tram routes.
But as housing extended into as yet untapped areas, the question of new ser-
vices had to be faced. The use of motor buses to replace and extend the
Avenue Road tram route had two advantages; it eliminated a loss-making tram
service and it was a means whereby a new housing area could be economically
provided with transport. The efficiency of the new mode, in such matters as
passenger capacity and fuel economy, was not convincing enough to recommend
the use of petrol buses throughout the town. But although the larger part
and the most heavily trafficked part of the tramway system remained intact,
there were two reasons why a decision whether to rebuild it or to scrap it
could not be long delayed. These were the rise of motor bus competition and
the poor condition of the tramways themselves.
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CHAPTER 10
EXTERNAL ATTACK AND INTERNAL DECAY
Motor Bus Competition 
Competition between transport modes will exist even within a monopol-
istic supplier as, say, in an East European city transport undertaking today
which must decide between the relative merits of trams, trolleybuses, motor
buses and underground railways. Doncaster Corporation Tramways were not a
monopoly, but even so they had to decide whether to use trams or motor buses
for out-of-town extensions and, later, experimented with motor buses on town
services too. Not being a monopoly, however, the tramways' department was
greatly influenced in its actions by the threat, real or imagined, of exter-
nal motor bus competition.
Possibly the first public motor vehicle licensed in Doncaster was a
charabanc owned by one of the former horse bus operators and put on the road
in 1908. 1 The first regular motor bus services seem to have come in from
the Dearne valley which, of course, lacked any mechanised road transport
till than. A Mr. Jefferson was licensed to run to Goldthorpe in 1913, 2 to
be followed less than a year later by the B&DETC to the same destination. 3
A few bus licences were issued during the war4 and others refused; 5
 there
1. Doncaster Minutes, 11 May 1908m 115M, 292.
2. Sanitary Committee, 12 Aug 1913, 323N, 604.
3. E&TC, 31 Mar 1914, 43P, 354; at the time responsibility for issuing
licences was not clearly allocated to one committee.
4. For instance, C-in-C, 29 Apr 1915, 107M, 370; 26 May 1915, 114M, 431.
5. For instance, C-in-C, 1 Dec 1915, 16M, 135.
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were perhaps a dozen applications in all. '
By 1920 the pace had quickened markedly, with twenty-seven applications
for bus licences being granted in that year and still others being refused. 2
Initially licences were dealt with as and when requested, but from the early
1920s regular half-yearly licensing inspections were held. The numbers of
licences granted are given in Appendix DN4. Taken on their own, these fig-
ures give a slightly false view of the situation. In the early days at
least the numbers of vehicles licensed over-emmeerate the extent of the
problem because so many of the buses were extremely small and primitive. In
the first four months of 1920, for example, eight vehicles were licensed;
of these, four seated fourteen or less, whilst the remainder, though having
up to thirty five seats, were charabancs without any permanent weather pro-
tection. 3 Some so-called buses were really only lorries with canvas sides
and longitudinal benches reached from a rear step; one was used by a man
called Goodyear on a route between Carcroft and Doncaster. 4 The capacity
and standard of comfort offered by independent bus proprietors thus did not
compare with that given by the larger companies such as the B&DETC or, later,
the Corporation. As the decade passed, however, the size and all-weather
capability of vehicles improved considerably. In August 1923, for instance,
seven buses were licensed. All were saloons and only two were small, with
eight andSourteen seats apiece, the remainder being twenty or twenty-five
seaters.
5
On the other hand, the figures for vehicles licensed under-estimate the
extent of competition because a lot of the small men either did not trouble
to get a licence at all or cheerfully evaded the conditions attached thereto. 6
1. Doncaster Minutes, passim.	 2. Watch Committee, 1920, passim.
3. C-in-C, 28 Jan 1920, 69M, 209 and 4 Feb 1920, 80M, 270; Watch Comm-
ittee, 17 Mar 1920, 69F, 348 and 8 Apr 1920, 81F, 414.
4. Reminiscence of Mrs. R. Roberts, Goodyear's daughter; the bus was
called 'Ruby' after her.
5. Watch Committee, 20 Aug 1923, 169-70F, 563.
6. DCT Jubilee, 35.
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An example is F. Stewardson of Goldthorpe who ran a service despite being
continuously refused a licence by Doncaster Watch Committee) Probably App-
endix Table DN4 is about right on balance therefore, if one bears in mind
both the primitive nature of many early buses and also the fact that an un-
known but probably considerable number were not licensed at all.
It has already been noted in connection with the DDLR that large bus
operators, like the B&DTC, had a distinct cost advantage over trams, any-
thing from 25 to 50 per cent. 2 Small bus proprietors or 'pirates' were in
an even more advantageous position. The reasons for this were partly econ-
omic and partly legal. The one or two vehicle operator was able to run at
costs way below the large firms or municipalities. He had few overhead
charges to meet, with no large garages or maintenance facilities to build
and no 'headquarters staff' to pay. Many small bus owners appear to have
had more than one business over which they could spread their overheads as
well. An operator called Camplejohn, for example, owned the Empire Palace
theatre/cinema at Adwick-le-Street. 3 In many cases buses did not need to be
bought outright either, but came on hire purchase, 4 meaning that there was
no capital outlay needing servicing as there was for the 'majors'. In other
cases the vehicles were often 'more or less scrap'. 5
Small owners had distinct operating advantages too. In the first case,
they often only ran when it was profitable to do so, although this was
usually illegal. Early in 1924 Mr. Potts referred to 'intolerable pirating'
1. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 56; actually Doncaster Minutes, Hackney
Carriage Sub-Committee, 18 Apr 1923, 77F, 341 do show that Stewardson was
licensed after appeal to the Ministry of Transport, but that the licence was
later withdrawn due to failure to observe the timetable (Ibid., 6 Mar 1925,
100F, 268).
2. See above, 146.
3. From an agreement in the possession of Mrs. R. Roberts between
Camplejohn and W. E. Goodyear to perform at the Empire in 1914; this, of
course, meant that Goodyear also had another profession to fall back on.
He also later ran a small garage/motor cycle shop.
4. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 57-8; doubtless this was true of the
Doncaster area too.
5. SYT Letters, 24 Jan 1924, 35.
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and to small Ford buses running without licences from various streets to the
collieries; in slack hours the vehicles were used for general carting work.
1
Above all, the independents had working costs which must have been way below
those of the established operators. One of Camplejohn's conductors worked
16 hours a day, 6 days a week for £2 10s. He had no regular meal breaks,
but was dropped off at the owner's home for a scratch meal and picked up as
the bus returned. 2 This made an hourly rate of about 5 31d., which was act-
ually about what Corporation tram conductors had been getting pre-war. 3 Cor-
poration hours were about half too, being 54 as early as 1902, reducing to
48 by 1939. 4 A week's wages on private buses, Mr. Potts said, often did not
equal one day's trades' union pay and this, together with the poor vehicles
used, made it impossible to compete on fares. 5 Pirate buses were thus bound
to undercut the Corporation on price, even where motor bus services alone
were concerned. 6 They were also frequently more convenient, like those ref-
erred to above which went direct to the collieries. This was especially the
case where the trams were concerned, for neither the Brodsworth nor Warms-
worth cars actually ran to the pit gates. The latter service, involving a
longish walk from Edlington to Warmsworth terminus, was wide open to compet-
ition, a fact recognised by the early introduction of a municipal bus to
Edlington.
A local authority was, perhaps, in an invidious position in the 1920s.
As a local authority it had the duty of controlling bus transport, a control
it could hardly avoid exercising for the sake of the safety and convenience
of the public and to minimise traffic congestion. This might be regarded as
a disinterested task, yet if the particular authority was also a transport
1. Ibid., 20 Jan 1924, 33. 	 2. Ibid., 15 Feb 1924, 102.
3. See above,196.	 4. DCT Jubilee, 11.
5. SYT Letters, 24 Jan 1924, 36.
6. Though the new municipal buses seem to have coped fairly well with
the competition. Revenue per bus was £842 per annum in 1922-3 and then
£2,006, £1,925 and £1,945 in the next three years, a better performance than
the trams' was (calculated by dividing income in Doncaster Accounts, Motor
Bus Revenue a/c by the number of buses in DCT Jubilee, 49).
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operator, it was clearly very much in its own interest to limit putative
competitors. This was, in view of the economic facts, almost the only way
Doncaster could defend its transport undertaking.
The difficulties of attempting to control motor buses with the weak
Victorian legislation available have already been discussed, both in general
and in the particular case of the DDLR. 1 In 1924 Doncaster Watch Committee
revised its licensing conditions. Some of these conditions seem to have
been relatively uncontroversial, matters like the safety and cleanliness of
vehicles, but others were more obviously protective in nature; things such
as a prohibition on picking up or setting down short-distance passengers
until tram termini had been passed and an insistence on charging a protect-
ive bus fare or surcharge of 2d. over and above the tram fare. 2 The Corpor-
ation naturally reserved the right to refuse licences too, which was often
done. 3 These regulations were the strongest yet, following less stringent
versions in 1921 4 and 1923. 5 Fully applied, they might have been quite eff-
ective, but there were several major difficulties. 	 First, private bus
owners had the right of appeal to the Ministry of Transport on both licence
conditions and on refusals. A particularly significant case involved W. T.
Underwood Limited, which had been a large operator in the area since at
least 1922, when they took over another company's licences. 6 Their relations
with the Corporation were always strained
7
 and in 1925 they appealed to the
Minister over the new licence conditions; although his initial advice was to
1. See above, 46-9 and 106-9.
2. Doncaster Minutes, Hackney Carriage Sub-Committee (hereafter, HC/SC).
8 Feb 1924, 64F, 245-6.
3. For instance, in May 1922 various applications were turned down
because of the large number of buses already running in the Borough; Watch
Committee, 17 May 1922, 97F, 385.
4. Ibid., 19 Oct 1921, 5F, 22.	 5. Ibid., 21 Feb 1923, 50F, 237.
6. Ibid., 18 Jan 1922, 45F, 176.
7. In 1922, for instance, the Company withdrew its services over the
planned Corporation routes before the latter was ready to start; E&TC,
12 Oct 1922, 17K, 19.
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sort the matter out locally,
1
 it proved impossible to agree on the protect-
ive fare, 2 which the Minister eventually reduced from 2d. to ld.
3
 A penny
was simply not enough to deter passengers from using private vehicles, 4 so
the Council had a major leg of s policy knocked out from under them by
the Ministry itself. Licensing appeals proper did not always go against the
Watch Committee, 5 but most did; five licences were issued on 'suggestions'
from the Ministry in April 1923 for instance. 6 Mr. Potts was very bitter
about the Ministry's policy which was, he believed, to license all-comers;
7
the Ministry seemed to sympathise with the small companies
8
 and were glad to
get 'licence fees for any old vehicle'. 9 From references like this and
frequent mention of successful appeals by owners in the Minutes, it is ob-
vious that the attitude of higher officialdom was seen as extremely damaging
to municipal transport undertakings. The private bus firms received support
from other quarters too. They had an effective trade organisation to plead
their cause. The Commercial Motor Users' Association raised queries about
licence refusals with the Watch Committee on a number of occasions, 10 though
they were not always heeded. 11
Another reason why the control of private buses was unsuccessful was
that operators, both large and small, flouted the regulations more-or-less
openly. The YTC's buses were known to pick up passengers along the Corpor-
1. Watch Committee, 11 Feb 1925, 86F, 225.
2. Ibid., 13 May 1925, 138F, 376. 	 3. Ibid., 15 Jul 1925, 177F, 463.
4. See above, 164.
5. One of Underwood's appeals was turned down in 1925, for example;
see Watch Committee, 11 Feb 1925, 85F, 225.
6. HC/SC, 18 Apr 1923, 76-7F, 341. 	 7. SYT Letters, 24 Jan 1924, 35.
8. Ibid., 33; obviously more than one letter was usually written each
day, but the page number distinguishes these.
9. Ibid., 26 Jan 1922, 409.
10. For example, Doncaster Minutes, Watch Committee, 20 Jan 1922, 32F,,,,
138.
11. For example, ibid., 16 Apr 1924, 100F, 361.
247
ation's routes,
1
 whilst the conditions of an agreement between the Corpor-
ation and the East Midland Company
2
 were all broken by the latter.
3
 Viol-
ations by smaller concerns were even more numerous. They ran without any
licence at all 4 and to unauthorised termini;
5
 they drove dangerously
6
 and
with overloaded vehicles 7 and withdrew their services without notice.
8
 There
are countless references to these and other misdemeanours which made the
Manager conclude that 'so far as we are concerned in Doncaster any Rule or
Regulation made for the protection of the Tramways from unauthorised Motor
Omnibus competition has been futile. 9 A further cause for frustration was
the failure of certain bodies to give the support which Mr. Potts believed
was due to the municipal transport undertaking. The Watch Committee did not
consult the Tramways Committee and even though there was some common mem-
bership 10 there was obviously some bad blood between the two at times.
11
However there does seem to have been some concerted attempt at committee
level to deal with the problem of excessive motor bus competition, even if
it was ultimately unsuccessful. 12 Mr. Potts may have been on stronger
ground in feeling that the police did not act against those breaking regul-
ations, such as those against overcrowding, 13 and he wrote many times to the
1. SYT Letters, 31 Dec 1930, 143; this and the next example are later
than the period now being discussed, but there is no reason to suppose the
major companies suddenly became more aggressive after 1930, rather the rev-
erse if anything.
2. In 1927 Underwoods changed their name to the East Midlands Motor
Services Limited; see Cummings, Railway Buses 1, 107.
3. SYT Letters, 31 Mar 1932, 23.	 4. Ibid., 16 May 1924, 349.
5. Ibid., 11 May 1925, 465. 	 6. Ibid., 11 May 1925, 467.
7. Ibid., 6 Apr 1925, 271. 	 8. Ibid., 16 May 1924, 349.
9. Ibid., 7 Mar 1927, 581. 	 10. Ibid., 23 Jul 1926, 923.
11. Ibid., 29 Mar 1926, 582.
12. Outside the Borough where much of the tramways and most of the bus
routes lay, the Corporation was at the mercy of the licensing policy of out-
side authorities, who had no particular reason to favour Doncaster Corporat-
ion vehicles; see for instance, ibid., 6 Mar 1925, 271 and 30 Apr 1924, 285.
13. Ibid., 6 Mar 1925, 211.
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Chief Constable pointing out the operations of unlicensed vehicles,' the
obvious implication being that the police were not acting on the matter.
The Manager also felt that organised labour should support a publicly-owned
undertaking which paid trade union rates; yet prominent unionists were advis-
ing members to ride opposition buses in order to force Corporation fares
2
down and tramways' department employees were chartering independent buses
and even repairing them in the Corporation's time. 3 There was, Potts con-
cluded, no way of dealing with competitors under Hackney Carriage law, backed
4
up as the former were by the Ministry and by organised labour, and, as we
have seen, when the regulations imposed were so regularly flaunted.
The effect of this barely restrained competition upon the Corporation's
services is extremely difficult to estimate. As Table 36 below shows, most
TABLE 36
DONCASTER CORPORATION TRAMWAYS: PERFORMANCE 1920-1--1924-5
•
1920-1 1921-2 1922-3 1923-4 1924-5
Passengers (millions) (1) 10.21 8.25 8.49 a 8.95
Receipts per tram (E) (2) 1,596 1,538 1,554 1,415 1,510
Passengers per car mile (3) 13.03 11.40 10.70 a a
Passengers per head/population (4) 127.60 103.00 106.00 a a
SOURCE: Lines (1), (3) and (4) from Doncaster Statistics for the years con-
cerned, except for passenger total for 1924-5 from SYT Letters, 4 Dec 1925,
222; Line (2) is calculated from the receipts given in Appendix DN1 divided
by the number of cars in the fleet.
a. Figures not available.
indices relating to the tramways show a severe fall in 1921-2, after which
there is some small and hesitant recovery in passenger levels, though not in
much else. Clearly, some quite serious event must have caused the loss of
two million passengers between 1920-1 and 1921-2. Mr. Potts made two quite
contradictory statements about this. In the first place, he said that corn-
1. Ibid., 11 May 1925, 465 for example. 	 2. Ibid., 24 Jan 1924, 35.
3. Ibid., 15 Feb 1924, 102. 	 4. Ibid., 24 Jan 1924, 35.
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petition had reduced receipts by about £5,000 in the first half of the fin-
ancial year 1921-2. 1 But in May 1921 he said that the service was operating
at a tremendous loss to the undertaking' because running cars to the coll-
iery villages when the men were on strike simply did not pay; the undertak-
ing was doing it purely to keep the staff employed.
2
One could hardly have two more diametrically opposite statements, but
luckily the figures tell their own story. The 1921 coal strike has been
discusssed above. 3 Potts later compared the receipts between 1 Apr 1921 and
14 Jul 1921--roughly the period of the strike--with a similar period the
preceding year, finding that revenue had fallen by £3,861; 4 there was later
some slight recovery, and apart from the time of the strike revenue was act-
ually up by 10 per cent.
5
 This matches the decline in receipts over the
whole year, which was about £3,000. 	 It seems highly likely that by far the
major cause of the tramways' loss of passengers and revenue in 1921-2 was
the trouble in the coal industry. There were, after all, only fifty to sixty
licensed motor buses in the area at the end of this period, and it is not
likely that there was so great a number of unlicensed vehicles to add to
these. As a new threat this was doubtless very alarming to the municipal
authorities, but it was not yet enough to cause real economic harm. In
1923-4, however, tramway revenue suffered another and larger collapse, this
time by over £6.500. So far as is known, there was no serious industrial
trouble in the area during 1923-4, so a different explanation must be sought.
By this time the number of licensed motor buses had increased by about half
(twelve were municipal though) 6 and, more ominously, Potts now refers to
'intolerable pirating' even within the Borough and to unlicensed vehicles
running in from outside and evading regulations by issuing return tickets;
1. Ibid., 19 Sep 1921, 974.	 2. Ibid., 31 May 1921, 703.
3. See above,226.	 4. SYT Letters, 27 Jul 1921, 846.
5. Ibid., 26 Oct 1921, 24; revenue ought to have risen after the Nov-
ember 1920 fares rise (see above,	 ).
6. Unacknowledged data above from Appendices DN1 and DN4.
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revenue, he said, was dropping away week by week. ' It would seem, then,
that by the mid-1920s private bus competition was having a severe effect on
tramway traffic and revenue, rather as it had done in London over a decade
previously. 2
The curious fact is, however, that over the self-same period the tram-
way section of the undertaking was turned round from a £5,500 deficit in
1920-1 to a surplus of £5,600 in 1924-5, the main reason being a steep and
rather fortuitous decline in working costs, 3 itself a consequence of the
then general deflation in prices. But revenue was actually rising from the
low point of 1923-4, probably because of an alteration in the fare structure
designed to meet the pirate bus competition. In the first place a cut in
off-peak fares was given a trial, 4 but this was evidently unsuccessful,
probably because the real threat of the pirates was to peak traffic, such as
that to and from the collieries. So later in the year an imaginative scheme
for weekly tickets was introduced costing, for instance, 2s. 6d. over a 2d.
tram stage. 5 These tickets, almost unique in the country, gave unlimited
rides over the chosen section and were designed to encourage regular riders
to use the trams, which ran regularly themselves as opposed to the pirate
buses, which did not. 6 Some traffic was undoubtedly regained by this means.
Sales of weekly passes achieved £3,953 in the first, incomplete year and
then rose to £7,269 in 1924-5 and to £8,175 in 1925-6; after the collapse of
1923-4 ordinary ticket sales remained more-or-less steady until 1926-7, so
the returns from passes were a bonus which helped to bring traffic receipts
almost back to the their 1922-3 level by 1925-6.
7
To sum up, during the first half of the 1920s the Doncaster tramways
1. SYT Letters, 24 Jan 1924, 33; issuing returns meant that, strictly
speaking, the buses were not plying for hire in the Borough.
2. See above,36 .	 3. See Appendix DN1.
4. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 15 Mar 1923, 103K, 279.
5. Ibid., 16 Jul 1923, 183K, 488.	 6. DCT Jubilee, 42.
7. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Revenue a/c, passim.
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suffered two severe falls in revenue. The first appears to have been almost
entirely due to strikes in the coal industry in the early part of the finan-
cial year 1921-2, despite some contradictory statements from Mr. Potts
ascribing the difficulties to competition from private buses. The second,
in 1923-3, was, however, the result of intensified motor bus competition.
The introduction of weekly passes succeeded in stemming some of the loss in
revenue, but the greater part of the concurrent improvement in the tramways'
financial health was a consequence of declining working expenditure.
It would probably be fair to say that the tramways were not abandon.ek
because of competition from pirate or larger bus companies. It is true that
this was a serious problem, but it was one that did not go away when the
trams had begun to disappear and which affected the Corporation's motor and
later trolleybus services too. During 1931 the last but one tramway route,
to Warmsworth, was closed, 1 but the Manager was still fearing a concerted
attack from the major bus companies, although he intended to 'die kicking';2
a little later he was advising his Committee to reduce expenditure or be
'run off the road 1 . 3 In the mid-1920s it was still possible for the tram-
ways to rally from an increased level of competition, to recapture some of
their traffic and to remain profitable. It was in just those years that the
decision to abandon the tramways was taken and so, obviously, primarily for
other reasons. The most important of these were:
1. the need to replace or improve much of the working capital, a point
dealt with below;
2. the need to extend services to new areas, which could be more econ-
omically done by newer modes of transport;
3. the fact that several of the tram routes were not paying their way
even under existing circumstances.
All of which is not to say that private and company motor bus competit-
ion could have been resisted indefinitely. In the late 1920s there was a
1. DCT Jubilee, 50.	 2. SYT Letters, 4 Feb 1931, 297.
3. Ibid., 18 Sep 1931, 231.
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remarkable growth in the numbers of private motor buses. Between March 1927
and March 1929 there was an 149 per cent increase in the numbers licensed to
a total of 653; 1 many of the owners evaded conditions put upon the licences
or did not license their vehicles at all, so in 1930 there were actually 746
buses running in and out of town 2 as opposed to the official number of 579.
3
The official history quotes some figures to show how these buses were aff-
ecting the tramways. The Warmsworth service is said to have taken £5,500 in
1923 and only £1,100 in 1930; over the same period through passengers fell
from 312,761 to 78,745 and, by 1931, private buses were running 155 trips
per day over the route. On the Brodsworth line, receipts are given as
£15,132 in 1922 and only £11,092 in 1931, a reduction of 36.5 per cent; by
1931 there were 317 daily bus journeys over this section. 4 Only one of
these figures can readily be checked, the Brodsworth receipts for 1921-2,
which the accounts give as only £13,806. 5 There is no obvious explanation
for the discrepancy, so some doubt must be cast on the other figures in DCT
Jubilee. Moreover, it is too simplistic to ascribe the whole of any decline
in revenue to motor bus competition. On the Brodsworth line again, the
through fare in 1921-2 seems to have been 5d., 6 but in 1924 it was reduced
to 4d.
7
 and then cut again to 3d. in June 1930. 8 So more-or-less between
the dates in question, fares fell by 40 per cent, which could well account
for the whole decline in receipts. One has to say therefore that the impact
of private motorbus competition does not seem to have been as great as
municipal apologists, both at the time and later, made it out to be.
However, when in 1932-3 it is possible to pick up the receipts for the
Brodsworth route on its own again, revenue is down to £7,955 per annum. 9
1. See Appendix DN4.
	 2. DCT Jubilee, 35.
3. See Appendix DN4; 39 were municipal buses. 	 4. DCT Jubilee, 23.
5. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Revenue a/c, 1921-2.
6. See above,232.
	 7. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 19 Feb 1924, 103K, 235.
8. Ibid., 4 Jun 1930, 136, 574.
9. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Revenue a/c, 1932-3; individual route
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This is just 37 per cent of the figure ten years previously in 1922-3, when
it had been £13,462,
1
 a fall far greater than can be accounted for by fare
cuts alone. The route, like that to Warmsworth, was particularly vulnerable
to competition because most of it lay outside the Borough and thus escaped
even the minimum control exercised by the Watch Committee. A long-running
battle between the Corporation and the YTC began in 1927 when the (then)
B&DTC made an attempt to get a licence for a service to Huddersfield via
Brodsworth, but the Hackney Carriage Sub-Committee rejected the application
on the grounds that the section from Brodsworth was already adequately
served.
2
 In May the Company got onto part of the tram route from Barnsley
Road/Sun Inn inwards, following a successful application for a Barnsley ser-
vice.
3
 In September two other operators wanting to run via Brodsworth were
rejected.
4
 The B&DTC's General Manager, Mr. Robinson, failed again to get
his services extended in from Woodlands later that year.
5
 The issue dragged
on until after the Traffic Commissioners had taken over licensing from the
Borough in 1932, and they evidently did allow the YTC to extend their Barns-
ley to Woodlands service into Doncaster; the Corporation appealed to the
Minister, but in vain.
6
 At the Committee's next meeting Mr. Potts gave a
report on the effect of the extension of the YTC services and other decisions
of the Traffic Commissioners affecting the Corporation's services, and it
was decided to protest to the Ministry and to the Municipal Tramways Assoc-
iation.
7
 These events coincided almost exactly with the collapse in takings
receipts were last recorded in 1922-3, but from 1932-3 onwards only the
Brodsworth tramway remained, so its revenue can be known.
1. Ibid., 1922-3.
2. Doncaster Minutes, HC/SC, 18 Mar 1927, 277 (these entries lack par-
agraph numbers); this was a common ground of refusal.
3. Watch Committee, 11 May 1927, 404. 	 4. HC/SC, 13 Sep 1927, 634.
5. Watch Committee, 12 Oct 1927, 22.
6. E&TC, 8 Aug 1932, 157, 684; from 11 Jul 1931 the title became Elec-
tricity and Transport Committee (abbreviation unchanged).
7. Ibid., 12 Sep 1932, 167, 737.
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on the tram route, from £11,092 in 1931 1
 to £7,955 in 1932-3. 2
The gradual worsening of the tramways' position in the last decade or
so of their existence is displayed in Table 37. Leaving aside 1935-6, which
as the last period of operation is probably exceptional, the Table demon-
strates a gradual decline in the tramways' profitability, as measured by
income per mile and by the operating ratio. Again, the temptation is to say
TABLE 37
DONCASTER CORPORATION TRAMWAYS: RESULTS 1927 -8 - -1935 -6
Year Ending	 Income in pence	 Income per mile	 Expenditure in
31st March	 per car mile	 pence per car mile
Operatinga
Ratio (%)
1928 18.57 4,975 13.96 73.79
1929 16.65 3,910 14.34 84.03
1930 16.83 5,948 12.98 75.21
1931 15.53 4,064 11.78 72.90
1932 15.35 3,240 13.34 81.40
1933 14.30b 2,287 13.39b 92.73
1934 11.91 2,188 11.38 83.01
1935 11.07 2,225 10.35 82.61
1936 9.83 - 13.36 135.79
SOURCE: Tramway Returns.
a. The Income per car mile is based on traffic revenue only, but for
some reason the Operating Ratio is obviously based on total revenue and thus
does not quite match the Income and Expenditure figures given here.
b. These figures are transposed in the original, but clearly require
the larger amount under Income.
that because this coincided with the great increase in the numbers of priv-
ate motor buses in the late 1920s, up from 262 in March 1927 to 540 in March
1930, 3 this is necessarily effect and cause. However, there were certainly
other causes too. In the middle of the 1928-9 financial year the Bentley
tram route was converted to trolleybus operation. 4 Since this was one of
1. DCT Jubilee, 23.
2. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Revenue a/c, 1932-3.
3. See Appendix DN4.
	 4. See below, 268.
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the most profitable tram routes, ' this must have affected the income overall.
The same would be true of the closure of the Balby section, in 1931-2. 2 It
is not clear whether the fare cut of June 1930 applied to all trams or only
those to Brodsworth, but even so there was a fare reduction over what was by
then about half the entire tram system; this must have influenced the fall
in income between 1930-1 and 1931-2. From then on, only the Brodsworth
route remained, and it is true that letting in the YTC in 1932 does seem to
have caused a sharp fall in revenue then. But this adverse effect of the
Road Traffic Act was probably a fairly isolated instance, for normally the
3
Traffic Commissioners tended to work in favour of established operators.
Later on, the Act worked to the Corporation's benefit, making it possible to
reach co-ordination agreements with the larger companies and to buy out
smaller competitors together. 4 In other words, it is likely that competit-
lye pressures on other parts of the tram system, if still existing, would
have been reduced rather than increased. So one cannot argue that the
Brodsworth experience would have been repeated system-wide.
Despite all the sound and the fury, one has to conclude that there is
very little evidence that motor bus competition did serious harm to Doncaster
tramways, and certainly none to lead one to suppose that this was the main
reason for their abandonment. In 1921-2, a bad year, the tramways earned
£72,285; in their last full year of operation, 1927-8, and in the midst of
the massive rise in motorised competitors, they earned £72,586. 5 This was
also of course a period of falling fares on the tramways. 8,491,701 passen-
gers were carried in 1922-3; 6 in 1927-8 the total had risen to 10,439,623,
7
and in that year the tramways earned a surplus of £8,585, 8 the best in their
whole history. This is not a picture of an industry wholly incapable of
1. See below,261. 2. See below, 269.
3. Dyos and Aldcroft, British Survey, 358.	 4. DCT Jubilee, 30.
5. See Appendix DN1.	 6. Doncaster Statistics, 1922-3.
7. Tramway Returns, 1927-8; part of Doncaster's individual annual entry.
8. See Appendix DN1.
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meeting competition.
Two qualifications must be made however. First, where competition was
let in on a large scale, as it was outside the Borough on the Brodsworth and
Warmsworth sections, motor bus competition clearly was devastating in its
effect. Competition was so serious here because legal controls were lacking
to prevent it. In addition, because these were out-of-town routes, the
motor bus's turn of speed must have shown to great advantage over the slower
trams.' Tighter legal controls and slower speeds enforced by traffic con-
gestion would have meant these advantages were greatly reduced in the town
itself. But it remains true that if buses had been allowed to compete on
equal terms on the other tram routes, the trams would probably not have been
able to withstand this. And second, all the buses that were running must
have carried a great deal of passengers between them, but how many the frag-
mented nature of the industry makes it impossible to tell. Many of these
would have been to destinations beyond the tram routes, but by various means
quite a number of possible tram passengers must have been siphoned off. If
these people had travelled by tram, earnings would have been higher and
investment in new equipment might have been viable.
Problems with the Permanent Way 
As a whole, even if not in particular cases like Avenue Road, the tram-
ways remained viable in the mid-1920s and achieved a reasonable surplus from
1922-3 onwards, except for the year of the General Strike. 2 Revenue was
high enough and working and capital costs low enough to make this possible.
Traffic recovered from both industrial troubles and intensified motor bus
competition, whilst working expenditure remained fairly steady. The third
variable, capital costs, did not change much either because it was dependent
upon past expenditure. However, once it became necessary to spend large new
sums on the tramways, annual capital payments could well rise beyond the
level at which they could be met from revenue. It was the threat of this
1. See above,114-5. 2. See Appendix DN1.
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which really brought the problems of the tramways to a head.
In dealing with track maintenance on a day-to-day basis minor irrit-
ation may have been caused by the fact that a different Council Committee
was responsible for track repairs.' The Tramways (E&TC) Committee did once
try to take the job back, 2 but instead liaison was improved by appointing a
joint E&TC/Sanitary Sub-Committee. 3 Though many other tramways had similar
arrangements, including over half those in the Croydon Survey, 4 the personal
relationship between Doncaster's tramway Manager and the Borough Surveyor
seems not to have been warm or co-operative. Mr. Potts wrote numerous notes
about necessary repairs, such as points which were causing derailments, 5 and
sometimes complained about work which had not been done. 6 Obviously, had
the Manager been able to give his own instructions for repairs, these sit-
uations would probably not have arisen. He obviously did feel his lack of
overall control was unsatisfactory, but experienced considerable opposition
from the Highways Committee7 when he tried to change the arrangement.
8
 Lee
found this to be a most serious problem in Hull, partly on the grounds of
divided managerial responsibility 9 and partly of splits between the Tramways
Committee and their Managers.10 Doncaster's problems were in no way so sev-
ere. In one sense, municipal control probably helped tramways, for the slow
decision-making may have kept some of them open longer than might have been
the case under private ownership. There are other reasons for this, but
1. DA, TC, 13 Jun 1904, 67P, 188; by this minute the Sanitary Committee
and the Borough Surveyor assumed responsibility for the track.
2. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 10 Feb 1913, 41P, 234.
3. Ibid., 14 Apr 1913, 66P, 341.	 4. DA, Croydon Survey, passim.
5. SYT Letters, 21 Jan 1927, 428; 4 Feb 1927, 487.
6. Ibid., 13 Jul 1927, 893.
7. This Committe took over some of the Sanitary Committee's functions
when the latter was disbanded in 1914; see Doncaster Minutes, C-in-C,
9 Nov 1914, 6-7M, 7.
8. SYT Letters, 10 Mar 1926, 519.	 9. See above,70-1.
10. Lee, 'Tramways of Hull', 143, 186-7, 191, 212-14.
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but thirty-one of the forty-one tramways closed between 1917 and 1930 were
1
The track joints, always a weak point in tramway construction, began to
give trouble a little over a decade after the Doncaster tramways had been
built; some new joints were bought, 2 but many more were welded and retreaded
through a contract with the Tudor Accumulator Company.
3
 The problem was
serious, but no more than any other tramway had to put up with at the time.
More general problems had appeared even earlier, and the Surveyor had
been asked to report on the cost of paving all routes with granite setts or
wood blocks and of putting track and foundations into thorough repair.
5
 By
1915 both the Balby and Bentley tracks needed urgent relaying and as an
experiment it was decided to relay a short length of line on Nether Hall
Road, 6 the specification for which indicates some of the things which were
deficient or missing in the original track: ferro-concrete foundations,
sett-paved margins, tarred macadam centre and new rail.
7
 It is obvious, by
the way, that though reduced maintenance during the war may have made the
track deteriorate more rapidly, this was not the cause of the problems,
which had shown themselves before or in the early stages of the conflict.
The worst trouble was on the Bentley route. The difficulties were undoubt-
edly exacerbated by inter-local authority rivalry. Bentley UDC had no res-
ponsibility for either the tramway or the road, and was thus free to complain
1. Numbers compiled from Appendix G5.
2. Doncaster Minutes, Highways Committee, 11 Apr 1916, 143W, 419.
3. H/E&TC Joint, 11 Dec 1916, 12P, 100.
4. Even a large system like Liverpool's used the Tudor process, which
involved a quasi-arc type of electric fusion welding, but still using fish
plates, which were arc welded into place; see Horne and Maund, Liverpool 
Transport 2, 84.
5. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 11 Dec 1911, 16P, 135.
6. H/E&TC Joint, 20 Jan 1915, 21P, 172; this was actually on the
Avenue/Beckett Road routes, showing how general the problems were.
7. Ibid., 24 Nov 1915, 13P, 87; it seems highly probable that the tar
macadam specified in the plans for the original routes was actually replaced
by ordinary water-bound macadam.
company operated.
4
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vociferously about both; nothing was done about either, because the County,
who were the road authority, would not act unless Doncaster raised the level
of their tram lines, which they refused to do. ' This squabbling had two
effects--it probably initially magnified the problem beyond its real dimens-
ions and it delayed effective action so long that the track really did get
into bad condition. In many cases the road was worse outside the tracks and
other traffic drove along the lines,
2
 which must have increased the diffic-
ulties for the tramways' department.
Bentley UDC first raised the issue with Doncaster in 1912, 3 only ten
years after the original route had been constructed; later experience showed
that tram track should usually last about twenty years.
4
 The dispute simm-
ered on well into the war without much being done on the ground, until in
1916 the Corporation finally decided to relay the portion from Bentley
Church to the old terminus, 5 but then found themselves blocked by the refusal
of the Ministry of Munitions to give the necessary clearance.
6
 A threat to
close the line
7
 had the desired effect, and the work went ahead.
8
 One other
minute recorded a refusal of a track work certificate from the Ministry,
this time upheld, 9 and doubtless the Corporation was inhibited from applying
in other cases knowing the likely negative response. It was one manifes-
tation of the wartime difficulty in getting materials and skilled labour to
carry out repairs, with the result that the post-war condition of the tram-
ways was worse than it would otherwise have been. The Bentley saga continued
1. Doncaster Gazette, 19 Feb 1915,
2. SYT Letters, 1 Sep 1922, 779.
3. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 12 Feb 1912, 29P, 228.
4. See above, 57.
5. Doncaster Minutes, H/E&TC Joint, 21 Jul 1916, 530 (no paragraph
number); this was only a few hundred yards.
6. C-in-C, 21 Aug 1916, 527.
7. H/E&TC Joint, 16 Aug 1916, 83P, 530.
8. C-in-C, 6 Sep 1916, 123M, 557.
	
9. E&TC, 15 Jun 1917, 89P, 328.
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unabated after the war, with the UDC1 and County2 complaining about the
tracks every month or so; this went on right until closure. 3 The 'coup de
grace' was given quite early on, however, by the decision of the WRCC to
repave Bentley Road with modern materials, so involving the Corporation in
the expense of reconstructing their tracks4 and raising the levels.
5
 As it
happens, it would have made no difference in this case if the tracks had
been in superb condition, because the County Council had the legal authority
to enforce the alteration of levels, 6 which effectively meant the complete
reconstruction or repaving of the tram lines. It was because of this that
the Tramways Committee decided in June 1923 to abandon the Bentley Road line 7
and to substitute trolleybuses ..8
This was the first time it had been decided to abandon an existing
tramway (though in the event Avenue Road was closed first9 ) as opposed to
deciding not to build a proposed one. The Bentley case was particularly
significant because the route had always been amongst the most profitable;
it was not like Avenue Road, which probably never even met working costs, 10
nor Brodsworth, which became unable to cover capital costs from about 1921. 11
Table 38 overleaf displays the results on the Bentley line from 1919-20 to
1922-3. Even though working and capital costs may not have been wholly
average for this line,12 the results show pretty conclusively that the Bent-
ley trams more than earned their way; and that was in a four year period
when for three years in succession the system as a whole showed a loss after
1. For instance, ibid., 12 May 1919, 60P, 380.
2. For instance, ibid., 14 Jul 1919, 85P, 511.
3. The last reference seems to be in November 1927 when a special
'Bentley Road Sub-Committee' was appointed; see E&TC, 10 Nov 1927, 21, 86.
4. E&TC, 13 Feb 1922, 72-5K, 223-4. 	 5. Ibid., 18 Jun 1923, 162K, 436.
6. E&TC Special Committee, 19 Jul 1923, 185K, 533.
7. E&TC, 11 Jun 1923, 157K, 435.	 8. Ibid., 18 Jun 1923, 162K, 436.
9. See above, 238. 	 10. See above,237.
	
11. See above, 224.
12. Higher, if anything, because of the recent investment in the line
and because of a more intensive service than on the shorter routes.
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TABLE 38
DONCASTER CORPORATION TRAMWAYS: BENTLEY ROUTE RESULTS 1920--1923
Year ending Revenue/mile: Working Costs/ Capital Costs/ Surplus/mile:
31st March	 Bentley	 mile: system mile: system 	 Bentley
1920	 6,284	 3,962	 602	 1,710
1921	 7,901	 4,845	 805	 2,251
1922	 . 8,286	 4,387	 767	 3,132
1923	 8,888	 4,808	 834	 3,246
SOURCES: costs and revenue for Bentley route and for tramway system as a
whole from Doncaster Accounts, 1919-20--1922-3. Calculated on a per mile
basis from the total mileage in Doncaster Statistics (14.25 miles) and on an
estimate for the Bentley route (2 miles) taken from the map in Figure 6.
capital payments. 1 It shows that the abandonment of this line was not due
to its being loss-making (and thus not to motor bus competition) and, more
importantly, that closure was a very serious step indeed, as it effectively
meant depriving the system of one of its two really profitable sections.
The consequence was, that if it was not worth reconstructing one of the
most economically viable tram routes, it was scarcely going to be worth
rebuilding those which were less financially sound. This conclusion was
quickly drawn, and at a special committee meeting in August 1924, and after
considering a report from the Borough Surveyor on the track and another from
the Manager on alternative policies, it was decided that the 'tramway track
be gradually substituted by a system of trackless vehicles ,3 It was not
specified whether these were to be petrol buses or trolleybuses, and the
Avenue Road conversion was obviously intended to be a test-bed for the fut-
ure wholesale conversion. The results of this were sufficient to convince
the Committee that trolleybuses were preferable, so the Doncaster Corpor-
2
1. See Appendix DN1.
2. The other was Balby, which on the same measure as in Table 38 was
earning £7,152 per mile in 1922-3. The mileage for the route is calculated
from data given above in Table 30 and on page 	 above and divided into
gross revenue from Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Revenue a/c, 1922-3.
3. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC Special Sub-Committee, 6 Aug 1924, 210K, 553.
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ation Bill, 1926, primarily seeking County Borough status for the town, also
included application for trolleybus powers. Specific authority was given
in it only for the Bentley conversion, but general powers to extend the
system, subject to statutory control, were also included. 1
Part of the reason why these general enabling powers were sought was
evidently the condition of the track on the other routes (as the August 1924
special meeting implied, of course). For instance, the Balby track was in
poor repair in 1920 and it was decided to rebuild part of it and to double
some at the same time. 2 Tenders for one section were accepted in 1921
3
 and
for another in 1923, 4 but this still left the track beyond Balby church so
bad that trolleys were constantly leaving the wire, whilst many joints had
given way and a piece of track on one loop had completely broken away. 5 A
couple of years later the lines in St. Sepulchre Gate needed raising because
the road surface was to be replaced with bituminous asphalt. 6 This was a
similar problem to that faced on the Bentley Road at the beginning of the
decade, but this time the expense was imposed by another department within
the same authority. It was not, of course, evidence of malice on the part
of the Highways Committee, merely that tramway legislation required owners
to maintain the area between their tracks and for eighteen inches either
side. This was a source of much aggravation to tramway managers however.
Why, Mr. Potts asked, should Doncaster tramways have to fund the improve-
ment of the Great North Road for the benefit of increased motor traffic, as
they were now expected to do? This situation arose on the Racecourse route
in 1926-7. The Manager wrote that the Surveyor's department 'now calmly
come along and inform the Tramways Committee that they are satisfied that
the Macadam road will not bear the weight of modern traffic, and that they
propose ripping the whole of the surface up, and replacing with Asphalt, and
1. Finance and General Purposes Committee, 30 Jun 1926, 159H, 419-20.
2. E&TC, 14 Jun 1920, 127P, 553.	 3. Ibid., 13 Jun 1921, 80P, 532.
4. Ibid., 8 Jan 1923, 70K, 174.	 5. SYT Letters, 2 May 1924, 294.
6. Doncaster Minutes, Highways Committee, 27 Apr 1926, 174W, 322.
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This was merely for the surface, not the track, which only had about three
years more life left in it, and even then would be about three years short
of its loan repayment period. Average yearly receipts were only 6.5d. per
car mile. 'Is it any wonder that Tramway Managers get worried?', Mr. Potts
concluded. 1 The Committee's subsequent decision to investigate an alternat-
ive method of traction for this route
2
 is scarcely surprising in the circum-
stances.
Examples of track problems could be multiplied many times, but enough
has been said to show that this was a crucial factor in the decision to dis-
pense with tramways in Doncaster. Of course, it was not only the track
which was worn out; the cars, Mr. Potts said in 1925, were 'in like condit-
ion , . 3 The first two of the original fleet were withdrawn at the end of the
same year. Even so, Doncaster was a good deal better off, or should have
been, than many other towns of similar size. Ten cars were only five years
old in 1925, another four were nine years old and seven were twelve years
old, all of which were quite new in terms of tramcar life-expectancy. 4 The
small company tramways in South Yorkshire were certainly a lot worse off
than this; Barnsley had only one tram built after 1905 5 and the M&STC none
built after 1908. 6 Rotherham Corporation, which ran a system comparable in
many ways to Doncaster's, had no genuinely new trams dating from later than
1909, except for four bought in 1920; nine of their older cars were fairly
thoroughly rebuilt in the same year, but the only new part was the lower
deck. 7 Photographic evidence does bear out Mr. Potts's description of his
cars, however.8 One reason for their poor condition as compared to pre-war
would be lack of maintenance during World War I, another would be their
1. SYT Letters, 21 Jan 1927, 437-9.
2. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 12 Dec 1927, 46, 170-1.
3. SYT Letters, 28 Oct 1925, 84. 	 4. See Appendix DN2.
5. Bett and Gilham, SY&H Tramways, 40.	 6. Ibid., 42.	 7. Ibid., 44.
8. See Richard J. Buckley, Tramway Memories of Old Doncaster (Doncaster,
1986); compare for example pictures on pages 4, 18 and 26.
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increasing age, so far as the original cars were concerned; also, a small
undertaking like Doncaster's would not have the workshop facilities to make
the best of their cars. A major tramway like Glasgow's could almost com-
pletely reconstruct and refit a large number of their older 'standard' cars
(over 300 by the beginning of 1930) in their own workshops, 1 a task quite
beyond Doncaster's resources of space or skill.
The condition of the trams was not, however, the decisive factor in the
course of events which led to the closure of the tramway system in Doncaster.
It is clear from the volume of references to the matter that it was the
track which was uppermost in everyone's mind. There were three reasons for
this. First, the original track had been built with economy in mind and
using methods which were not the best practice even then. This led to the
need for extensive and costly repairs, sometimes within as short a time as
ten years. Incidentally, 'second generation' construction was no better
than the first, for the Warmsworth track needed rebuilding by 1925, also ten
years after being laid. 2 Second, very little of the original track actually
was properly rebuilt, partly because of the difficulties caused by wartime
shortages; a short length of the Bentley route was reconstructed during the
war and quite a lot of the Balby line afterwards, but no major work seems to
have been done on any of the other routes. A further reason why matters
were allowed to get to such a pitch may have been the deficiencies in local
authority decision—making referred to above. For one thing, day—to—day con-
trol of the tram track lay with the Borough Surveyor, not the Tramways' Man-
ager, a partnership which did not work too well in practice. For another,
tramway business could be batted back and forth not only between these two
gentlemen and the Committees to whom they were responsible, but between
these and the full Council; the end result was often either delayed action
or no action at all, not aided by the fact that government bodies, such as
the Board of Trade or the Ministry of Munitions, often had to be involved
1. Oakley, The Last Tram, 82.
2. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 30 Mar 1925, 137K, 312.
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as well. Third, and perhaps in the end most crucially, the road surfaces
in which the tracks had been laid in the early 1900s needed modernising to
withstand increasing motor traffic in the 1920s. This involved the recon-
struction or renewal of the tram lines. It would obviously be unfair to
blame the planners of 1899 for not taking account of the requirements of
post-World War I road traffic, but the money saved then on cheap foundations
was clearly a false economy.. It was the need to rebuild both tracks and
roads which materially helped to push the Doncaster tramways into crisis
after 1919.
The replacement of the existing tram lines was not, however, the full
extent of the problem. It was one of the possible options and would have
involved minor improvements such as lengthening some of the passing loops.
But a layout dating back to plans made in 1899 would have been too slow and
cumbersome for the changed conditions of the mid-1920s. If the trams were
to be retained, the lines really had to be relaid with double track and ex-
tended to newly-built areas of the town. This was carefully considered, but
the costs involved were large; £151,000 to rebuild the existing system prop-
erly and a further £60,000 to build the extensions necessary to bring in in-
creased revenue, making a total debt of £211,000. The third option, which
was adopted, was to scrap the trams in favour of petrol or trolleybuses. 1 A
further factor was that at the time the existing debt on the tramways was
not extinguished. From the Manager's comments on the Racecourse route 2 it
is evident that the original tracks were financed by loans over a thirty
year period and would thus fall due for repayment in 1932-3. Later routes
were probably financed over twenty years, since that was the time the Cor-
poration wanted to keep the Brodsworth trams running forPsome debts would
therefore have been outstnding until at least 1943, twenty years after the
last major track work was done on the Balby route. Any new expenditure
would thus have to be added to the old, averaging about £11,000 per annum in
1. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 114.
2. See above,263.	 3. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 9 May 1932, 119, 489.
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the 1920s.
1
 The annual cost of simply rebuilding the old system was calcul-
ated to be £11,500,
2
 which is 7.6 per cent of the gross cost (£151,000);
applying this percentage to the cost of extending the system as well
(£60,000), one gets a total annual capital bill of £16,036 on new works plus
£12,951
3
on the old, a grand total of £28,987. It was difficult to envisage
even a rebuilt and reinvigorated tramway earning enough to cover such a debt.
Conclusion 
The series of decisions which led to the dismemberment and closure of
the tramway system were mostly taken on the grounds of the prohibitive cost
of replacing or renewing capital assets, especially the track. During the
same period private motor bus competition was a growing threat, but as a
whole the tramways proved surprisingly well able to combat this and to
return adequate surpluses throughout the 1920s, except during periods of
industrial strife. There is some evidence that this ability to meet compet-
ition was being eroded by the early 1930s, but this evidence applies to
out-of-boundary routes which were not necessarily typical of more urban
tramways. It might thus have been possible for trams to continue to pay
their way, had expensive renewals not been necessary. Since they were, how-
ever, the vehicles with the cheaper first cost immediately became more
attractive.
1. See Appendix DN1.
2. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 114.
3. The 1925-6 figure from Appendix DN1.
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CHAPTER 11
THE TROLLEYBUS TRIUMPHANT
The Conversion of the Tramways 
By 1926 the decision had finally been taken that the trolleybus was to
become the main mode of urban transport in Doncaster. The first tramway to
be converted was that to Bentley, which had been a bone of contention for so
long. There was some initial contact with the RET, the pioneer of trolley—
buses in Britain, ' but which by the 1920s was giving way to larger firms.
2
The whole contract eventually went to the established firm of Clough, Smith
and Company, 3 which had formed a marketing arrangement with two vehicle
.
manufacturers, Straker Squire and Kamer.
4
 Only four of the first eight
trolleybuses were Karriers though; the others were Garretts.
5
 The trolley—
bus wires were to be extended in a loop from New Village tram terminus via
Victoria Road and Askern Road back to the former tram route; there was also
a proposal for a spur from this loop to Bentley Toll Bar.
6
 Only the loop
was actually constructed though.
7
 Between March and April 1928 trolleybus 1
started driver training duties on the Racecourse route, which was then only
partially equipped with a negative return wire; on the other sections a rail
1. See for example, SYT Letters, 30 Oct 1925, 90; 11 Nov 1925, 128.
2. Owen, British Trolleybus, 36.	 3. DCT Jubilee, 42.
4. Owen, British Trolleybus, 39.
5. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 116.
6. SYT Letters, 30 Oct 1925, 90.
7. Figure 6 above shows completed but not projected trolleybus routes.
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'skate' was used in the tram rail. On 22 Aug 1928 an official party
travelled to Bentley in trolleybus 4, after which bus 6 inaugurated the pub-
1
lic service.
By May the decision was taken to convert all the remaining tram routes
2
to trolleybus, with the exception of Balby and Brodsworth. These two were
probably retained for a while because large sums had been spent on them rel-
atively recently; the Brodsworth line had only been built in 1916
3
and exten-
sive doubling had taken place even more recently to Balby.
4
 Additionally,
nine of the trams were only six years old.
5
 Because the Nine Arch Bridge
carrying the Hexthorpe route over the railway was being widened, the Town
Clerk asked the Ministry of Transport to anticipate permission for trolley-
buses so the tram tracks could be lifted at once.
6
 Permission was given in
February 1929. 7 Hexthorpe was thus the next route to be converted, though
the date on which trolleybuses took over is not at all clear. Two sets of
notes in the back of the Employees Register, the first probably contemporary
with the events described, give conflicting dates--either Sunday 23 Jun 1929
or 1 Jul 1929. A possible explanation is that the earlier date refers to a
trial, since this did happen on Beckett Road, where normal trolleybus ser-
vice began on 31 Jul 1929 after a trial run the previous Sunday. The Hyde
Park dates are also doubtful, being either 16 or 19 Jan 1930.
8
 In this case
the trolleybuses were probably extended at the same time via Carr House Road
to the Racecourse, as had been previously planned.
9
 There are no discrepan-
cies for the later conversions, which were as follows--Racecourse 20 Mar
1. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 116; DCT Jubilee, 42
has 19 August for the official opening, but gives 22 August in an appendix
(page 50). That the latter date is correct is confirmed by an entry in Don-
caster Accounts, Trackless Trolley Income a/c, 1928-9.
2. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 14 May 1928, 139, 499-500.
3. See above222.	 4. See above,236.	 5. See Appendix DN2.
6. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 17 Dec 1928, 39, 158.
7. Ibid., 18 Feb 1929, 67, 278.	 8. SYT Register, 677-8.
9. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 13 May 1929, 122, 466. Alternatively this
may have been done when the Racecourse route opened two months later.
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1930, Wheatley Hills 4 Mar 1931 and Balby 26 Jul 1931.
1
 Trams are believed
to have ceased the previous day in all cases
2
 (except Wheatley of course),
though the original plans had allowed for interim motor bus services.
3
The decision to extend trolleybuses to Balby was taken in May 1930
after considering a report on the state of the tram track. The portion
within the Borough could be converted under the 1926 Act, but a new Bill
would be necessary for the section to Warmsworth; it was intended to extend
the wires to Edlington at the same time.
4
 The YTC and the Omnibus Owners'
Association objected to the Bill however, 5 so the overhead was initially
erected only as far as the Borough boundary
6
 at Austen Avenue, with the rest
of the route to Warmsworth being covered by an augmented motor bus service
to Edlington. 7 One note in the minutes raises the intriguing possibility
that the through Warmsworth cars continued to run for a short while after
the Balby service had been taken over by trolleybuses. On 10 Aug 1931, a
fortnight after the conversion, the Committee resolved to notify the WRCC
of its intention (my emphasis) to cease running the Warmsworth cars.
8
 Maybe
they had just forgotten to do this and were merely covering themselves leg-
ally by phrasing the minute in this way, or perhaps the trams did run a
little longer to maintain the Corporation's rights on the route until alt-
ernative arrangements could be made. It is one of those interesting but ult-
imately unimportant little puzzles. Trolleybuses never did run to Warms—
worth anyway, though a further short extension was made in July 1942, taking
the wires to Barrel Lane. 9 In other cases the trolleybuses did not only run
1. SYT Register, 678.	 2. DCT Jubilee, 50.
3. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, Special Sub—Committee, 18 Aug 1925, 237K,
512.
4. E&TC, 12 May 1930, 123, 509.	 5. Ibid., 9 Feb 1931, 65, 298.
6. Ibid., 17 Feb 1931, 72, 299.
7. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 116.
8. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 10 Aug 1931, 177, 701.
9. DCT Jubilee, 50.
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over the complete former tram route but beyond it. Two have already been
mentioned--the New Bentley loop
1
 and the connection between Hyde Park and
the Racecourse.
2
 The latter was used to operate a circular service along
the two former tram routes. The Beckett Road route was also extended a
fairly short distance at the time of conversion
3
 and then a further half
mile in April 1941.
4
 The Wheatley route was obviously longer than the for-
mer Avenue Road tramway too, -since it was actually replacing the extended
motor bus service; the trolleybuses went a bit further even than that.
5
Various additional pieces of wiring were also needed to make the town centre
layout suitable for trolleybus operation
6
 and a few minor extensions were
made as late as 1958.
7
 Even before that, in 1955, the Bentley route had
closed due to the rebuilding of the Don bridge and during the 1960s the rest
of the system was gradually run down; the final trolleybus ran to Beckett
Road on 14 Dec 1963.
8
Going back to 1931 however, the trolleybus conversion programme had
still left one tram route running to Brodsworth. The fifteen newest trams
seem to have survived the Balby closure, though by the time the Woodlands
service itself was withdrawn there were only eight trams left.
9
 In 1932 the
WRCC was evidently proposing some road works which would have affected the
off-street tram tracks, but stayed its hand on being assured by the Corpor-
ation of their intention to close the route within about twenty years of its
.	 10
opening. The intention was obviously to get the maximum life out of the
assets, such as they were, for the track was already giving trouble.11 In
1. See above,267.	 2. See above, 26&
2. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 116. 	 4. Ibid., 152.
5. Ibid., 116.	 6. See the map, Figure 6.
7. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 156.
8. Tuffrey, Electric Transport, Introduction.
9. Appendix DN2; the falling fleet is an indicator of falling traffic.
10. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 11 Jul 1932, 144, 614-5.
11. Ibid., 13 Feb 1933, 71, 304.
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November 1933 therefore it was decided to seek legal powers to abandon the
line. ' The last tram ran on 8 Jun 1935 and motor buses took over on the
following day. 2 Why trolleybuses were not used is not stated, but probably
the difficulties over the Warmsworth replacement made the Corporation think
that it would be easier to get permission to run motor buses outside their
boundary and over a route shared with the YTC. The last trams were sold to
a scrap dealer for E130. 3 Four elderly employees who could not be found
alternative work were pensioned of f. 4 And arrangements were made to lift
the track, 5 bringing to an end thirty-three years of tramway operation.
The Advantages of Trolleybuses 
Most of the discussion in Doncaster related to the merits of trolley-
buses over motor buses, rather than over trams, probably because once the
decision had been taken in 1924 to scrap the trams in favour of a railless
system, the debate was not about trams versus the others, but about which of
the two alternatives was better. Some of the obvious advantages of trolley-
buses as opposed to trams were, however, that the former required no expens-
ive permanent way, that they were quiet and smooth running,
6
 and that they
did not need to load and unload in the middle of the road.
7
 Also, writing
about the projected Bentley conversion, Mr. Potts said that the trams were
being replaced because they and their tracks were practically worn out; it
was no use merely relaying the line, whilst trolleybuses 'lent themselves
admirably to cheap extensions ,8 since, of course, it was fairly economical
to extend the wires without tracks. To this first cost advantage needed to
be added the fact that trolleybuses were popular with the public. The local
press described the new Bentley vehicles in 1928 as the last word in comfort
1. Ibid., 13 Nov 1933, 25, 30.	 2. DCT Jubilee, 50.
3. Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 14 Oct 1935, 182, 720.
4. Ibid., 8 Jul 1935, 144, 571.	 5. Ibid., 14 Oct 1935, 186, 720.
6. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 43. 	 7. Wilson, L. U. T., 177.
8. SYT Letters, 28 Oct 1925, 84.
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as well as being speedier than the trams. ' As opposed to motor buses,
trolleybuses were preferred because they had better and steadier lighting
and were noiseless and free from fumes. 2 Operators would presumably expect
to see this public approval translated into terms of increased rides and
revenue.
Electric power was attractive to some operators in itself, particularly
to those already using trams. Electric motors were simple and trouble free,
3
making trolleybuses reliable vehicles. 4 Mr. Potts also made much of a point
not usually mentioned elsewhere, that electric motors were not running when
the bus was stopped, whereas petrol engines were; this could be as much as a
quarter of the journey time. He believed this saved wear and tear 5 and may-
be had fuel economy in mind too. Electric traction was favoured in Doncaster
anyway because it provided a continued load for the municipal power station
6
and because the current was ultimately derived from coal, which was a local
industry. 7
According to Mr. Potts there was only one problem with continued rel-
lance on electric traction; the fuel cost was greater than with motor buses.
8
It is arguable whether this actually was the case at the time of conversion 
from tram to bus however. Pilcher, no friend to trolleybuses, numbers
among their advantages in his 1930 book the fact that they had low operating
1. Doncaster Gazette, 24 Aug 1928, 16.
2. SYT Letters, 28 Nov 1930, 52.	 3. Ibid.
4. Tuffrey, Electric Transport, Introduction.
5. SYT Letters, 3 Jan 1931, 158. In practice this is unlikely, since
there is little wear on an idling internal combustion engine; see Flint and
Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 114.
6. Tuffrey, Electric Transport, Introduction.
7. Not directly stated in a Doncaster source, but can be presumed to
have been in mind. Rotherham and the M&STC used this as part of their apol-
ogia for putting trolleybuses on their joint route in 1929; see, Maltby-- 
Rotherham--Conisborough: Souvenir issued by the Rotherham Corporation Trans-
port Department and the Mexborough & Swinton Tramways Company to celebrate 
the Inaugeration of the Trolley Vehicle System between Rotherham and Conis-
borough (Rotherham, 1929 ), 6.
8. Potts, Doncaster Cavalcade, 7.
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costs because of lesser electricity prices as against petrol. He quotes
certain case studies in support, such as Hull, where the relative prices of
electricity and petrol were estimated as 1.012d. and 2.650d. per car mile.
1
On the other hand, the figures for the DDLR and the YTC in the early 1930s
reverse the relationship in favour of petrol costs.
2
 Presently available
figures for Doncaster itself do not provide anything like a proper compar-
ison, but in 1925-6 petrol for buses was costing 2.19d. per bus mile, 3
whereas trolleybus power costs only once exceeded 2.09d. per bus mile in the
first eight years of operation and showed a consistent decline from 1932-3
onwards.
4
 So it would probably be true to say that trolleybuses did have
the advantage over petrol buses in respect of fuel costs in the second half
of the 1920s. One might assume, as mentioned in connection with the DDLR, 5
that the introduction of oil—engines would have swung the balance against
the trolleybus during the 1930s, but this was certainly not inevitably so.
Portsmouth Corporation Transport reported on comparative costs in 1939 when
its omnibus fleet was presumably mostly dieselised; motor bus and trolleybus
power expenses were then 1.62d. and 1.46d. per bus mile.
6
 Only after World
War II did the difference in overall operating costs force authorities like
Darlington and Ipswich to introduce their first motor services to supplement
their trolleybus systems, 7 so it may well be to this post—war scenario that
Mr. Potts is referring in his 1948 article. When trolleybuses were actually
coming on to Doncaster's streets, it is fairly clear that they had a dis-
1. Filcher, Road Transport Operation, 44 and 50; the figures are from
estimates drawn up for a proposed rather than an actual trolleybus route.
2. See above,149; relating to trams versus buses here of course.
3. Calculated from gross fuel costs in Doncaster Accounts, Motor Omni-
bus Revenue a/c, 1925-6 and bus miles in SYT Letters, 17 Jul 1926, 898.
4. From gross fuel costs and mileage in Tramway Returns, passim.
5. See above,149.
6. City of Portsmouth Passenger Transport Department, Comparative Ex-
penses per Mile (hereafter Portsmouth, Comparative Expenses), 24 Jun 1939;
in a file of papers formerly belonging to C. T. Humpidge.
7. Klapper, Tramways, 271.
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tinct advantage over internal combustion engined vehicles in terms of fuel
costs.
Be that as it may, Mr. Potts certainly assumed in 1930 that trolleybuses
were cheaper to run 'in toto' than petrol buses were. '
 This is supported by
certain examples from other towns, such as Wolverhampton, where the relative
costs per 100 seat miles were 24.173d. and 29.590d. in 1929, or Hull, where
a projected comparison by Mr. Rayner costed trolleybuses at 12.824d. per bus
mile and petrol buses at 14.694d. 2
 On the other hand, Pilcher was able to
quote fourteen towns operating both kinds of buses, ten of which gave the
advantage to motor buses.3
 As he said, such comparative figures have to be
taken with reserve because costs were not allocated in the same way in diff-
erent towns. Whether or not Portsmouth was one of his sample is not stated,
but by 1939 motor buses there had a slight edge over the trolleybuses, with
working costs of 12.40d. per bus mile as against 12.48d. 4
 The balance of
advantage was obviously a pretty fine one, for when Hull actually did start
running trolleybuses, they were cheaper to run than motor buses for four out
of the first eight years during which they were both in use, whereas the
motor buses had the edge for the other four. 5
 There is no reason to doubt,
therefore, that petrol buses appeared more expensive to run at the time when
conversion of the tramways was being considered in Doncaster, but equally it
is unlikely that the advantage remained with the trolleybus for any long or
continuous period.
In late 1930 or early 1931 Mr. Potts was involved in correspondence
with a ratepayer, a Mr. Pearce, who strongly supported the new 'crude oil
engines' as against trolleybuses. Potts was obviously rather sensitive to
this criticism, and replied to the effect that diesel engines in buses were
very much untried technology at that time. For instance, he said, the eng-
1. SYT Letters, 28 Nov 1930, 52.
2. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 50-1.	 3. Ibid., 46.
4. Portsmouth, Comparative Expenses.
5. Lee, 'Tramways of Hull', 2, Table D.12, 95-100B.
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me fitted to a bus on the Sheffield to Doncaster run had been scrapped
after only 103 days. ' The usual hostages to fortune were lined up as wit-
neses, including Sir Herbert Austin, who was reported by Potts as saying
that 'a crude oil engine could never be a success in any Motor Car or Motor
Omnibus '. 2 Any prudent management would have taken Potts 's attitude at the
time, but his reaction to Pearce does seem to show that he was aware that
there were two sides to the trolleybus versus motor bus debate.
One further point in favour of the motor bus was admitted; it was
faster than the trolleybus. However this high maximum speed was not usable
in town traffic, where the trolleybus's maximum of about twenty—eight miles
per hour was quite adequate, especially where stops were frequent.
3
 One of
the electric bus's great advantages, in fact, was its rapid acceleration,
4
which enabled it to maintain a high average speed over the route as a whole;
5
this, Potts believed, would ensure that working costs were considerably less
than for the slower trams. 6
These are the reasons why trolleybuses were chosen as the main tramway
replacements in Doncaster. Charles Klapper's general comment is very appos-
ite--that trolleybuses relied for their success partly on the 'electrical
affections of the management and largely upon economic circumstances'.
7
The Economic Performance of the Trolleybus and the Tram 
compared in practice 
Three major economic or commercial points arise out of the above summ-
ary of the expected advantages of trolleybuses as against trams. These are
1. Owned by Sheffield Corporation, this was the first municipal diesel
bus in the country; see Chas. C. Hall, Sheffield Transport (Glossop, 1977),
228.
2. SYT Letters, 26 Nov 1930, 32.	 3. Ibid., 28 Nov 1930, 52.
4. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 43.
5. The combination of fast acceleration and relatively low average top
speed used to be noticeable when cycling behind trolleybuses in Hull; one
was always catching them up at stops only to have them swoop ahead to the
next, where the process was repeated (personal reminiscence).
6. SYT Letters, 28 Oct 1925, 84.	 6. Klapper, Tramways, 271.
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that capital and running expenses would be less and that revenue would be
higher. Starting with capital, the contract for the first conversion went
to Clough, Smith for £12,990 for the wiring etc. and £16,840 for eight buses.'
The accounts show the actual costs to have been £11,718 and £20,620 2 plus
£674 (the expense of raising the capital), making a total of £33,012. 3
 The
total planned length of the Bentley route was 4 miles, 4 furlongs and 7.8
chains, but the spur to Toll Bar, amounting to 5 furlongs and 8.9 chains
4
was not built, so the actual length was 3 miles, 6 furlongs and 8.9 chains.
This is about 34or 3.875 miles.
Taking the expenditure from the accounts, the overall cost of construct-
ing and equipping the route works out to £8,518 a mile; the cost of overhead
and feeders alone was £3,024 per mile whilst each bus cost £2,062. 5
 The
cost of overhead wiring only was £8,1966 or £2,115 per mile. Here a direct
comparison with trams is possible, for Pilcher quotes £2,000 per mile for
trams in his 1930 book; 7 one would actually have expected double trolleybus
wiring to be relatively more expensive than it was.
So far as vehicles were concerned, some conventional trams delivered to
Walthamstow Corporation in the early 1930s cost £2,444 10s. Od. each; the
really modern Feltham cars built for London at the same time cost £3,420
apiece. 8 Both were bogie cars, which Doncaster never had, and the Felthams
were more advanced than anything a small-town system would have been likely
1. DCT Jubilee, 42.
2. Almost certainly including two extra buses bought in advance of the
next conversions or in anticipation of higher traffic levels.
3. Doncaster Accounts, Trackless Trolley Capital a/c, 1928-9.
4. Distances from, SYT Letters, 3 Jan 1927, 368.
5. Assuming the global figure was for ten buses. This seems likely,
as ten further vehicles were bought in 1931 for £19,750 or £1,975 each; see
Doncaster Minutes, E&TC, 24 Nov 1931, 23.
6. Doncaster Accounts, Trackless Trolley Capital a/c, 1928-9.
7. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 71.
8. K. C. Blacker, The Felthams: the story of the Union Construction 
Company (Blackpoo1,1962), 21.
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to buy. According to Pilcher, the difference in price between four wheel
and bogie trucks was £132, so a likely 'Doncaster car' might have cost about
£2,300, a little more than a comparable trolleybus. Evidently trolleybus
wiring and vehicles were not all that much different in price from tramway
overhead and cars. The key difference was that no track was needed. Pilcher
estimated that one mile of double track would cost £15,776 to renew. ' So
to the actual expenditure on the Bentley trolleybus route one might add £300
per vehicle, or £3,000, and £15,776 per mile, or £61,132, if trams had been
used instead. This puts the theoretical expenditure up to £97,144, almost
three times the actual cost of construction. 2
 The moral is obvious.
Moving on to running costs, it was expected by Potts that these would
be reduced as against trams because of the trolleybuses' higher speed. 3 As
shown in Appendix DN5, trolleybus working costs were indeed consistently
below those of the trams. The difference varied between only 2 per cent (in
1930-1) to 29 per cent (in 1932-3) and averaged 16 per cent. 4 This was
obviously a distinct advantage for trolleybuses. In seeking to discover why
they were cheaper to run than trams, it seems best to take a year when the
latter were still a going concern and before the major part of the system
had been abandoned.. Thus the comparison is made for 1929-30, for much of
which trams were still running on most routes, yet in which trolleybuses
were also becoming well established; as a check that this is not an atypical
year, the figures for 1933-4 are also tabulated in Table 39 (overleaf).
Various interesting facts arise from the comparison. First of all,
trolleybuses used more electricity per car mile than trams. This may reflect
the original reason why trams were a success in the first place, that steel
1. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 56; although the Bentley track
had been single, it would probably have been doubled if renewed.
2. Trolleybus costs may have been reduced by re-using tramway poles or
feeders, but this would not have done much to close the gap.
3. SYT Letters, 28 Oct 1925, 84; the logic is that if vehicles are
faster, less of them are needed to move the same number of passengers, and
hence running costs such as wages are reduced.
4. Percentages calculated from figures in Appendix DN5.
Item TBTram TB Tram
Repairs
Traffic
Power
Rates etc.
Other
Total
3.49
6.15
1.41
0.89
1.03
12.97
1.80
4.97
1.77
0.24
1.14
9.92
2.07
6.45
0.77
0.99
1.09
11.37
1.84
5.74
2.47
0.26
1.22
11.53
1929-30 19 3-4
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TABLE 39
DONCASTER CORPORATION: COMPARISON OF TRAM AND TROLLEYBUS WORKING COSTS
IN PENCE PER CAR MILE FOR 1929-30 AND 1933-4
SOURCE: Tramway Returns, costs divided by mileage.
wheels on steel rails have a lower rolling resistance than road wheels on
macadam. In the two years in question, the trams used 1.41 and 1.03 and the
trolleybuses 2.47 and 2.36 units of electricity per car mile. '
 So in this
case the trams had a definite advantage.
But traffic expenses, which were mainly wages, did favour the trolley-
buses, probably because of the speed factor noticed by Potts. As an indic-
ation of this, the Bentley trolleybus route was 1.4 miles longer than the
old tram route, but the journey time was ten minutes less. 2
 Repairs also
favoured the trolleys, partly as one might expect when comparing new buses
with old trams. But the main difference was accounted for by the addition
of permanent way costs to the trams' total. In 1929-30 track cost 1.23d.
per car mile,3 leaving 2.26d. for other repairs, not greatly in excess of
the trolleybus figure. The smaller gap under this head in 1933-4 is not
significant, for by then track repairs had almost ceased, only 0.20d. per
car mile being spent then. Trams also had to pay rates on their tracks,
the trolleys only on their wiring and depot, which will account for the
1. Tramway Returns, 1929-30 and 1933-4.
2. Flint and Fowler, 'Corporation Transport', 116.
3. This and the 1933-4 figure calculated as for Table 39.
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difference in this item.
So where working expenses were concerned trolleybuses were more costly
than trams in terms of power consumption. But this was more than compensated
for by two other savings. First and most important the trolleybus ran
on public roads and thus saved (in 1929-30) 1.23d. per car mile in repairs
and 0.63d. in rates, a total of 1.86d. Second, there was a reduction in
traffic costs, though this was only 0.41d. per car mile in 1929-30; perhaps
significantly, this had increased to 1.48d. by 1933-4 when the trolleys
had become more established.
One should be cautious about reading too much into a single set of
figures. Odly enough, the fact that trolleybuses were cheaper to run on a
car mileage basis did not necessarily mean that they were cheaper overall.
A rather more significant measure is the cost of providing a certain amount
of passenger accommodation. Pilcher cites from figures from Wolverhampton
for costs per 100 seat miles. These show that tram and trolleybus costs
there were more evenly matched in the late 1920s that the car mileage figures
from Doncaster might lead one to expect. Total working expenses from 1925
to 1929 were as follows for tram/trolleybus in pence per 100 seat miles--
29.48/29.75, 29.665/29.745, 25.746/30.150, 24.579/24.373, 28.568/24.173.
However although trams had the edge overall in the first three of these five
years, maintenance and repair costs for trolleybuses were always less, 4.5d.
versus 6.39d. in 1925 for instance, and from 1928 onwards a clear cost
differential in favour of trolleybuses does seem to be opening up. '
The reason for the differences between the seat mileage and car mileage
figures is that trams tended to be larger than buses. Hence, for every
vehicle mile, they could move more seats (and passengers), so reducing the
unit cost per seat. As a matter of fact this is irrelevant as far as Don-
caster is concerned, for the older trams replaced by the first trolleybus
conversions had only fifty-six seats 2 whereas the new trolleybuses had more
1. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 50-1.
2. Appendix DN2 gives dates of withdrawal and seating for trams.
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at sixty each. ' So the vehicle mileage costs presented in Table 39 are a
perfectly fair measure as far as Doncaster is concerned.
Turning to revenue, there can be no doubt that the trolleybuses earned
more per mile than the trams did, and they did so in every year from the
inception of the trolleys until the closure of the tramways. 2 Too much ought
not to be made of the widened gap between the two after 1932-3, for by then
only the Brodsworth tram route remained and this was, as noted above, 3
extremely susceptible to motor bus competition. Nontheless the difference
was dramatic enough. Mr. Potts reported an immediate 50 per cent rise in
revenue on the Bentley route after conversion. The change was less on the
other routes, but even so the average increase was 38 per cent. 4
Various reasons may be surmised for this. One thing, of course, was
that in most cases like was not being compared with like. Out of seven tram
or motor bus routes converted to trolleybus, five were extended beyond the
old terminus. 5
 This would naturally account for some of the increased rev-
enue. Another reason would be the higher speed of trolleybuses, which might
make short journeys more worthwhile as against walking. A third reason
would be the general attractiveness of the new vehicles as opposed to the
old trams.
It seemed a fairly general experience for traffic to rise on conversion.
Wolverhampton recorded increases in receipts varying from 64 per cent down
to 13 per cent after converting various tram routes to trolleybus between
1923 and 1927. 6 This town was one of the first to envisage and carry out
the complete changeover of a medium sized tramway to trackless operation and
its Manager, C. Owen Silvers, was a noted propagandist for trolleybuses. 7
Mr. Potts had some contacts with him prior to the Bentley conversion. 8
1. SYT Letters, 21 Nov 1930, 23.
	 2. See Appendix DN5.
3. See above,253.
	 4. Potts, Doncaster Cavalcade, 7.
5. See above,270.
	 6. Pilcher, Road Passenger Transport, 52.
7. Yearsley, 'Bus and Coach'.
8. SYT Letters, 27 Apr 1927, 769; 3 May 1927, 795.
281
Between 1927 and 1936 the Doncaster tram fleet declined from 44 to nil,
the motor bus fleet rose from 21 to 38 and the trolleybus fleet, starting at
16 in 1929, rose to 37. In the first five of those ten years, the transport
department returned a profit after capital payments in only one year, 1928.
The losses were actually caused more by the motor bus side than by the
trams,' which were usually marginally but not deeply in the red. In the last
five years of the period a regular and usually rising surplus was earned.
This was greatly aided by a sharp recovery in motor bus profits, but the
largest contribution was made by the trolleybuses, which earned as much as
£10,000 in 1936. Meanwhile the trams remained stuck in deficit. 2
 In comm-
ercial terms, the decision of the Manager and Committee to dispense with
trams was amply justified. In fact, between 1903 and 1935 when the trams
were running, the department earned a surplus in only eighteen years out of
thirty—five; yet from 1932 to 1952 it was never in the red at al1. 3 It would
not be correct to ascribe the entire change in fortunes to scrapping the
trams. It is probably no coincidence that the long period of prosperity
began in 1932, the year the effects of the Road Traffic Act began to be felt.
The department benefitted greatly by the Act. By it, a id. protective fare
was secured against long distance operators. 4 Some pirating still took
place though, evidence for this occuring in September 1931 when flooding
caused motor buses to be substituted for the Bentley trolleybuses and long
distance buses to be withdrawn; revenue on the route went up by a further 25
per cent during that period. 5 But the 1930 Act gave the road transport ind-
ustry stability and made it possible to eliminate competitors, which over
time must have increased the transport department's income by a considerable
proportion.
It is true as well that a modernised tramway would have been capable of
1. Which must have confirmed the management in the wisdom of their
decision to opt for trolleybuses to replace trams.
2. See Appendix DN6. 3. DCT Jubilee, 49.
4. Potts, Doncaster Cavalcade, 7.
	 5. DCT Jubilee, 42.
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attracting increased revenue. 1 It was not so much that trolleybuses them-
selves were better than trams; it was that they were new and comfortable.
However the fact that the debt on a rebuilt tramway was unlikely to be
recoverable from increased revenue 2 clearly meant that new trams were not
actually an option for Doncaster. This was because even if trams were able
to increase receipts by an equal percentage to trolleybuses, the higher cost
of installing a tramway would still have made it difficult to cover the
annual capital costs, especially as tramway working costs were also higher.
Postscript 
Trolleybuses continued to provide the bulk of Doncaster's town services
until well after World War II. New Corporation Transport Offices and a
motor bus garage were opened at Intake in 1937, but the outbreak of war
meant that the original plan to transfer the trolleybuses there too was not
carried out3 and they remained at Greyfriars Road. 4
 The fleet was improved
in 1943 by the purchase of the first two-axle fifty-six seat trolleybus,
which was later joined by other batches, mostly secondhand. 5 After the war
trolleybuses began to run into some of the same problems which had affected
the trams. The cost of installing overhead had risen to between £8,000 and
£11,000 a mile and recovery of such capital expenditure was becoming doubt-
ful. As trolleybuses declined elsewhere, the supply of spares and replace-
ments became difficult. 6 The town centre was being redeveloped as well, and
the trolleybus became accused of the same sin as the tram--inflexibility.
The Bentley route--by a strange coincidence--was the first to close, in 1955,
because of the need to reconstruct a bridge. Despite minor extensions in
1958, the whole system was closed in the early 1960s; the last trolleybus
1. See above, 60 .	 2. See above,266.
3. One of the entrances actually has 'Trolley Vehicles' carved on the
lintel.
4. Potts, Doncaster Cavalcade, 7.
5. Tuffrey, Electric Transport, Introduction; other towns did the same.
6. DCT Jubilee, 42.
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ran to Beckett Road on 14 Dec 1963. 1
Even before this, motor bus services had long ceased to be purely 'out
of town'. In 1929 a new housing estate was being built at Intake, an area
never served by trams. So on 28 Mar 1930 a motor bus route started; 2
 there
seems not to have been any intention to convert this to trolleybuses. The
Woodlands tram service went over to motor bus in 1935, of course, and various
other routes were initiated both before and after the war. 3
 Pneumatic tyres
began to be fitted to buses in 1930 and in 1934 the first diesel buses were
introduced, on the Intake route. 4
Doncaster Corporation Transport Department lost its independence on
1 Apr 1974, when as a result of local government reorganisation the South
Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive took over all municipal bus services
in the county. 5
 At the time of writing the whole bus industry is in the
throes of the most severe reorganisation since 1930 as a result of the
Transport Act, 1985. Doncaster's publicly-owned buses are now operated by a
'hands off' Company, South Yorkshire Transport. The main feature of the
legislation is deregulation, taking the industry in some respects back to
the conditions of the 1920s. 6
 Whether deregulation will work any better in
the 1980s remains to be seen. The uncertainties caused by this legislation,
together with public spending restrictions, are likely to mean that an
ambitious plan to reintroduce trolleybuses to Doncaster (and Rotherham) will
be unlikely to see fruition for a long time, if ever. In August 1985 a
two-year test programme was inaugurated in Doncaster of a new British-built
trolleybus. About a mile of overhead wiring has been installed along a
private road on the Racecourse, and the installation will be used to evaluate
1. Tuffrey, Electric Transport, Introduction.
	 2. DCT Jubilee, 34.
3. Ibid., 50.
	 4. Ibid., 36.
5. South Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive (SYPTE), Transport 
Development Plan (Sheffield, 1978), 1.
6. South Yorkshire Passenger Transport Authority, The Price of Change 
(Barnsley, 1986); passenger information leaflet (no page numbers).
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the commercial and technical viability of modern trolley vehicles. ' It
would be rather ironic, considering all the effort which has gone into
phasing out electric transport from Doncaster's streets, if it were to
return in the future.
1. SYPTE, News Release, 5 Aug 1985.
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CHAPTER 12
CONCLUSION
There is nothing very remarkable about the fact that the Doncaster
tramways were replaced by another form of transport. By 1962 all Britain's
tramways, with one exception, had closed, making this a commonplace. What
is interesting, however, is why Doncaster Corporation decided to dispense
with its trams when it did. Certainly it is fair to assume common factors
behind the closure process in Doncaster in the 1920s and, say, Sheffield in
the 1950s. But it is also reasonable to suppose that there were differences
too, if only because there was such a lapse of time between the two events
and because of the disparity in size and importance between the two towns
and their tram systems. So the bald question, 'Why did Doncaster's trams
close?', may elicit an answer of no greater weight than, 'For the same
reasons as everywhere else' (though of course the Doncaster experience may
help to clarify those general reasons). But an answer of more significance
may result from a slightly different question, 'Why did Doncaster Council
decide to do away with its trams at the time it did?'.
The future of the tramways was actually put into doubt quite early on,
less than twenty years after their opening. This was not directly related
to World War I, which affected the tramway system rather less than a cursory
examination of the statistics might suggest. However, the next few years
brought up many problems to assail the tramways which were partly or even
largely the result of the war. They included a marked deterioration in the
physical condition of the trams and of their infrastructure, partially a
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consequence of deferred maintenance during the war; rapid inflation coupled
with industrial conflict, particularly in the vital coal industry; and the
rise in motorised competition owing to the 'hothouse' development of the
internal combustion engined vehicle during the war and to the release of
thousands of vehicles and qualified men into the civilian market.
The tramways' declining physical and financial health meant that they
were less able to meet competition when it came. Inflation meant that the
costs of new construction were now far greater than they had been before or
even during the war. The arrival of the motor bus on the scene meant that a
viable and cheaper alternative (in capital if not yet in operating terms)
was now available. The Oxford Street fiasco had also shown the folly of
constructing tram lines for which there was insufficient demand.
The result for Doncaster was that extensive and well-advanced plans for
new tramway construction after the war were not realised. It was quickly
decided, and probably partly under the influence of the new manager, that
,
long tram lines serving the outer ring of colliery villages were not econom-
ically feasible, even though routes such as that to Brodsworth had been cap-
able of paying their way up until about 1919. The motor bus, already being
used by private enterprise, was seen as the obvious means of serving these
outlying communities. The town itself was also changing as new municipal
housing estates were built. At first these might be on existing tram routes,
but where they were not, the problem arose of how to serve them. Should it
be by tramway extensions? as was proposed along Carr House Lane. Or should
it be by another mode? In the end, nothing was done to extend the tramways.
The initial result of these debates was stagnation for the tramways.
They ceased to grow in terms of route mileage, and from having served the
whole of the local transport area, were reduced to serving only a part of
it. In any enterprise, ceasing to grow is almost always a precursor to
decline, and this was the case here. Without either saying so or even
realising it, the decision of management and councillors not to expand
the tramways was effectively the first step towards their closure.
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In the mid-1920s four decisions were taken about the future of the
tramways. In order of time these decisions (though not their execution)
were as follows--to replace the Bentley trams with trolleybuses, in 1923; to
replace all trams by trolleybuses or motor buses, in 1924; to replace and
extend the Avenue Road trams by double-deck motor buses experimentally, also
in 1924; and to replace both the latter and the remaining trams (except, at
the time, those running to Warmsworth and Brodsworth) by trolleybuses, in
1926.
The initial plan to withdraw the Bentley trams was undoubtedly due to
the track problem. The tracks themselves needed rebuilding, partly because
of normal wear and tear, but also because of poor initial construction. The
urgent need to replace a section of line in 1916, well before tram track's
normal twenty year life span, demonstrates the effect of earlier penny
pinching. However this section, between Bentley Church and the old terminus,
was only a small part of the whole and so the problems could only worsen
after the war.	 Reconstructed or not, however, the lines also required
raising in the 1920s to match new road surfaces required by the road author-
ity, so the expense of partial rebuilding would have been necessary in any
case, had the trams been retained.
Clearly, the need to reconstruct the tracks lay behind the second dec-
ision, to replace all trams by a trackless mode, and it also dictated the
timetable of abandonment; the Hexthorpe route went early, for example, bec-
ause of the concurrent need to rebuild the railway bridge and the Balby route
lasted late because much of its track had been attended to in the early
1920s.
Relaying of the tracks was of course a technically feasible option. It
was not taken up for a variety of reasons. Underlying them all was the fact
that the capital cost of new tramway construction was at an historically
high level in the 1920s, far higher than it had been when the lines were
first laid down. One obvious corollary of this was that lines which were
not commercially viable at the old costs would never be so at the new. Cer-
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tamn lines, such as those to Avenue Road or the Racecourse, were probably
always loss-makers, even in terms of the revenue account; there was and
never had been a surplus available to meet even the pre-war capital costs on
these lines, and post-war costs could certainly never have been covered.
One way of making these short urban routes pay might have been to extend
them to the new housing estates further out of town. Again, however, the
capital costs of doing so were so great that even the increased traffic
gained would almost certainly not have compensated for the increased expend-
iture.
It was this combination, of a loss-making tramway which stopped short
of new housing development, which provided the justification for the third
policy decision, the replacement of the Avenue Road trams by motor buses.
Later trolleybus routings, notably along Carr House Lane, in New Bentley and
beyond Beckett Road terminus, showed the need for expanded services else-
where too.
Adding to fears that the revenue on even modernised and extended tram
routes would not be enough to meet loan costs was the fact that receipts
were already, or were feared to be vulnerable to private motor bus incursion.
This appears to have worried the tramways' management more than any other
matter in this period. However it has been shown that such competition was
not really a serious threat to the tramways in the early 1920s and that the
fall in revenue which was experienced then was much more related to indust-
rial troubles, especially in the coal industry. Even when competition did
get more severe in the mid-1920s, the tramways proved surprisingly resilient,
with the introduction of weekly passes being a particularly effective weapon
in the battle to retain passengers. The series of decisions taken in the
mid-1920s about the trams' future were not therefore taken because of com-
petitive pressures, or not greatly so. Insofar as this was a factor, it was
more a question of fearing what might happen, rather than reacting to what
actually did occur.
Three caveats must be entered to this conclusion though. First, even
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though revenue was relatively buoyant, receipts would obviously have been
higher without competition and might, in such a case, have been sufficient
to encourage investment in tramway renewal. Second, by the early 1930s bus
competition was severely affecting the rump of the tram routes, to Brods-
worth and Warmsworth, and the whole system would probably have suffered, if
not so badly as these out-of-town routes (though the 1930 Road Traffic Act
would have accorded some relief). Third, the weapon used to beat competit-
ion was reduced fares. This merely accentuated the trams' reliance on low
fares, already noticed in connection with workers' tickets before World War
I, bringing to prominence the obvious difficulty of reconciling a high cost
transport mode with low fares.
None of the above would have mattered if the choice in 1923 had been
the same as in 1903; between public transport using trams and no public
transport at all, bar horse-drawn vehicles. Even in 1903 motor buses were
just about a viable alternative, though very few towns were yet prepared to
risk them, but by 1923 both these and trolleybuses were proven transport
modes. After experimenting with an urban motor bus service from 1925 the
management decided, for the reasons discussed above, that trolleybuses would
be their preference for tramway replacement. This provided a solution to
most of the problems affecting the tramways. Trolleybuses needed no track,
which meant that worn-out or badly-placed lines did not need to be renewed
or relocated. As a consequence, trolleybuses were much less capital inten-
sive than trams were, which diminished the problem of loan debt, meant that
they would be much more likely to pay than a modernised tramway, and made
necessary extensions far more viable.
The commercial viability of the trolleybus was not only due to lower
capital costs, but to an ability to earn more at lower running costs than
trams. Obviously, that left a larger surplus to meet the already reduced
loan debt. But it also meant that trolleybuses would withstand a fares' war
better than trams could and were far more competitive with low-cost pirate
or company buses. In addition, trolleybuses had a proven ability to attract
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passengers through their comfort, speed and silent, fume-free progress,
which meant that as motorbus competition became more severe, the municipal
undertaking was able to fight back more effectively than if it had retained
its trams. The trolleybus was, in short, the answer to a hard-pressed man-
ager's economic problems.
To sum up, Doncaster's tramway undertaking took a decade from its
inception in 1903 to become financially self-sufficient. Once it did so, a
successful period of expansion followed, not greatly dampened by the effects
of World War I. In post-war conditions, however, planned extensions were
shelved and severe difficulties were caused to the existing tram system by
industrial decline in the area and private motorbus competition. The trams
rallied from both these problems however, but the question of replacing them
still became acute relatively early because of the condition of the tracks
and of the need to improve the road surfaces. Capital costs by that time
were at a level which made relaying a scarcely viable proposition, particul-
arly as several routes did not pay and/or needed extending. Thus a trackless
alternative was decided upon, the early preference being for trolleybuses
with their attendant advantages over both trams and motor buses. Tramways,
as opposed to trolleybuses, cost too much to lay and too much to run, whilst
they also earned too little. If municipal transport was to survive in the
area, it needed to remain attractive to passengers and commercially viable.
For an undertaking serving a dispersed population around a relatively small
town, the combination of motor buses and trolleybuses made far more economic
sense than even a modernised tramway. By 1926 all the arguments had been
rehearsed and the key decisions taken, so when the last tram ran in 1935 it
was already an anachronism in the town's transport system. Fifty odd years
later publicly-owned buses still operate from Leicester Avenue garage; had
the wrong decisions been taken in the inter-war years there might have been
none left to do so.
PART IV
SHEFFIELD CORPORATION TRAMWAYS
THE CITY TRAMWAY
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CHAPTER 13
INTRODUCTORY AND FINANCIAL
Introduction 
The history of Sheffield tramways has been fully dealt with in two pub-
lished works, one concerned with trams alone 1 and the other with the buses
also. 2 No attempt is made here to cover the same ground.
3
 Three things are
broadly lacking in both these books. First, there is no detailed treatment
of finances. Second, neither author attempts any reasoned analysis of the
reasons for the trams' removal in the 1950s nor of why this did not happen
in the 1930s. Third, the usual convention for tramway histories encourages
an author to describe 'his' system in isolation, but since cities similar to
Sheffield were following different policies in the 1930s, an element of com-
parison is desirable, the main example taken being Manchester.
4
Once the Sheffield tramways were municipalised, they were extremely
successful. In 1878-9 the former private horse trams had carried 4,633,010
passengers for revenue of £34,967; 5 in the first seven months of mixed elec-
tric/horse service by the Corporation in 1899-1900 the respective totals
were 7,715,314 and £30,105, whilst by 1913-14 they exceeded 104 million and
£386,000. 6
1. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways.	 2. Hall, Sheffield Transport.
3. For a table of dates and events, see Appendix Si.
4. For Manchester dates and events, see Appendix S2.
5. Tramway Returns, 1878-9.
6. See Appendix S3, columns (5) and (6).
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Sheffield's tramway system seems to have been less affected than most
by World War I and there is no evidence of an acute decline in standards
similar to, say, Liverpool's. Progress continued in the inter-war years,
though the really spectacular growth was now on the motor bus side. ' Early
in World War II the blitz caused severe interruption to services and the
loss of some trams, but these were later replaced. 2 Record traffic3 meant
that secondhand trams from Bradford 4
 and Newcastle5 had to be pressed into
service. A further thirty-six new trams were added after the war, 6 but clos-
ure was recommended in 1951 7
 and was achieved by 1960. 8
This closure decision was, in comparison with other undertakings,
taken at a very late date. The total number of British electric tramways
was 152. Of these 77 per cent or 117 had already closed by 1940 9 and sev-
eral more had already abandonned large parts of their systems. 10
 In that
year Sheffield's tramways were largely intact and there was no plan to re-
place them. Local policy thus appeared to be going against the national
trend, even despite the fact that all other South Yorkshire tramways had
also closed by then, with one exception. The Barnsley, Dearne District,
Doncaster and Mexborough trams were all replaced between 1929 and 1935, 11
 and
so were most of Rotherham's except for the joint service with Sheffield;
this was kept only because the latter would not agree to a trolleybus ser-
vice.12 So Sheffield's isolation in transport terms prompts the question,
'Why did Sheffield not abandon or decide to abandon its trams in the 1930s,
as most small and many larger operators had already done?'.
Sheffield was not alone in its pro-tram policy though. At least six
other towns continued to improve their tramways up until after World War II,
1. See below, 327ff.2. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 79-81.
3. See Appendix S3, column (5).	 4. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 83.
5. Ibid., 81.	 6. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 299-300.
7. Ibid., 261.	 8. Ibid., 268.
9. Calculated from data in Appendix G5.
	
10. See above, 52.
11. Dates in Appendix G5.	 12. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 67.
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either by putting new cars into service or by building new extensions. These
were Aberdeen, Blackpool, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds and Sunderland. A few
other towns, such as Dundee, put their tramways back into pre-war order
and showed no signs of abandonCrt.3 them, although no new investment was
made. However another former tramway stronghold, Liverpool, had already
announced a closure programme in 1945, and it was not long before all the
others named, except for Blackpool, had made similar decisions. 	 So the
second major question relating to the experience which Sheffield shared with
other post-war tramway survivors is, 'Why was transport policy changed in
post-war conditions? What had made an undertaking worth investing in up to
the early 1950s something thereafter to be disposed of as quickly as poss-
ible?'.
The basic difference between those towns and cities which retained
trams and those which replaced them was the ability to choose. In a major-
ity of cases there was really no rational choice once the trams began to
wear out and there were alternatives available in the form of motor or
trolleybuses. In the worst examples like the Dearne District this was bec-
ause the trams were losing money at an insupportable rate and any alternat-
ive which offered lower operating costs and even a possible profit was pref-
erable. In other cases like Doncaster's the trams might earn a profit in
good years, but only on the basis of old and relatively cheap capital assets.
Once renewal of a major part of the track or fleet was faced, it became
clear that there was little prospect of earning enough to pay for this; the
equation was tilted even more strongly towards tramway closure when it was
realised that buses were not only cheaper to buy but could earn more than
trams. It was really only a relatively few tramway operators whose finances
allowed any reasonable latitude of choice.
Conversion to motor bus or trolleybus was itself expensive, of course,
and a number of operators found ways of avoiding this. Some, like the Dearne
District, sold out to or co-operated with rival bus operators. Others found
1. Joyce, Tramway Twilight, 33, 45, 54-5 and 65.
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cheaper ways of continuing with tram services by buying equipment second-
hand; the best pre-war example is the Llandudno and Colwyn Bay Electric
Railway, which bought fifteen cars in the 1930s and managed to keep them
running until 1956.
1
 Quite a lot of cars changed hands after World War II 2
and the practice is still common abroad; the Innsbruck tramways, for example,
have run for years almost exclusively on secondhand purchases.
3
 Usually,
however, this was not a long-term option, particularly for major cities.4
Before World War II, however, Sheffield had the financial freedom to
make its own choices about the future of its tramways, for the reasons given
below:
1. the tramways covered all costs and earned a surplus;
2. that surplus was sufficient to finance necessary new investment and
without recourse to the secondhand market;
3. the required investment was limited because it was never necessary
to replace all or most of the capital assets at once; and
4. largely because of this last fact, tramway retention and motorbus
conversion were not very far apart in terms of capital cost, which allowed
other advantages of tramways, such as lower running costs, their due weight.
The Profitability of the Tramways 
Reference to Appendix S3 and particularly to columns (12) and (16) to
(19) shows that between 1919-20 and 1939-40 Sheffield Corporation Tramways
were always in profit. The operating ratio was invariably positive, indic-
ating that working costs were easily covered leaving an adequate margin for
meeting other obligations, notably Income Tax and Debt Payments and, from
the net balance remaining, amounts for Rate Relief and Renewals. Table 40
1. Edward Marshall, 'The Llandudno and Colwyn Bay Electric Railway',
lecture given to the Sheffield Light Rail Transit Association, 16 Jan 1978.
2. Joyce, Tramway Twilight, 106-11 (Appendix IV).
3. Rricharcg J. Buckley, Tramways and Light Railways of Switzerland 
and Austria, ed. by W. J. Wyse (Milton Keynes, 1984), 99.
4. Though Leeds bought a lot; see the source cited in note (2) above.
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shows how this contrasted with Doncaster and the DDLR.
TABLE 40
COMPARISON OF TRAFFIC REVENUE AND WORKING COSTS ON THE SHEFFIELD,
DONCASTER AND DEARNE DISTRICT TRAMWAYS FOR SELECTED YEARS
FROM 1919-20 TO 1935-6 IN PENCE PER MILE
Year
Traffic Revenue Working Expenditure Operating	 Ratio
Sheff.
d.
Donc.
d.
DDLR
d.
Sheff.
d.
Donc.
d.
DDLR
d.
Sheff.
%
Donc.
%
DDLR
%
1919-20 19.27 20.72 - 15.84 19.58 - 82.07 94.04 -
1920-1 21.94 22.60 - 17.98 21.15 - 81.86 92.04 -
1921-2 21.76 23.70 - 16.85 20.70 - 77.33 86.50
1922-3 20.49 21.65 - 15.46 17.70 - 75.33 80.10 -
1927-8 17.60 18.57 11.62 13.51 13.96 10.65 76.66 73.79 88.45
1928-9 17.17 16.65 11.16 13.09 14.34 10.79 76.25 84.03 96.65
1929-30 17.16 16.83 10.88 13.12 12.98 10.49 76.35 75.21 96.38
1930-1 16.02 15.53 9.48 12.43 11.78 10.08 77.48 72.90 102.60
1931-2 15.35 15.35 8.87 11.77 13.34 9.85 76.54 81.40 107.13
1932-3 14.86 13.39 7.92 11.18 14.30 9.41 75.25 92.73 114.21
1933-4 15.29 11.91 7.59 11.66 11.38 8.91 76.24 83.01 111.58
1934-5 14.76 11.07 - 11.46 10.35 - 77.63 82.61 -
1935-6 14.62 9.83 - 11.60 13.36 - 79.38 135.79 -
,
SOURCES:
Sheffield: Annual Reports, Statistical Information (most figures
reduced from three to two places of decimals).
Doncaster: Doncaster Statistics 1919-20--1922-3; Tramway Returns
1927-8--1935-6.
DDLR: Tramway Returns, 1927-8--1933-4.
The DDLR was the cheapest of the three tramways to run. Reasons for
this would include new equipment, light service and, latterly, reduction in
maintenance as closure loomed. But revenue was also low, sometimes no more
than 50 per cent of Sheffield's and often inadequate to meet working costs.
As the DDLR's early critics had said, a high cost transport mode like a
tramway needed a heavy traffic in order to make it pay, and this the DDLR
lacked. In its best year (not in Table 40), 1924-5, the DDLR carried 5.389
passengers per car mile as against Sheffield's 14.147. And even though
1. Calculated from Tramway Returns (Appendix D4).
2. Appendix S3, column (9).
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Sheffield's fares were much lower at 1.353d. per passenger 1
 as against
2.18d. on the DDLR,
2
 earnings on the former were still higher, which meant
that the larger system could cover its working costs and the smaller could
not.
The comparison with Doncaster presents a more mixed impression, with
the tramways there sometimes able to earn more than Sheffield's per mile and
less frequently to run at a lesser cost. Except at the turn of the decade,
however, the operating ratio was worse. Passengers per car mile in Doncas-
ter--10.7 in 1922-33 for instance--still fell short of Sheffield's 13.948 in
that same year.
4
 So to achieve reasonably high earnings, Doncaster had to
charge higher fares, an average of 2.02d. 5 as against 1.496d. 6
Whereas the problem for the DDLR was one of inadequate revenue, for
Doncaster it was more one of failure to keep working costs low enough.
Sheffield's usual ability to achieve better results was probably due to
economies of scale. Traffic in Doncaster was such that it could not run its
cars intensively enough to maximise use of assets; track and cars still
needed repairing, men had to be employed, but the expense could not be
spread sufficiently to bring average costs down as far as desirable. So the
miles run per car per annum in Doncaster and Sheffield in 1927-8, as one
example, were respectively 20,891 and 30,375. 7
For a tramway to be profitable, the operating surplus had to be large
enough to meet capital charges. The DDLR, of course, could never do this,
whereas Doncaster managed to do so sometimes but not always. 9 The 'big
city' had an advantage here too, for capital costs could also be spread over
a higher mileage to produce a reduced charge. In 1921-2, for example, ShefiZeLk
1. Ibid., column (8).	 2. Tramway Returns, 1924-5 (Appendix D4).
3. Doncaster Statistics, 1922-3.	 4. Appendix S3, column (9).
5. Doncaster Statistics, 1922-3.	 6. Appendix S3, column (8).
7. Calculated from Tramway Returns, 1927-8; of course Doncaster was
over-provided with cars, having bought ten for unbuilt extensions.
8. See Table 12 above,89 . 	 9. Appendix DN1.
8
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nAa1242,5112.32d. per car mile to service its debt
1
 whilst Doncaster had to
find 3.60d. 2 The latter 's ability to earn more per car mile sometimes was
not of much value, because the undertaking normally had to pay higher work-
ing and capital costs than Sheffield, 3 the result being occasional deficits
before and regular ones after 1927-8, when the closure programme began to
affect revenue. 4
The prosperity of Sheffield's tramways was not achieved through high
fares either. Apart from brief flirtations with higher fares for longer
distances, the principal of a standard City to terminus maximum fare was
kept throughout. It was id. up to 1919, 2d. from then until 1923 (but with
3d. returns) and lid. from 1930. 5 This last reduction led to a marked fall
in revenue, but there was still a surplus of £6,394 in 1930-1 6 after meeting
all charges even with 'the cheapest through fare known ,7 It was a close-run
thing, though, since the trade depression was seriously affecting both tram
and bus revenues; the following year's report said that 'Any Route Extension
or Fare Adjustments will require most careful consideration, as the balance
on the two services has been reduced to a minimum'.
8
By contrast, in 1920 Doncaster's fares ranged from 11d. to 5d. giving,
for example, 2.17 miles for 2d.; 9 for the same amount the Sheffield travel-
ler could go to the terminus, an average distance of 3.125 miles but a
maximum of just over five. 10
1. Calculated from debt payments and mileage given in the Statistical
Information published with the Annual Report (hereafter, Sheffield Statis-
tics), 1921-2. Full reference to Annual Reports in note 7 below.
2. Doncaster Statistics, 1921-2.	 3. See Table 40 above.
4. See Appendix DN1.
5. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 178-9; numerous other concessions, such
as the usual stages fares and central zone fares, are detailed here.
6. Appendix S3, columns (6) and (20).
7. Sheffield Corporation Tramways (for later title changes, see Appen-
dix S4), Report and Statement of Accounts for the Year Ended 31st March (25th
March prior to 1920-1) (hereafter, Sheffield Reports), 1930-1,
8. Ibid., 1931-2,	 .	 9. Doncaster Statistics, 1920-1.
10. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 178.
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To some extent the one followed from the other. Sheffield's low fares
meant high traffic, high traffic permitted low fares, whereas Doncaster was
unable to afford low fares. But the same demand was not there anyway, bec-
ause Doncaster had had to build an uneconomic length of tramway in order to
serve a low density population. In 1921-2 there was a mile of route to
2,907 people there, ' whereas in Sheffield it was a mile to 12,482.
2
 Shef-
fielders used the trams more too, 282 times per head per annum
3
 as opposed
to 106.
4
 This may partly have been because Doncaster faced more severe
motor bus competition, 5 but also because city dwellers use public transport
more because residential and shopping/work areas tend to be a very long way
apart.
6
 By contrast around 1920 in Doncaster 'It was the exception rather
than the rule to travel long distances to work. With very few cars, most
workmen walked or cycled and usually came home for their dinners in the
middle of the day'.
7
Sheffield's tramways were thus in the happy position of having a heavy
traffic, relatively high earnings and relatively low working and capital
costs per mile and low fares; almost the ideal package from both the supp-
lier's and customer's point of view. Because Sheffield tramways made an
operating profit, the interest and sinking funds on loans taken out for
their construction were easily payable, leaving a substantial net balance.
8
Therewasa small outstanding debt on the Petre Street route, closed in 1925,
but this was the only time this happened. 9 By contrast, the DDLR debt had
to be paid off almost entirely from the rates and from a share in YTC motor
1. Calculated from figures in Doncaster Statistics, 1921-2.
2. Ibid., Sheffield Statistics, 1921-2. 	 3. Appendix S3, column (13).
4. Doncaster Statistics, 1921-2.	 5. See Ch. 15 for Sheffield buses.
6. This would have been increasingly so as the concept of zoning was
introduced into town planning; see opening section of Ch. 14 below.
7. W. M. Renshaw, An Ordinary Life: memories of a Balby Childhood 
(Doncaster, 1984), Ch. 31, first page (no pagination).
8. See Appendix S3, columns (16) and (17).
9. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 48.
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bus profits ' and when the Doncaster tramways were being closed £58,200 had
to be contributed from the rates towards liquidating the debt. 2 Sheffield
was able to pay large sums into the rate fund in most years, to a grand
total of £585,731 when payments ceased in 1927-8; 3 this was due not to any
financial crisis but to a change of political control on the Council. 4
Additionally, up to 1929-30 when this charge too was rescinded, the tramways
had paid £292,475 towards servicing the debt on street improvements. 5 From
all points of view, then, Sheffield Corporation Tramways were a financially
viable undertaking during the inter-war years.
Financing New Investment 
Investment designed to replace life-expired assets or to buy additional
ones came from three basic sources as displayed in Appendix S5. The first
was the Renewals Fund, payments into which are shown in Appendix S3, column
(19) and which usually came more-or-less directly from the surplus earned in
any one particular year. The second source was capital, raised by new loans.
From an early date the policy was to reduce reliance on loans, especially on
the motor bus side 6 (not shown in Appendices), though from 1933-4 loans more
or less disappear as a source of tramway expenditure too; right up until
then, however, they were the most important way in which new trams were fin-
anced. Partly to replace this source, towards the end of the period the
accumulated reserves of the tramways were drawn upon to pay for renewals and
replacements. This is really the only item which did not come from current
earnings, for of course the capital had to be serviced from revenue, as
shown in Appendix S3, column (16). A relatively small amount did come from
the Unemployment Grants Committee; 7 the total provided for 'construction of
1. See Part II above, passim.
2. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Net Revenue a/cs, 1931-2--1935-6.
3. Appendix S3, column (18).	 4. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 49-50,
5. Sheffield Reports, 1929-30, 2.	 6. For example, ibid., 1924-5, 2.
7. A government unemployment relief scheme.
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tracks etc' was only £75,803 in the period 1921-2--1938-9, 1 barely a year's
capital and renewal expenditure and thus not likely to have influenced
policy between trams and buses. Appendix S5 may not include absolutely all
funds spent on track, overhead and cars, but certainly covers most; it does
not include items such as buildings, because the capital accounts do not
distinguish between, say, bus garages and tram depots. In the inter-war
years from 1919-20--1938-9 Appendix S5 shows that a total of £2,346,550 was
spent on tram track, overhead and cars, in the percentages of 58.98, 1.33
and 39.69. The sources of finance were the renewals fund (52.1 per cent),
loan capital (39.84 per cent) and other, largely reserves (8.01 per cent).
Over half the expenditure came direct from revenue via transfers to the
renewals fund, 2 about 40 per cent was deferred as a burden on later earnings
through service of debt, and a small percentage came from savings. As
already noted above, it was possible to finance all this expenditure from
revenue throughout the period.
Taking a typical year, 1923-4, track expenditure included new extensions
like that from Owlerton to Parson Cross, and also widespread relaying and
track doubling, seven completed schemes being mentioned; in addition four
and a half miles of overhead wire were renewed and two automatic points and
one trolley reverser installed. 3 Virtually all the track and overhead must
have been replaced at least once in the inter-war period, quite apart from
normal repairs. On the fleet side, older cars were brought up to modern
standards, especially by fully-enclosing the upper decks 4 and later by fit-
ting upholstered seats. 5 The main expenditure was on new cars, a total of
432 being built between 1919 and 1939, the earlier ones usually by outside
builders but latterly from Queens Road Works. All these cars were, of
1. Sheffield Reports, passim.
2. Not much of this fund was usually carried over from year to year;
it was more of a 'rolling fund' topped up annually to cover planned needs.
3. Sheffield Reports, 1923-4, 3; 'Parson Cross' was more usually known
later on as Wadsley Bridge, being some way short of the Parson Cross estate.
4. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 56.	 5. Ibid., 63 and 66.
302
course, fully-enclosed from the start and were basically of three types, the
Standard 1919-27 Class, the Standard 1928-35 Class and the Improved Standard.
Mechanical improvements included better trucks of the Peckham P22 type--on
all cars
1
 --and more powerful motors, of 40 h.p. on the earliest class and of
50 h.p. on the later cars. The first series still had wooden seating, in-
cluding the traditional two longitudinal benches along the lower saloon.
But on the later classes, which had more modern straight-sided bodies, most
of the lower deck seats could face the direction of travel and all seats
were upholstered on both decks. The Improved Standards were not greatly
different from earlier models except for a more modern semi-streamlined body
style.
2
 In 1935 a brighter blue and cream livery was introduced.
3
 By 1938-9,
when the final cars were being built, it was expected that the last pre-1918
cars could be withdrawn, leaving none over twenty years old; no more would
have been needed until 1944,
4
 in line with the policy that trams should be
5
replaced after twenty-five years service.
Appendix S6 contrasts the amounts spent on renewals in Sheffield and
Doncaster whilst the latter's tramways were still an on-going concern. Don-
caster was unable to build up a large reserve owing to small margins or out-
right losses; the only other major items not in the appendix met later from
this fund were £5,000 towards track reconstruction in 1925-6 and, later,
the costs of lifting tracks and part of the loan debt.
6
 So in contrast with
Sheffield, a much larger proportion of any renewals had to come from new
loans, which were a long term burden on the undertaking. Because of its
lack of 'disposable income', Doncaster spent far less pro rata on track
(20.76 per cent of Sheffield's expenditure) and cars (72.29 per cent) in the
period covered by Apendix S6; the percentage for new cars is distorted by
1. Bogie trucks were never used; see Hall, Sheffield Transport, 131.
2. Fleet details from text/pictures in Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 150-2.
3. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 205. 	 4. Ibid., 207-8.
5. Bett and Gilham, SY&H Tramways, 7-8.
6. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Reserve Fund, 1925-6 and 1928-9ff.
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the purchase of ten in 1919-20, a quarter of the existing fleet. These facts
support the conclusion in Part III that one major cause of Doncaster's prob-
lems was poor track; not only had it been badly built, but far too little
was spent on maintenance too. Some allowance has to be made for the fact
that Doncaster's lines were less intensively used, but in practice tracks
seem to have needed attention at approximately similar intervals. A major
section of Sheffield's original track, for example, was replaced in 1909, a
decade after its construction. 1 Then Doncaster's Bentley line was giving
trouble in 1912,2 also a decade after being laid. Where the fleets were
concerned, by 31 Mar 1927 535 trams (including works cars) had entered the
Sheffield fleet, of which ninety-eight had been sold or scrapped. All the
older cars had been top-covered, sometimes retaining open ends, but new
all-enclosed cars were rapidly replacing these. 3 In Doncaster by 1927 just
three of the forty-eight trams had been scrapped, seven (about 15 per cent)
were still open-topped and none were fully-enclosed. 4
City tramways, unlike smaller ones, thus had the earning power to fin-
ance the renewal of their capital assets and to keep the track and fleet in
good condition and up to contemporary technical and 'passenger appeal' stan-
dards.
Continuous Improvement 
It was not always possible to keep up these ideal standards; Sheffield
had, for example, major arrears of maintenance to make up after World War I 5
and by the mid-1930s the 1928 Standard trams were a little dated. 6 But gen-
erally the tramways were kept in good order. There was thus never a need
to do more than continue a process of planned replacement and improvement.
1. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 120-1; this refers to city centre tracks
from High Street to the Moor.
2. See above ,259	 3. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 161-2.
4. See Appendix DN2.
	 5. Sheffield Reports, 1919-20, IV.
6. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 205.
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Neither the DDLR, which was new, nor Doncaster, which did have some newish
cars and tracks, is a particularly good example of the opposite trap into
which so many small tramways fell whereby the original track and rolling
stock was retained unaltered until the question of replacement became acute.
Then the management was faced not with the necessity of acquiring a few new
cars, but of replacing the whole lot at once. For instance, the small Kil-
marnock system had fourteen trams dating from 1904-5. Admittedly the two
latest came with early top covers, but apart from the necessity for major
repairs to the original eleven cars from 1913, the only obvious later alter-
ation made was the fitting of windscreens to just one car. 1
 When recon-
struction of the tramways was considered in 1923 the cost would have been
£70,000, of trolleybuses £12,340 and of motor buses £12,000. 2
 But not all
small tramways remained as firmly stuck in the past. Burton-on-Trent and
Chesterfield Corporation Tramways, started respectively in 1903 and 1904,
each bought some balcony cars later and fitted top covers to others, 3
 rather
like Doncaster did. Even so, such cars were very dated by the time Sheffield
was introducing its fully-enclosed and upholstered cars by the end of the
1920s.
Turning to South Yorkshire, of the six tramways existing up to 1929,
only four had any post-war cars at all. The DDLR was a special case with
30 and Sheffield had a large number, but Barnsley had none, Doncaster 10 out
of 47, Mexborough and Swinton none and Rotherham only 4 out of 68. Exclud-
ing the DDLR, the four other smaller systems had just 14 newish cars, all
built in 1920 4 when standards were not far advanced over pre-1914 designs;
that is, out of 147 cars barely 10 per cent were built after the war.
5Whereas by 1929 Sheffield had 201 cars built since 1919, or nearly 50 per
1. Brotchie and Grieves, Kilmarnock's Trams, 31-3.	 2. Ibid., 24.
3. W[Ingate] H. Bett and Jrohn] C. Gilham, The Tramways of the North 
Midlands, ed. J. H. Price (n.d.), 26.
4. Bett and Gilham, SY&H Tramways, 40-4.
5. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 150 and Hall, Sheffield Transport, 297-8.
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cent of the 4161 service cars.
A further example is a small tramway like that of Chester. By 1921 of
its eighteen cars, twelve were said to need immediate replacement and five
heavily reconditioning; 2 that is, two thirds of the fleet really needed re-
placing in one year and the remainder expensively repairing. It was no won-
der that almost all small tramways took the alternative of abandoni.k9 their
trams to their own or another operator's buses. Sheffield was never faced
TABLE 41
SHEFFIELD TRAMWAYS CAR BUILDING PROGRAMME 1919-1939
Year Cars Built Newa
	Percentage of Fleet b
1919 25 6.13
1920 27 6.62
1921 24 5.88
1922 2 0.49
1923 - -
1924 9 2.21
1925 16 3.92
'	 1926 40 9.80
1927 11 2.70
1928 9 2.21
1929 37 9.07
1930 25 6.13
1931 20 4.90
1932 30 7.35
1933 24 5.88
1934 31 7.60
1935 29 7.11
1936 27 6.62
1937 22 5.39
1938 20 4.90
1939 4 0.98
Total 432
Average p.a. 20.57
SOURCES:
a. Hall, Sheffield Tramways, 296-9
b. Average inter-war fleet 408, calculated
from data in Appendix S3, column (3)
1. See Appendix S3, column (3).
2. W. D. Clark and H. G. Dibdin, Trams and Buses of the City of 
Chester (Rochdale, 1979), 28.
307
with such a difficulty during the inter-war years, due to good housekeeping
and prudent anticipation. Table 41 above shows that 432 new trams were
built between 1919 and 1939, an average of 20.57 per annum. Such a number
in any one year would have been almost impossible for a small tramway to
finance and the only undertaking which did something like it was Falkirk.
Here motor bus competition was reducing traffic in the 1920s, and worn out
trams on dilapidated track were no match. However in 1920 the line came
into the ownership of the Fife Tramway, Light and Power Company, under whose
auspices the whole circular route (excluding an unprofitable branch) was re-
built in the period 1921-9. Fourteen new 'Pullman' single deck trams were
put into service in 1929-31, fully upholstered, completely enclosed, and
capable of 35 miles per hour; all the old double deckers were scrapped. The
new trams cost £1,900 each, so the total for these alone was £26,000, a not
inconsiderable sum. Incidentally, five ex-DDLR cars were purchased and re-
built for Falkirk in 1933. The management's faith in trams seemed justified
as traffic rose each year, but in 1935 the Scottish Motor Traction group
bought the company out and closed the tramway the following year.' It is
impossible to know what long-term future such a modernised small system
might have had, but one may assume the owning company would not have invested
so much capital without reasonable hope of return. So maybe in favourable
circumstances--in this case particularly the fact that the tramway company
also controlled most of the local buses during much of the period 2--a small
tramway could succeed; but most did not try.
Returning to Sheffield, Table 41 shows that twenty new cars per annum
was a relatively small matter for a major tramway. In no year was more than
10 per cent of the fleet replaced, and usually much less. Although not so
easy to calculate, the track and overhead renewals would have been averaged
out in the same way, to produce a programme that could be financed on a year
1. Brotchie, Falkirk, 25-32, passim.
2. Ibid., 21-30, passim; the Falkirk case is a very interesting one
about the financial and competitive details of which one would like to know
more.
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on year basis. Most small municipal tramways, which usually had opportunity
to build up only a small reserve fund if any, could not cope with virtual
100 per cent renewal of assets.
The Cost of Replacing Trams 
It is not known if anyone explicitly calculated the costs of tramway
replacement for Sheffield around 1930; it is more likely that it was implic-
itly assumed that keeping trams would be cheaper than all-out motor bus sub-
stitution. But the ability to spread renewal over a number of years was the
key to such an assumption. At 31 Mar 1927 there were 421 trams in service,
whose seating capacity was as listed in Table 42 below. Double-deck motor
TABLE 42
SHEFFIELD TRAMWAYS CAR SEATING CAPACITY 31 MAR 1927
Number of Carsa	Seats per Car b Total
69 51 3,519
52 58 3,016
18 51 918
21 72 1,512
13 56 728
6 56 336
73 62 4,526
4 58 232
2 62 124
9 62 558
79 76 6,004
75 68 5,100
Totals 421 26,573
SOURCES:
a. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 162.
b. Ibid., 140-50.
of standard size then only seated about fifty, although seventy plus could
be achieved with a six-wheel chassis, 1 but except for trolleybuses the des-
ign did not prove permanently popular with operators. 2 The leader in the
1. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 128.
2. Humpidge, 'Development of the P.S.V.', 4; the design was necessary
because of Ministry restrictions on axle-weights, but maintenance was costly.
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field at this period was the Leyland Titan TD1 which, when redesigned with
an enclosed rear staircase, seated only forty-eight; since this was the bus
Sheffield was buying at the time
1
 it makes the obvious comparison with the
tram fleet. To obtain an equivalent seating capacity, 554 buses would have
been needed. In 1930 the YTC at Barnsley was also buying Titans
2
 which cost
them £1,608 each. 3 Thus Sheffield's notional total requirement for tramway
replacement would have cost £890,832. Further complexity is introduced by
the fact that motor buses at this date did not have a very long life; Shef-
field's 1928 batch of Titans were going by 1935 and its 1929 'closed back'
sisters by 1937. 4 Manchester assumed a bus life of six and a half years,
5
 so
seven years seems a good average. Thus, if one assumes a tram replacement
programme beginning in 1930 and ending in 1939, over that decade about 55
buses would have been needed annually. In 1937-9, though, replacements
would also have been needed for those bought in 1930-2, a further 165 buses
at a cost of £265,320. One could then go further to allow for the fact that
no new trams were thought necessary after 1939 until 1944, 6
 which would mean
allowing for another four years' replacement of older buses at £353,760. On
the other hand, four more years' expenditure on tram track etc. would also
have to be allowed for, so it is probably best to leave the calculation as
it is. The same goes for the fact that as the decade passed buses got larger
with more seats, 7 so less than 554 vehicles would actually have been needed
for tram replacement; however, in envisaging a conversion programme in 1930,
one has to take the then-ruling size and capacity of buses. So adding
£265,320 to the original total makes £1,156,152 for buses. Pilcher estim-
1. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 224.
2. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 37.
3. YTC, Table with Letter to R. W. Birch (the Manager), 27 Oct 1944.
4. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 227.
5. Filcher, Road Passenger Transport, 118. 	 6. See above, 302
7. Humpidge, 'Development of the P.S.V.', 4; increased weight limits
allowed fifty-six seats on two axles from the mid-1930s.
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ated that garage accommodation would cost about £150--200 per bus. '
 Tram
depots could sometimes be converted, but were not usually ideal. In Shef-
field' post-war conversion, Shoreham Street was re-used, with room for 110
vehicles, but no other tram depots were converted. 2
 So that would, in this
notional scheme, leave 444 buses to be housed at a minimum of £150 each, a
total of £66,000, raising the whole capital cost for bus replacement to
£1,222,752.
The policy actually followed of retaining the trams involved building
279 new cars between 1928 and 1939. 3
 Twenty-five ordered from a firm in
Sunderland in 1929 cost £1,190 apiece, 4
 but that was deliberately pitched
low to attract orders to the depressed north-east and the firm went bank-
rupt.
5
 Thus the next lowest tender at £1,5906
 was probably a fairer indic-
ation of the current price of trams. 279 cars at £1,590 is £443,610. Actual
expenditure on cars from 1928 to 1939 was £527,470; 7
 the higher figure will
reflect the fact that new trams were costing £2,200 by 1939. 8
 Taking one's
standpoint at the beginning of the period, however, one must once again take
the lower figure. Finally, to obtain the total cost of retaining the trams,
actual expenditure on track and overhead between 1928 and 1939 has to be
added, that is, £690,873. 9
 This makes a grand total of £1,134,483.
Granted, various relatively small items of tramway expenditure are not
included here--improvements to depots and workshops, for instance--but the
bus side is not complete either, in particular the cost of lifting disused
tram tracks is missing. But there seems little argument that, to anyone
1. Filcher, Road Transport Operation, 127.
2. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 323.
3. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 151-2.	 4. Ibid., 63.
5. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 202.
6. Gandy, Sheffield Transport, 63.	 7. Appendix S5.
8. S. T. D., The Tramway Era, 27.
9. Appendix S5; expenditure on track and overhead varied greatly from
year to year, so one cannot really form an estimate of costs in '1928 prices'.
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planning the wholesale conversion of Sheffield's tramways to motor buses
around 1930, there would be an appreciable capital advantage in keeping
trams; certainly it would be just as economical to keep the trams as it
would be to replace them, particularly as some renewals on the tramway side
would have been inescapable during the run-down period. The tram option was
only viable, though, because the system was efficient and well-maintained,
needing only routine repairs andreplacements; if, say, the whole tram fleet
had needed replacing in the 1930s the attractiveness of buses would have
become much greater. A further factor was the then-accepted dictum that
buses cost more to run than trams did. Even Pilcher, in his 1930 book, ad-
mitted that the cost per seat mile of running a fifty seat bus was more than
for a tram of equivalent size. 1 This was not so on a mileage basis, at least
not by 1938-9 when the relative Sheffield working costs were 10.81d. for
buses2 and 11.957d. for trams (costs per car mile),3 but the variance in cap-
acity made all the difference. Even as late as 1951, bus operating costs
were estimated to be in excess of those for an equivalent number of trams.
4
Other qualifications could be made, such as the fact that motor buses
were faster than trams and could do more work in a given time, though Pilcher
had to admit in 1930 that trams still had the advantage in capacity. 5 It
was also true that buses seemed to attract higher earnings than trams, even
though the case Filcher chose in 1930 largely related to trolleybuses not
motor buses; 6 in any case in Sheffield modern trams were being compared to
modern buses, not old trams with new buses, which was the usual case when a
conversion was being suggested. In conclusion, two points seem fairly clear
1. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 129.	 2. See Appendix S7.
3. See Appendix S3, column (11).
4. Sheffield Transport Department, 'Report of the General Manager on a
Scheme of Tramway Replacement', presented to the City Council, 4 Apr 1951;
filed with Council Minutes, 1950-1, after page 603 (separate pagination and
hereafter, Replacement Report), 5.
5. Filcher, Road Transport Operation, 9.
6. Ibid., 52; the fact that motor buses might have improved their per-
formance by the time Pilcher wrote his next book is irrelevant to this case.
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from the viewpoint of about 1927-30. First of all, the capital cost of re-
taining a well-maintained city tramway and of replacing it with motor buses
was pretty much the same, or even slightly to the advantage of the tram.
Second, in city service, motor bus running costs were in excess of the tram-
car's. Taken together, these facts make a powerful argument for the increm-
ental improvement of existing capital assets represented by tramways rather
than replacing them wholesale by motor buses; it is precisely this policy
which Sheffield followed.
Conclusion 
The evidence therefore supports the four points made at the opening of
this chapter. Sheffield Corporation Tramways earned a large surplus after
meeting both working and capital costs. This was partly because economies
of scale permitted these costs to be spread over a high mileage and thus to
be reduced on a car mileage basis as opposed to smaller systems. These good
results were not a result of high fares, for Sheffield's were exceptionally
low. Revenue, though not necessarily as much per car mile as elsewhere, was
always amply sufficient because of high potential and actual demand due to a
good ratio of population to length of tramway and to a high propensity to
travel. 'Profits' of about £750,000 were paid to the city in the form of
rate reliefs and contributions towards street improvements, and before the
tramways closed their debt was fully paid off. About £2.35 million was spent
in the period 1919-39 from renewals, loan capital and reserve funds on the
track, overhead and fleet. Yet further sums, not quantified above, were
spent on buildings and other items. Most of this money came from current or
past earnings and the relatively small proportion financed by new loans
could easily be financed from future income. It was thus possible to main-
tain the tramway at modern and efficient standards throughout the period.
In contrast, other towns like Doncaster could not afford new investment from
revenue or reserves, and any improvements had to be financed by loans, which
usually meant that very little work was done.
Finally, Sheffield's continuous programme of investment in its tramway
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meant that it was never necessary to replace a large part of the capital
assets at once, as it often was for smaller undertakings; as a result, these
usually tended to be closed rather than improved. The fact that a large sum
did not need to be spent on the tramways in a short period of years meant,
very importantly, that the capital cost of continuing to run trams was no
more or even a bit less than that of converting to motor buses; in addition,
the latter had higher running costs because relatively small buses were
being compared to high capacity trams, making the retention of tramways an
even sounder financial option. R. S. Pilcher should be allowed the last
word. He remained convinced, he said in 1930, that 'tramways still form an
essential part of the passenger transport in any large city , . 1
1. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 183.
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CHAPTER 14
OTHER REASONS FOR CONTINUED TRAMWAY DEVELOPMENT
Tramways and Town Planning 
Town planning is itself as old as towns themselves, but as a legislat-
ive concept in Britain is relatively new, one of the first major planning
laws being the Housing and Town Planning Act, 1909. 1 Electric trams and
planning thus grew up together and were to a certain extent seen as comple-
mentary. In 1914, for instance, Liverpool's City Engineer presented a paper
to the Tramways and Light Railways Association on 'Town Planning in relation
to Tramways, .2 His ideas included segregation of fast and slow traffic and,
a key objective of town planners, lower density housing; this could be
served by fast tramways built on reserved 'grass tracks', 3 which were later
built on a large scale in Liverpool where extensive suburban housing estates
were combined with nearly thirty miles of reserved track tramways 'built in'
to the schemes from the outset. 4 A contrary approach to solving the problem
of the overcrowded inner city was the garden city concept, but even there
the originator of the idea, Ebenezer Howard, saw a place for the tramway to
act as a link between the small settlements forming a larger city-scale
.	 5
unit; Letchworth was actually built with space for a segregated tramway,
1. J[Ohn] LFis3 Womersley, 'Urbanity Lost--and Regained', The Munic-
ipal Journal, no.3129, 3 Feb 1953, 247.
2. Horne and Maund, Liverpool Transport 2, 92.
	 3. Ibid., 90.
4. Joyce, Town Transport, 51.
5. Hamilton and Potter, Losing Track, 76.
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although the lines were never laid. ' There was therefore no necessary
conflict between town planning and the modern tramway.
One of the most well-known town planners before and just after World
War II was Patrick Abercrombie. 2 In 1924 he produced an outline plan for
Sheffield, and his generally positive attitude towards trams is instructive.
'Sheffield', he said, 'is exceedingly well equipped with Tram service in
so far as the population is at present situated: it requires, however,
the opening up of new areas and the use of the tram or bus as pioneer rather
than as camp follower'.
3
 He suggested a central tram station
4
 and suburban
extensions, the latter being related to a planning concept which has lasted
largely unscathed to the present day, that of zoning. The Victorian jumble
of works and terraces was to be sorted out by separating residential, busin-
ess, light industrial and heavy industrial land useage; 5 in the latter areas
some 500 acres of housing would eventually be eliminated. 6 Tramways could
assist this process of dispersion, especially because Sheffield was a comp-
act city, with areas of countryside close enough to need only fairly minor
road connections to provide access to work. Thus 'there will be no long and
wearisome tram rides through endless town streets, but quick transit along
grass tracks at the side of wide boulevards'. 7 The Manor housing estate,
already in the course of construction,8 could be served by a modern reserved
track tramway along Prince of Wales Road. 9
 This road was of post-war con-
struction and late in 1926 it was decided to seek powers for a tramway on
the existing central reservation; when it opened on 25 Feb 1928 a new cir-
cular tram service was started via Darnall and Intake to/from the city
centre.10 The estate was a large one, and by 1926 the second to the sixteenth
building schemes had already resulted in 2,361 new homes, the planned total
1. Ibid., 78.	 2. Womersley, 'Urbanity Lost--and Regained', 247-8.
3. Abercrombie, Civic Survey, 22.	 4. Ibid., 56-7 and 60.
5. Ibid., 45.
	 6. Ibid., 49.	 7. Ibid., 55.	 8. Ibid., 22.
9. Ibid., Plate XLII; similar to the Liverpool 'grass tracks'.
10. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 190.
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1
being 3,268, equal to a population of at least 10,000. One other major
reserved track line had been built a little earlier, along Abbey Lane and
2
again forming a circular route serving new housing estates; there were in
fact to be no more such lines in Sheffield, which remained predominantly a
street tramway.
Because of the way in which current town planning concepts of population
dispersion could accommodate; even welcome tramways as a means to that end,
and because of the specific recommendations of the Abercrombie Survey, it
seems highly probable that Sheffield was influenced by planning consider-
ations in adopting its tramway development policy. A particular advantage
pointed out by Abercrombie was that only relatively short extensions were
needed to take the transport network out into 'virgin territory'. A diagram
shows the time taken by tram to the suburbs, and even the outermost zone,
3
including only two tram routes, was only 25-30 minutes away. A second dia-
gram gives distances from the city, and again only two trams routes extend
more than three miles as the crow flies. Certain existing or planned est-
ates were already on or near tramways, and the plan showed the wide fingers
4
of land open for development reaching to within a mile of the city centre;
5
one to the south—east was later used for the Manor and Wybourn estates and
a larger area to the north—west for the much larger Parson Cross development.
The latter was served by extensions to Wadsley Bridge in 1924 and to Shef-
6
field Lane Top in 1934, though neither really penetrated the estate. Even
when the various extensions mentioned were built, no tramways would have
gone much more than three and a half miles from the centre. Moreover, except
to the west where Sheffield's boundary stretched well out into the Peak Dis-
1. City of Sheffield, Minutes of the Council and Minutes and Reports
of Committees (hereafter, Sheffield Minutes), Estates Committee, 15 Sep 1926,
758.
2. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 189.
3. Abercrombie, Civic Survey, Plate XV11.
	 4. Ibid., Plate XVI.
5. Sheffield Minutes, Estates Committee, 15 Sep 1926, 758.
6. For dates of extensions etc. see Appendix S8.
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trict, the longer tram routes already reached to more or less the boundary
1
of the city by 1924.
The Problem of Extensions 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s Sheffield's tramways already therefore
served the city fairly well; where extensions were needed, they could be
quite short. In Manchester this was not so. The city's centre is the Royal
Exchange; about'a quarter of a mile to the west is the River Irwell and the
boundary with Salford, so no development in that direction was possible. A
2
plan of the city shows that the built-up area extended roughly three miles
north, south and east. In the latter case housing already more or less
reached the boundary, and though there was about a mile of open land to the
north, much of this was public open space. So the only room for expansion
3
was in the south. By the 1920s new suburbs were already spreading this way
and new reserved track tramways--modelled on those already built in Glasgow
and Livergool--were constructed to serve them via Princess Road and Kingsway
4
for distances of about two miles. In 1926 Manchester bought a large area
of land to house up to 100,000 more people. This was six to seven miles
away at Wythenshawe, then outside the city boundary in Cheshire. In 1929
the Council decided to serve it by a modern tramway running about two miles
further than the previous extensions and costing £50,000. However Stuart
Filcher, newly appointed as Manager that same year, produced a report favour-
ing motor buses which would, he said, be faster, cheaper to introduce, more
able to serve various parts of the new estate as it developed and well able
to cope with expected demand. Moreover, since Wythenshawe was outside the
city, a tramway could not be properly protected from competition. So the
1. Abercrombie, Civic Survey, Plate XIX.
2. Sherratt and Hughes' Large Scale Plan of Greater Manchester and
Salford (n.d., but possibly pre-World War I).
3. J. Joyce, Roads and Rails of Manchester 1900--1950 (hereafter,
Rails of Manchester), 77-8.
4. Ibid., 65.
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tramway was not built and buses, at a subsidised fare of 8d., were introd-
uced instead. 1
In Sheffield's case, though, trams could reach Manor via the Intake
tramway after only one and three quarter miles; even when the Prince of
Wales Road line was built, trams were never much more than three track
miles from the city centre. 2 There was no advantage in construction costs,
for the Sheffield line was about the same length as the proposed Wythenshawe
extension. But the latter was much longer overall, and a motor bus could
only manage one return journey per rush hour, packed with passengers from
the estate travelling at subsidised fares and leaving no room for more
3profitable short distance passengers. Wythenshawe was six to seven miles
away, say six and a half, so a thirteen mile return trip at a Manchester
4bus's service speed of 11 m.p.h. would take a theoretical 1.18 hours (1
hr. 11 mins.) plus, say, ten minutes layover time--total 1 hr. 21 mins.
Trams round the Prince of Wales Road had to travel only about six and three
quarter miles 5 but their average speed of 8.49 m.p.h. 6meant that they
7
were timed at exactly one hour including layovers.
	 This did give the
trams an advantage in time and they could, theoretically, have completed
four trips to the buses' three with an equivalent increase in earnings.
Probably more important would be the reduction in running costs. Trams
at the time cost less to run per seat mile than buses anyway, so over half
the distance working costs per peak hour trip would be less than half,
giving a very significant advantage to the Sheffield trams in this partic-
ular case. This advantage was shared with passengers through low fares.
Wythenshawe return cost 8d. and whereas on a pro rata basis the Sheffield
fare should have been 4d., up to 1930 it was 3d. and thereafter lid. single.8
1. Ibid., 77-9.	 2. Distances off a map drawn by J. C. Gilham.
3. Joyce, Rails of Manchester, 79.
4. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 116.
5. Distance from Gilham's map.	 6. Tramway Returns, 1928-9.
7. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 177.	 8. For fares, see above 29a
319
Even at such rates, Sheffield was able to operate its trams at a profit,
whilst the Wythenshawe buses were subsidised, meaning that passengers there
should actually have been paying more than they did. Sheffield commuters
benefitted in another way too from the construction of the circular route,
for it provided a direct connection to the city's East End where all the
main works were. Morning and evening large numbers of special cars ran dir-
ect to/from Intake and Elm Tree and the East End,
1
 providing cheaper and
faster journeys for commuters and again, of course, reduced costs for the
transport undertaking. Workers, instead of going into town and out again,
could travel direct in one car, which could do more work in a given time at
a lesser costs. A Manchester passenger going to, say, Trafford Park would
2
have faced a further journey of two to three miles and an additional fare.
It should be noticed, however, that establishing Sheffield's special
advantages in this way also supports Pilcher's general case that trams were
not suitable for long suburban routes. Because trams were slower than buses,
journey times would have been greatly extended on a long route like that to
Wythenshawe, which would have caused inconvenience to the public, a fall
in earnings per vehicle and a rise in costs. Of course, some lengthy tram-
3
way extensions were built in this period, in Leeds for instance, and it
would be interesting to know how they were made to pay; higher speed is an
obvious possibility, and about this time Leeds did get the speed limit raised
4
to 30 m.p.h. on its Middleton Light Railway. 	 But whatever was done, dist-
ance was a problem in serving new areas, and Sheffield was obviously very
fortunate in not having to build very far out.
1. Although a later period, see Sheffield Tramway and Omnibus Timetable 
(1955), 20.
2. This is assuming a tramway had been built to Wythenshawe, though
even then through works services might have operated; this would have been
much easier with buses, which probably did run various direct services.
3. Hamilton and Potter, Losing Track, 79.
4. Andrew D. Young, 'Leeds Trams, 1939--1959: 3', MT 35 (Aug 1972),
269 (this is a multi-part article spread over numerous issues of the
journal; future references are to 'Leeds Trams' with full journal citation).
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Traffic Congestion 
City tramways were laid down at a period when the only other street
traffic was horse-drawn. This caused its own problems of congestion, but
obviously the advent of the motor vehicle caused further difficulties, par-
ticularly during the interim period when there was still a large amount of
horse-drawn traffic too. It was at this stage that Manchester City Council
commissioned a report on traffic congestion, ' much of which was concerned
with the problems caused to and by trams. Difficulties caused to trams in-
cluded being held up by other vehicles, especially by broken-down motor
I lurries' (sic), though the implication of this reference is more to point
the virtues of more flexible vehicles which could avoid such hold-ups.
2
 The
report did recommend prohibiting passing trams on the nearside at stops,
3
but the main drift was that trams were an obstruction and a danger to other
traffic, mainly because most Manchester streets were too narrow to allow for
fast and slow lanes plus the tram tracks, so forcing the slow (then usually
horse-drawn) and fast traffic into the same lane. Trams caused obstruction
by their inflexibility, whereas motor vehicles, being able to deviate, did
not. There was serious congestion in the central area, because streets were
too narrow putting ordinary traffic under a severe handicap because of so
many trams in such close succession; this was a 'serious and largely con-
tributing cause to the present congestion of traffic'. 4
A detailed traffic survey of the central area over one day in 1913 was
undertaken and there were indeed a lot of trams. InMosley Street, one-way
for trams, 382 cars passed; in the central area as whole, 18,712 trams were
recorded, up slightly from the 17,765 reported after a similar survey in
1911. One reason for the very large numbers may have been because of the
inter-running arrangements with other authorities; on Deansgate, for example,
there was a great majority of Salford cars. It was noticed that between
1. City of Manchester Watch Committee, Traffic Congestion: Causes-- 
Relief, Report of the Special Sub-Committee (hereafter, Report) (Manchester,
1914).
2. Ibid., 86.	 3. Ibid., 166.	 4. Ibid., 68-72.
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10 a.m. and 4 p.m. only one third of tram seats were used; 111 of the cars
along Mosley Street carried less than ten passengers apiece, for example.
The Sub-Committee made an instant statistical deduction; if only one third
of the seats were used, two thirds of the trams could be withdrawn during
off-peak hours. Passengers would have been unlikely to have appreciated the
corollary of tripled waiting times, and nor was there any logical reason for
thinking that the trams would have been uniformly as lightly loaded on the
outer portions of their routes. However, the Sub-Committee were impressed
with certain cities where trams were banned altogether from the centre, which
was served by motor bus instead; these cities included London, Paris and
Berlin. It was therefore suggested that tram traffic be either reduced or
banned in the city centre in off-peak hours; motor buses could carry the
relatively few cross passengers onwards, with the least possible effect on
1
normal traffic (my emphasis) because of their flexibility and mobility.
At the same time as the Watch Committee's Report was commissioned, the
Tramways' Committee was asked to enquire into ways of dealing with rising
demand.
2
 Joyce gives details of this and of a subsequent report by the
General Manager following an overseas tour. Tram traffic was already very
heavy, with three to four and a half million passengers per route mile per
annum on the main arteries, comparable to that on some London tubes. It was
obvious that saturation point had been reached on certain city centre roads,
and the Manager's report favoured an eventual sub-surface rapid transit
system linked to main-line railways. Tram subways were not favoured,
3
 but
as an immediate palliative various additional central area lines were prop-
osed plus development of city termini rather than having cross-town tram
services. The various reports on the traffic problem, together with another
1. Ibid., 9-10, 68-73, 75, 125, 133-4, 167-8.
	
2. Ibid., 5.
3. Though it does appear one was proposed in 1914 between London
Road (now Piccadilly) Station and Blackfriars. Today a light rapid transit
system is proposed combining the best of both worlds, with light railcars
providing surface connections between the railway stations and also running
on certain suburban rail lines (lecture given by Dr. Tony Young, Principal
Planning Officer, Greater Manchester PTE, to the Light Rail Transit Assoc-
iation's 1986 AGM).
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from the Improvement Committee, were further considered by a Traffic Conges-
tion Special Committee, which reported in 1917. It tended to combine elem-
ents from each approach, favouring central tram termini and also the use
of motor buses to connect these following the withdrawal of trams from
some busy streets. It was also hoped, rather optimistically, that as
horse-drawn traffic was replaced by motor vehicles after the war, the latter
would actually reduce congestion because of their speed and mobility. 1
The available data on traffic congestion in Sheffield is not directly
comparable. Abercrombie's report naturally dealt with the issue and rec-
orded a great increase in traffic since before World War I. In fact, traf-
fic seems to have been very light then. A traffic census taken between
26 Aug and 8 Sep 1910 from 8 a.m. to 9 p.m. on Abbeydale Road South, Chest-
erfield Road, Ecclesall Road South, Manchester Road and Middlewood Road
recorded an average of between 32 and 129 motor vehicles and 279 and 719
horse-drawn vehicles passing per slay. on the various routes. 2 Granted these
were suburban roads rather than the city centre, but in no way could these
rates have been aggregated to produce the 67,000 plus vehicles reported
in Manchester's city centre in both 1911 and 1913.
3
 Abercrombie said that
traffic on the Wicker had risen from 5,188 tons per day in 1914 to 14,085
4
in 1923; at Exchange Place the increase was of 377 per cent. The tonnages
do not include trams but, significantly, they do appear in a measure of
obstructiveness used elsewhere in the report. This was based on a table
of 'obstruction units' used by the Board of Trade, part of which is reprod-
uced below in Table 43. As and when these are used, the 'traffic measure-
ments' on streets go up sharply as against those based only on tonnages.
Before continuing with the Manchester versus Sheffield comparison, it
is worth following up the issue of congestion and especially the supposedly
1. Joyce, Rails of Manchester, 57-64, passim.
2. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 31.
3. Manchester Watch Committee, Report, 9-10.
4. Abercrombie, Civic Survey, 20.	 5. Ibid., 20-1.
5
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TABLE 43
BOARD OF TRADE OBSTRUCTION UNITS
(SAMPLE VALUES ONLY)
Nature of Traffic 	 Values
Cycles	 2
Cars	 1
Cattle	 2
Bus -	 3
Charabancs	 4
Traction Engines	 6
Heavy Vehicles, two or more horses 	 10
Tram	 10
SOURCE: Abercrombie, Civic Survey, 21.
'scientific' basis of measurement. The origin of the 'Table of Co-efficient
of Obstruction' is shrouded in mystery. Bond says that it was 'reputedly'
drawn up by the London Traffic Branch of the Board of Trade, but that it
was always 'strenuously denied' by the Board's Railway Inspectorate, who
condemned it. It was however regularly used by the Metropolitan Police
against the LCC and other London tramays. Incidentally, it appears that
the original table did not even include traction engines, so apart from
horse buses and slow motors at '5', there was nothing else to dispute
the tram's and two-horse dray's position at the 'top'. ' Presumably this
table must have had some sort of justification at one time, though much
of it seems based on impressions rather than anything worthy of being
described as 'Obstruction Unit Values'. It is difficult to see how cattle
or traction engines could be less obstructive than trams or even than horse
vehicles, to all of which the tram could show a clean pair of heels. The
way this table reappears in Abercrombie's report shows how figures of doubt-
ful validity could-probably in the absence of anything better--find their
way into academic or professional work and thus carry an undeserved weight.
1. Bond, History's Orphan, 57-8; he has a rather different version
of the table.
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For there is no doubt that the tram's real or supposed effect on traffic
movement was a serious factor in the generally negative image it came to
have in the 1930s.
Returning to the relative incidence of congestion in Sheffield and
Manchester, it certainly appears that the problem was worse at an earlier
date in the latter city. Even before World War I Manchester had built
extra tram lines to parallel -existing ones to relieve central area congest-
ion and had also started to use locations like Albert Square as termini
to keep trams out of the worst affected streets. ' It was not until 1924
that Sheffield found it necessary to construct a central tramway loop via
Exchange Street, to be used by cars on three routes to help reduce congest-
ion in Haymarket, Fitzalan Square and Commercial Street by obviating the
need to reverse the trolleys there.
2
 A little earlier, in 1922, there
had been some discussion of traffic problems caused by loading of vehicles
in the centre, by parking and by tram stops;
3
 this last came up again in
4
1924, but in general the issue seems to have arisen later and bulked less
largely on committee agendas than in Manchester. It was not until the
late 1920s or early 1930s that traffic control began to worry the authorit-
ies in Sheffield seriously, nearly twenty years after the first of the
series of Manchester reports was commissioned.
5
 After consultation between
the Chief Constable and the Watch Committee in 1930 trams stops were removed
from one of the main streets, Fargate, and re-sited in Pinstone Street,
which was made one-way except for trams. Traffic control between the two
streets at the Town Hall was by a point duty policeman then, but early
1. Joyce, Rails in Manchester, 57.
2. Sheffield Minutes, Tramways and Motors Committee (hereafter, T&MC),
Engineering Sub-Committee, 26 Aug 1924, 772.
3. Joint Sub-Committee, T&MC, Watch and Markets Committees, 15 Dec
1922, 102.
4. Watch Committee, 19 Jun 1924, Report of the Joint Sub-Committee on
regulation of traffic at tramway stopping places, 637-8.
5. In 1911; see Joyce, Rails in Manchester, 57.
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in 1931 he was replaced by a manned kiosk with colour light and semaphore
signals. In 1933 a third track was added in Pinstone Street giving facil-
ities for some services to load from the kerb whilst others, which had
stopped previously, could overtake. The police-operated signals were also
removed and, oddly, Pinstone Street once again became two-way. ' As Gandy
points out in the passage just cited, these alterations were very much
for the benefit of tram passengers, and the whole approach does not seem
to betray any of the Police/Watch Committee anti-tram bias so evident in
the Manchester reports.
It therefore seems fair to say that (1) traffic congestion was less
severe; that (2) serious problems arose fifteen or more years later; and
that (3) the attitude of the police etc. was more favourable to trams in
Sheffield than was the case in Manchester. There are various obvious reas-
ons for facts (1) and (2), notably that Sheffield was a smaller city than
Manchester and was, with the exception of being contiguous to Rotherham,
not the centre of a large conurbation. Undoubtedly, it would appear, the
variation in the traffic problem was one reason why trams were kept in
Sheffield but not in Manchester. It is a little curious, however, that
Pilcher did not make more of this. In 1930--probably writing before he
came to Manchester--he does refer to the motor bus's mobility in traffic
and its freedom to move away from the road centre.
2
 In 1937 he expanded
a little, possibly with a hint of the issues raised in the Manchester report
of 1913; buses could reduce congestion by spreading traffic over several
streets and central termini, possibly even avoiding the main streets in
the centre altogether, but the process is limited, he said.
3
 However,
as will be shown below, the equation 'Trams Congestion' was to lose none
of its force with the passing years.
1. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 68-9; two-way for road traffic, of
course, for trams had operated both ways throughout.
2. Filcher, Road Transport Operation, 182.
3. Filcher, Road Passenger Transport, 292.
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Conclusion 
It has been shown that in the inter—war years town planning objectives
of population dispersion could be assisted by tramways, particularly where
distances were relatively short; longer extensions, such as that proposed
to Wythenshawe, were more problematic, and Sheffield was fortunate in having
vacant sites close to the city centre to which tramways could be economic-
ally prolonged.. Trams were perceived as major contributors to traffic
congestion from early in the century, but do not appear to have been so
viewed in influential quarters in Sheffield, which probably had a good
deal to do with the fact that congestion was not so severe there as it
was in a conurbation like Greater Manchester.
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CHAPTER 15
MOTOR BUS POLICIES AND THEIR EFFECT ON TRAMWAYS
The Sheffield Policy 
Appendices S9 and S10 show the development of motor bus services in
and around Sheffield. Municipal services seem to have started about a
year before private concerns entered the field, and this really epitomises
the relationship from then on; the Corporation was almost always ahead
of the competition, and took a leading role in initiating bus services
over a wide area. The policy was succinctly put in a statement by the
Tramways and Motors Committee in November 1925:
The policy of the Sheffield Corporation in regard to road transport is,
plainly stated, that they, being the owners of the large tramway system
in the central area, feel that it is their duty to provide, in connection
with that system, transport facilities for the less densely populated and
surrounding areas within reasonable distance of the city. They recognise
that the motorbus has a useful field of operation in conjunction with the
tramways, and as the Transport Committee for the Sheffield area they are
prepared to do all that is necessary in and around that area by providing
motorbus services to the whole of the surrounding districts . . . The
opinion of the Tramways & Motors Committee is that it is better for road
transport to be co-ordinated in this way rather than that wasteful and
unnecesary vehicles should be operated, which in the end would mean
loss, inefficiency, unnecessary expenditure, and, finally, the waste of
the effort and money of the competitors. (1)
The policy of limiting private motor bus competition was effected by exclus-
ion, purchase and agreement. The initial policy was the almost total exclus-
ion of buses from the city centre by making them stop at tram termini. This
was true for municipal buses too until 1925,
2
 with only one real exception
1. Sheffield Minutes, T&MC, 24 Nov 1925, 71.
2. S.T.D., Brief History, 15.
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between Fitzalan Square and Heeley Green.' There were a number of private
services which started running in to the city from 1921 onwards, 2 but the
scale of operation was such as to pose no real threat to the trams; for
instance, when Battey's route was purchased by the Corporation he had only
two vehicles. 3 Analysis of traffic returns 4 reinforces the common sense
view that infrequent out-of-town bus services had little or no effect on
the trams. Later in the 1920s, however, the pace of competition began
to increase; more private services were established and most started to
run in over the tram routes, partly as a result of a dispute between the
Watch and Tramways Committees. In 1925 the former made it clear that they
saw no reason not to licence local applicants who paid union wages, ran
new buses and would provide an adequate service; it was in response to
this that the Tramways Committee issued the statement quoted earlier. 5
The City Council ruled that a tramways' representative should attend further
licensing hearings, 6 but of course some damage had already been done.
Usually, however, every effort was made to enforce the exclusion policy
where the Corporation's interests were felt to be threatened. Refusal
of licences sometimes deterred applicants, 7 and where it did not actual
or threatened prosecution might see the offender off, as it did with Machin,
who withdrew his Chesterfield service after less than a year. 8 Other more
determined operators paid the fines and appealed to the Ministry of Trans-
port or, later, to the Traffic Commissioners against the refusal of licences;
at the hearing the Corporation sometimes gained an advantageous compromise, 9
1. See Appendix S9.	 2. See Appendix S10.
3. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 162.	 4. See Appendix Sll and below.
5. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 164.
6. Sheffield Minutes, Watch Committee, 15 Apr 1926, 423.
7. For the refusal of a planned Millhouses--Dore service in 1921, see
Hall, Sheffield Transport, 158.
8. Ibid., 160-1.
9. For instance, Kitson's two services to Treeton were reduced to one
following a ruling from the Commissioners in 1932; see ibid., 217.
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though there was a tendency on the Ministry's part to support established
independents) TheTh  most serious dispute was with the much larger firm
of Underwoods, who appealed to the Ministry in 1922 2 and in 1924 secured
an agreement to limit competition and to share services; 3 when this broke
down in 1927 after provocation by the Corporation, the latter had to climb
down and surrender certain services they had purchased. 4
Where exclusion failed,-the Corporation often purchased the services
of small operators who had succeeded in becoming established. This policy
began in 1924 with Battey's Bakewell service and eventually included most
surviving independents, so although there were quite a number of these
in total, at any one time there were very few on the road. By summer 1925,
for example, 16 operators had started 25 services, but already 8 proprietors
had surrendered all their routes to the Corporation, either through their
own failure or by purchase, and a few other routes had been transferred
by agreement; this left just 7 operators and 14 routes in private hands,
and by 1934 almost all those in Appendix S10 had been purchased or put
off the road. 5 By these means the Corporation was very successful in limit-
ing the numbers of private competitors. Unfortunately a good 'run' of
figures for buses licensed does not seem to be readily available, but in
July 1924 82 vehicles were licensed, 6
 rising to 147 in 1926. 7
 This compares
with 272 licences issued (about twenty being municipal) for the much smaller
town of Doncaster in the latter year and to 653 (all private) in 1929, 8
a number which can never have been approached in Sheffield. The largest
block licensed must have been the East Midland (ex-Underwood) fleet, which
1. Wigmore's eventually gained a licence by this means; see ibid., 211.
2. Ibid., 158.	 3. Ibid., 162.	 4. Ibid., 168-9.
5. See Appendix S10.
6. Sheffield Minutes, Watch Committee, Stage Plays and General
Sub-Committee (hereafter, Watch Sub-Committee), 17 Jul 1924, 699.
7. Ibid., 1 Jul 1926, 590; it is not made clear if these figures in-
clude municipal buses, but it is unlikely.
8. See Appendix DN4.
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numbered 82 in 1928. 1 The Corporation was unable to deal with operators
of this size by any of the means outlined, and so was forced to compromise.
Sometimes routes were divided between themselves and a competitor, as happ-
ened with Underwood in 1924, 2
 but more commonly individual services were
shared with each participant contributing a set proportion of the vehicles
and taking an equivalent share of the profits; the partners might be munic-
ipal, as on the route to Chesterfield, 3 or private, as on the Buxton and
Castleton routes shared with the North Western Road Car Company.
4
A new and serious threat arose around 1928 when the main-line railway
companies were seeking general road transport powers. Fortunately Sheffield
was far-sighted enough to open negotiations with the London Midland and
London and North Eastern Companies at an early stage, and the result was
the formation from 1 Jan 1929 of a Joint Omnibus Committee (hereafter,
JOC) between the three parties. Routes were divided by distance into categ-
ories A (city), B and C, owned respectively by the Corporation, by both
parties and by the railway companies alone. The existing fleet was offic-
ially split three ways too, but the whole remained under the operational
control of the Corporation, whose Manager was also Secretary of the JOC.
5
In effect, this was a similar agreement to that reached by the railways
with many of the area bus companies, like Yorkshire Traction; the railways
took a financial stake but left operation to the professionals. Curiously,
with all its obvious advantages, this type of arrangement never spread
beyond Yorkshire, in which similar joint services were arranged with Hali-
fax, Huddersfield and Todmorden Coporations; an agreement with Leeds was
almost concluded but never put into effect. 6 C. T. Humpidge, when Manager
of Sheffield Transport and Secretary of the JOC, commented that the scheme
1. Sheffield Minutes, Watch Sub-Committee, 7 Jul 1928, 553.
2. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 162.	 3. Ibid., 161 and 164.
4. Ibid., 169; for details of all joint services, see Appendix S10.
5. Ibid., 169, 171-2 and 210.
6. Charles F. Klapper, The Golden Age of Buses (hereafter, Buses)
(1978), 49-50.
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was most successful, worked well and was the envy of many; there was, he
said, 'no competition', which in effect was true, for virtually all buses
running in and out of Sheffield were under Corporation control and rules
and were staffed by them.
1
Protecting the Trams 
Although by exclusion, purchase and agreement the Corporation was
able to reduce private bus operations to very low levels indeed, the problem
of competition with the tram services remained and indeed grew more serious
as the inter-war years progressed.
In 1925 the Corporation began extending its own bus services from
tram termini into the city centre. 2 There were at least four reasons for
this. First, pressure was often put by or on behalf of the public to
achieve the convenience of through services. So, for example, when the
Corporation took over Battey's Millhouses to Bakewell service, Bakewell
UDC threatened not to renew the licence if the buses did not run through,
which they did from February 1925. 3 Second, extension of services was
often a response to competition; this was why the Penistone and High Green
routes started to run through the following month. 4 Third, as the Corpor-
ation began acquiring other operators' services, such as Glossop's routes
in 1926, 5 it obviously made sense to continue to run from the city centre
if this was already the case. Finally, and especially in the 1930s, there
was an increasing need for purely urban services; these were sometimes
established as tramway feeders, but not always, and even if they were,
the pressure was always for through routes to be provided. Thus, for ex-
ample, the long-established Wincobank service was run through to the Midland
Station in 1931, only the first of a number of urban bus routes which were
1. Humpidge, unpublished lecture notes, 2.
2. S.T.D., Brief History, 15; for full details, see Appendix S12.
3. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 162.
	 4. Ibid., 163-4.
5. See Appendix S10.
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extended or established in that decade. ' It will be necessary to return
to this point later.
But it was still policy to protect the trams. This was done vis-a-vis
external operators by imposing the usual conditions on picking up and dis-
charging passengers along a tram route
2
 and, second, by enforcing a protect-
ive fare, which in the case of Underwoods in 1924 was 100 per cent higher
than the tram fare.3 It is not known whether the first condition also
applied to Corporation/JOC services, but the second certainly did. For
example, the pioneer route to Lodge Moor had a 3d. maximum in 1913
4
 at
a time when the standard tram fare was only id. Of course, high fares
were probably necessary then to cover the high running costs typical of
buses; the . short-lived Brocco Bank service in 1920 also had a 3d. fare, but
ran at a loss.
5
 Later fares were not so high pro rata, but were still
kept above tram fares. Early in 1935 fares were fixed for the recently
acquired Thorpe Hesley bus route. The tram fare of 11d. only took passen-
gers to Garter Street, a bit short of Newhall Road on the Brightside tram-
way; Brightside Station, roughly the tram terminus, 6 was 2d.; and to reach
the city boundary at Deep Lane cost 31d., whereas tram routes such as
Middlewood and Intake reached the boundary for less than half that.
7
A reasonable conclusion from Appendix S10 is that as rural or interur-
ban services were extended into the city, they did little or no harm to the
tramways. When tramway revenue on a particular route is measured before and
after the incursion of a bus service, in most cases up to 1927-8 gross rev-
1. See Appendices S9 and S12.
2. Sheffield Minutes, Watch Sub-Committee, 7 Jan 1926, 180 for example.
3. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 162.
4. Ibid., 122; of course this route did not compete with any tramway,
so the intention here was not protective.
5. Ibid., 155; price rises would have made this fare much less in real
terms than the Lodge Moor one.
6. Other tram routes went much further for the standard fare.
7. Bus fares in Sheffield Minutes, T&MC, 15 Jan 1935, 222.
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enue actually goes up, though there does seem to be a tendency for revenue
per car mile to fall, which could have been a problem. If these four-weekly
results are translated into a notional annual increase/decrease, then the
largest tramway 'loss' was £1,206 per annum on the Woodseats route following
the introduction of the Chesterfield bus and of a short-working to Dron-
field. This would obviously reflect the loss of the former 'feeder' traffic
from the shuttle bus service; Overall, though, the imposition of carriage
and fare restrictions on out-of-town buses seems to have been quite effect-
lye in this period in protecting tramway revenues. Protection was not
the only reason why the buses had little impact. Another, already ment-
ioned, was that the scale of services was insufficient to make much of
a dent in tramway traffic. For example, when the Corporation bought
Glossop's services he was running five separate routes, but had only six
single deck buses, '
 clearly only allowing an infrequent and low-capacity
service. In the same year, 1926, the tramcar fleet stood at 400 2
 and a
typical off-peak service varied from ten to three minutes, depending on
the route. 3
 As final confirmation that motor bus competition was not all
that serious a threat to the tramways--or was at least prevented from becom-
ing so by the Corporation's tough policies--after a shaky start around
1922-3, both tram passengers and revenue rose steadily over the rest of
the decade, apart from a set-back in the 1926-7 period.
4
The Policy in Manchester 
Manchester by contrast seems to have been much more troubled than Shef-
field by persistent pirate/private motor bus competition. One reason may
have been that the Corporation failed to develop its own bus services early
enough. It is true that Manchester started a service in 1906, 5
 seven years
1. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 165-6.
	 2. Appendix S3, column (3).
3. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 175; actually 1939 services, but 1926
service levels were probably not greatly different.
4. Appendix S3, Columns (5) and (6).
5. Joyce, Rails in Manchester, 68.
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earlier than Sheffield, but development was slow. By 1914 there were only
eight buses, which were commandeered, presumably bringing services to an
end for the duration; in 1924 there were twenty-five buses running over
twenty-three route miles.'
 In the same year, Sheffield had fifty-one buses 2
in service on routes as far out as Bakewell (about seventeen miles) and
Penistone (about fifteen miles), plus quite a number of shorter routes. 3
The contrast is greater when-the relative sizes of the cities are compared;
in 1931 Sheffield's population was 518,257 and Manchester's 766,311. 4
So far as private motor bus competition with trams was concerned,
Manchester had a problem which Sheffield did not in that many of its routes
extended beyond the city boundary where protection was not necessarily
available. In one case the Corporation appealed to the Minister of Trans-
port over the granting of a licence to A. Mayne and Company5
 for a Manches-
ter to Droylsden service on the grounds that the tramway was inadequately
protected. Mayne's were already prohibited from picking up or setting
down local passengers in the city and had to charge ld. excess fare per
stage, but Manchester wanted the same rules to apply beyond the city plus
even higher bus fares; this was not granted, on the interesting ground
6that the tramway was inadequate for a through service beyond Manchester.
In this case, buses gained a legal right to compete. In another, when
private buses started running over the Altrincham tram route on 18 Nov
1929 through the areas of six local authorities, only one--Ashton-on-Mersey--
had licensed them; curiously, it thus appeared they could operate anywhere
without police control and on streets where Manchester buses were not allowed,
1. Klapper, Tramways, 137; he dates the first bus service to 1908.
2. See Appendix S13.
	 3. See Appendix S9.
4. H.M.S.O., National Register, United Kingdom and Isle of Man, Stat-
istics of Population on 29th September 1939 . . . Report and Table (1944),
10 and 24.
5. It is interesting to note that after the deregulation of bus ser-
vices in 1986 buses with the fleet name 'Mayne' again appeared on Manchester
streets, presumably owned by the same firm (personal observation).
6. Chester, Public Control, 131 and footnote thereon.
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so taking some of the tram traffic. ' When Manchester did begin to develop
its own bus services seriously in the 1920s, these tended to be suburban
feeders to the tramways,
2
 as Sheffield's were at that time too. This was so
rigid a policy that when the Middleton tram company's operations were taken
over in 1925, an existing bus route to Heywood was cut back to the tramway.
3
However, partly in order to protect its own trams against bus competition,
the city introduced express buses from April 1927 which ran over the tram
routes.
4
 It is worth noting that this change took place whilst Stuart Pil-
cher's predecessor was still in office and that Pilcherhimself did not
originally expect or even want these buses to take the trams' short-stage
traffic.
5
 The scheme was much more successful than expected, and the att-
ractions of speed and comfort inevitably took passengers from the trams.
Most neighbouring transport operators were quickly brought into the network,
and even by 1928 there were sixteen routes; by 1930 there were twenty-seven.
In effect, the tram system had been outgrown; it did not serve the new res-
idential areas and was in any case fundamentally unsuited to providing
long-distance services, 6
 as the Mayne judgement and the popularity of express
buses showed.
The almost inevitable result seems to have been that, where trams and
buses ran together, the trams started to lose money. So for instance
when Middleton Council asked for a through bus service to Manchester or
Salford via Manchester Old Road in 1929, Manchester refused because most of
the road was already covered by buses and trams, and the latter were losing
money even then.
7
 In the case of the Altrincham route, tram receipts fell
1. A. K. Kirby, 'The Tramways of Sale and Altrincham' (hereafter,
'Tramways of Altrincham'), TR 14 (Summer 1981), 57.
2. Ibid., 56.
3. A. K. Kirby, Middleton Tramways (Rochdale, 1976), 56.
4. Ibid., 67.	 5. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 131.
6. Joyce, Rails of Manchester, 74-6.
7. A. K. Kirby, Middleton Tramways, 67.
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from £1,473 a week in 1927-8 to only £1,102 in 1930-1 (up to September)
due, Pilcher thought, to their own express buses and to competitive private
ones. Bearing this out was the fact that the Sale branch (off the Altrin-
cham line) had suffered only a very small decline in revenue and had no
express or other competitive buses along it; Filcher was nontheless careful
to add that 'the problem will shortly be the same as Altrinchaml.
It was thus quite possible to have three types of vehicle operating
along the one road--express buses, trams and competing stage buses. The
obvious solution was to eliminate one or more, so ensuring the remainder
were profitable. In Manchester it was unlikely that the loss-making trams
would be preferred, particularly as expensive track renewals were becoming
necessary too; £42,640 needed spending on one of the lines to Middleton,
for example. In cases like this, Pilcher recommended tramway closure.
Of course, since the replacing buses had to observe all the tram stops,
they were slower than the express buses, by ten minutes in this instance.
This was still faster than the trams, but the tendency as buses replaced
trams was to eliminate the express buses also; it did not make sense to
run two categories of the same vehicle, and in any case the Traffic Commiss-
ioners, once established, did not agree with the express services. 	 So
the result of tramway abandonment was largely to concentrate traffic on
one sort of vehicle instead of three, which must obviously have made econ-
omic sense.
It is true that from 1925 Sheffield buses began to be extended into the
city centre too, but initially these services were deliberately designed not
to compete with the trams and were certainly not marketed as superior. The
change does not appear to have affected tramway revenues very much, though
by the 1930s new city bus routes were beginning to abstract traffic.
Pilcher was probably right to say that 'the problem will shortly be the same
1. Kirby, 'Altrincham Tramways', 59.
2. Kirby, Middleton Tramways, 71.
3. Joyce, Rails of Manchester, 76.	 4. See Appendix Sll.
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as Altrincham l , but Sheffield's policies succeeded in deferring the problem
for a decade, which obviously made a great deal of difference to the sur-
vival prospects of the tramway.
Increasing Difficulties 
In the 1920s and still more in the 1930s Sheffield continued to grow
and expand as the planning aims of residential/industrial zoning and the
transfer of residents to new estates were gradually achieved. In addition,
the city boundary was extended and these new areas required better trans-
port. The Manor estate was served by tram, but others were not; in 1927,
for example, a bus service was provided to Norwood and two years later
another to Southey Green, ' both being some way off the Firth Park tram
route. Some of these routes, such as those to Wisewood and Stannington
in 1930, were started as tramway feeders in the old way. But this was
generally a temporary expedient, and gradually these and other longer estab-
lished routes were extended into the city, on the same pattern as the
out-of-town services. Other routes were established as direct city to
suburb services from the start. Three short tram routes were closed in
the period 1925-36. Each was judged on its own merits and not as part
of a general tramway replacement scheme.
2
 It had originally been intended
to renew and extend the Petre Street tramway, but the cost of this was
£27,000 as against only £11,800 for buses; at the time receipts were only
about £220 per week.
3
 So the line was closed on 19 Apr 1925.
4
 The same
happened when the Nether Edge track came up for renewal in 1933;
5
 buses
started in March 1934. 6 Finally the Fulwood via Broomhill service was
replaced on 25 Aug 1936. 7 It had, the Manager reported, run at a consider-
1. For details of the bus routes, see Appendix S9.
2. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 194 and 196.
3. Sheffield Minutes, TOC, 22 Jul 1924, 773.
4. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 189.	 5. Ibid., 194.	 6. Ibid., 195.
7. Ibid., 196.
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able loss for many years and, except at peak hours, was not worth running
as a tramway; an additional difficulty was that much of the track was laid
very close to the kerb. ' Cutting away dead wood like this would have been
beneficial to the tramways
2
 rather than the reverse, whilst in 1934 four
tramway extensions were authorised for the Meadowhead (the only one not
built
3 ), Handsworth, Intake (extended again at the end of 1935
4
) and Firth
Park (taking it to Sheffield-Lane Top) routes; the total cost of the com-
plete scheme would have been £54,099, all to be met out of revenue. No
addition was to be made to through fares, but revised id. fares would be
fixed.
5
The long-standing Council policy of uniform maximum fares, whatever
the distance, had serious financial implications towhich Mr. Fearnley drew
attention in a comprehensive report on fares in June 1935. 6
 The extra
mileage on the three extensions had then been operated only for a few
months, but even so had reduced overall tramway receipts by 0.529d. per
car mile as compared to 1931; a full year would show a larger drop.
7
 Some
actual results for the lines concerned are given below. It will be seen
that a marginal increase in gross revenue (and for the longest extension to
Intake, quite a substantial one of nearly 20 per cent) was achieved due
to the increased ridership attracted. But in every case the revenue per car
mile fell markedly, reflecting the fact that some passengers were travelling
further for the same fare and also, probably, that more cars would be needed
1. Sheffield Minutes, T&MC, 21 Jan 1936, 244.
2. As was the contemporary policy in Leeds of abandonning awkward
single-and-loop lines in the city centre and also cutting back long routes
outside the boundary and subject to bus competition; see A. E. Jones, Roads 
and Rails of West Yorkshire 1890--1950 (hereafter, Rails of Yorkshire)
(1984), 124.
3. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 194.	 4. Ibid., 195.
5. Sheffield Minutes, T&MC, 20 Feb 1934, 279.
6. Ibid., 18 Jun 1935, 720-3; drawn up in a successful move to oppose
City Council pressure for yet lower fares.
7. Ibid., 722-3; revenue per car mile did fall by 0.73d between 1930-1
and 1933-4 and by a further 0.53d. in 1934-5 (Appendix S3, column (7)).
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TABLE 44
SHEFFIELD CORPORATION TRAMWAYS: COMPARISON OF REVENUE PER CAR MILE
ON SELECTED TRAM ROUTES BEFORE AND AFTER EXTENSION
Gross Receipts Average Revenue per Car Mile
Route Before After Change Before
d.
After
d.
Change
d.
Firth Park 6,095 6,155 60 16.71 14.82 1.89
Hand sworth 3,337 3,401
.
64 12.99 11.69 1.30
Intake 1,903 2,265 362 17.39 15.79 1.60
SOURCE:	 Traffic Returns in Sheffield Minutes, T&MC (page in parentheses),
for the four weeks ending 17 Nov 1934 (58) for Firth Park and Intake and
16 Jun 1934 (634) for Handsworth; for all routes after extension, 15 Jun
1935 (724).
for the longer routes. Despite this, short tram extensions were (according
to Hall) preferable to putting on buses to the new housing estates, because
bus services would have competed with trams for most of their length. 1 How-
ever, it Was a different matter when a longer extension to the newly devel-
oped part of Shiregreen was required. A tramway loop from Sheffield Lane
Top back to Firth Park had been previously authorised, but it would have
been two miles long and could not have been operated except at a loss. So a
circular bus service was put on instead; three years later, in 1938, this
was extended into the city. It was also decided to serve the developing
Parson Cross estate by direct buses and another authorised tramway--a short
extension from Wadsley Bridge--lapsed in the process.2
The management had always been aware of the dangers of parallel city
bus and tram services, and usually resisted pressure to provide them. 	 In
1932, for example, a request was made for a service from Birley Carr, just
beyond Wadsley Bridge terminus; the Manager reported that the tramway had
only been extended eight years previously at a cost of £30,000 and a bus
service would seriously affect revenue,3
 so the proposal was rejected in the
1. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 194.	 2. Ibid., 196.
3. Sheffield Minutes, T&MC, 19 Jul 1932, 649.
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Council.	 It was impossible to avoid competition in every case and, Hall
says, 'always, within the city, the tendency was for new bus routes to
extract traffic from the trams ' . ' He quotes the Firth Park tramway, which
shortly after the start of the through Shiregreen buses had lost receipts
of £120 per week, equivalent to 20,000 passengers, the same as had trans-
ferred from the Intake cars a year before when a bus route had started
to another new estate at Arbourthorne. 2 Appendix Sll shows monthly receipts
for certain tram routes both before and after the institution of a competit-
ive motor bus service. The losses are not always as great as in the ex-
amples quoted by Hall. The Handsworth via Woodthorpe bus, for instance,
seems to have had little effect on competing tram routes. However the
general trend in the 1930s is adverse, sometimes severely so. Of the routes
analysed, Wincobank/Brightside lost £89 a week, Lodge Moor/Fulwood only
£13, Bents Green/Ecclesall £97.50, Gleadless/Intake £48.25,
Shirecliffe/Firth Park £135.75 and Shiregreen/Firth Park £62.25. The Intake
,
and Firth Park losses are less than the £120 Hall quotes, one possible
explanation being that the effect was worse immediately after a bus route
opened and that after a year the tram passengers tended to rise again.
On the other hand, though, the Firth Park route was actually losing more
than Hall indicates, for it was not one but several bus routes which were
imposed upon it. If one takes the revenue on Firth Park for the four weeks
ending 16 Oct 1937 before any of the Shirecliffe, Shiregreen or Parson
Cross bus services had begun 3 and then again in the month ending 15 Jul
1939, there is a fall in gross revenue of £926 (or £231.50 a week) and
of revenue per car mile of 0.39d. 4
There is no simple causative relationship between the financial per-
formance of the trams and a rise in motor bus services and traffic. Refer-
ence to Appendix S3 shows that both passenger loadings and revenue fell
1. City Council, 7 Sep 1932, 720.
2. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 222.	 3. Ibid., 196.
3. See Appendix S9.	 4. See the last two lines of Appendix Sll.
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away sharply after 1929-30, the decline continuing until 1932-3, after
which there is a gradual recovery until 1937-8, when there is renewed evid-
ence of weakness in these key variables. ' The decline in traffic at the
beginning of the decade cannot have been much affected by new or extended
bus routes, for there were not many of these at the time, 2 the fall probably
being more related to general economic conditions of the period. Addition-
ally, revenue was bound to fall after the fare reductions of 1930-1, which
would only have fully worked through in 1931-2. The peak in passengers
and revenue in 1937-83 was followed by a further decline which can much
more clearly be related to changes in the bus network in the late 1930s.
4
Significantly, also, the revenue per car mile figure does not again reach
its 1931-2 level
5
 until after the outbreak of war.
6
 As shown above, the
fall in revenue per mile run was partly related to the fares policy for
tramway extensions, but competitive bus routes almost always reduced it
7
too.
The most illuminating contrast is between the general trend of tramway
results and those for urban bus services. Table 45 below shows the changes
in traffic revenue for trams and buses between 1929-30 and the outbreak
of war. Tramway revenue, despite the partial recovery already noted, act-
ually declines by 1.11 per cent over this period, whereas motor bus revenue
overall rises by 184 per cent and that for Category A buses--the urban
competitors to the trams--by a staggering 247 per cent. Overall bus revenue
goes up from 22.23 per cent of tramway receipts in 1929-30 to 58.13 per cent
in 1938-9. Motor buses were thus evidently rapidly increasing their market
share. Most of this was obviously new traffic, because the trams did not
lose £339,372 revenue over the decade.
8
 But some existing tram traffic was
1. Appendix S3, columns (5) and (6).
	
2. See Appendix S12.
3. Appendix S3,columns (5) and (6); the most passengers to date.
4. See Appendix S12.	 5. The first full year of reduced fares.
6. Appendix S3, column (7).
	
7. See Appendix Sll.
8. The amount gained by buses during the period of Table 45.
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going to the buses, as the analysis in Appendix S12 demonstrates, and some
of the new traffic picked up by the buses would have gone to the trams
in the former's absence, particularly if certain planned tramway extensions
had been built.
TABLE 45
TRAFFIC REVENUE EARNED BY SHEFFIELD CORPORATION TRANS AND BUSES
1929-30-1938-9 IN POUNDS
Year
Tramsa Buses
b
Category A 50% Category B Total
1929-30 910,812 123,176 61,058 184,234
1930-1 849,531 134,055 60,732 194,787
1931-2 809,009 147,732 60,788 208,520
1932-3 785,631 158,632 58,871 217,503
1933-4 811,690 179,904 65,645(c) 242,549
1934-5 821,507 222,514 71,548 294,062
1935-6 851,682 254,213 76,875 331,088
1936-7 875,440 296,268 85,364 381,632
1937-8 905,099 379,558 94,690 474,248
1938-9 900,947 427,471 96,135 523,606
SOURCES AND NOTES:
a. Appendix S3, column (6).
b. Bus revenue from Sheffield Accounts (printed with Annual
Reports), Motor Bus Revenue a/c.
c. From this year onwards these figures include a very tiny
amount of miscellaneous revenue not strictly traffic revenue.
In spite of their difficulties the Sheffield tramways remained profit-
able throughout the 1930s. A net surplus was earned each year and the gen-
eral trend for profits was upwards.1 Most if not all of the routes must
have remained individually viable too, or else moves would presumably have
been made to close them like those which had already been replaced. There
was something of a question mark over the Brightside route, but in the event
all that happened was the replacement of trams by buses on Sundays? it may
have been thought necessary to keep the route, even if marginal, because of
its heavy workers' traffic during the week. The relative prosperity of
1. Appendix S3, column (20).	 2. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 194.
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Sheffield tram routes, as opposed to those in other cities, probably had
a lot to do with the fact that the transport department continueito make
every effort to ensure that trams and buses did not run along the same
roads. The Shiregreen bus route, for example, left the city by entirely
different streets to the Firth Park tramway, paralleled it for just three
quarters of a mile mid-way, and then struck off on its own again. 1 Whereas
in Birmingham, by contrast, buses were running up to 42- miles along a part-
icular tramway, causing passenger losses of 40,894 per week to the trams
after the buses had been running for a year;
2
 this was double the passenger
losses mentioned by Hall for Sheffield. Manchester's express buses would
have had a similar effect on parallel tramways. As against the latter
too, there was no attempt in Sheffield to provide a city- or entire
conurbation-wide bus service, as there was in Manchester, so though certain
tram routes might lose traffic and revenue to buses, other parts of the
system would maintain or even improve their position.
Managerial Attitudes 
Using Manchester again as a contrasting example, the Tramway Manager
there around the period of World War I was J. P. McElroy. 3 Not surprisingly
at the time, he saw the tram as the main mode of urban transport and did not
believe motor buses could cope with the traffic; in one hypothetical example,
the tram rush hour service of a car every forty seconds would have required
a bus every ten seconds, practically 'a long string of omnibuses nearly the
whole length of Rochdale Road from Queen's Park to town , . 4 He was succeeded
in 1922-3 by Henry Mattinson, under whose management new tram routes and
several hundred new bogie tramcars were constructed, whilst buses were kept
1. Based upon information from maps and timetables.
2. Bond, History's Orphan, 49; the figures are not as full as one
would like, for whilst the loss of 24,315 passengers per week is recorded
for three bus routes shortly after their introduction, the full year's fig-
ures cover only one route, obviously disguising the full effect.
3. Joyce, Rails of Manchester, 50.	 4. Ibid., 62.
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only as tramway feeders. '
 As already noted, however, this policy was chang-
ing by the late 1920s when express buses were introduced, there being six-
teen routes as early as 1928.2
 In September 1928 Mattinson died at the
early age of 51. In November R. Stuart Pilcher was appointed to the vac-
ancy, taking up his duties in January 1929. 3
 By April the track on route
53 needed renewal,
4
 and in July the transport committee was recommending
its replacement by motor buses.
5
 Conversion followed on 3 Mar 1930. 6
Pilcher made much of this example in his subsequent writings. The
53 was Manchester's busiest route, he said, with over a mile of awkward
single and loop track. Old single-deck forty seat trams were replaced
by double-deck fifty-six seat buses, of a special design which would pass
under the low bridges on the route. For a week or so trams and buses ran
together7
 and the buses were far more popular and earned almost 2d. per
vehicle mile more than the trams. This was because the buses ran faster
and could offer a more attractive and frequent service and also because
the ease of kerbside loading attracted the old and women with children
to ride. 8
 All this was quite true, and Pilcher did have the grace to admit
later that modern trams might have proved attractive too, though he qualif-
ied this immediately by saying that Manchester passengers still preferred
buses over even high-speed cars with upholstered seats. 9
 Ian Yearsley says
that Pilcher did not lie, but presented his facts in such a way as to serve
his cause.'0
 That was certainly so in this example, which Pilcher really
presented as proof that buses could replace city trams successfully. What
1. Ibid., 64-5.	 2. See above, 335.
3. Kirby, Middleton Tramways, 59.
	 4. Klapper, Tramways, 137.
5. Joyce, Rails of Manchester, 80.
6. Pilcher, Road Passenger Transport, 114.
7. Accounting for the fact that Klapper gives the date of conversion
as 7 Apr 1930; see Tramways, 137.
8. Pilcher, Road Transport Operation, 114 and 116.
	 9. Ibid., 117.
10. Yearsley, 'Bus and Coach'; 'economical with the truth', perhaps.
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he only mentioned in passing if at all was the quite unique nature of route
53. Unlike most city tramways it was not a radial line, but described
a semi-circle around most of the city. Not only did it have to contend
with low bridges and some single track, which Filcher did say, it also
crossed at least six other lines, with all the delays and jouncing over
junctions that involved. Pilcher also stated the trams were old
single-deckers, but did not elaborate on their curious design (so far as
British cities were concerned). They were 'California' cars, with a central
saloon flanked by long open ends, on which Mancunians could sit and enjoy
the weather typical of their city.
1
 No wonder passengers preferred the
buses. Pilcher's policy thereafter was to run down the tramways in favour
of motor buses. He usually isolated each route or group of routes and
considered its rebuilding or replacement individually rather than as part
of a linked system. For instance, he recommended closing one route to
Middleton in 1930-1 because of the cost of relaying and because trams al-
ready lost money. 2 As he said, each line should be considered as a new
tramway; would it be built under current circumstances? If not, it should
not be reconstructed either. 3 Filcher was unashamedly pro-bus, being a
consultant to the fanatically anti-tram magazine Bus and Coach. 4 He later
became known as 'the foremost advocate of omnibus substitution for tram-
ways', 5 and indeed Bond suggests that he joined the move towards a change
precisely to make a name for himself. It is true that 'in the ultimate he
did not cause tramway abandonment, which would have taken place without
him anyway, [but) he appeared as the standard bearer to his contemporaries'. 6
Manchester's trams clearly had major problems and deficiencies by 1929
1. Details from Joyce, Rails of Manchester, 80-1; it is curious, as
he says, that one of these untypical cars alone should have survived.
2. Kirby, Middleton Tramways, 67-8.
3. Filcher, Road Passenger Transport, 112.
4. Yearsley, 'Bus and Coach'.
5. Joyce, Rails of Manchester, 88.	 6. Bond, History's Orphan, 65.
346
(far more serious than Sheffield's did) and any manager would have had
to address himself to them, as Mattinson had already begun to do. But
with Filcher there was never any doubt of the direction in which he would
move, and though he may not have influenced the ultimate result, he certain-
ly affected its timing.
In Sheffield A. R. Fearnley was in continuous office as General Manager
from 1904 to 1936.
1
 He was not blind to the advantages of motor buses,
having suggested their use as much as thirty years before his retirement;
2
he had also carried through the closure of three tram routes after 1925.
But this was all against the background of tramway modernisation, and
there was little reason to doubt his belief in the tram's value for city
service. Fearnley was succeeded by Mr. H. Watson, who was in office until
1945 and seems to have been a less dominant personality than Fearnley,
though obviously the period of World War II was not one in which significant
new developments could be undertaken. Insofar as one can tell, he seems
to have regarded trams positively; in 1938 he even suggested an experiment
3
with a Blackpool-style centre-entrance double-decker. The lack of any
impression of a 'new broom' may partly have been due to the fact that Watson
4
had been Fearnley's assistant; his own sucessor was R. C. Moore, and
5
he was the first Manager to state that eventually trams would have to go.
Sheffield thus had a pro-tram management up until 1945, and this obviously
must have influenced policy, just as Filcher had done in Manchester. It
is equally obvious that the financial and operational deficiencies of Man-
chester's tramways as compared with Sheffield's profitable and well-run
system would have made differing approaches necessary anyway. But manager-
ial style and belief, particularly when expressed with the crusading zeal of
1. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 109. 	 2. S.T.D., Tramway Era, 21.
3. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 208.
4. Ibid., 253; though the example of Rayner and Potts in Doncaster
shows another way in which former deputies could react.
5. Ibid., 255.
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a Pilcher, were extremely significant in explaining the differences in
attitudes to tramways taken in the two cities in the 1930s.
Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter has shown that it was possible for a
large city like Sheffield to protect its tramway system against motor bus
competition for most of the inter-war period, even though the policy proved
less effective as time went on. Up until 1925 the tramways were protected
almost 100 per cent by the exclusion of external competitors from the city.
Thereafter such competition was kept at a minimum by the determined expans-
ion of the Corporation's own services, by the purchase of competitors,
by the development of joint services (especially later with the JOC) and
by protective clauses levied on such competitors as remained. At the same
time, the tramway system continued to develop. There were a few minor
route closures, but these were more than matched by extensions. These
were individually fairly short, but because of the uniform fare policy
tended to reduce the trams' earning power. This meant that longer extens-
ions would have been wholly uneconomic, which made further urban bus services
necessary. Thesenewservices, joined by older 'feeder' routes extended into
the city, caused quite serious losses of revenue and earning power on the
tram routes concerned, although the tramways' income overall remained fairly
steady. This, however, was against the background of rapidly rising bus
traffic, brought about to a considerable degree by rigid adherence to the
uniform fare which meant that trams were not used to serve large new estates
like Parson Cross. Even so, the 'pro-tram' management in Sheffield helped
to ensure that the system was maintained and improved right up until World
War II.
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CHAPTER 16
POST-WORLD WAR II FINANCIAL PROBLEMS
The preceding three chapters have identified a total of seven factors
which may have contributed towards the retention of the Sheffield tramway
system up to and including World War II. The first three relate to finance,
namely that the tramways were profitable, that they could finance new
investment from earnings (directly or via loans), and that the consequently
practicable policy of continuous improvement meant that at any one time
,
in the 1930s it was probably actually cheaper to retain the tramways than it
would have been to replace them entirely with motor buses. As well as
being economically viable, the tramways also fitted into town planning
objectives and could be extended relatively cheaply into certain new housing
estates. In the city centre traffic congestion was not yet a severe problem
and, finally, a successful policy of motor bus development and control gave
generally adequate protection to the trams.
Already during the 1930s certain trends were moving against the trams.
As just discussed in the preceding chapter, for instance, there was a great
expansion in urban bus services. The war was a kind of intermission during
which no change in transport arrangements could be carried out. Financially,
the transport department seems to have got through the war relatively
unscathed. The only deficit came in 1940-1 after making a payment of
£124,643 for renewals; the loss of £59,263 was the first in the undertaking's
history, but thereafter surpluses were earned again until 1944-5 1 , helped by
1. See Appendix S14.
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1
a rise in the through tram fare to 2d. in November 1941. This was only
a temporary respite, though, and public transport generally faced severe
problems for the remainder of the decade. The result was to negate most
of the factors which had formerly favoured trams and to make motor buses
the most attractive option.
Working Results after the War 
Appendix S14 shows the working results for both trams and buses.
So far as the trams were concerned, the figures made very bleak reading.
Over the twelve years 1943-4--1954-5 the trams earned a surplus only five
times and clocked up a total deficit of £363,287 as opposed to a surplus
of £188,108 on the motor bus side. It is true that merely reading the
final column of the Table may be regarded as exagerating the financial
crisis. The operating ratio 2
 remained positive throughout, so traffic
revenue always more than covered working costs. Also, column (1) of Appen-
dix S14 shows that the tramways remained in the black after paying loan
charges and taxes each year except 1946-7. Many less fortunate undertak-
ings, such as the DDLR or Doncaster, would have been happy to earn enough
to do this. It is really the renewals appropriations which caused the
deficits. From one point of view these payments might seem excessive.
It is noticeable that up to 1946-7 trams and buses were paying aproximately
equal amounts into the renewals fund, but that thereafter the tramways's
contribution about doubled. Had the sum been split 50:50 the tramways
might have paid about £30,000 less per annum, though even so it would only
have succeeded in reversing the deficit once, in 1953-4. The trams' higher
contribution was probably justified anyway, given the heavy expenditure
from the renewals fund on permanent way. Between 1943-4 and 1954-5 the
tramways' contribution was £1,155,5993
 set against track renewals of
£1,310,404.
4
 Obviously, had a more prodigal policy been followed whereby
1. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 178.
	 2. Appendix S3, column (12)
3. Sum of figures in Appendix S14.
	 4. Ibid., from Table 50 below.
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sufficient funds were not set aside, the tramways would rapidly have
declined into a run-down condition, whereas they were in fact maintained
1
at a reasonably high standard.
The problems were not entirely tramway ones, as the bus side of the
undertaking also made losses after renewals payments, not as frequently,
but in the early 1950s they were much worse than for the trams; in 1951-2
it was not even possible to cover loan charges. However Appendix S14 con-
ceals the severity of the financial crisis facing the tramways in one impor-
tant particular. Appendix S5 shows that the last time recourse was had
to loan finance for major items of capital expenditure was in 1933-4.
This meant that by the time the war ended most old loans had been fully
paid off. Fully 87 per cent of capital on the undertaking as a whole had
2	 3
been repaid by 1940; by 1946 this had risen to 94 per cent. This meant
that the tramways' working balance was having to meet very low loan repay-
ments by this period, and hence that column (1) in Appendix S14 was normally
well on the plus side. If the tramways had been asked to bear the same
loan burdens pro rata post-war as they had before it, the financial situat-
ion would have been even more serious than it was. This helps to conceal
another fact about the post-war situation. Although the operating ratio
remained positive, reference to Appendix S3 will show that the gap between
traffic revenue and working costs grew smaller from 1944-5 onwards; there
were ups and downs, but the trend was adverse and the 1944-5 ratio of 78.65
per cent, quite reasonable even by late pre-war standards, was never
approached again. By 1954-5 the ratio was 98.255 per cent, and it was
only the fact that loan repayments were low which kept the tramway account
in the black. From 1956-7 until the end of the tramways even this veil
was torn away as the revenue account itself slipped into worsening deficit,
with the operating ratio rising from 100.999 to 123.481 percent over those
final years.
1. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 84. 	 2. Sheffield Reports, 1939-40, 2.
3. Ibid., 1945-6, 2.
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In the decade between 1945-6 and 1954-5 the Sheffield tramways showed
a deficit after renewals payments in seven of ten financial years because
the operating surplus was getting smaller and less able to meet these pay-
ments; at the same time the renewals appropriation itself was doubled over
pre-war rates, so putting even further pressure on the already falling sur-
plus. These difficulties were related to the inflation which followed the
war. It was not as severe as that immediately following World War I, partly
because subsidies were used to keep the rate down, but there was also no
deflation, fall in price levels or widespread unemployment as there had been
in the 1920s. The causes of the inflation were various--post-war shortages
or 'too much money chasing too few goods'; imported inflation due to a
decline in the terms of trade; and the consequence of both, manufacturers
raising their prices and workpeople demanding higher wages in self-defence. '
Between 1946 and 1958 the retail price index rose by about 77 per cent;
sometimes the rise was checked, but was generally steadily if not rapidly
set on an upward course. 2 Naturally this had a considerable effect on the
public transport industry, which had to raise its prices to meet increased
costs.
Sheffield increased tram and bus fares six times up to 1960, raising
the standard tram fare from 2d. to 7yd. 3
 This means that any measure of
money income over time shows a steady increase, with tramway revenue per car
mile going up from 20.066d. in 1944-5 to 49.36d. in 1960-1; in the same
period working costs rose from 16.705d. to 60.95d., 4
 rising by 265 per cent
as against 146 per cent for revenue, which clearly failed to keep up with
expenses.
There were three or four possible explanations for this. First, in a
report on the undertaking's financial position in 1946 the General Manager
1. For post-war inflation, see Michael Shanks, The Stagnant Society 
(1961), 34-5.
2. Political and Economic Planning, Growth in the British Economy 
(1960), 182.
3. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 178.	 4. Figures from Appendix S3.
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said that high wartime loadings gave a false impression of revenue, because
each vehicle had been crammed to excess. The officially permitted number of
standing passengers had already been cut, and might be reduced again, whilst
passengers were in any case no longer agreeable to standing. So further
vehicles would have to be put on the road, with no guarantee of any more
1
revenue.	 Actually Appendix S3 shows that this problem was of very short
duration. Revenue per car mile had fallen back in 1945-6, but this was bec-
ause less passengers were carried rather than more miles worked. In any
case, revenue per car mile recovered to beyond its wartime peak in 1946-7 2
and car mileage never exceeded wartime totals. The basic reason was that
ridership fell after the war, meaning that people could be carried comfort-
ably whilst still working less car miles.
Revenue did, however, decline in real terms, but this was not related
to a need to carry the same number of passengers with more vehicles, but to
a quite steep fall in ridership from its 1944-5 peak of 204 million. There
was a sharp fall in 1945-6, a slight recovery in 1946-7, and then a steady
decline to 164 million in 1951-2; towards the end of this year the first two
tram routes closed. 3 The decline continued until 1953-4, when the total was
only about 145 million; after that the accelerating closure programme makes
further comparison meaningless. In about a decade, some 25 per cent of
traffic was lost.
To some extent, this was inevitable. Wartime workers' traffic natur-
ally fell, as the General Manager had said in his 1946 report, 4 and it
was unlikely that traffic in excesss of anything in peacetime before would
be maintained. In fact, it seems surprising in some ways that it took until
1951-2 for tram traffic to fall below the 1938-9 level again. 5
 An explanation
1. Sheffield Minutes, Transport Committee (renamed in 1934; hereafter,
TC) (Special), 24 Apr 1946, 247.
2. Before the first post-war fare increase in April. 	 3. Appendix S8.
4. Sheffield Minutes, TC (Special), 24 Apr 1946, 247.
5. See Appendix S3, column (5).
353
(relating to motor buses but equally applicable to trams) was offered by
C. F. Klapper. This was the bus's golden age, he said, as pre-war traffic
had risen because, for example, of petrol rationing; there were few outlets
for cash, again because of rationing, so the cost of travel was not a great
disincentive; and the main entertainment was the cinema or theatre, which
boosted evening traffic. '
 Be that as it may, tram traffic did fall in the
1940s and early 1950s. Four - reasons may be offered, most in fact relating
to the erosion of the factors suggested by Klapper.
First, there were fare increases in April 1947, December 1950 and March
1952 (and in later years too). 2
 From 1944-5-1953-4 there was an average
loss of about 6.5 million passengers per annum. Between 1946-7 and 1947-8
the loss was nearly 13 million, between 1950-1 and 1951-2 it was average at
6.5 million3 and between 1951-2 and 1952-3 it was up again to 12.8 million. 4
The obvious inference is that fare increases were meeting with resistance
from travellers, although this is not mentioned as a specific cause of
declining traffic until the Annual Report for 1957-8. 5 The same Report
identifies two further changes which were affecting public transport.
These were the increase in the number of private cars, motorcycles and--a
phenomena of the period—scooters together with the decline in evening
traffic caused by the popularity of television. A graph published in the
following year's Report showed how car and motor cycle registrations in
Sheffield had risen from about 33,000 in 1954 to over 140,000 in 1959, there
being an almost exactly equal rise in the number of television licences
issued. 6 However, given that both motor and television licences each only
numbered 33-35,000 in 1954 and that the decision to abandon the trams was
taken in 1951, neither are likely to have caused much traffic loss
1. Klapper, Buses, 2.	 2. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 178.
3. But 1950-1 includes three or four months at the higher fares.
4. Calculated from annual totals in Appendix S3; this last steep drop
in passengers took place after the closure decision had been made.
5. Sheffield Reports, 1957-8, 9.
	 6. Ibid., 1958-9, 10.
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prior to that or to have influenced the closure decision.' It is true that
the number of cars in the UK did go up from 1,486,600 in 1945 to 2,257,873
in 1950, but this was only a fairly small rise of three quarters of a mill-
2
ion doing little more than getting back to the 1939 total of 2,034,400;
in any case, Sheffield is now, and probably was then, a city with a relat-
3
ively low proportion of car owners.
A final cause of falling tram traffic had already become apparent
before the war, namely the tendency of new city bus routes to abstract
tramway passengers. There was not much scope for this after the war until
1948-9, because up until then it had been impossible to get enough vehicles
or to repair the old ones in order to maintain existing services; private
buses and coaches had to be hired as substitutes.
4
 In 1948-9, however,
potential competition was offered to the trams by a new city to Wordsworth
5
Avenue route and by the (re-?) extension of the Dore to Ecclesall service.
In 1950 another new bus route was started touching each of the Meadowhead,
Ecclesall/Fulwood and Millhouses/Abbey Lane tram routes.
6
 Thus whereas
by 1951 the trams were carrying 64 per cent of city passengers, four years
before it had been 71 per cent, so the share of the buses had risen from
29 per cent to 36 per cent.
7
 So the two main reasons why the number of tram
passengers fell prior to the closure decision are thus the deterrent effects
of fare inceases and the 'leakage' to the bus side of the undertaking.
The failure of revenue to keep up with costs was obviously closely rel-
ated to the decline in traffic. Another important factor in this was that
1. Declining traffic receives little mention in the Replacement Report.
2. William Plowden, The Motor Car and Politics 1896--1970 (1971), App-
endix B, 456; the main interest of this study of the motor lobby is negat-
ive, in that it dpes not contain mention of tramways despite the known oppos-
ition of motoring organisations to them.
3. SYPTE, Transport Development Plan, 7-8; in 1971, incidentally, car
ownership was a lesser proportion of the population in Sheffield than in
Doncaster which, if so in the 1920s, could have affected decisions re. trams.
4. Sheffield Reports, 1946-7/47-8, 4.
	 5. Ibid., 1948-9, 4.
6. Ibid., 1951-1, 3.	 7. S.T.D., Replacement Report, 1.
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fare increases took too long to implement. The first post-war increase was
proposed in April 1946, applied for in August, subjected to an inquiry in
November but not accepted by the Minister of Transport until March 1947,
which meant that it was too late to affect the deficit for that year. 2
 This
was the worst ever loss for either the trams or for the undertaking as a
whole.3
 The next increase was applied for in late 1949, 4
 but not imposed
till a year afterwards. 5
 The third rise was granted more expeditiously,
being proposed in November 1951 6
 and put into effect on 9 Mar 1952, 7 though
by that time it was too late to affect the future of the trams.
TABLE 46
SHEFFIELD TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT
PROPOSED FARES NOVEMBER 1951
Maximum Distance
Fare
d.
Tram
(Miles)
Bus
(Miles)
2 11 1a
3 3 2i
4 4
5 5 plus 41
6 6
7 7 etc.
SOURCE: Sheffield Minutes, TC,
25 Nov 1951, 361.
a. Bus fares were also sub-
ject to tramway protective fares
over appropriate stages.
A fourth and related possibility was that the pre-war policy of setting
bus fares above tram fares--partly intended to protect the latter against
loss of traffic to motor buses--might, if reversed by allowing tram fares to
rise to bus levels, have benefitted the trams by increasing the amount of
1. Sheffield Minutes, TC (Special), 24 Apr 1946, 247.
2. Sheffield Reports, 1946-7, 4.	 3. See Appendix S14.
4. Sheffield Minutes, TC, 15 Nov 1949, 335.
	 5. Ibid., 19 Dec 1950, 406.
6. Ibid., 20 Nov 1951, 361.	 7. Ibid., 9 Feb 1952,525.
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their income. '
 Table 46 above shows a differential fare scale proposed
in 1951, which was presumably later adopted; in any case, fares were not
equalised until 1955.
2
 But far from increasing tramway revenue vis-a-vis the
buses, the advantage previously enjoyed by the trams seems to have been
eroded, as Table 47 below shows. There would be other reasons, notably that
TABLE 47
SHEFFIELD TRANSPORT: TRAFFIC REVENUE IN PENCE PER CAR MILE
FOR BUSES VERSUS TRANS 1949-50--1960-1
Year Busesa Trams Differenceb
1949-50 23.403 25.220 1.187
1950-1 23.678 25.673 1.995
1951-2 26.108 29.229 3.121
1952-3 29.495 32.352 2.857
1953-4 29.772 32.007 2.235
1954-5 31.855 33.178 1.323
1955-6 36.350 39.900 3.550
1956-7 38.260 38.360 0.010
1957-8 42.090 40.720 1.370
1958-9 42.100 41.560 0.540
1959-60 42.160 49.390 2.790
1960-1 46.000 49.390 3.390
SOURCE: Sheffield Reports and Accounts, passim.
a. Includes Traffic, Hire and Sundry Revenue for
Category A (city) buses only.
b. Tram revenue less bus revenue.
as the tramway system declined buses would be taking over the traditional
tram services with denser loadings than their former routes. But it could
well be that once the financial disincentive for using buses was removed,
people used them rather than the trams; this was what happened when some
protective fares were reduced or discontinued in Liverpool in 1949.
3
 Tram
revenue did actually go up, as shown by Table 47, but this corresponded to
1. Young suggests this might have been so in Leeds, where higher bus
fares allowed the buses to be profitable without clearing the trams' debt;
the trams, he says, were victims of pre-war ideas of cheap fares. See
Young, 'Leeds Trams: 10', MT 36 (Apr 1973), 117.
2. Sheffield Minutes, TC, 15 Feb 1955, 567.
3. R. E. Blackburn, 'Post-war Liverpool', MT 30 (Nov 1967), 353.
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fare increases in February 1955, January 1957 and May 1960 and showed no
sustained improvement versus buses.
To sum up, revenue proved inadequate in the 1940s prior to the decision
to abandon the tramways because passenger traffic declined. The most impor-
tant reasons for this were that wartime loadings were not maintained, that
fare increases met with passenger resistance and that city bus routes cont-
inued to attract tram passengers away. It is unlikely that two other
factors--rising car ownership and decline in cinema-going--were especially
significant in this period. Revenue suffered further because fare increases
could not be implemented quickly enough though not, it would appear, because
tram fares were kept below bus fares (rather the reverse in fact). This
accounted for half the squeeze on the operating surplus; the other was
a rise in working costs.
On the face of it, the considerable increase there actually was in cash
receipts should have been more than sufficient to clear working expenditure
by a large margin. Inflation took prices up by 77 per cent between 1946 and
1958, whilst tramway revenue rose by 106 per cent over the same period. The
problem was that working costs increased by 133 per cent. Appendix S15
shows these costs from 1939 to 1950. The most important were Traffic, Rep-
air and Power costs and, under these heads, wages of platform staff plus car
and permanent way repairs.
It will be noticed first from Table 48 (overleaf) that total working
costs were always at a higher level relative to 1938-9 than was traffic rev-
enue. The former also always increased more rapidly, with the exception of
the year between 1946-7 and 1947-8, when a fare increase suceeded in closing
some of the gap, albiet temporarily. The varying percentage rises in the
individual costs are surprising, with power costing only 28 per cent more by
1949-50, wages nearly 100 per cent and repairs far in excess even of that.
Even though they did not go up as rapidly as repairs, wages formed an
important element in the overall cost increase because they were so large a
proportion--41.03 per cent in 1938-9 and 39.50 per cent in 1949-50 (based on
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TABLE 48
SHEFFIELD TRANSPORT: PERCENTAGE INCREASES OF SELECTED TRAMWAY
WORKING COSTS FOR THE YEARS 1944-5--1949-50
AS AGAINST 1938-9 (a)
Year
Wages
(Traffic)
PW
Repairs
Car
Repairs Power All Costs Traffic Revenue
1944-5 44.39 35.40 53.54 0.20 39.71 34.29
1945-6 53.69 44.44 - 70.62 10.35 51.67 32.04
1946-7 64.84	 - 93.81 92.72 23.26 70.11 36.79
1947-8 79.03 128.89 128.86 25.18 83.76 66.64
1948-9 93.21 118.89 154.53 26.86 97.56 67.06
1949-50 96.25 126.51 173.20 27.94 103.86 68.79
SOURCE: calculated from data in Appendix S15.
a. The Table is taken to 1949-50 only because (1) costs from then on
are recorded under slightly different and not strictly comparable heads and
(2) since the decision to close the tramways was taken in 1951, only cost
movements prior to that year are relevant to that decision.
b. This excludes costs attributableto World War II (such as air raid
precautions) which the transport department clearly regarded as exceptional.
figures in, Appendix S15). Wage increases were not within the control of the
transport department, as these were negotiated through the National Joint
1
Industrial Council for Transport Workers. There was either an increase in
pay and/or a reduction in hours in most post-war years. In 1945-6, for
example, wage increases cost £37,000 per annum, whilst from 1 Jan 1946 add-
2
itional Sunday pay was negotiated.
	 Every annual report mentions wages as a
major cause of cost increases and/or deficits. Wages will have risen as a
response to post-war inflation and also because transport undertakings found
it very hard to attract and retain staff in a period of full employment;
'higher wages and more sociable working hours in manufacturing industry more
3
than off-set the security of municipal employment. This problem became
4
even more acute in Sheffield in the mid-1950s, after the tramway scrapping
1. Sheffield Reports, 1944-5, 4.
2. Sheffield Minutes, TC (Special), 24 Apr 1946, 246.
3. Jones, Rails of Yorkshire, 156.
4. See, for example, Sheffield Reports, 1955-6, 11.
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decision, but wage costs themselves may have beeninfluential because bus
wage costs rose less rapidly. '
Electricity costs rose surprisingly little in this period. An increase
in charges was mentioned in 1946, 2
 but thereafter this did not appear in the
litany of justifications for fare increases. The percentage increases
which did occur were probably related to the price of coal and thus tied
loosely to inflation. It is frequently said that nationalisation of the
elecrtricity supply industry--which took place on 1 Apr 1948
3
--was detrimen-
tal to tramway (and trolleybus) operation. 4
 For instance, a transport
journal said in 1962 that 'The Electricity Boards have been extremely short-
sighted in their attitude towards electric traction and particularly to
trolleybuses. The threatened complete disappearance of these useful
vehicles within a few years can be mainly attributed to high current costs' 
.
5
Actual increases in charges can be dismissed, however, as a reason for the
closure of the Shefield tramways, both because of the slow rise in costs
prior to 1951
6
 and also because higher charges, though imposed under nation-
alisation, were not made until after 1951. Up until 1953 Electricity Boards
had honoured existing contracts made with their predecessors, but these nat-
urally varied from place to place. The Municipal Passenger Transport Assoc-
iation pressed for a standard rate, the result of which in Yorkshire was
reduced charges in Bradford and Huddersfield but higher ones in Leeds and
Sheffield.
7
 These were imposed in two stages, from 1 Apr 1952 and again the
1. For bus costs, see Appendix S7.
2. Sheffield Minutes, TC (Special), 24 Apr 1946, 246.
3. Andrew Shonfield, British Economic Policy since the War (1958, rev-
ised edition 1959), 8.
4. See, for example, Jones, Rails of Yorkshire, 156.
5. From Passenger Transport (1962), quoted in Joyce, Town Transport, 64.
6. In fact Appendix S15 shows that electricity costs tended to level
out or even decline in the years immediately after nationalisation.
7. Young, 'Leeds Trams: 13', MT 36 (Aug 1973), 269.
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following year.' This is not to say that the electricity industry, pre-
as well as post-nationalisation, might not have given more favourable con-
sideration to such large customers, nor to deny the general point that
with the loss of municipal electricity departments, local authorities no
longer had the same interest in maintaining electric transport.
2
 But
changes to charges as a result of nationalisation were introduced too late
to influence the closure decision in Sheffield.
Repairs costs for cars and track showed the greatest increases in
the 1940s and from being 17.90 per cent of costs in 1938-9 rose to 22.81
per cent in 1949-50. 3
 Various factors combined to cause this sharp in-
crease. Wages of engineering staff obviously rose like those of traffic
employees. Moreover, just as shortage of labour helped to push up wages,
the post-war shortage of materials doubtless encouraged manufacturers to
push up their prices. Difficulty in getting materialswasmentioned in
1947, for ,instance, 4
 and rising costs in the previous year. 5
 The problem
was also one of post-war adjustment, as maintenance had been deferred during
the war and had urgently to be done at higher cost. 6
 One might also expect
that as the tram fleet aged, repair costs would become proportionately
higher. By 1951 17 per cent of the fleet was over twenty-five years old
(twenty-six cars were over thirty years old) and a further 59 per cent
over fifteen years; only 12 per cent could be described as new. 7
Many of these problems were of course shared with the motor bus side of
the undertaking, which was also subject to higher costs. Unfortunately the
bus accounts were not presented in terms of pence per vehicle mile until
1. Sheffield Reports, 1952-3, 4 and 1953-4, 4.
2. Joyce, Tramway Twilight, 46.
3. Calculated from costs per mile in Appendix S15.
4. Sheffield Reports, 1946-7, 4. 	 5. Ibid., 1945-6, 4.
6. Sheffield Minutes, TC (Special), 24 Apr 1946, 247.
7. S.T.D., Replacement Report, 1.
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1950-1, but luckily a paper in the files of a later General Manager,
C. T. Humpidge,
1
 . permits a comparison with 1939, displayed in Appendix S7.
When the percentage cost increases for trams (Table 48 above) and for buses
(Appendix S7) are compared, it becomes clear that motor bus costs rose less
quickly than tramway costs in this period, overall by as much as 20 per cent.
The major costs involved were again wages, repairs and power, and these
increased respectively by 12.20, 12.54 and 19.27 per cent less than the
equivalent tramway costs.
Taking the last first, some advantage probably accrued from the elimin-
ation of petrol-engined buses from the fleet. In 1938-9 there were about
sixty such vehicles left, whereas by 1949-50 there were no more than one or
two, mostly used as works vehicles. 2
 Diesel engines return about twice the
mileage per gallon as equivalent petrol engines. 3
 Sixty buses formed 17 per
cent of the 19389 fleet of 351, 4
 so the elimination of these should theor-
etically have produced a fuel saving of half that--8.5 per cent. There was
also something of a craze at the beginning of the 1950s for constructing
lightweight bodies in the interests of fuel economy, meaning that the stan-
dard eight ton double-decker5 could be replaced by one weighing as little as
six tonsPit was not likely that this trend would have influenced Shef-
field's fuel costs in the 1940s, however, particularly as the immediate
1. Chaceley Humpidge, referred to several times above, joined Birming-
ham Corporation as an Assistant Engineer in 1928, moving to Liverpool in
1935 (during the tramway modernisation period there). He then became succ-
essively Chief Engineer at Portsmouth and Nottingham, before being appointed
General Manager at Rochdale (1942), Bradford (1951), where he developed the
trolleybus system, and finally Sheffield (1961). The various papers
referred to under his name were part of a file of miscellaneous transport
material in his private papers. Biographical details from The Journal (of
the Tramway Museum Society), 9 (June 1969), 14-15.
2. See Hall, Sheffield Transport, 304-5; one cannot be entirely precise
about numbers because of the way in which Hall records withdrawal dates.
3. Pilcher, Road Passenger Transport, 224.
	 4. See Appendix S13.
5. Gavin Booth, Bus Monographs 1: Leyland Atlantean (1984), 6.
6. A. A. Townsin, 'The Future of Bus Design in Great Britain', in
in Buses and Trams [mid-19500], 32.
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post-war tendency was to build stronger designs in the interests of long
life and without too much regard to weight.' Ironically, severe increases
in fuel oil costs came after the decision to abandon trams had been made.
One reason why costs did not go up much in the 1940s was evidently that
fuel oil taxation was kept at a fairly low level. The tax was raised in
2
the 1950 budget, costing Sheffield £58,650; in the following year it went
up by another 41d. a gallon at a cost of £40,000; 3 in 1952 a further 71d.
was imposed, making the tax rate a massive 200 per cent, equivalent to
4
£200,000 per annum.
Moving on to repairs, the increasing use of all-metal bus bodies from
1931 onwards meant that buses could be kept for at least ten years without
drastic rebuilding, and the resultant savings in maintenance costs consider-
ably increased profit margins.
5
 Just how many Sheffield buses were of
this type is not easy to determine. Some post-war buses were certainly
still provided with what were known as composite bodies, which had metal
cladding on wooden frames; Roe's of Leeds provided some for the JOC
6
 in
1952, for example. By contrast, it is likely that the Roberts bodies on
some 1948 deliveries
7
 would have been of the all-metal type used by them
for trams. In contrast, apart from the Roberts cars, all the trams were
either composite or else wooden-bodied, with correspondingly high mainten-
ance costs, especially as they grew older. The 'drastic rebuilding'
mentioned in connection with the older buses was still necessary for trams,
so that for instance between 1952 and 1956 twenty-three older cars had
their lower saloons totally rebuilt to resemble those of the 'improved
8
Standards'.
1. Ibid., 33.
	 2. Sheffield Reports, 1950-1, 2.
3. Ibid., 1951-2, 3; there was a price increase too.
4. Ibid., 1952-3, 3-4.
5. A. Millar, British Buses of the 1930s (Cambridge, 1982), 76.
6. Townsin, 'The Future of Bus Design in Great Britain', 32.
7. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 308-9.	 8. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 91.
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Finally, wages. The fact that the bus wage bill rose less quickly
than the trams' •can only have been due to increased productivity. Because
the data is not readily available, this cannot be shown from Sheffield
itself. But there is good evidence that productivity was rising in the
industry as a whole. Table 49 is part of a larger table relating to the
giant Midland Red bus company and shows the number of miles operated
TABLE 49
FLEET, MILEAGE, PASSENGERS AND STAFF OF THE MIDLAND RED BUS COMPANY
1934 - -1954 (WITH ADDITIONAL DATA)
Year Fleet Staff Mileage Passengers
Total :Bus :Staff Total :Bus :Staff
1934 1,045 5,198 38,483,603 36,826 7,405 145,882,777 139,600 28,065
1944 1,432 6,362 43,525,542 30,395 6,841 327,424,183 228,648 52,587
1954 1,910 8,454 76,996,006 40,312 9,108 384,594,462 201,258 45,492
SOURCE: Fleet, staff and total mileage and passengers from R. C. Anderson,
A History of the Midland Red (Newton Abbot, 1984), Appendix IV (no page num-
ber); the other columns are per bus and per member of staff and are calculat-
ed for this Table.
and passengers carried per vehicle and per employee. Especially as against
1944, employees in 1954 were operating many more miles apiece, which would
obviously tend to reduce wage costs per mile, or rather to moderate the
sharp pay increases typical of this period. Incidentally, each bus was also
operating more miles, which would have a similar effect on repair costs per
vehicle mile. It is noticeable that the number of passengers carried per
vehicle/employee, regressed over the decade, not too surprising when the base
year was 1944, but evidence that earnings per mile might be on a less favour-
able trend than running costs. Turning to Sheffield trams, there is no
reason to suppose that their productivity was getting any better during the
second half of the 1940s, rather the reverse in fact. Car mileage was
static or slightly falling, and the fleet, and presumably therefore the num-
ber of employees, remained the same throughout, so there could not be any
dramatic increase in labour productivity as there was for the Midland Red.
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1
It is a reasonable assumption that part of the reason why buses and bus
staff were able to cover much higher mileages was that the buses themselves
were capable of running faster. Again, this would not be true of the trams,
which were the same vehicles as had been running before the war, whereas
a lot of the Sheffield buses were new.
Both motor buses and trams were, of course, becoming more expensive
to operate in this inflationary period. However, because bus costs rose
less fast, the trend was moving in their favour. It will be seen from
cen_t"
comparing Appendices S7 and S15 that whereas buses were 9.6 perhcheaper
per vehicle to run in 1938-9,
2
 by 1949-50 their advantage had risen to 22.8
per cent. Even allowing for the trams' higher capacity, the argument was
moving very much in favour of the motor bus.
Costs of Renewal 
The obvious inference from the fact that tramway repair costs were
rising so rapidly after the war is that renewal costs would rise by an
at least equal proportion. Table 50 overleaf shows the expenditure on
permanent way between 1938-9 and 1950-1. Without knowing the mileage of
track dealt with in each year, it is impossible to form an adequate estimate
of costs per mile of line, but obviously renewal costs overall post-war
were at least double those of 1939. This was partly due to rising prices;
rails, for example, were costing about 60 per cent more than they had done
by the 1940s.
3
 But it was also a result of exceptionally high expenditure
due to deferred maintenance during the war.
4
 Nor were costs the only prob-
lem; by 1951 increasing difficulty in obtaining rail supplies was expected
1. Fleet and car mileage in Appendix S3, columns (3) and (4).
2. The 1938-9 . figure is the sub-total without the exceptional war
costs.
3. Joyce, Tramway Twilight, 45.
4. Sheffield Minutes, TC (Special), 24 Apr 1946, 247.
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TABLE 50
SHEFFIELD TRANSPORT: EXPENDITURE FROM THE TRAMWAYS' RENEWAL FUND
ON PERMANENT WAY 1938-9--1950-1
Year Expenditure
£
Change over 1938-9
1938-9 44,237
1939-40 39,402 10.93
1940-1--42-3 Not available
1943-4 91,437 106.70
1944-5 92,940 110.10
1945-6 109,479 147.48
1946-7 89,567 102.47
1947-8 124,003 180.32
1948-9 142,553 222.25
1949-50 115,281 160.60
1950-1 114,118 157.97
SOURCE: Sheffield Reports and Accounts, passim.
too. 1 Even so, the track had been maintained in 'satisfactory order' during
the war, 2 and afterwards the level of expenditure showed that efforts were
being made to restore it 'to its former quality and condition'.
Although the cars too were kept in good order, little or no attempt
was made to renew the fleet. The 1947 annual report refers to an unsuccess-
4
ful effort to get an allocation of timber to build new trams, and before
that just one car of a new streamlined design had been built at Queens
Road in 1946, largely to mark the Jubilee of the undertaking.
5
 By 1947
the rolling stock problem was becoming acute, and of the actual fleet of
468 cars 93 were unserviceable and the peak hour requirement was short
7by 31. It was therefore decided to order 35 new cars, basically similar
to the Sheffield-built prototype, but using the same constructional tech-
1. S.T.D., Replacement Report, 2.
	 2. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 84.
3. Ibid., 86.
4. Sheffield Reports, 1946-7, 4; presumably these bodies were to
be built at Queens Road, as had been the rule for many years past.
5. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 86.	 6. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 255.
7. Sheffield Reports, 1947-8, 4.
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niques as contemporary buses with metal frames and pillars instead of the
traditional wood; the only tender came from Charles Roberts of Horbury,
a firm of railway wagon builders who had recently entered the bus body
1
market. The original tender for the complete cars was for £4,420 per
car, plus 5 per cent contingencies and any increase in labour or material
costs; the body shell itself was priced at £1,800.
2
 By the end of 1949
3
Roberts were asking £3,280 per body, and the eventual cost of the complete
4	 5
cars--delivered between 1950 and 1952 --was £254,452, or £7,270 apiece.
The original tender plus 5 per cent was £4,641, so the price had inflated
by 57 per cent over three or four years. At the same period new double-deck
buses--Metro-Cammell-Weymann bodies on Leyland chassis--were available
6
at £4,206 complete, less than the original quotation for trams. By the
time the last new 'Roberts cars' were entering service, the decision to
close the tramway had already been reached.
The whole episode of the fleet renewal, such as it was, illustrates
the various difficulties which made the post-war situation so much harder
than before it. First, the difficulty in obtaining supplies in the immed-
iate post-war years stifled any attempt to return to previous programmes of
regular fleet renewal. As it happens, the Replacement Report estimated that
293 trams would need replacing over fifteen years if they were to be kept;
this works out to about twenty per annum, almost exactly the same as pre-war.
But this was achieved only by planning to scrap twenty-six cars without
8
replacement and, more significantly, by extending the 'book life' of new
9
trams to thirty years instead of the former twenty-five. The reason for
1. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 255.
2. Sheffield Minutes, TC, 18 Nov 1947, 38.
3. Ibid., 20 Dec 1949, 408.	 4. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 89.
5. Capital AcCount, 1949-50--1952-3, passim.
6. Sheffield Minutes, TC, 17 Jun 1952, 84.
7. S.T.D., Replacement Report, 1.
	 8. Because of lower traffic?
9. S.T.D., Replacement Report, 1.
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this is not stated, but it may have been thought that modern metal-bodied
cars would last longer. If so, previous tramway experience was not all
that encouraging. For example, Johannesburg tramways had placed fifty
all-metal bodied cars in service in 1936, 1
 but by the early 1950s serious
corrosion had appeared, as it had on the similar and contemporary cars
in Edinburgh; rather than spend the necessary £600 per car, the undertaking
laid them up. 'The premature withdrawal of these cars with body defects
was probably a major factor in the demise of the tram in Johannesburg'.
S.o the Sheffield car modernisation plan may have been over-optimistic;
`41P-Aar
if a twenty-fiveixlife had been assumed as before, a further sixty-four
cars
3
 would have needed replacing during the envisaged time span. In any
case, the Roberts cars came through too slowly for any full-scale replace-
ment; thirty-five cars over three years averages about twelve per annum,
whereas twenty were needed. This illustrates another problem, the diffic-
ulty in getting a supplier. Sheffield is a perfect example of the point
mentioned by Ian Yearsley, that the habit of large tramways of constructing
their own cars led to the atrophy of the commercial car-building industry.
Of the 310 cars built for Sheffield since 1921, only sixteen were from
4
outside manufacturers. As a result, when the Corporation needed such
manufacturers,
5
 they were not there. Charles Roberts were not a large firm,
and could only offer slow delivery and high prices, as opposed to the fairly
cheap and mass-produced vehicles available from the bus manufacturers.
1. Tony Spit, Johannesburg Tramways: a history of the tramways of the 
City of Johannesburg, revised and with additional material by Brian Patten
(1976), 67-8.
2. Ibid., 96-7; it is worth pointing out that one of the Sheffield
cars still runs regularly as the National Tramway Museum, Crich, and that
another runs at the Beaumish Museum and also had a full season running in
service conditions at Blackpool in 1985 (personal knowledge).
3. See S.T.D., Replacement Report, 1.
4. See Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 151-2 and 155.
5. The inability to build locally was blamed on post-war restrictions;
see S.T.D., Tramway Era, 26. It is also true that if metal bodies had been
required, Queens Road would probably not have been equipped for this form of
construction.
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Virtually all of the few post-war new trams in Britain were built loc-
ally--principally by Glasgow--or by firms previously unknown in the ind-
ustry, such as R. Y. Pickering, who built twenty cars for Aberdeen. '
 The
2
price differential between new buses and trams in 1952-43,000 --contrasts
sharply with the situation about 1930, when trams and buses cost the same.
Some of the difference must have been because the few trams needed had
to be virtually hand-built by small suppliers. In West Germany, on the
other hand, post-war reconstruction was dealt with by re-equipping the
4
tramways with small mass-produced cars, which were probably relatively
cheap to buy.
The difficulty in purchasing new trams meant that the price escalated
in the period between ordering and delivery. When buses could be bought
more-or-less off the shelf, their attractiveness was obvious. Another
reason why buses were bought in preference to trams in the 1940s was that
many pre-war buses were by then over-age and virtually had to be replaced,
whereas trams were solidly-built enough to carry on for a while longer.
Young makes this point in relation to Leeds, and also shows how, once new
5
buses were bought, they put the old trams at a disadvantage. Hall says
of Sheffield that petrol-engined buses bought in 1930 with a life-expectancy
of eight years were still running in 1945 and needed urgent replacement.
Investment plans as a whole favoured buses too, most of the capital schemes
mentioned as post-war priorities being bus related--namely, Pond Street
bus station, Herries Road garage, extensions to Queens Road works and a
7
new employees club and canteen.
	 There were other reasons for this, but it
added to the pro-bus thrust of the first five post-war years. By the time
1. Joyce, Tramway Twilight, 33-6.
	 2. See above, 366.
3. See above, 309 and 310.
4. Hendlmeiei, Handbuch der deutchen Strassenbahngeschichte 1, 153.
5. Young, 'Leeds Trams: 10', MT 36 (Apr 1973), 118.
6. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 253.
7. Sheffield Minutes, TC (Special), 24 Apr 1946, 247.
3
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investment in new trams was possible, they were too expensive.
Nevertheless, when the capital costs of tramway renewal and bus re-
placement were estimated in 1951, there was not all that much difference
between them, as Table 51 below shows. The capital advantage of using
buses was only £30,000, and even this would have been reversed if fleet
replacements had been calculated in a different way. The longer loan red-
emption period for the trams could have been argued, especially as the
'life' for trams had been raised from twenty-five to thirty years in the
same report, but there was not much justification for reducing the loan
period on buses, as these too were now more durable; vehicles being bought
TABLE 51
SHEFFIELD TRANSPORT: ESTIMATED ANNUAL COST OF TRANS OR REPLACEMENT BUSES
Item Trams
£
Alternative
£
Buses
£
Alternative
£
1.	 Annual Working Expenses 1,360,000 ft 1,373,400 It
2.	 Annual Loan Charges
a.	 On Capital Expenditure
to date (amount still
payable at the end of
15 years)
b.	 For new trams (over
15 years)
4,600
175,900
II 4,600 ft
OR ibid. (over 25
years)
c.	 For new buses (over
10 years)
121,000
195,000
OR ibid. (over 8 years)
d.	 For permanent way
renewal
e.	 For garages, road
reinstatement etc.
120,000 II
56,100
237,000
56,100
Totals 1,660,900 1,606,600 1,629,700 1,671,100
SOURCE: S.T.D., Replacement Report, Appendix A, 4.
in 1950 were only withdrawn in the period 1961-7. 1
 Taking a long view, it
1. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 309.
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might have been argued that because buses were (still) shorter-lived than
trams, they would need replacing again during the trams' life, thus doubling
the £195,000 allowed for new buses. However although after the war reduced
surpluses forced a reversal of the pre-war policy of buying buses from
revenue or reserves,' it was always the intention to return to the previous
arrangement
2
 which, if achieved, would have meant that bus replacements
would not have been a capital burden. Another point is that whilst the
sum for garages, road reinstatement etc. was a one-off payment, that for
track renewal would have needed paying perpetually. All-in-all, it is best
to take the figures as they were presented, and on which the decisions
were taken. What made buses cheaper on the bottom line was not working
but capital costs. The obvious item which swung the balance was permanent
way renewals, which were not chargeable to buses. But of course if trams
had still cost roughly the same as buses, with their longer loan period
they would have been cheaper to finance. So the high cost of cars was
also an important factor influencing future policy. The argument from
capital costs was clearly crucial, and this was so in other cities which
were considering the future of their tramways about this time. In a 1945
report the Liverpool manager estimated that an all-bus solution would cost
£3,779,450, whereas modernised trams would cost either £6,765,400 or
£7,439,600, depending on the type of car chosen. 3
 In Leeds, Young con-
cludes, if a planned post-war extension had been built and 100 new cars
bought, the loan debt would have crippled the undertaking financially for
twenty years. What people wanted was cheap transport in British buses,
which were the cheapest in the world seat-for-seat, and politicians had
little choice but to follow suit. 4
 A final and almost certainly decisive
point is that by 1950 the trams in Sheffield were not earning enough to pay
1. Sheffield Reports, 1946-7, 2. 	 2. Ibid., 1954-5, 3.
3. Blackburn, 'Post-war Liverpool', MT 30 (Aug 1967), 272; this was
not merely for replacement of existing tramways, but for their complete mod-
ernisation and relocation off-street.
4. Young, 'Leeds Trams: 17', MT 37 (Feb 1974), 42 and 44.
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for their renovation. In the 1940s after proper allowance was made for
renewal, the trams were often in the red, and this in a period when the
loan burden on the system was declining. Had loan charges been raised
by £1.6 million, there was no way in which this could have been covered
by earnings without massive fare increases. These would probably then
have hastened the shift to private transport and been politically indefens-
ible as well. There really was little choice.
Conclusion 
This chapter has summarised the financial problems facing the tramways
after World War II. In contrast to the situation before the war, Sheffield
tramways were no longer profitable after making proper provision for renewal
and were increasingly threatened with a working loss. They were also unable
to earn enough to finance new investment either from revenue or by loans
and when the situation was analysed it was clear that renewing the tramways
would be more costly than an all-bus solution, which was the opposite of the
situation before the war. Part of the difficulty lay in the fact that it was
increasingly hard to protect the trams against municipal motor buses, which
were taking a growing proportion of the traffic and thus, obviously, con-
tributing to the tramways' financial weakness.
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CHAPTER 17
PLANNING AND POLITICS
The Central Area Plan 
The Sheffield Manager's report recommending closure of the tramways
actually made very little of the financial argument, apart from saying that,
with buses, vehicles were 'the first and last expense' and had no track
costs. '
 Much more spacewas given to matters of town and traffic planning,
and as with the finances, the positive pre-war image of the tram was giving
way to a negative one. A crucial passage in the report read as follows:
,
In view of the foregoing, and bearing in mind the City Council decision
of 5th February 1947, in connection with the new Central Area plan, and
with particular reference to the present growing traffic congestion in
the City centre and the need for some early relief being provided,
a scheme of gradual tramway replacement might be considered desirable for
commencement at an early date. (2)
In common with most major cities, Sheffield was much exercised before and
during World War II with planning and, later, with post-war reconstruction,
in which a major concern seems to have been to fit the motor vehicle into
towns which had been built for the use of men and horses only. The problems
were naturally most acute in city centres, and Sheffield City Council first
adopted a draft central area plan in December 1939. 3
 There seems to have
been some disagreement as to how best to proceed from principle to practice,
and by the middle of the war three separate plans drawn up by the City Plan-
ning Officer, Architect and Engineer respectively were being considered.
There does not seem to have been much consulation with the transport depart-
1. S.T.D., Replacement Report, 2.
	 2. Ibid.
3. Sheffield Minutes, City Council, 6 Dec 1939, 8.
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ment, though the Deputy Chairman of the Transport Committee, Councillor
1
Bridgeland, was a member of the Town Planning Committee. It was anyway
decided to ask Mr. Manzoni, the City Engineer of Birmingham, to adjudicate
on the three plans.
2
His report, favouring plan B, was presented in 1944. All three plans
were designed to keep trams running reasonably well whilst the schemes took
shape; Manzoni said it had to be assumed trams might not be eliminated for
ten years. But it was categorically stated that 'in order to derive the
maximum traffic relief from any of the three plans, it is essential that
trams should ultimately be removed from the principal traffic routes. The
gyratory system of traffic controls cannot work with trams running, and a
great part of all the schemes would, therefore, be abortive until trams were
removed'. The 'gyratory system' here probably means roundabouts, but may
refer as well to the idea of a City Circle around the centre, beyond which
no PSVs at all were expected to penetrate. 3
 The Council agreed to the plan
in December 1944 and by 1947 the Planning Committee was making further prop-
osals, including the following: that 'the Council . . . approve . . . the
abandonment of trams at surface level4
 in the Central Area as soon as this
course becomes practicable' and that the Moor 5
 be redeveloped on the
assumption that PSVs do not use it at all, but run along alternative streets
to be provided east and west of the Moor. This scheme also involved the
building of both a Civic Circle6
 and an inner ring road. 7
These plans included a number of then fashionable concepts. The 'Civic
Circle' was to enclose the core of the city and take most traffic around
rather than through it. Public transport was to be excluded entirely (bring-
1. Appointed in 1939-40 and then Chairman from 1944-5; see Sheffield
Reports, passim.
2. Special Committee re. Town Planning and Civic Centres, 25th Report,
in Sheffield Minutes, 1943-4, 208.
3. Town Planning Committee, 30 Nov 1944, 50.
	 4. My emphasis.
5. A city street, then used by trams.
	 6. An 'inner' inner ring.
7. Sheffield Minutes, Town Planning Committee, 27 Jan 1947, 141.
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ing to mind the Manchester plans of a generation previous). This was not
necessarily incompatible with tramways, as the Sheffield planners evidently
believed it was, for both Leeds and Liverpool floated plans at about this
time for inner rings complete with reserved track tramways, inside which
trams would be banned. ' But it did make trams more of a hindrance than a
help, and in fact none of the schemes put forward ever received much support.
The objections--such as the possible need for shuttle buses within the
zone--were not insuperable, and there is at least one excellent example of
such an arrangement which involves trams in Braunschweig, West Germany; here
through motor traffic uses a 'box' around the historic centre, and though
trams do not run right round, they use two sides currently and are being
projected along a third. 2 In early post-war Britain, however, adoption of
'traffic free' zones was much more likely to lead to removal of tramways
than to their relocation. A further idea which was doing the rounds at the
time was that of underground tramways. Such a possibility was presumably
implied by the amendment tabled in 1947 about removing trams 'at surface
level'. If so, there appears to have been no real intention of carrying out
further studies, and the amendment was doubtless only so phrased to defuse
any possible opposition from the Council. A similar idea was pursued more
seriously in Leeds during the war and a system of tram tubes reached the
planning stage, 3 but eventually lapsed in the face of financial realities. 4
A second issue raised by these events was the general attitude of town
planners to tramways. As described above, in the 1920s and even into the
early 1930s, trams could be seen as aids to better planning. Yet by the
middle of the war, if not earlier, planners made the almost axiomatic ass-
umption that trams had to go. It may have been simply that different prob-
lems required different solutions in the two decades concerned; in the 1920s
1. See Young, 'Leeds Trams: 8', MT 36 (Feb 1973), 43 and Blackburn,
'Post-war Liverpool', MT 30 (Aug 1967), 270.
2. Personal knowledge.
3. Young, 'Leeds Trams: 8', MT 36 (Feb 1973), 43-4. 	 4. Ibid., 48.
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it was population dispersion, for which the tram was often well-suited,
whereas in the 1940s it was traffic congestion in city centres, for which
the tram was seen as a cause rather than a solution. On the other hand it
could have been more a matter of fashion; 'in the post-war world [the tram1
was a thing of yesterday, something from the past that was obsolete in
1
modern times'.
Traffic Congestion 
The Central Area Plan was largely designed around the need for traffic
management, and trams were seen as an obstacle to this. The report on
replacing the tramways mentioned 'relief in the central area' as an advant-
age to be derived from eliminating certain tram services and also that clos-
ing the Malin Bridge branch would reduce congestion at the terminus 'which
has been a source of anxiety for some time and about which the City Police
2
have made representations to the Transport Department'. Traffic delays
caused by 'trams running and picking up in the centre of the roads were
mentioned in the report too. Clearly, pre-war days when traffic congestion
was seen as either not particularly severe in Sheffield or as a problem in
whose solution trams deserved as much if not more consideration than other
vehicles were gone. Bearing in mind that the report came out early in the
3
1950s when car traffic was not all that much greater than in 1939, this
stress on traffic problems could seem a little surprising. However although
the number of cars had only just recovered to pre-war levels, the total of
motor vehicles as a whole was 25 per cent greater, a lot of them probably
lorries which would have been prominent in an industrial city like Sheffield.
Also, the planners were obviously and rightly envisaging a still greater
growth in motor traffic, and were laying long-term plans for the city centre
1. Joyce, Tramway Twilight, 47-8.
	 2. S.T.D., Replacement Report, 9.
3. Of course, this is precisely when traffic planning for the city
centre was beginning.
4. See Table 52 overleaf.
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with this in mind.
TABLE 52
UNITED KINGDOM: MOTOR VEHICLES IN USE FOR SELECTED YEARS
BETWEEN 1939 AND 1960
Year Total Cars
(Aug) 1939 • 3,148,600 2,034,400
"	 1945 2,552,500 1,486,600
(Sep) 1950 4,409,223 2,257,873
"	 1955 6,465,433 3,525,858
"	 1960 9,439,140 5,525,828
SOURCE: Plowden, The Motor Car and Politics, Appendix B,
456.
Three specific arguments were deployed against the trams--that they
caused delays by loading in the centre of the streets; that traffic could
not pass between trams and parked cars, preventing overtaking; and that
1
trams could not negotiate roundabouts. The first was probably the most
serious objection and had been causing concern to tramway operators them-
selves as traffic grew because of the danger to passengers; the problem was
that though reserved tracks might be built in outer areas, this was not
2
thought possible in city centres because of the cost.
	 In Sheffield there
was scope for kerbside loading or pedestrian refuges at only a very few cen-
tral locations like Pinstone Street and Exchange Street. The second point
was largely irrelevant, for the report itself admitted that in the majority
of Sheffield streets any other form of transport would run in the same pos-
3
ition in the roadway if parking were permitted at the roadside though, of
coursel it was true that buses could draw to one side when loading. Regard-
ing roundabouts, when these began to be constructed in Sheffield trams did
run straight through the middle. There is still one example at Firth Park,
1. S.T.D., Replacement Report, 2.
	 2. Joyce, Tramway Twilight, 46-7.
3. S.T.D., Replacement Report, 2.
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1
where the tram tracks remain today, isolated in the centre of the roundabout.
There was, however, no real reason apart from cost why tracks could not be
diverted to flow with the traffic; as late as 1951 London Transport was
installing new tramway roundabouts.
2
 So except for the difficulties caused
by street loading, the effect of trams on traffic congestion was at least
arguable. Joyce included this telling quotation in one of his books:
Just over a year ago, Glasgow said goodbye to the last tram. They were
regarded by the experts as the biggest contributory factor to traffic
chaos. What difference has the tramless twelve months made? According
to the police traffic department, 'the difference, if any, is negligible
. . . At peak times, traffic is no faster in the centre of town than at
this time last year'. (3)
Moreover, trams were probably at least as much sinned against as sinning,
for increasing congestion slowed them down too. Glasgow's horse trams in
1872 had achieved an average speed of 9 m.p.h., yet by 1952 the city's
electric trams could only manage 9.23 m.p.h.
4
 In a sense, however, the
actual effect of trams on street traffic is irrelevant in the present con-
text; what mattered was that planners, and bodies such as motoring organis-
ations, believed trams to be a major cause of congestion, so making this a
reputable argument to use towards their replacement.
Extensions 
A further point mentioned in the Manager's report was the cost of track
laying in order to adjust routes. 5 This may refer to alterations in order
to meet the Central Area Plan, but could also cover the ever-present need to
expand services to new areas. The previous discussion has shown how in the
1930s plans for some tramway extensions were allowed to lie on the table,
and that instead new motor bus routes were introduced. So when in 1949 the
powers for extensions to Shiregreen and from Handsworth, Wadsley Bridge and
1. Personal observation. 	 2. Joyce, Tramway Twilight, 36.
3. Glasgow Evening Citizen (1963); quoted in Joyce, Town Transport, 59.
4. 'Municipal Passenger Transport: Extracts from Mr. A. C. Findlay's
Paper', MT 16 (Dec 1953), 231; Findlay was then General Manager of Leeds
City Transport.
5. S.T.D., Replacement Report, 2.
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Meadowhead were approaching expiry, it was decided not to build them, except
that housing developments in the Meadowhead area made the Committee leave
1
this possibility open. 	 This is the last which is heard of the matter,
though, and even before that it had been decided on the suggestion of Roth-
erham Corporation to make permanent the originally temporary withdrawal
2
 of
the joint Sheffield to Rotherham tram service; 3 the reason for this was that
Rotherham's small tram fleet wasworn out and would have needed replacement.
4
Official Attitudes 
This chapter has shown how after and to some extent also before the war
the tramways became obstacles rather than aids to town planning, especially
because of the presumed causative link between trams and traffic congestion
and because of the real and heavy costs of diverting or extending tramway
tracks.
5
 There remains one factor which had formerly gone in favour of
trams in Sheffield, that of attitudes. The professional management of the
transport department had been alive to the merits of the various available
forms of urban transport from an early date. Broadly speaking, a balanced
attitude to the relative merits of buses and trams was maintained until
World War II, though perhaps with a discernible swing away from trams and
towards buses.	 By the late 1930s doubts about the trams' future were
beginning to surface. Mr. Watson's idea for a new type of tram was con-
demned by the engineer for technical reasons, but also because 'the future
programme is uncertain
,
.
6
 This may have reflected awareness of the planning
proposals then taking shape, though as already noted there seems to have
been little liason, at least at Council and Committee level, between the
1. Sheffield Minutes, TC, 15 Nov 1949, 336.
2. Closed for bridge reconstruction; see ibid., 19 Oct 1948, 592.
3. Ibid., 19 Jul 1949, 144. 	 4. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 86.
5. Leeds built a new line after the war at an infrastructure cost (no
new cars were bought) of £250,000 (this may include the planned cost of an
unbuilt depot); Young, 'Leeds Trams: 11', MT 36 (May 1973), 162-3.
6. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 208.
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planning and transport departments. It almost seems as though the Central
Area Plan was drawn up and accepted by the Council--which obviously included
the members of the Transport Committee--without its radical conclusions in
respect of tramways having any effect on day-to-day affairs. The Committee
was reminded by the Manager in 1946 that heavy costs would be incurred 'what-
ever form of transport is ultimately decided shall be adopted to conform to
the new road proposals'.
1
 But in the same financial year unsuccessful att-
2
empts had been made to get materials for building new trams at Queens Road
and a quotation was received from Roberts for the thirty-five cars actually
ordered;
3
 in the following year it was also decided that the Rotherham ser-
vice's closure should be only temporary, and that the reintroduction of
tramways should at least be considered later. 4
 The Meadowhead extension was
also left on the table as late as 1949. 5 It is as if the Committee were
continuing to discuss the development of the tramways without being aware of
the almost irresistible tide of professional opinion which regarded their
•
abandonment as a foregone conclusion.
The main strand in this expert assessment seems clearly to have come
from the planners. It was they who, from at least the middle of the war,
talked in terms which implied the rapid disappearance of the trams. And
such discussion seems to have reached the level of stated policy on the
Planning Committee much earlier than it did in the Transport Committee.
However, when Harris Watson retired and was succeeded by R. C. Moore in
1945, the latter went on record almost at once to the effect that, in his
opinion, trams would eventually be replaced by buses. 6
 Mr. Moore was a for-
1. Sheffield Minutes, TC (Special), 24 Apr 1946, 247; my emphasis.
2. Sheffield Reports, 1946-7, 4.
3. Sheffield Minutes, TC, 18 Nov 1947, 38; the explanation for the
seeming conflict in policy is probably that any replacement programme would
have to be long term, and that meanwhile fleet renewals were urgently needed
to keep existing services going (see Hall, Sheffield Transport, 255).
4. Ibid., 19 Oct 1948, 592. 	 5. Ibid., 15 Nov 1949, 336.
6. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 255.
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mer employee of the department; he had left for a post with a bus undertak-
ing at Stockton-on-Tees in 1929 1
 and had latterly been at Liverpool, a major
tram operator,
2
 so he was well aware of the arguments on both sides of the
tram scrapping issue and probably represented the general though still not
quite universal opinion of the day. Even so, the impression remains that
the real push to get rid of the trams came not so much from the Transport
Committee or its management, but from the planners, who obviously regarded
the removal of trams as a 'sine qua non' of their redevelopment plan.
Politics 
It is as well to dispose of one false trail here. In an article in
Modern Tramway Philip Webb says that trams became a political issue in
Leeds, Sheffield and Edinburgh and were scrapped after the anti-tram party
gained power in local elections. 3 This was the case in Leeds, where the
Conservatives made great efforts to deal with the losses on the trams when
4
in power between 1951 and 1953, but where Labour won the municipal election
of the latter year with a tram scrapping policy which was quickly implemented
against Conservative opposition and an initial reluctance on the part of the
5
management.
	 A change in party political control was not, however, a factor
6
in Edinburgh, and nor was it in Sheffield. The Labour Party had been in
almost continuous office since 1926, and it was their policy, rather than
political control of the Council, which had changed. It seems rather curious
to find, as in Leeds, that the Conservatives were the pro-tram party, par-
7
ticularly as they had opposed them pre-war; but a split of this nature
1. Sheffield Minutes, TC, 19 Nov 1929, 32.
2. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 253.
3. Philip Webb, 'The View from Toronto', MT 43 (Nov 1980), 370.
4. Young, 'Leeds Trams: 13', MT 36 (Aug 1973), 266-7.
5. Ibid., (Nov 1973), 366-72, passim.
6. John S. Wilson, 'The View from Edinburgh', MT 44 (Mar 1981), 85.
7. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 97.
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was almost inevitable, given the adversorial nature of British politics.
The Sheffield Transport Committee quickly accepted the General Manager's
scheme to replace trams by buses over a period of fifteen years.' The issue
was fought quite strongly on the Council, where the initial motion to accept
the Committee's decision was only won by fifty votes to thirty-one
	 A fur-
ther attempt was made to defer any action for two years, the request being
related to a rearmament programme of the time which would, it was said, need
all available labour and material, but this too was defeated?
 There was
considerable public reaction against the move; a Sheffield Tramways Develop-
ment Association was formed, 4
 and local residents' petitions were sent in •
from both Malin Bridge and Fulwood after the first closure.5
 The latter is
slightly surprising, in that Fulwood is a high-class residential area where
people were not supposed to like trams; maybe Sheffield's escaped being
tarred with the 'working class image' brush said to be the case elsewhere.6
Much of this particular protest, though, was due to the fact that the former
through tram service was cut, bus passengers being decanted at less conven-
ient termini. The Council's first reaction was to order the restoration of
the tram service, but the eventual result, five months later, was a through
bus route. 7
 The largest protest was an 11,465 signature petition submitted
in May 1952, but this was referred to the Transport Committee, who merely
noted it. 8
 Just about the last serious move to delay the changeover came a
year later when two councillors tried unsuccessfully to get the Ecclesall to
Middlewood conversion deferred. 9
Two matters are worthy of further consideration. First, Webb made the
1. Sheffield Minutes, TC, 28 Mar 1951, 582; the tramways actually
closed more quickly, but this was usually found more economic than delaying.
2. City Council, 4 Apr 1951, 606.
	 3. Ibid., 6 Jun 1951, 75.
4. Ibid., 3 Oct 1951, 232.
	 5. Ibid., 13 Feb 1952, 499.
6. See above, 72.
	 7. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 98.
8. Sheffield Minutes, TC, 20 May 1952, 39.
9. City Council, 6 May 1953, 639.
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point in the article already referred to that in Toronto the transit author-
ity was much more independent of local political control than has tradition-
ally been the case in Britain; party politics was in any case less important
at the local level. Hence it was possible for a pro-streetcar citizen's
group to have an effect when a change was proposed in 1972. 1
 It may be that
under such a system local feeling in Sheffield might have had more impact
than it did, but in the British context, of course, the result would have
been the same anywhere. But the formation of a 'Tramways Development Assoc-
iatiorepoints the fact that no official thought seemed to have been given in
Sheffield to the possibilities for really modernising the tramways, as opp-
osed to merely renewing existing assets. The former was very seriously
considered in Liverpool, where in 1945 the General Manager costed a scheme
for a completely modern fleet running on segregated tracks;
2
 the same was
true of Leeds, where two new trams with the latest control equipment were
actually built in 1953.
3
 In both cases, however, the costs were found to be
too high, and there is no reason to suppose that it would have been any
different in Sheffield. This was still the era when subsidies for public
transport were felt to be aberrations, and it was assumed that undertakings
should be able to pay their way; if trams could not do this, which it app-
eared they could not, then they would have to go. All-in-all, party politics
seems to have been of little importance in the course of events in Sheffield,
less so than in, say, Leeds. The trams were seen to be dispensible because
they could not achieve either financial or planning objectives, and on this
both the majority party and the management agreed.
1. Webb, 'The View from Toronto', 370.
2. Blackburn, 'Post-war Liverpool', MT 30 (Aug 1967), 270 and 272.
3. Young, 'Leeds Trams: 14', MT 36 (Oct 1973), 330.
383
CHAPTER 18
SHEFFIELD TRAMWAYS: CONCLUSION
Winding up the Tramways 
The detailed timetable of tramway closures is given in Appendix S8;
statistics showing the concurrent decline in route/track length and in the
numbers of cars are given in Appendix S3. As tended to be usual in such
circumstances, the closure programme was speeded up once underway. Origin-
ally some routes were to have survived as late as 1965, with long periods in
the 1960s with no closures at all, but in the event the last tram service
between Beauchief and Tinsley (Vulcan Road) closed on 8 Oct 1960 with, as
was again usual by this time, a ceremonial procession.1
During this period an attempt was made to reduce annual charges for
painting the fleet by £2,000 per annum for buses and £2,500 for trams by
using a green colour scheme instead of the familiar blue and cream. 2
 A num-
ber of both types of vehicle were repainted, but in the face of public
disapproval, the idea was dropped; 3
 to offset this, the Corporation decided
to allow external advertising, which had not been done since World War I. 4
By 1955-6, £32,155 was coming from this source.5
As the expected life of the remaining tram routes grew shorter, it was
1. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 266 and 268.
2. Sheffield Minutes, TC, 19 Feb 1952, 525.
3. Leeds did change its livery, achieving the lowest painting costs of
any municipality; see Young, 'Leeds Trams: 12', MT 36 (Jun 1973), 196-7.
4. Gandy, Sheffield Transport, 94.
	 5. Sheffield Reports, 1955-6, 3.
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obviously possible to cut down on maintenance without which, of course, the
already rapidly rising working costs would have gone up even more. The
impression of a youthful tramway enthusiast in 1959 was of worn track, which
caused the trams to roll at speed, and of cars which were generally dirty
and poorly maintained. '
 A slightly curious feature was that some of the
older Standard trams survived until the end as well as some, though by no
means all of the newer cars.
2
 - Most of the trams were scrapped by the local
firm of T. W. Ward and a special track was laid across the road from Tinsley
depot into their yard to facilitate this.
3
 A total of eight trams eventually
4
ended up in the hands of museums or preservation societies.
The Results of the Conversion 
During the 1950s the problems facing the transport department did not
disappear and if anything worsened. Labour shortages remained serious,
5
causing services to be curtailed.
	 Efforts to plug the gap included hiring
230 'coloured British nationals' as conductors, which aroused trade union
opposition,
6
 and also the introduction of new high-capacity 76 and 78 seater
buses; the latter provoked a damaging seventeen day strike over the issue of
standing passengers which cost £225,000 in lost revenue and, allowing for
7
expenditure saved, a net loss of £100,000. Wages and fares continued to
rise,
8
 and partly as a consequence traffic continued to decline.
9
 The peak
in travellers had been nearly 300 million in 1947, but by 1955 the total was
only 256 million.
10
 Nevertheless the severe financial crises of the late
1940s and early 1950s were not repeated in the rest of the latter decade.
The deficit which had been accumulated was dealt with by transferring sub-
1. Personal reminiscence.
	 2. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 110.
3. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 258.	 4. Gandy, Sheffield Tramways, 116.
5. Sheffield Reports, 1955-6, 11.
	 6. Ibid., 1956-7, 9.
7. Daily Telegraph, 5 Nov 1959.
8. Sheffield Reports, 1957-8, 1.
	
9. Ibid., 9.
10. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 261.
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stantial sums from reserves and, exceptionally, by a transfer from the rates
of £131,694 in 1952-3. This left the Reserve and Renewal Funds with a nil
balance and a continuing overall deficit of £18,127. During 1952-3 the first
surplus for five years was earned, of £74,533, and by the following year it
was possible to eliminate the deficit entirely, leaving £26,245 to put into
reserves.
1
 In 1954-5 the Renewals Fund was re-established in the hope of
purchasing future bus replacements without recourse to loans. 2
 The follow-
ing year the fund was still £147,000 below the sum needed to achieve this,
and tram replacement buses being bought from loans in any case, 3
 but by
1957-8 replacement of the large number of immediate post-war buses was said
to be possible from the Renewals Fund, which now totalled £608,708; 4
 this
was a remarkable turn-around for a fund which had been exhausted only five
years before. By the time the trams closed, all tramway loans had been
fully paid off and all road reinstatement charges met. 5
Where did all this money come from? As a matter of book-keeping, the
trams continued to pay their share of renewals, contributing £93,000 to the
buses' £83,000 in 1954-5; but the result was only to put the tramway account
into deficit, which then had to be covered from the surplus earned by the
6
buses.	 After a better year in 1955-6, thereafter the trams never again
covered their working costs, so were a net drain on the department's fin-
7
ances.	 That being so, the financial recovery was almost entirely due to
the buses' earning capacity, except during 1951-2 and 1952-3 when the trams
did earn good surpluses to help reduce the deficit. 8
 From 1952-3 to 1968-9
there was a net surplus every year, which was a good deal better than in the
immediate post-war period before it had been decided to dispense with trams.
A further crisis did hit the undertaking in 1969-70 and 1970-1; the Reserve
1. Sheffield Reports, 1960-1, 30, Finances of the Transport Department
(Table).
2. Ibid., 1954-5, 3.
	 3. Ibid., 1955-6, 5.
	 4. Ibid., 1957-8, 3.
5. Ibid., 1960-1, 5.
	 6. See Appendix S14.
	 7. See Appendix S3.
8. See Appendix S14.
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and Renewal Funds were again reduced to nil, and in the second year recourse
was had to the rates, to the tune of £240,191, only for the second time in
the department's history. But matters improved dramatically in the sub-
sequent two years, the money was repaid to the rate fund and over £300,000
was put to reserves. '
Could these results have been achieved by a revivified tramway? So
many variables must be conjecture, for by 1970 there was no British city
tramway to provide any yardstick by which to judge; what would track renewal,
priced at £120,000 per annum in 1951, have cost twenty years later, for
instance? But even on the facts which can be known, the answer is pretty
conclusive. The most damning statistic is the trams' operating ratio, which
Appendix S3 shows to have worsened fairly steadily ever since World War II
and to have become regularly negative from 1956-7 onwards. The trams, in
short, could not earn enough to pay capital and other charges and even,
latterly, their own working expenditure. During this period motor buses
could, for though their earnings might be slightly less per vehicle mile,
their costs of operation were markedly less. Had the tramway been renewed,
the higher capital cost of this would have pushed annual costs--as calculated
in 1951--to £31,200 above the bus option. From 1954-5 until 1960-1 the net
surplus for the undertaking as a whole after renewals was never as much as
this, so tramway capital costs would necessarily have put the department
into the red.
2
 Of course, renewals payments could have been reduced, but
this would only have forced necessary replacements on to loan finance,
so putting up later annual redemption costs which, of course, the trams were
already incapable of meeting.
Given the general assumption of the time that local transport should
pay its way from revenue, there was really no choice but to dispense with
trams, which were expensive to buy and run, and to replace them with buses,
which were cheaper on both counts. A quarter of a century later, the
1. Sheffield Reports, 1972-3, 9.
2. Net surplus from Sheffield Reports, passim.
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expectation had changed, and South Yorkshire County Council, which had taken
1
over Sheffield's transport responsibilities in 1974, could adopt a policy
whereby 50 per cent of expenditure on revenue account came from various
2
forms of subsidy.	 It might, under such a regime, have been possible to
adopt better if more costly transport modes without worrying about the price,
but in 1960 and still more in 1951 such an option was not open to Sheffield
City Council; they had to make the same commercial judgements as any company,
and trams were not an affordable option.
Conclusion 
The two key questions asked originally about Sheffield's tramways were,
why were they retained and developed up to 1939? and why did the policy
change thereafter? The reasons why the city had the option of keeping the
trams and why, in contrast to (say) Manchester, it made good sense to do so,
may be briefly summarised as follows. The tramways were profitable and
could finance new investment from earnings. A very important point was that
on a well-run tramway only a relatively small proportion of assets needed
replacing annually at or more likely below the cost of an all-bus option.
In the 1920s, too, tramways fitted town planning objectives of zoning and
population dispersal, Sheffield being particularly favourably placed in this
respect because of the fairly short distances required to reach some of the
new housing estates. In the city centre, traffic congestion does not seem
to have been as serious as it was in Manchester and, again in contrast to
that city, the transport management in Sheffield had a balanced attitude to
the uses and merits of both trams and motor buses. The latter were enthus-
iastically developed in and around Sheffield, but care was taken to avoid
direct competition with the trams as far as this was possible.
Even in the 1930s some of these advantages were being eroded. Traffic
congestion was worsening, various Corporation officials were beginning to
question the trams' long-term role, and urban bus routes were causing serious
1. SYPTE, Transport Development Plan, 1. 	 2. Ibid., 72.
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losses of revenue and traffic to some tram routes. Tramway extensions
were made particularly diffficult to justify because of the Council's rigid
adherence to the standard maximum fare, which was uneconomic for longer dis-
tances. After an enforced standstill during the war, the position of the
trams worsened rapidly after 1945, and during the first five years of peace
it became quite evident that the tramways were no longer a viable entity.
Financial difficulties showed themselves in a variety of ways. First
of all, earnings were usually insufficient to meet renewals appropriations,
meaning that deficits were more common than surpluses after 1945. It was
occasionally not even possible to cover the existing and by then much reduced
loan debt, showing how unlikely it was that any new capital expenditure
could have been serviced from revenue. Reduced earnings were obviously
reflected in a worsening operating ratio, which was a consequence of falling
revenue and rising working costs. Traffic, and therefore revenue fell bec-
ause of the decline in loadings immediately after the war, because of the
negative effect of sharp fare rises and because of the 'leakage' of passen-
gers to buses. Revenue was also adversely affected by the fact that fare
increases, despite their deleterious effect on passenger totals, were applied
too long after their necessity became apparent. Although the fare increases
did succeed inincreasing income in money terms, the operating ratio was
put under pressure by the even faster rise in working expenditure, mainly a
result of rises in the costs of wages and repairs. Meanwhile, motor buses
established an advantage by keeping the increases in their working costs
below those of the trams. The same was, of course, true of renewal costs,
and it became increasingly obvious that buses would be cheaper in capital
terms than a rebuilt tramway would be, and this outweighed any residual
advantage which the trams might possess in terms of working expenditure.
When the decision to replace the trams was taken in 1951 the cost of renewal
was the crucial factor. But as the decade progressed the trams' operating
surplus declined further and was eventually eliminated. By then the tram-
ways had reached a stage where an outworn capital asset could neither be
389
replaced nor even operated profitably.
Other chapters in this section cover the influence of town planners,
traffic congestion and official or political attitudes on the tramways'
position. It seems to have been taken for granted from World War II onwards
that trams could not be adapted to meet modern planning objectives and that
they were a major cause of traffic congestion; it is arguable whether these
assumptions were correct in all particulars, but the important point is that
they were believed and formed a part of planning orthodoxy. The formation
of the Central Area Plan, with its clear statements about eliminating trams,
pre-dates the severe post-war financial crisis described above. This would
in any case have rendered the tramways unviable in a period when public
transport was required to break even, but the plans were laid before this
became apparent. So one has to assume that planning issues were the key
influence behind the closure decision as, in fact, the balance of evidence
in the 1951 Replacement Report indicated. It is most interesting to note
that in his survey of Hull's tramways Lee concluded that the traffic problem,
due in turn to poorly planned British cities with narrow streets, was the
decisive cause of tramway abandonment there too. 1 Had tramways been thought
desirable on planning grounds, it would no doubt have been possible to make
financial and physical arrangements to accommodate them. This was, for
example, done in Hanover soon after the war, when a joint report of the
operating company and the City recommended keeping trams on all main radial
routes for reasons which included their ability to carry more people than
buses whilst using less road space and the greater opportunities for segreg-
ating public from private transport.2
One or two suggested reasons for the disappearance of tramways have
been found not to be significant for Sheffield in the 1940s. These are the
growth in private car and television ownership, both of which really took
off later, and also party politics.
1. Lee, 'Tramways of Hull', 274-5.
2. Riichard] J. Buckley, 'Post-war Hannover; l', MT 44 (May 1981), 152.
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It seems therefore that the future of the tramways in Sheffield was
really decided by the planners during and immediately after World War II.
Later financial difficulties made the choice of motor buses attractive on
commercial grounds too, so 'if the plans had not existed, they would have
had to be invented'; that is, if planning imperatives had not forced the
removal of trams, financial ones would have done so later.
It is somewhat ironic, therefore, to find South Yorkshire PTE promoting
a scheme for a new t Supertram' network for Sheffield almost exactly a quarter
of a century after the final closure of the original tramway. 'Supertramt,
the PTE said, 'will mean fast, efficient, lower cost Public Transport
ideally suited to carrying large numbers of people in urban areas and giving
direct access to the heart of the city'.
1
 There are a great many reasons
for doubting the plan's ultimate success, but one of them has a certain
feeling of de la vu about it; outside the local public, it is town planners
who have the greatest doubts about the scheme.
1. SYPTE, Press Release, 4 Jul 1985, 2.
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FIGURE 10
SOURCE: Hall, Sheffield Transport, endpapers.
PART V
SUMMING UP
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CHAPTER 19
CONCLUSION
The rise and decline of the British street tramway industry is broadly
contained within the single century 1860 to 1960. Both the omnibus and the
railway were established beforehand and are still important contributors to
inland transport today, as are tramways in other parts of the world. What
caused the British tram to disappear as swiftly as it did? A large number
of possible explanations have been identified in the introductory chapters
of this work and a large amount of evidence accumulated from the three case
studies. It now remains only to draw general conclusions. •
Even before World War I financial problems were becoming apparent.
First, some marginal tramways were already making losses. Although the DDLR
was not built until afterwards, the pre-1914 inquiry into its construction
provided interesting confirmation of this, as well as identifying tramways
running outside towns as particularly at risk; later experience showed that
those built tended to have shorter lives than tram systems in more built-up
areas. The DDLR was thus always a marginal proposition and would probably
never have been built had the consulting engineers not disguised the likely
level of working costs.
Doncaster tramways were also loss-making over much of the pre-World War
I period, but at least in the short term this was not a sign of permanent
unviability, but merely a reflection of the fact that building up business
took time. Later experience showed, however, that certain individual lines
always ran at a loss, with obvious implications if profits earned elsewhere
were ever reduced.
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A second early weakness, which was exemplified in Doncaster, was an
inability (or in some other cases, unwillingness) to set aside adequate
reserves to cover depreciation of assets. It was usually the smaller tram-
ways where this was the case, however, and Sheffield tramways illustrate the
opposite tendency: for electric tramways to be profitable and successful
from the start, giving the undertaking the ability to cover all loan debts,
to make adequate allowance for depreciation and also to pay large sums
towards rate relief and road improvements. Sheffield itself stopped making
these two latter payments in the 1920s, but the tramways remained profitable
because of (1) heavy traffic due to a high population per mile of track and
(2) economies of scale, which meant that working and capital costs could be
spread over a high mileage.
The financial weakness identified in some cases could have been partly
a consequence of certain legal restrictions placed on tramways. The 1870
Act required tramway owners to repair the road surfaces and also to pay full
rates. Neither seems to have been a particularly significant matter in
Sheffield or to the DDLR. All three systems were municipal, which meant
that payments for rates and repairs were, in a sense, merely matters of
internal book-keeping to the authority. Doncaster and the Dearne District
both paid lesser rates as light railways too. But Doncaster laboured under
adisadvantage in that several of its longer lines reached into the areas of
other authorities. Rates would have been payable, but more importantly
major disputes arose over road repairs, causing the closure of the otherwise
profitable Bentley tramway; road charges were also mentioned as a reason for
favouring trolleybuses for the town.
A quasi-legal factor which could have affected tramways vis-a-vis motor
buses was that tramway pay was set by a wages council, whereas company bus
pay was not. The DDLR provides some evidence of a higher wage bill for
tramways, but this was due much more to higher productivity on the motor bus
side than to lower pay scales (though this was true where the independents
or 'pirates' were concerned).
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A further restriction was that tramways were normally required to offer
special workmen's fares and services, whereas buses were not. This was not
a limitation on any of the three South Yorkshire undertakings, though, for
the ordinary fare on each was usually the same as the statutory workman's
fare. Both Doncaster and the DDLR found it necessary to introduce yet lower
fares, by offering either half fares or discounted tickets, but this was
not due to legal impositions but to competitive pressures and/or the need to
build up traffic. This policy proved a success in Doncaster, both before
World War I, when workmen's fares helped to encourage the riding habit, and
also in the 1920s, when weekly passes proved a valuable weapon against pir-
ate bus competition. The fares battle in the Dearne valley, when fares were
reduced to very low rates, also succeeded in increasing DDLR revenue, though
not by sufficient to break even. The Croydon Survey did show, however, that
most pre-1914 tramway managements--including Doncaster's--believed the Id.
fare likely to be offered to workmen was unprofitable; in the 1920s, too,
the DDLR Manager would have liked to dispense with workers' concessions. So
workmen's fares were obviously a bit of an Achilles' heel to tramways, and
if ordinary traffic was low for any reason could drag the undertaking into
deficit.
The effect in Sheffield was rather different. Here the tramways were
profitable right up to and including World War II, whilst at the same time
charging very low fares (much lower than Doncaster's standard fares, for
example). But the rigid adherence to a standard city to terminus fare
meant that even quite short route extensions caused severe falls in revenue
per car mile. For longer lines, this was insupportable, so motor buses were
used instead; once extended into the city centre, they provided damaging
competition to the trams.
Tram fares were also usually lower than bus fares, intended as a prot-
ection to the former. Young suggested that after World War II this harmed
the trams by reducing their income, but the evidence is that when fares
were equalised, trams lost both revenue and traffic. Undoubted harm was
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however done by the statutory machin.ery for raising fares above the maximum
set at the time of a tramway's construction. It was a slow and time-consum-
ing business to increase fares, and this was especially damaging during the
inflation following the World Wars since fares could not be raised quickly
enough to meet rising costs; there is evidence from both Doncaster and Shef-
field for this.
National economic performance naturally affected tramways, not least
via inflation. Though serious after World War I, stability was eventually
re-established, the most important consequence for trams being the reluctance
of costs--in particular, of wages--to fall as fast as prices. Post-World
War II inflation was more damaging for surviving tramways because the fare
increases made necessary helped to reduce passenger totals, whilst at the
same time both working and renewal costs rose disproportionately and less
fast than comparable motor bus costs.
Both Doncaster and the DDLR were seriously affected by the more local
,
economic difficulties of the coal industry. It was the 1921 coal strike
which caused significant loss to the Doncaster tramways in that year, rather
than--as alternatively claimed at the time--pirate bus competition. All
three tramways naturally suffered from the strikes in 1926--Sheffield was
still a mining area at the time--but it was the fledgling DDLR which was
hardest hit because it was so dependent upon the employees of one industry.
Because tramways were a capital intensive industry, anything affecting
capital assets or charges was important. In the early days the period of
loan redemption was often too long, so that equipment had worn out before
the loans were paid off; this was true in Doncaster. Of course, this was
partly related to the financial strength of the undertaking itself and
Sheffield--with one minor exception--had no difficulty in paying off its
entire loan debt (though latterly partly from motor bus earnings).
An interesting variant on this difficulty was where a tram line was so
misconceived as to fall into disuse long before its capital debt was
extinguished. The Oxford Street line was a small but real burden on the
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Doncaster undertaking, though the DDLR Joint Committee succeeded in solving
its problem very neatly by becoming a sleeping partner in the Yorkshire
Traction bus business. A further problem was that equipment had sometimes
not worn out or been fully paid-off before it became out-dated. This was
certainly true for the DDLR, whose wooden-seated cars and single line were
no match for the motor bus, and also to some extent of Doncaster, where most
routes were also single track. and whose older open-topped trams were very
archaic by the end. The implication of having the millstone of old capital
tied to them when renewal became necessary was, of course, that undertakings
sought the least capital intensive replacement to avoid having the problem
compounded; this did not usually favour the tramcar.
Either by obsolescence or by wear and tear, most tramways became due
for relaying or re-equipping by the 1920s or 1930s. The DDLR was of course
an exception, but its construction in those very years demonstrates the
difficulty other tramways were facing, which was that inflated capital costs
,
would be difficult or impossible to cover from any reasonable assessment of
earnings. In Doncaster, it was decided that planned and partially executed
extensions into the coalfield should not after all be built, as it became
evident that older lines built at lesser cost were becoming unable to meet
their capital charges. So motor bus services were started instead. If new
construction was not worthwhile, neither was renewal of old lines. This was
so even if existing routes, like the Bentley line, were profitable, because
they were built on old capital. Doncaster's tramways were forced into
crisis at an early date because of the inadequate methods used to build its
original tracks, which had poor foundations and paving. Trouble arose dur-
ing and even before World War I, barely a decade after construction.
This was not a purely economic matter though. At least as important
was the statutory obligation to maintain the road surfaces around the track.
When other local authorities--or Doncaster's own Borough Surveyor--wished
to improve roads to modern standards, the tram tracks had to be relocated or
rebuilt. The difficulty was excacerbated by inter- or intra-local authority
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disagreements, but the root of the matter was the obligation imposed by the
1870 Act. So it was decided to convert the profitable Bentley tram route to
a trackless mode, whereas without the road problems the trams would probably
have continued to run for several years longer.
When Doncaster went on to consider the wholesale rebuilding and improve-
ment of its tramways, it was quickly decided that this could not be financed,
and that a cheaper alternative was desirable. This was partly because of
the problem already mentioned, that struggling undertakings like Doncaster
could not set aside adequate funds for depreciation. That would, of course,
have been difficult in inflationary times anyway, but Doncaster was never
able to build up anything like an adequate reserve, so that almost all
improvements which were made had to be financed by fresh loans, with all the
attendant disadvantages of that course. The DDLR, obviously, was never in a
position to put aside any funds.
Between the wars, by contrast, Sheffield always had adequate funds
•
available to service loans, and in addition to set aside large sums for
renewals or reserves. Although new loans continued to be taken out, much
renewal was paid for from current or past earnings, so reducing the burden
of capital payments. The most significant reason why trams continued to be
an affordable option for the city was that a rolling programme of renewal
and improvement had been carried on throughout the undertaking's existence,
and so the question of wholesale replacement never arose, as it did for less
financially well-endowed systems. The most dramatic consequence of this was
that further gradual improvement of the tramways was, in the 1930s, cheaper
than all-out bus replacement. Following World War II, however, Sheffield
found itself in the same situation as other tramways after World War I.
Only the much-reduced pre-war capital charges could now be met, and renewals,
let alone full-scale modernisation, could not be financed out of the declin-
ing surplus.
Poor management practices within local authorities have sometimes been
cited as a weakness of the, mostly municipal, tramway industry. This does
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not appear to have been a difficulty in South Yorkshire. It was quite
general for responsibility for tramway track to be left to the highways'
department, as it was in Doncaster, but here the relationship between the
two officials concerned does seem to have been less than cordial and so less
effective than it should have been. Relations between local authorities
themselves have also been mentioned. Doncaster's long tram routes meant
that both neighbouring UDCs and the WRCC had the opportunity to be obstruct-
ive and critical, which they were. It is clear that far from working tog-
ether to ensure a good public transport service,each authority was concerned
only to protect its own interest. This was undoubtedly a major reason
behind the series of decisions which led to the substitution of trolleybuses
for trams.
Also in the case of Doncaster, it was noticeable that a policy change
followed the appointment of a new manager in 1919, and this was to some
extent effect and cause. It is also undoubtedly true that Sheffield's
pro-tram management in the inter-war years was a sharp contrast to Pilcher's
advocacy of the motor bus in Manchester, and that transport policies in the
two cities did reflect the personal preferences of their General Managers.
Equally, other factors underlay these divergent policies, as was also the
case when R. C. Moore changed Sheffield's policy after World War II.
One particular problem after 1945 was the difficulty in obtaining new
cars. Sheffield had, like most other large operators, built most of its
large requirement of cars itself for many years, thus starving commercial
builders of markets. When either shortage of materials or of the necessary
skills to build modern cars forced a reversion to outside supply, there was
only one small firm prepared to tender. The price must almost inevitably
have been higher than an 'in-house' cost because of the profit element, was
possibly inflated because it was the only tender, and may also have been
higher than a large firm could have offered, had such a firm still existed.
Slow delivery was also a problem.
The case studies throw little further light upon Yearsley's point that
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tramways were never properly modernised anyway, except by an argument from
silence. Certainly Doncaster's tramways never progressed beyond early 1920s
technology, and though Sheffield kept its system up to date until 1939 and
even ordered new cars after World War II, the latter were really no more
than semi-streamlined bodies on traditional trucks and equipment and did not
signal any radical change in design or operating method.
The decision to abandon Sheffield's tramways owed little to the compet-
itive impact of the the private car, for closure was agreed before motor
traffic really began to expand with the end of post-World War II austerity.
The troubles experienced by the remaining trams and by the buses later in
the 1950s are evidence that cars would have abstracted tramway traffic, but
this effect was not yet serious in 1950; the same goes for the impact of
television on evening patronage.
Competition, in its broadest sense, between trams and buses was the key
factor behind the decline of the tramway industry. The financial advantages
•
of buses were threefold--that they were always cheaper to install; that
after their early experimental days they became cheaper to run, first on a
vehicle mile and then on a seat mile basis; and finally that they earned
more.
The fact that the capital cost of road vehicles was less than that of
trams was not of particular importance when the former were at an early
stage and too unreliable and too small to cope with major traffic flows in
cities and towns. Even before World War I, and certainly after it, these
deficiencies were being remedied. Doncaster in the early 1920s exhibits an
interim stage in this process. By then motor buses were clearly the cheaper
option for the coalfield services, but they were not yet thought capable of
taking over the urban routes operated by trams. Equally, buses were quite
well able to deal with the traffic offering in the Dearne valley,and their
advantages over the trams of speed, comfort and direct services meant that
the DDLR was unable to compete effectively. It was in these semi-urbanised
areas, with relatively light traffic, that the capital advantage enjoyed by
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buses first came into its own. Later a fairly successful experiment was
made with motor buses on the Avenue Road route in Doncaster itself, though
in the event it was decided to use trolleybuses for tramway replacement.
The capital cost of trolleybuses was only one third that of a comparable
tramway, which was a major reason for preferring the railless option.
One of the most interesting results of the case studies is that in
inter—war Sheffield the wholesale replacement of the modern and well—kept
tramway would not have been cheaper in capital terms than continuing to
maintain and improve the trams. This was partly because double—deck buses
still did not match the seating capacity of larger trams--whereas in Don-
caster trolleybuses did--and also because Sheffield's tramways needed only
incremental improvement, rather than wholesale replacement. It may have
been perfectly correct for Pilcher to argue that worn out tram routes in
Manchester should be replaced by buses at lesser cost, but in Sheffield the
tram routes were not worn out, and it was more economical to keep them. But
after 1945 this capital advantage was lost and buses became the cheaper
option even for cities like Leeds and Sheffield.
The second major point about buses was that they were cheaper to run.
The Dearne area provides striking confirmation of this. Company bus costs
were markedly less than the trams' for these reasons-41) economies of scale;
(2) lesser repair costs; (3) lower 'track' costs; (4) smaller fuel bills;
and (5) reduced wage costs, due in turn to higher productivity, mostly con-
sequent on the buses' higher speed. In Doncaster motor buses were still more
costly to run on a seat mileage basis in the early 1920s. But a few years
later larger buses were quite capable of operating an extended urban route
satisfactorily. Trolleybuses too were cheaper to operate than trams per car
mile and, since they were larger than most of the trams, also per seat mile.
This was because payments for repairs and rates were less since there was no
track. Wage costs were also lower because the trolleys ran faster than
trams; the electric bus had higher power costs though.
In Sheffield, of course, the high capacity trams could still be run
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more cheaply than the smaller buses on a seat mile basis. Sheffield also
had a particular advantage in that the expanding city could be served by
relatively short tramway extensions; these were more economical to run than
longer suburban bus routes were in Manchester. After World War II, however,
tramway working costs went up more sharply than those of the buses, and the
trams gradually lost most of their former advantage.
The third financial benefit derived from using motor buses was that
they could earn more than trams, often, of course, taking traffic from com-
peting trams to do so. Motor buses were very successful in the Dearne
valley and Doncaster Corporation also faced severe competition from pirate
buses, particularly in the mid- to late-1920s. Once they introduced their
trolleybuses, it was found that they earned more than the trams had done,
for three reasons-41) their routes were often longer; (2) they were faster,
so making short rides better value; and (3) they were generally attractive
to passengers. Even in Sheffield from the mid-1930s onwards motor buses
allowed to compete with the trams were proving more attractive and abstract-
ing passengers and revenue. In all three cases, once the tramways ran
into financial difficulties, it was only after conversion to motor bus or
trolleybus that the undertaking was able to earn a surplus again.
In the Dearne valley the economics of operation decisively favoured the
bus. It may seem curious that the moral was not drawn earlier in Sheffield.
Two reasons for this have already been noted, the fact that larger trams
could still carry more people more cheaply than smaller buses could and
also that, in Sheffield, capital costs still favoured trams in the 1930s.
A further reason why buses advanced much more slowly in Sheffield was that
the tramways were effectively protected against competition, which was
not the case for either the DDLR or Doncaster. There were six difficulties
in the way of imposing adequate controls-41) weak legislation; (2) lack of
support from the Ministry of Transport; (3) flouting of regulations by bus
operators; (4) pressure from motor owners' trade associations; (5) lack of
liason between the Watch and Tramways Committees; and (6) lack of trades'
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union backing. In Doncaster tramway revenue suffered two severe falls in
the 1920s; analysis has shown that the earlier one was largely not a result
of pirate bus competition, but the second was. An interesting fact is that
it was still feasible to counter external competition by a change in fares
policy, but by the early 1930s it seemed impossible to defend the remaining
tram routes against outside bus operators. One reason, as listed above,
was lack of support from the Ministry and, by that time, the Traffic
Commissioners, both of whom seemed at times to work against the interests of
municipal transport and in favour of private firms. The DDLR had exactly
the same experience. Even Sheffield Corporation found that its decisions on
licensing were sometimes overthrown, and this general bias against the
municipal operator was clearly a negative influence on tramways, which were
primarily publicly owned.
Generally in Sheffield, though, private bus competition was severely
limited by a three-pronged policy of exclusion, purchase and protective
agreements. These measures were broadly successful in keeping all the tram
services free of external competition, and also in establishing Sheffield
Corporation and the Joint Omnibus Committee as the major motor bus operators
over a very wide area. Comparison with Manchester has shown that trams were
far more at risk there, for these reasons-41) the Corporation was slow to
start its own motor bus services; (2) trams ran outside the city, where they
had no protection; (3) there was severe illegal pirating; and (4) partly in
self-defence, Manchester and surrounding authorities introduced express
buses which competed with their own trams.
Eventually, of course, private and Corporation buses did begin running
into the centre of Sheffield too. This was not really because the city
lacked the power and the will to protect its own undertaking--though there
was a short-lived split between the Watch and Tramways Committees--but for
two other reasons. Through travel to the city without changing was demanded
by the public and, as well, bus routes were established to outer estates
in preference to extended tramways because the latter would have been unec-
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onomic with a flat fare. This tendency was not particularly serious when it
was confined to rural bus services, but more intensive urban services later
began to cause significant losses of passengers and revenue to the tramways,
a process which was continued after World War II.
Considerable capital was made during the tramway conversion period from
the supposed flexibility of the motor bus, a rather vague concept which
covered three issues--traffic congestion, extension of routes to new estates
and deficiencies in existing tram services. Traffic congestion was not
mentioned as a reason for dispensing with trams in either the Dearne valley
or in Doncaster, probably because it was not yet a serious problem in either
place. It does not seem to have been regarded as serious enough to threaten
the position of tramways in the inter—war period in Sheffield either, in
contrast to Manchester, where the traffic problem was clearly much worse at
an earlier date. The supposed causative relationship between trams and
traffic congestion was cited at some length in the later Sheffield closure
report, but most of the problems said to be caused by trams were either not
unique to them or could have been overcome by proper planning. To some
extent, however, the truth of the allegations was irrelevant; what mattered
was that they were believed.
Turning to extensions of routes, the option of rebuilding and extending
the tramways was not taken up in Doncaster because the high cost of new
tramways could not be justified by the traffic offering. A point often made
about buses earlier in the century had been that their low first cost meant
they could be used to prove a route's traffic potential, and in a sense that
was just what was done with motor buses on the Wheatley Hills route. Once
the traffic had built up, this and the other town tramways were converted to
trolleybus, again a more flexible mode in the sense of being easier and
cheaper to install than a tramway, and one which proved capable of earning a
return on the capital invested.
In Sheffield the reason why some planned tramway extensions were not
built before 1939 was rather different. A rigid policy of a single standard
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maximum fare, regardless of distance, meant that even short extensions were
found seriously to reduce the earnings per car mile. Longer extensions were
not feasible under these conditions, though with the introduction of higher
fare stages they could well have been made to pay. Once again, the flexible,
low cost bus was used, though not really because of inordinate capital costs
for trams, but of an artificial restriction on their earning ability. After
World War II, of course, building costs had become excessive, and the tram-
ways' balance sheet was such that no large capital projects could be financed,
so all question of extensions was soon forgotton.
The third point about flexibility covers two perceived deficiencies of
tramways, that sometimes systems were isolated from each other and that
cross-city services were not possible, in both cases providing an opening
for bus competition. The former was true of the DDLR, which was denied
access to Barnsley town centre and never made any effective use of its link
with the Mexborough line. Buses were also able to offer more direct services
than the straggling tramway could do. The problem was less acute in Don-
caster, though some pirate bus operators did offer direct trips to the pits.
In Sheffield it was not a difficulty at all, for trams provided good access
to the city centre and the only possible tramway link--to Rotherham--was
fully exploited.
Traffic congestion was one focus for opposition to trams in general.
The introductory chapters above identified four sources of opposition, the
press, town planners, automobile organisations and politicians. The case
studies have not really thrown any further light on the first and third of
these and the others have really only come up in relation to Sheffield.
Politics, in the party sense, did not affect the decision to abandon the
city's tramways, even though it did in near-by Leeds. Which leaves only the
very interesting question of town planning.
It has been shown that town planning and tramways were perfectly com-
patible in the first decades of the century, and that the main aims of
planning at that period--zoning and population dispersal--could be assisted
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by tramway extensions, particularly those built on fast reserved tracks.
Sheffield's topography, with large greenfield sites fairly close to the city
centre and to industry, was ideally suited to this, needing only fairly
short additions to existing tramways, which were thus relatively cheap to
build and to operate. This is probably a major reason why tramways continued
to be developed in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
From 1939-45 onwards, however, the emphasis of planning switched to
the city centre and to the need to reduce actual or projected congestion
there. It was regarded as axiomatic that trams could not be accommodated to
a redesigned central core, and also that they themselves were a cause of
congestion. Perhaps as early as 1939, and certainly by 1944, the planners
had decided that trams must be eliminated and the first political decisions
to implement this had been taken. This was in advance of the post-war
downturn in the tramways' finances, and thus it must be assumed that plan-
ning considerations carried more weight than commercial ones; this was what
the balance of evidence in the replacement report indicated as well.
In many ways this research project has simply confirmed earlier know-
ledge and assumptions, though because local transport history tends necess-
arily to be written about individual places, a comparative approach has been
lacking previously. Certainly, even with Lee's detailed study of Hull
and Sleeman's national synopsis, there is no academic survey of the decline
of tramways to match McKay's authoritative study on their rise. This work
goes some way towards remedying the deficiency, by comparing local events to
national trends and also by putting together studies of three widely differ-
ing tramways.
This supports Finer's comment about 'eccentric local economic entities'
quoted at the end of chapter 2. If one cause had to be chosen for the demise
of each of the three tramways, in each case it would be a different one--for
the Dearne District, motor bus competition; for Doncaster, the cost of track
and road repairs; for Sheffield, planning objectives in which trams were
seen as irrelevant or a hindrance.
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There are also of course many common features too. Bus competition,
either as an external threat or as an attractive alternative to trams, is
one. The gap between motor bus and tramway operating costs in the Dearne
valley around 1930 is remarkably wide, and it was only the higher capacity
of trams which enabled them to retain an advantage in city conditions.
Buses were cheaper to run--and install--for the obvious reason that they
lacked track costs, but also because their higher speed increased staff
productivity; these advantages were shared by Doncaster's trolleybuses.
Sheffield's trams were, however, atypical in the 1920s in that, under certain
circumstances, they were cheaper to run than a comparable bus service else-
where. The advantage lay in the fact that the first estates being built
under new planning regimes could be built quite close to the city, meaning
that trams could actually serve them at a lesser running cost than, say,
Manchester's buses could serve Wythenshawe.
It was generally accepted from their first appearance that buses were
cheaper than trams in terms of capital cost. This was broadly true, and
when tramways became due for renewal in the 1920s, the inflated costs of
reconstruction compared very unfavourably with the low first cost of buses.
This was why Doncaster opted to serve the coalfields with motor buses and to
replace most of its existing trams with trolleybuses. Again, Sheffield
provides a most interesting contrast, for it appears that for a large tram-
way needing only incremental improvement and replacements, purchasing buses
was not necessarily cheaper before World War II.
The difficulties of protecting trams against motor bus competition are
well known, and were not ameliorated by what clearly appears as a bias of
the authorities against municipal tramways. Once more, Sheffield provides
a contrast, but even there the Corporation's own buses made increasing
inroads into the trams' traffic and revenue, which ceased to grow in the
1903s as bus services expanded. After World War II the trams gradually lost
market share to the buses. This was partly a consequence of the City Coun-
cil's standard fare policy, which made it uneconomic to build extensions to
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the more distant estates being established in the 1930s.
Fares were an important influence on tramways' viability in other
ways. Statutory restrictions on raising them made losses worse after both
World Wars and, after the Second, and rather paradoxically, steeply rising
fares caused passenger totals to fall. A much earlier weakness in tramway
finances was the large proportion of traffic carried at discount fares, many
of which were probably uneconomic.
Differences between tramways are perhaps the most informative aspect of
this study. The advantages enjoyed by Sheffield Corporation Tramways as
against the other local lines have been mentioned already, but the contrast
with Manchester is also interesting. Extensions were one area where Shef-
field enjoyed an advantage, and another was the relatively low level of
traffic congestion in the smaller city. Policies were also influenced by
personalities such as R. S. Filcher.
The broad sweep of tramway history in the half century up to 1950
is well described as a process of marginalisation. Tramways are inevitably
a high cost transport mode, and anything which puts up those costs further
or decreases revenue threatens their survival. Even as the last (but one)
electric tram systems were being built in 1913, it was clear that some were
already at or beyond the margin of commercial viability; a class of line
particularly at risk was the out-of-town tramway, which does much to explain
the fate of the Dearne District. As time passed, and particularly during
the inflation and economic difficulties after both wars, more tramways
became marginal as costs rose (or, in between the wars, failed to fall with
prices) and revenue fell. First it was the small town tramways, like some
of the Scottish ones mentioned above; then slightly larger ones, like Don-
caster's; later, middling undertakings like Hull's were brought into the
net, and though large cities could still justify tramway retention before
World War II, afterwards this was difficult to do--even city tramways had
become marginal.
This is not a total explanation though. Non-commercial factors were
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also important, and the primacy of town planning considerations in the
decision to abandon the Sheffield tramways--taken in principle before the
dismal post-war financial results were known--is good evidence of that.
In large towns and cities it would still have been possible to plan physic-
ally and financially for trams, had that been desired, as many European
towns did at the time. Rather belatedly, that is now being realised in
Britain as well, and by the 1990s we may yet see a new generation of 'super-
trams' running in our cities.
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Cl: CONVERSION TABLES 
G1/1: Money 
Until February 1971 the British currency was based upon pounds, shillings
and pence (E. s. d.), with 20 shillings to the pound and 12 pence to the
shilling. The two smaller denominations were written as 5s. and 6d. or, in
combination, 5/6. The penny could be further subdivided into halfpence
(id) or farthings (id.), though the latter was rarely relevant to the tram-
way industry and the coin was in any case withdrawn well before decimalis-
ation. This monetary system was in use throughout the period covered by
this work and is thus retained unaltered in original data. Enough decimal
equivalents are given below to provide a basis of comparison, bearing in
mind of course that a simple conversion says nothing about relative values.
E. s. d.
	
Decimal 
	
id.	 0.104p
	
ld.	 0.208p
	
id.	 0.417p
	
6d.	 2.5p
	
is.	 5p
	
2s.	 10p
	
4s.	 20p
	
5s.	 25p
	
10s.	 50p
	
15s.	 75p
El	 £1.00
As a rule of thumb, it is sufficient to take d. as equivalent to 0.25P, id.
to 0.5p and so on, though the exact equivalent is 2.4d. to lp.
Examples:-
16s. 9d.	 84p
El 5s. 21d.	 E1.26
G1/2: Length 
Imperial	 Metric
Mile (1760 yards)	 1.61km
Furlong ('mile or 220 yards)	 200m
Chain (6mile, 22 yards or 66 feet)
	 20m
Yard (3 feet)
	 0.91m
Foot (12 inches)	 30.5cm
Inch	 2.54cm
G1/3 Speed 
Miles per Hour 	 km/h
10	 16
20	 32
30	 48
40	 64
50	 80
60	 96
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G1/4 Other Measures 
Imperial	 Metric 
(Area)	 Acre	 0.405 hectares
(Capacity)	 Gallon	 4.546 litres
(Weight)	 Pound	 0.450 kilograms
Ton	 1.016 tonnes
414
G2; LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND AND WALES EXCLUDING LONDON 
Municipal Corporations Act 1835 
Reformed and democratised the old 'rotten boroughs' and provided a framework
for those towns--including many large cities such as Sheffield--later given
a charter.
Local Government Act 1888 
Set up elective County Councils to replace administration by justices of the
peace; large towns (over 50,000 inhabitants 1
 ) were excluded from the juris-
diction of these Councils as County Boroughs.
Local Government Act 1894 
Transformed previously created ad hoc sanitary authorities into Urban or
Rural District Councils, in the second of which Parish Councils became third
tier authorities. 2
 Interestingly, in the old Boroughs at least, the two
functions were kept legally separate; thus in Doncaster the Borough Council
was also the Urban District Council and met separately to transact the bus-
iness of each. 3
Local Government Act 1972 
Replaced all the above authorities by unitary counties, except for six Met-
ropolitan Counties, which also had a District Council tier. 4
 South York-
shire was one such Metropolitan County.
NOTES AND SOURCES:
1. Frangopulo, Tradition in Action, 138.
2. W. A. Robson, Local Government (n.d., reprinted from Esso Magazine,
1958 issues), 3-9.
3. See Doncaster Borough Council Minutes, passim.
4. Frangopulo, Tradition in Action, 238-9.
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G3: LEGISLATION AFFECTING LOCAL TRANSPORT 
G3/1 TRAMWAYS 
Private or Special Acts 
The earliest tramways were laid with only local authorisation, but in 1862
it was held that statutory authority was required. Only two Acts were sec-
ured in the next six years, for a short line in Portsmouth in 1863 and for
the first real town tramway in Liverpool in 1868. An increased number of
applications thereafter led to consideration of general legislation, but
even thereafter some tramways continued to be promoted by means of Private
Bills; in rare cases, such as Paisley's, it was possible for a company to
circumvent a local authority's opposition in this way.
Tramways Act 1870 
An earlier Bill proposing advantageous conditions for tramway promotion was
defeated by pressure from vested interests, and a Select Committee was app-
ointed to consider the matter, the result being the 1870 Act. This was an
enabling Act, providing legal provisions applicable to all subsquently con-
structed tramways as well as a simpler method of obtaining statutory powers
for such lines. Its most important provisions were as follows:-
(1) instead of following the tedious and expensive Private Bill proced-
ure, promoters might obtain a Provisional Order (an Order made by a Minister
of the Crown which has no legal force until approved by Parliament) from the
Board of Trade which could later be confirmed with several others by an Act,
whose expenses would then be shared between a number of promoters;
(2) local authority (and the highway authority, if different) approval
consent was essential, except that if several authorities were involved, the
consent of two thirds was sufficient;
(3) if the lines came within 9ft. 6in. of the kerb for 30ft., one third
of the frontagers had to consent;
(4) no land could be acquired by compulsion;
(5) if not themselves the promoters, local authorities could acquire
tramways after twenty-one years, and could exercise the option every seven
years thereafter; the Act gave no powers for them to operate trams however;
(6) powers were given to the Board of Trade (whose powers relating to
tramways were later transferred to the Ministry of Transport) to supervise
and regulate tramways;
(7) owners had to maintain the road surface between the tracks and for
eighteen inches either side;
(8) two years were allowed for completion of works.
Regarding the power to purchase, the price was to be the 'then value', and
later legal judgements established that this was to be virtually scrap price
with no allowance for goodwill, profits etc.
Light Railways Act 1896 
This Act was largely introduced to encourage rural light railways, but bec-
ause it nowhere defined what a light railway was (nor the 1870 Act a tram-
way) and was less severe than the Tramways Act, it became commonly used by
promoters of urban tramways. The relevant provisions were as follows:-
(1) three Light Railway Commissioners were to be appointed, under the
Board of Trade;
(2) anyone might apply to the Commisioners for a Light Railway Order,
which then went to an inquiry. If favourable, the Board of Trade could
merely confirm it without referring it to Parliament, though exceptionally
they might do so;
(3) local authorities had no absolute veto over construction;
(4) land could be purchased by compulsion;
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(5) five years were allowed for completion;
(6) as compared to tramways, a 75 per cent rate rebate was allowed.
Light Railways Act 1912 
Cleared up some loose ends left by the 1896 Act.
G3/2 MOTOR BUSES 
Town Police Clauses Acts 1847 and 1889 
Originally these referred to Hackney Carriages, but the 1889 Act extended
the provisions to omnibuses. It was an offence to ply for hire without a
local authority licence in an area where the Act applied. But the legislat-
ion was permissive only, so it was rarely applied in rural areas and not
always in towns; in such areas anyone could set up a bus or charabanc busin-
ess without restriction. The licence applied only to the vehicle and not to
the service.
Locomotives on Highways Act 1896 
Freed motor vehicles from the four miles per hour speed limit imposed on
steam carriages by an Act of 1865; the maximum permitted speed was raised to
twelve miles per hour.
Motor Car Act 1903 
Raised speeds of light motor cars to twenty miles per hour by a Heavy Motor
Car Order issued under the Act. Most control over bus speed, design etc.
has been by administration regulation rather than by new legislation; for
example, it was the Ministry of Transport which raised the top speed for
buses with pneumatic tyres to twenty miles per hour in 1928.
London Traffic Act 1924 
In order to control pirate buses the Minister of Transport could designate
restricted streets along which no additional buses could run; only applied
to London.
Road Traffic Act 1930 
Introduced to regulate motor bus services (trams and trolleybuses--which
were controlled in broadly the same way as trams--did not come within the
Act). Public service vehicles were divided into stage (short distance), ex-
press (long distance) and contract (unlike the others, not taking separate
fares) carriages. All needed a PSV licence issued by the Area Traffic Com-
missioners set up under the Act, which was issued only when a prior Certif-
icate of Fitness was obtained. Stage and express services could only be
operated if a Road Service Licence was also obtained, and this was only
issued if the Commissioners were assured that there was a real demand for a
service not already being met by existing operators.
SOURCES:
Barker and Robbins, London Transport 2, 210.
G. A. Bonner, British Transport Law by Road and Rail (Newton Abbot, 1974),
255-9, 283, 299 and 352-5.
J. Graeme Bruce, A Source Book of Buses (1981), 12-13 and 26.
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Claydon, 'Tramways Act', 280-3.
Davies, Light Railways, 55 and 284-98 (Appendix G).
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G4; PRICE INDICES 
G4/1 Ministry of Labour Indices of Retail Prices (Cost of Living)
Food and All Items 1915--38; 1914 (July) . 100 
Year	 Food	 All Items
1915 131 123
1916 160 146
1917 1981 176
1918 215 203
1919 219 215
1920 256 249
1921 2291 226
1922 176 183
1923 169 174
1924 170 175
1925 171 176
1926 164 172
1927 160 1671
1928 157 166
1929 154 164
1930 145 158
1931 131 1471
1932 126 144
1933 120 140
1934 122 141
1935 125 143
1936 130 147
1937 139 154
1938 141 156
G4/2 Board of Trade Wholesale Price Indices 1900--38 
First Series 
	
Second Series
	
Third Series 
1900 100.0 (1913 . 100) 1930 100.0
1901 96.7 1920 307.3 1931 87.8
1902 96.4 1921 197.2 1932 85.6
1903 96.9 1922 158.8 1933 85.7
1904 98.2 1923 158.9 1934 88.1
1905 97.6 1924 166.2 1935 89.0
1906 100.8 1925 159.1 1936 94.4
1907 106.0 1926 148.1 1937 108.7
1908 103.0 1927 141.6 1938 101.4
1909 104.1 1928 140.3
1910 108.8 1929 136.5
1911 109.4 1930 119.5
1912 114.9 1931 104.2
1913 116.4 1932 101.6
1914 117.2 1933 100.9
1915 143.9 1934 104.1
1916 186.5
1917 243.0
1918 268.1
1919 296.5
1920 368.8
SOURCE: Brian R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British Historical 
Statistics (Cambridge, 1962), 466 and 476-7.
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G5: OWNERSHIP AND DATE OF CLOSURE OF BRITISH ELECTRIC TRAMWAYS
Town or Company Company Municipal Year of Closure
Aberdare * 1935
Aberdeen * 1958
Aberdeen Suburban * 1927
Accrington * 1932
Ashton-under-Lyne * 1938
Ayr * 1931
Barking * 1929
Barnsley * 1930
Barrow-in-Furness * 1932
Bath * 1939
Birkenhead * 1937
Birmingham * 1953
Birmingham District * 1929a
Blackburn * 1949
Blackpool * (Open)
Bolton * 1947
Bournemouth * 1936
Bradford * 1950
Brighton * 1939
Bristol * 1941
Burnley * 1935
Burton & Ashby * 1927
Burton-on-Trent * 1929
Bury * 1949
Cambourne * 1927
Cardiff * 1950
Carlisle * 1931
Chatham * 1930
Cheltenham * 1930
Chester * 1930
Chesterfield * 1927
Cleethorpes * 1937b
Colchester * 1929
Colne * 1934
Coventry * 1940
Cruden Bay * 1932
Darlington * 1926
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APPENDIX G5 continued
Town or Company • Company Municipal Year of Closure
Darwen * 1946
Dearne District
*c 1933
Derby * 1934
Dewsbury, Ossett * 1933
Doncaster * 1935
Dover * 1936
Dudley, Stourbridge * 1930
Dumbarton * 1928
Dundee, Broughty Ferry * 1931
Dundee * 1956
Dunfermline * 1937
Edinburgh * 1956
Exeter * 1931
Falkirk * 1936
Gateshead * 1951
Glasgow * 1962
Glossop * 1927
Gloucester * 1933
Gosport & Fareham * 1929
Gravesend & Northfleet * 1929
Great Crosby * 1925
Greenock * 1929
Grimsby * 1937
Grimsby & Immingham * 1961
Halifax * 1939
Hastings * 1929
Huddersfield * 1940
Hull * 1945
Ipswich * 1926
Isle of Thanet * 1937
Jarrow * 1929
Keighley * 1924
Kidderminster * 1929
Kilmarnock * 1926
Kircaldy * 1931
Lanarkshire * 1931
Lancaster * 1930
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APPENDIX G5 continued
Town or Company Company Municipal Year of Closure
Leamington & Warwick * 1930
Leeds * 1959
Leicester * 1949
Lincoln * 1929
Liverpool * 1957
Llandudno & Colwyn Bay * 1956
Llanelly * 1933
London * 1952
Lowestoft * 1931
Luton * 1932
Lytham St. Annes * 1937
Maidstone * 1930
Manchester * 1949
Mansfield * 1932
Merthyr
..
'f• 1939
Mexborough & Swinton * 1929
Middlesbrotgh * 1934
Musselburgh * 1928
Nelson * 1934
Newcastle * 1950
Newport * 1937
Northampton * 1934
Norwich * 1935
Nottingham * 1936
Notts & Derby * 1932
Oldham * 1946
Perth * 1929
Peterborough * 1930
Plymouth * 1945
Pontypridd * 1931
Portsdown & Horndean * 1935
Portsmouth * 1936
Potteries * 1928
Preston * 1935
Rawtenstall * 1932
Reading * 1939
Rhondda * 1934
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APPENDIX G5 continued
Town or Company Company Municipal Year of Closure
Rochdale 1932
Rotherham 1949
Rothesay 1936
St. Helens 1936
Salford 1947
Scarborough 1931
Sheerness 1917
Sheffield 1960
South Lancashire 1933
South Shields 1946
South Staffs 1930
Southhampton 1949
Southend 1942
Southport 1934
Stalybridge *d 1945
Stockport 1951
Stockton & Thornaby 1931
Sunderland 1954
Sunderland District 1925
Swansea & Mumbles 1960
Swansea 1937
Swindon 1929
Taunton 1921
Torquay 1934
Tynemouth 1931
Tyneside 1930
Wakefield 1932
Wallasey 1933
Walsall 1933
Warrington 1935
Wemyss & District 1932
West Hartlepool 1927
Weston—super—Mare 1937
Wigan 1931
Wolverhampton 1928
Wolverhampton District 1929e
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APPENDIX G5 continued
Town or Company
	
Company	 Municipal	 Year of Closure
Worcester
	
1928
Wrexham
	
1927
Yarmouth	 . 1933
York
	
1935
Yorkshire Woollen
	
1934
SOURCE: E. Jackson-Stevens, 100 Years of British Electric Tramways (Newton
Abbot, 1985), 94-5.
a. The Birmingham District ceased operations on its own account
on 31 Mar 1928, but a sister company ran over its metals until 17 Nov 1929,
which is the date preferred above; even then, some of the company lines
were leased and worked by Birmingham Corporation until 1939. See'
Webb, Black Country Tramways 2, 217-8.
b. Cleethorpes and Grimsby tramways were originally worked by a
single company, but were later separately municipalised, and so are given
distinct entries above (though not in the original source); see Bett and
Gilham, Networks, 67.
c. Jackson-Stevens wrongly puts the Dearne District into the
company sector.
d. Ibid. for Stalybridge.
e. Although the Wolverhampton District ceased operations on
31 Aug 1928, once again a sister company operated its final route until
28 Sep 1929; see Webb, Black Country Tramways 2, 217.
The above list omits quite a number of entries in the original. Some are
Irish and Isle of Man tramways, which do not come within the scope of this
work. Others are formerly independent tramways which were amalgamated
before closure, such as the London lines (Barking alone receives a
separate entry, because although it retained ownership of a short section
of tramway it ceased independent operations in 1929 before the formation
of the LPTB; see Bett and Gilham, Networks, 114); this table is intended
to illustrate the progressive effect of management decisions to abandon
tramways rather than the closure of particular sections of line, so
constituent parts of larger undertakings are not of interest.
DEARNE DISTRICT APPENDICES
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NOTES AND SOURCES:
a. Constant prices are calculated using the Cost of Living Index
reproduced in Appendix G4.
b. SYRO, Brief 1914, 11.
c. SYRO, Proceedings 1914, 644; Chivers was a witness for the
opponents.
d. No mileage figure stated; it is assumed he was working from
Sellon's figure.
e. SYRO, Proceedings 1920, 82-6; also a witness for the opponents
f. SYRO, Stanley 1920, 3-5; he gives various estimates, this being the
most favourable to the DDLR.
g. SYRO, Hoare 1920, passim; Hoare is most imprecise about many fig-
ures and is clearly hedging.
h. Hoare gives no precise figure for revenue, but mentions charging
higher fares; Stanley is using a fare of lid. and 10,080,000 passengers, so
it is assumed here that Hare's fare is 2d. for the same number of people.
i. Again, no figure given; but Hoare admits that standing charges will
be £4,000 p.a. and working costs 'over 1/-'; is. 3d. or 15d. is thus taken,
plus the £4,000.
j. Details from Tramways Returns (Appendix D4), except for Sinking
Fund/Interest (Loan Charges) from Table 12 in the text.
k. Not stated.
RURAL AND SUBURBAN TRAMWAYS IN GREAT BRITAIND2:	 INTERURBAN,
WITH OWNERSHIP AND DATE OF CLOSURE (a)
Tramway Company	 Municipal	 Closed	 Notes
Aberdare	 * 1935
Aberdeen Suburban 	 * 1927
Birmingham District 	 *	 b
Blackpool & Fleetwood 	 * 0=	 c,d
Burton & Ashby	 *	 1929
Cambourne	 *	 1927
Dearne District	 *	 1933
Dewsbury, Ossett	 *	 1933
Dudley & Stourbridge	 *	 1930	 b
Dumbarton	 *	 1928
Dundee, Broughty Ferry 	 *	 1931
Dunfermline
	
*	 1937
Gosport & Fareham	 *	 1929
Greenock	 *	 1929
Grimsby & Immingham
	
*	 1961
Isle of Thanet
	
*	 1937
	 d
Kidderminster & Stourport
	
*	 1929	 b
Lanarkshire	 *	 1931
Leamington & Warwick	 *	 1930
Llandudno & Colwyn Bay	 *	 1956	 d
Mexborough & Swinton	 *	 1929
Notts & Derby
	
*	 1932
Portsdown & Horndean	 *	 1935
Potteries
	
* 1928
Rhondda	  1934
Rothesay
	 *1936	 d
South Lancs.
	
 1933
South Staffs.
	 1930	 b
SMHD (Stalybridge)
	 *1945	 e
Sunderland District
	
* 1925
Swansea & Mumbles
	
Tynemouth	 *	
1960
1931
d
Tyneside
	
*	 1930
Wakefield
	
* 1932
Wemyss
	
 
Wolverhampton District
	
*	 b199N
Wrexham	 *	 1927
Yorkshire Woollen District	 *	 1934
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NOTES:
a. Because of problems of definition, it is difficult to say just how
many 'interurban' tramways existed in Great Britain. These are chosen on a
fairly subjective basis and not on any precise statistical test (such as
number of cars relative to length of line). However these thirty-eight
lines may reasonably be classified as either not-at-all or more-than purely
urban. There are other feasible candidates, particularly in South Lancs.,
where long tram routes between towns were common. But this was generally
(1) within built-up areas and (2) between independent and essentially urban
undertakings. Many large systems, such as Glasgow, had out-of-town branches
too, but these are not included, even when formerly independent. Details
are taken from Appendix G5.
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b. All owned by the BET and, except for the detached tramway at Kidd-
erminster, operated as a unit under the auspices of the Birmingham and Mid-
lands Tramways Joint Committee. Some parts continued for a while under mun-
icipal ownership.
c. Company-owned until 1919.
d. Lines with considerable holiday traffic.
e. One service retained until the end of World War II; rest closed
by 1936.
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D3: DEVELOPMENT OF MOTOR BUS SERVICES OPERATED BY THE YORKSHIRE TRACTION 
AND PREDECESSOR COMPANIES IN THE DEARNE VALLEY 1913--33 
Route
	 Sources &
:Extensions and Changes 	 Date	 Notes
Woodman 
Barnsley--Wombwell--West Melton	 3 May 1913	 a
:West Melton--Woodman Inn	 1 Oct 1919	 b
:some buses diverted via Brampton 	 15 Oct 1921
:Woodman Inn--Mexborough	 1928	 d
Manvers 
Barnsley--Wath--Manvers--Mexborough--Doncaster 	 1921
Circular 
Barnsley--Hoyland Common	 3 May 1913
	 a
:Hoyland Common--Wombwell--Stairfoot--Barnsley 	 c1920
:short workings, Barnsley--Stairfoot & Kendray 	 c1920
Thurnscoe via Wath 
Barnsley--Wath--Bolton--Goldthorpe--Thurnscoe 	 1923	 f
:Wath--Thurnscoe withdrawn	 1928	 d
:reinstated	 1933
Direct Services via Darfield 
Barnsley--Darfield--Goldthorpe	 3 May 1913	 a
:Goldthorpe--Doncaster	 Jun 1914	 a
Barnsley--Darfield--Great Houghton--Thurnscoe 	 Jun 1914	 a
:Thurnscoe--Doncaster
	
1923	 f
Mexborough 
Mexborough--Bolton--Goldthorpe via Montague Road 	 mid-1920s? e
:took over similar M&STC service via Manvers 	 15 May 1929	 h
:Goldthorpe--Thurnscoe--Great Houghton
	
15 May 1929	 i
GENERAL NOTE: this Table does not purport to list all YTC services in
the Dearne valley, but merely to indicate the development of those local
services most affecting the DDLR. Some of the services mentioned extended
further afield and other long-distance services passed through.
NOTES AND SOURCES:
a. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 12; all these pre-World War I services
were suspended by May 1915 and later reinstated, except for that to Melton.
b. SYRO, Brief 1920, 12.
c. SYRO, 1/14, Wombwell UDC Minutes, Council, 11 Oct 1921, 259.
d. SYRO, Clerk's Reports, 27 Sep 1928; the Thurnscoe via Wath service
was withdrawn as a result of an agreement between the YTC and the DDLR, the
former being compensated by being allowed to extend their Woodman service to
Mexborough.
e. Denton, D. D. L. R., 18.	 f. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 14.
g. Ibid., 26.
	 h. Goode, M&STC History, 26.
i. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 26.
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D4: MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT RETURNS FOR DEARNE DISTRICT 1924-5-1933-4
PART I:	 CAPITAL (POUNDS)
1925-6 1926-7 1927-8 1928-91924-5
Capital authorised 300,000 II I/ II If
Capital paid up 274,581 284,731 298,200 297,500 If
Capital redeemed - - - a.n . a 4,529
Funds for redemp-
-tion of capital 439 1,141 1,196 n.a.a 8,406
Total 435 1,141 1,196 n.a.a 12,935
Net Liability 274,142 283,590 296,214 n.a. a 284,565
Capital Expended on:
Permanent Way 220,218
b 139,102 If 139,453 II
Electrical Equip-
ment of Line - 26,493 II II II
Substations 4,918 If II II
Street Improvements 6,634 7,560 7,758 7,725c II
Land & Buildings	 • - 15,739 If It II
Cars & Equipment ., 41,318 II II II
Other - 2,865 2,995 II II
Total	
,
226,852 238,025 238,353 238,671 ft
Preliminary
Expenditure 42,947 42,089 42,110 ft 42,118
Total on Tramways 269,799 280,114 280,463 280,781 280,789
Other Businesses 9,416 10,883 12,706 II If
Total 279,215 290,997 293,169 293,487 293,495
PART II:
	 REVENUE (POUNDS)
Income:
Passengers 22,966 33,015 26,799 34,952 31,629
Advertising etc. 289 851 878 1,252 1,270
Total
s
23,255 33,866 27,677 36,204 32,899
Expenditure:
Repairs etc:
Permanent Way 558 2,490 2,283 2,759 2,428
Electrical Equip-
ment of Line 439 917 '	 823 1,111 1,036
Cars & Equipment 1,717 2,920 3,074 3,243 3,575
Miscellaneous 362 423 311 408 201
Total 3.076 6,750 6,491 7,521 7,240
Other:
Traffic 9,430 14,207 12,386 14,039 14,075
Electric Power 4,773 7,034 7,514 6,074 6,418
Rates & Taxes 391 1,214 1,156 1,799 1,343
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APPENDIX D4 continued
PART I:	 CAPITAL (POUNDS)
1930-1 1931-2 1932-3 1933-41929-30
Capital authorised II it it It it
Capital paid up 294,150 295,068 It
Capital redeemed 5,626 10,227 15,697 25,218 31,007
Funds for redemp-
tion of capital 11,210 10,737 9,521 5,789 2,665
Total 16,836 20,964 25,218 31,007 33,672
Net Liability 277,314 274,104 269,850 264,061 261,396
Capital Expended on:
Permanent Way It it it II it
Electrical Equip-
ment of Line II it II II 11
Substations II it it II it
Street Improvements II II It It It
Land & Buildings Ii if H H it
Cars & Equipment It u H H u
Other
Total
Ii
11
3;650
239,326
st
ft
H
u
. ft,
It
Preliminary n
Expenditure Plus 655d 43,086 n n ”
Total on Tramways 281,444 282,362 If n it
Other Businesses 12,706. n it n n
Total 294,150 295,068 n n it
PART II:	 REVENUE (POUNDS)
Income:
Passengers 32,810 29,565 27,769 24,548 11,464
Advertising etc 1,028 1,040 1,019 1,009 604
Total 33,838 30,605. 28,788 25,557 12,068
Expenditure:
Repairs etc:
Permanent Way 2,537 2,493 2,456 1,698 663
Electrical Equip-
ment of Line 1,046 1,108 1,147 974 464
Cars & Equipment 3,775 3,401 3,352 3,040 1,354
Miscellaneous 306 207 182 74 34
Total 7,664 7,209 7,137 5,786 2,515
Other:
Traffic 13,860 13,774 13,583 13,330 6,435
Electric Power 6,741e 6,521f 6,451 6,201 2,843
Rates & Taxes 1,238 1,163 1,024 975 515
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APPENDIX D4 continued 
PART II continued
Insurance
Other
Total
Balance
1924-5 1925-6
509 590
1,546 2,424
19,725 32,219
3,530 1,647
1926-7
393
2,262
30,202
2,525
1927-8
589
1,986
32,008
4,196
1928-9
104
2,617
31,797
1,102
PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION 
Passengers carried 2,526,279 3,896,549 3,039,438 4,235,832 3,661,072
Car miles run	 475,876	 695,710	 611,816	 721,617	 707,470
Car hours worked 	 61,672	 84,395	 74,468	 81,774	 84,727
Car miles per hour 	 7.71	 8.24	 8.22	 8.82	 8.35
Traction units used 	 785,400 1,206,127 1,038,363 1,213,208 1,169,706
Ditto, per car mile
	
1.65
	 1.73	 1.70	 1.68	 1.65
Fare paid per Pass-
enger (d)	 2.18	 2.03	 2.12	 1.98	 2.07
Fare per mile:
Ordinary (d)	 1.13	 If	 If
Workmen (d)	 0.63	 If	 If	 0.62
Traffic Iecome:
per car mile (d) 11.58
	 11.39	 10.52	 11.62	 11.16
per route mile (E) 1,620
	 2,329
	
1,890
	
2,466	 2,321
Working Expenditure
per car mile (d)	 9.95	 11.11	 11.84	 10.65	 10.79
Operating Ratio (%)
	 85.00	 95.13	 109.12	 88.45	 96.65
Route miles	 (following items unchanged in subsequent years
authorised	 15.11	 except as noted)
Route miles open:
Single	 10.38
Double	 3.80
Total	 14.18
As single track miles 17.98 (17.97 in 1925-6 only)
Sidings & depot track 0.25
Grand total
Cars under 40 seats
Seating capacity:
Total
Average per car
18.23 (18.22 in 1925-6 only)
30
1,080 (1,065 in 1926-7 and 1,060 1927-8ff)
36 (35.50 in 1926-7 and 35.33 1927-8ff)
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APPENDIX D4 continued 
PART II continued
1929-30 1930-1 1931-2 1932-3 1933-4
Insurance 590 588 372 374
Other 2,520 2,162 2,275 2,523 1,158
Total 32,613 31,417 30,842 29,189 13,466
Balance 1,225 812 2,054 3,632 1.398
PART III:
	 STATISTICAL INFORM/5TION
Passengers carried 3,798,018 3,458,065 3,277,841 2,974,220 1,337,938
Car miles run 746,205 748,125 751,591 744,200 363,595
-
Car hours worked 89,370 89,609 90,011 89,125 42,409
Car miles per hour 8.35 11 11 T1 8.55
Traction units used 1,275,105 1,228,852 1,220,845 1,154,675 538,916
Ditto, per car mile 1.71 1.65 1.62 1.55 1.49
Fare paid per Pass-
enger (d) 2.07 2.05 2.03 1.98 2.06
Fare per mile:
Ordinary (d)
Workmen (d)
It
It
11
It It
11 11
Traffic Intome:
per car mile ( d)
	 10.88 9.48 8.87 7.92 7.59
per route mile (£) 2,386 2,085 2,029 1,731
Working Expenditure
per car mile (d) 10.49 10.08 9.85 9.41 8.91
Operating Ratio (%) 96.38 102.60 107.13 114.21 111.58
SOURCE: Ministry of Transport Returns for Street and Road Tramways
(the original column headings have sometimes been abbreviated for
convenience).
NOTES:
a. These items noted as 'not applicable' in this year; reason
unknown.
b. Obviously the Return was filled in wrongly in this first year,
and all capital expenditure except for Street Improvements was put under
the Permanent Way heading.
c. The small reduction here is probably due to the transfer of some
earlier expenditure to Permanent Way.
d. £655 added for 'Other Displaced and Superseded Works'.
e. £606 shown.separately as 'Other Tractive Power'.
f. £539 ditto.
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D6: DDLR ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION AND CHARGES 
D6/1: STATEMENT OF UNITS CONSUMED AND CASH PAID TO THE BARNSLEY CORPORATION
FROM 6TH JUNE 1924 TO 31ST DECEMBER 1932
Year Units
\
E
Cash
s.	 d.
Average per Unit
d.
1924 138,751 982 16 5 1.70
1925 325,455 2,255 6 2 1.66
1926 304,894 2,086 0 9 1.64
1927 338,303 2,327 6 7 1.65.
1928 304,292 2,089 6 9 1.64
1929 325,227 2,246 16 1 1.65
1930 323,793 2,210 16 6 / 1.63
1931 316,662 2,180 4 8 1.65
1932
	 ,
315,907 1,728 15 7 , 1.31
D6/2: STATEMENT OF K. V. A. DEMAND UNITS CONSUMED AND CASH PAID TO THE
YORKSHIRE ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY FROM JUNE 1924 TO 31ST DECR. 1932 TOGETHER
WITH AMOUNTS DR. AND CR. FOR COAL CORRECTION CLAUSE
Year K. V. A.
K. V. A. Charge
E	 s.	 d. Units
Units Charged
E	 s.	 d.
Dr. C. C. C.
f	 s.	 d.
1924 2,418.67 1,024 6	 10 444,806 926 13 7 152 11 10
1925 4,133.83 2,066 18	 3 1,011,210 2,016 13 9 168 2 7
1926 3,627.81 1,813 18	 2 868,570 1,809 10 5 248 19 3
1927 3,420.19 1,710 1	 11 1,024,100 2,133 10 10 1,086 10 11
1928 3,186.66 1,593 6	 7 1,006,510 2,096 17 11 -
1929 3,190.81 1,595 8	 2 1,060,571 2,209 10 6 -
1930 3,217.80 1,608 18	 3 1,057,472 2,203 1 4 -
1931 3,134.76 1,567 7	 8 1,074,780 2,239 2 6 -
1932 3,145.14 1,572 11	 5 1,067,660 2,224 5 10 -
Cr.	 C.	 C.	 C. Amount Paid Per Unit
Year f	 s.	 d. E s.	 d. d.
1924 22	 1	 10 2,081 10	 5 1.12
1925 63	 10	 0 4,278 4	 7 1.01
1926 79	 16	 3 3,792 12	 1 1.05
1927 730	 1	 1 4,200 2	 7 0.98
1928 51	 10	 5 3,638 14	 1 0.86
1929 18	 18	 8 3,786 0	 0 0.85
1930 15	 11	 4 3,796 8	 8 0.86
1931 - 3,806 10	 2 0.85
1932 - 3,796 17	 3 0.85
SOURCE: SYRO, Misc. Papers, 18 Feb 1933.
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D8: ORIGINAL TRAMWAY OPENING DATES FOR TRAMWAYS SURVIVING Alla 1950
Town	 First Tramway (usually non-electric) 	 Notes
Aberdeen	 1874	 a
Birmingham	 1872	 b
Blackpool	 1885	 c
Dundee	 1877	 d
Edinburgh	 1871	 e
Gateshead	 1883	 f
Glasgow	 1872	 g
Grimsby & Immingham 1912	 c
Leeds	 1871	 h
Liverpool	 1869	 i
Llandudno	 1907	 c
London	 1870	 j
Sheffield	 1873	 k
Stockport	 1880	 1
Sunderland
	 1879
	 m
Swansea & Mumbles
	 1860	 n
NOTES AND SOURCES:
a. Aberdeen Corporation Passenger Transport Department, Sixty Years of 
Progress (Aberdeen, 1958); no page numbers.
b. Webb, Black Country Tramways 1, 2; horse tramway operation
actually began outside the then city boundary in 1872 and not within the
city until 1873.
c. Jackson-Stevens, 100 Years, 94-5; unlike the others, these were all
electrified from the start.
d. Alan W. Brotchie, Tramways of the Tay Valley (Dundee, 1965), 23.
e. D. L. G. Hunter, Edinburgh Tramways Album (Sheffield, 1972);
introduction (no page numbers).
f. H. A. Whitcombe, History of the Steam Tram, ed. and with an intro-
duction by Charles E. Lee (South Godstone, Surrey; 1954), 40.
g. Oakley, The Last Tram, 21.
h. H. Brearley, Tramways in West Yorkshire (South Godstone, Surrey;
1960), 25.
i. Horne and Maund, Liverpool Transport 1, 30.
j. R. W. Kidner, The London Tramcar 1861--1952 (Lingfield, Surrey;
revised 3rd? ed., 1965); 2-4. G. F. Train had laid three experimental
lines in 1860, but these were soon removed, so the first permanent horse
tramways date from 1870.
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APPENDIX D8 continued 
k. See Appendix Si.
1. Gray, Manchester Carriage Company, 65.
m. Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport Executive, Sunderland Transport: 
the first 100 years (Newcastle, 1979), 1
n. Charles E. Lee, The Swansea and Mumbles Railway (South Godstone,
Surrey: 1954), 5 and 13. The first railed passenger service in the world
began in 1807, but permanent service only started in 1860.
DONCASTER APPENDICES
447
DN1: DONCASTER CORPORATION TRAMWAYS PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT
1903--1936 ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST POUND
Year
ending
31st March Revenue
Working
Expenditure
Working
Balance
Positive
Interest
Payments
Capitala
Payments Balance
1903 7,288 4,316(b) 2,972 1,109 3,210(b) 871(b)
1904 11,246 10,151 1,095 879 4,147 2,174(c)
1905 11,111 11,621 510 246 4,286 4,550(d)
1906 11,586 9,906 1,680 - 4,018 2 338
1907 12,397 9,859 2,538 - 3,900 1,362
1908 12,865 10,612 2,253 - 3,894 1,641
1909 12,908 10,461 2,447 24 3,948 1 477
1910 15,172 11,186 3,987 131 4,252 135
1911 16,513 12,207 4,306 92 4,317 81
1912 17,669 13,254 4,415 133 4,601(e) 53
1913 20,262 13,779 6,483 85 5,277(f) 1,290
1914 23,209 17,027 6,182 16 4,971 1,226
1915 25,348 16,657 8,691 88 5,922 2,856
1916 29,349 21,274 8,075 254 7,573 757
1917 37,874 28,229 9,645 250 7,813 2,083
1918 44,519 33,069 11,450 267 7,879 3,838
1919 53,528 37,566 15,962 486 8,101 8,347
1920 60,193 56,607 3,586 414 8,572 4 572
1921 75,008 69,041 5,967
- 11,467(g) 5 501
1922 72,295 62,537 9,758 500(h) 10,928 670
1923	
.
73,055 58,516 14,539
- 11,887 2,665
1924 66,484 52,337 14,147 48 11,479 2,715
1925 70,947 54,993 15,954 444(1) 10,782 5,615
1926 71,434 54,592 16,842 450 12,951(j) 4,342
1927 62,479 55,201 7,278 535 11,806(k) 3 992
1928 72,586 53,605 18,981 576 10,971 8,586
1929 57,611 48,460 9,151 787 10,945 1 007
1930 45,843 34,612 11,231 715 11,767 178
1931 31,707 23,121 8,586 318 10,809 1 906
1932 17,373 14,149 3,224 361 9,403 5,818
1933 10,268 9,525 743 58 5,650 4,849
1934 10,161 8,501 1,660 - 4,301 2,642
1935 9,841 8,140 1,701 - 3,139 1,438
1936 1,169 1,586 417 680(1) 2,802(m) 2,539
SOURCE: Doncaster Accounts, Tramways a/cs, passim.
a. This item occasionally includes contributions to new capital assets
as opposed to payments on the old. These items are noted below, but are
never a high proportion of the whole.
b. DCT Jubilee, 49 has these figures up to 1922. There are occasional
minor discrepancies due to rounding errors, but in 1903 the sums for working
and capital expenditure differ more and the balance is £932; it is not poss-
ible to explain this conflict with the evidence available.
c. The actual balance in the 1904 account is only £1303, but this
because the previous year's profit of £871 was carried forward, contrary to
later practice.
d. Both DCT Jubilee, 49 and the accounts have a deficit of £3,248
because of the inclusion of £1,304 paid from the Borough Fund to cover the
previous year's deficit. This is adjusted in the present Table to accord
with the convention from from 1906 onwards, whereby each year's balance is
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APPENDIX DN1 continued 
isolated from subsequent years' accounts by being put into a separate Net
Revenue Account:
e. Includes £107 for switches, spanners etc.
f. Includes £665 towards motor tower wagon.
g. Includes £1,200 towards culverting the river Cheswold and £200 to
providing a shelter in Adwick-le-Street.
h. Income tax adjustment.
i. Includes £254 income tax adjustment.
j. Includes £793 for alterations and additions to car shed and £235 to
new Morris motor truck.
k. Includes £219 to new Morris motor truck and car.
1. Transfer of balance of Reserve Fund.
m. Includes £1,353 to removing track and re-instating roadway.
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DN3: EARNINGS OF THE BRODSWORTH TRAMWAY 
EARNINGS OF THE BRODSWORTH AND OTHER TRAM ROUTES
COMPARED TO WORKING COSTS IN POUNDS
Year Ending
31st March
Traffic Revenue per Route Mile	 Working Costs per Route Mile
Brodsworth Other Lines Entire System
1917 2,415 2,414 1,821
1918 •,884 2,845 2,113
1919 3,546 3,403 2,424
1920 4,275 3,743 3,652
1921 4,657 4,795 4,454
1922 3,944 4,789 4,035
1923 3,846 4,830 3,775
SOURCES AND CALCULATIONS:
Traffic Revenue and Working Costs, Doncaster Accounts, Tramways Revenue
a/c, 1916-17--1922-3. The revenue for each line is stated separately at
this period, so it is possible to obtain the exact revenue for Brodsworth
and for the other lines. From 1919-20 certain small items (such as 'convey-
ance of police' and never more than £313 p.a.) are credited entirely to the
other lines for the sake of simplicity.
The Route Mileages used to convert gross revenue and costs from the accounts
into amounts per route mile are as follows: Brodsworth 3.5, other lines
12.0 and entire system 15.5 miles. These are somewhat a matter of guesswork.
During World War I a mistake was made in the Tramway Returns by adding in
1
some new mileage twice.
	 The undertaking's own figures obviously repeat the
error, giving 11.25 miles in 1915, 16.00 in 1916, 14.75 in 1920 and 14.25 in
2
in 1922.
	 It is likely that the first and last of these are correct; the
3
final figure agrees with the Tramway Returns 1927-8, which was after the
error had been discovered. Since only the Brodsworth line was built between
the financial years ending 31st March 1915 and 1922, its length was 3 miles;
1. SYT Letters, 13 Jan 1921, 389.
2. Doncaster Statistics, passim.
	 3. Tramway Returns, 1927-8.
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comparison with the system map shows this to be about right. The map also
shows that half-a-mile needs adding for the common section with the Bentley
line to obtain the total route mileage. 1
 The track mileage for the rest
of the system was, of course, 11.25 (the figures quoted above are for track
and not route mileage), but common sections need adding to obtain the route
mileage, as follows:
Furlongs Chains
Avenue/Beckett Roads 4 41 (2)
Racecourse 1 31 (3)
Hexthorpe 2 -
Hyde Park - 1 (4)
Adding the total of 7 furlongs and 9 chains to the track mileage of 11 miles
2 furlongs makes a route mileage of 12 miles, 1 furlong, 9 chains or
12 miles to the nearest mile, which is the figure used in the table.
A Check on the soundness of the calculations can be made by working out the
operating surplus for the whole system from the above table and then compar-
ing it with the actual figures shown in Appendix DN1. Taking two years at
random, in 1920 the surplus from this table is £3,272 and the actual one
£3,576 and in 1923 the two sums are £12,908 and £14,539. So the above
calculation results in shortfalls of some 9-12 per cent; that is, it tends to
under-estimate earnings.
1. Figure 6 in the text above.
2. The outer ends of the two routes are about the same length, so the
as-built length of Beckett Road is subtracted from that for Avenue Road to
give this figure; lengths from Tables 30 and 31 above.
3. The length of the Priory Place line is about right for the extra
length of this route along St. Sepulchre Gate and Station Road; see Table 31.
4. Extra sections of these last two routes from the map in Figure 6.
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DN4:	 MOTOR BUS LICENCES ISSUED BY DONCASTER WATCH COMMITTEE 1922--1930
Date (page of minute)	 Buses Licenseda Corporation Buses b Private Busesb
16 Mar 1922 (279)	 51
26 Sep 1922 (577)	 61
21 Mar 1923 (288) 	 41 6 35
20 Sep 1923 (594)	 52
13 Mar 1924 (307)	 90 12 78
(Sep 1924 figures do not appear to be recorded)
6 Mar 1925 (267) 	 134 15 119
29 Sep 1925 (552-3)	 146
19 Mar 1926 (272)	 231 17 214
17 Sep 1926 (539)	 272
18 Mar 1927 (277-8)	 283 21 262
19 Sep 1927 (635)	 369
9 Mar 1928 (381) 	 380 24 356
20 Sep 1928 (738) 	 422
8 Mar 1929 (345)	 681 28 653
19 Sep 1929 (706)	 629
7 Mar 1910 (379)
	
579 39 540
18 Sep 1930 (752)	 622
SOURCES: Buses Licensed from Doncaster Minutes, Watch Committee,
Hackney Carriage Sub-Committee (19 Sep 1929 is Watch Committee proper);
Corporation Buses from DCT Jubilee, 49.
a. A certain margin of error should be allowed on these figures,
because it is not always made quite clear if certain licences mentioned
especially (such as vehicles which were unsatisfactory and needed replacing)
were included in the grand totals or not; the error, if any, is certainly no
more than ten and usually much less. The licences were issued per vehicle,
so the number of operators would be considerably less in any one year.
b. The total for buses licensed is only broken down when the number of
municipal buses is known.
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DN5: COMPARATIVE TRAFFIC REVENUE AND WORKING EXPENDITURE
IN PENCE PER CAR MILE FOR DONCASTER TRAMS
AND TROLLEYBUSES 1929--1936
Year Ending
31st March
Traffic Revenuea Working Expenditure Working Surplusb
Trams TBs Trams TBs Trams TBs
1929 16.65 17.28 14.34 11.53 2.31 5.75
1930 16.83 17.13 12.98 11.71 3.85 5.42
1931 15.53 16.19 11.78 11.56 3.75 4.63
1932 15.35 15.56 13.34 10.14 2.01 5.44
1933 13.39 15.01 14.30 10.16 0.91 4.85
1934 11.91 15.09 11.38 9.92 0.53 5.17
1935 11.07 15.00 10.35 9.77 0.72 5.23
1936 9.83 15.27 13.36 10.01 3.53 5.26
'
SOURCE: Tramway Returns, 1928-9--1935-6.
a. Revenue is based only on traffic income (excluding advertisement
revenue for the trams and this with a few other small items for the trolley-
buses), though total income was used in Doncaster's own accounts to calcul-
ate the working surplus; in 1932-3 this extra income was sufficient to
cancel out the deficit shown here for the trams. However the above figures
give the clearest impression of the comparative earning power of the two
types of vehicle.
b. Revenue minus expenditure.
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DN6: FLEET AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS FOR DONCASTER
CORPORATION TRANSPORT 1927-1936
Year Ending
31st March
Number of Vehiclesa Profit/Lossb
Tram TB Bus Tram TB Bus Total
1927 44 21 3,992 5,539 9,531
1928 38 24 8,585 968 9,554
1929 38 16 28 1,007 556 5,105 6,668
1930 18 22 39 178 1,869 5,159 3,112
1931 14 30 42 1,906 480 2,965 5,351
1932 11 31 42 5,818 7,328 533 2,043
1933 9 31 38 4,848 6,274 420 1,846
1934 9 32 38 2,641 5,011 4,637 7,007
1935 9 32 36 1,438 9,304 4,800 12,666
1936 37 36 2.539 10,252 8,229 15,942
f
SOURCES:
a. DCT Jubilee, 49.
b. Doncaster Accounts, Tramways, Trackless Trolley and Motor Bus
Net Revenue a/cs; the sum of these given here agrees with the total
profit/loss given in DCT Jubilee, 49 except for rounding errors.
SHEFFIELD APPENDICES
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Si: CHRONOLOGY OF LOCAL TRANSPORT IN SHEFFIELD 
1852	 First urban horse bus services.
1872	 Sheffield Tramways Act authorised the construction of about 9 miles
of tramway.
1873	 First horse tram route opened.
1876	 Trials with a steam tram engine.
1896	 Corporation takeover of company-operated tramways and decision
to electrify them.
1899
	
First electric tram service Tinsley to Nether Edge.
1902	 Last horse cars withdrawn.
1905	 Through running with Rotherham Corporation.
1907	 Authority obtained tO operate motor buses.
1912	 Authority (never used) obtained to operate trolleybuses.
1913	 First motor bus service Manchester Road to Lodge Moor.
1914	 Former tramways' generating station at Kelham Island transferred to
the Corporation Electricity Supply Department.
1915	 Women conductors employed.
1916	 Advertising contract cancelled due to wartime conditions; trams kept
free of advertising for many years afterwards.
1919ff Rapid development of motor bus services within and beyond the city,
aided by the purchase of vehicles and services from private oper-
ators and by joint running agreements.
1924	 Air brakes began to be fitted to tramcars.
1925 .	Bus routes began to be extended into City instead of terminating at
a tramway; Petre Street tramway converted to motor bus operation.
1927	 Introduction of transverse seating on lower decks of tramcars.
1927-8 Reserved track tramways built round Abbey Lane and Prince of Wales
Road.
1929	 „II:ant Omnibus Committee formed between Sheffield Corporation and the
LMS and LNER, involving the transfer of certain long distance Cor-
poration services to railway ownership, but with operation remaining
in Corporation hands.
1930	 Diesel-engined bus put into service.
1934	 Nether Edge tramway converted to motor bus operation.
1936	 Fulwood via Broomhill also converted to motor bus service.
1940	 Severe damage to tramways and temporary suspension of service during
the Blitz.
1946	 Final new tram built in the Corporation's workshops; 35 more built
later by an outside firm.
1948	 Tram route between Rotherham and Sheffield closed due to rebuilding
of a canal bridge.
1951	 The Council adopted the General Manager's report recommending the
replacement of tramways by motor buses over a period of fifteen
years.
1960	 The final tram service was withdrawn, earlier than originally planned
in order to achieve further economies.
SOURCES:
S.T.D., Brief History, 11, 13, 15 and 17 (all details up to 1940).
S.T.D., Tramway Era, 26-8 (subsequent details).
Much fuller information is to be found in Gandy, Sheffield Tramways and
Hall, Sheffield Transport, passim.
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S2: CHRONOLOGY OF LOCAL TRANSPORT IN MANCHESTER 
1877	 Horse tram services begun by the Manchester Carriage and Tramways
Company; at its peak in the 1890s the Company ran about 500 cars
over 140 miles of route in Manchester and surrounding towns.
1901	 Municipal electric trams started in Manchester.
1907	 The fleet was now over 500 and route mileage over 90.
1911	 Manchester was only one of ten municipal tramway operators in the
area, and by this time they served a population of nearly 2-1 million
with about 1,000 trams on more than 300 miles of route carrying well
over 300 million passengers p.a. Through services were provided by
joint working arrangements between operators, whilst some smaller
local authorities owned tramways which were worked by the larger
towns' frams. There were also three company-owned systems in the
area. Manchester also offered a tramways' parcels express service
throughout Manchester and Salford and over a wide area beyond.
1920s Sleeper track extensions were built to the south of the city. About
350 high-capacity bogie trams were built in this decade, making a
total of 638 versus 240 two-axle cars by the end of the decade.
1928	 The final tramway extension was opened.
1930	 The first tram route, inner circle route 53, was closed.
1931	 Three further major routes closed.
1932	 The final new trams, of a new lightweight two-axle design, were
delivered.
1939	 A decision was made to abandon all trams within eighteen months,
though the war held up completion of the programme.
1949	 The last tram ran.
SOURCES:
Joyce, Rails of Manchester, 16, 39, 41, 45, 65-6 and 139.
Kirby, Middleton Tramways, 47.
Kirby, 'Tramways of Altrincham t , 58.
Klapper, Tramways, 136.
Manchester Corporation, Parcels Express (a brochure advertising the service,
reprinted, Rochdale, 1972).
Sleeman, 'Municipal Transport', 53.
There is no full-scale history of Manchester's tramways yet available, but
the early years are covered in A. K. Kirby, Dan Boyle's Railway (Rochdale,
1972).
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S4: SHEFFIELD CORPORATION TRAMWAYS ORGANISATION 
Title of Department 
Sheffield Corporation Tramways 	 1896--1916
Sheffield Corporation Tramways and Motors	 1916--1934
Sheffield Transport Department 	 1934ff
Chairmen of Committee 
Alderman Sir William Edwin Clegg
	
1896--1926
Moses Humberstone	 1926--1927
Charles William Beardsley
	 1927--1929
(Deputy Chairman 1926--1927)
"	 Alfred James Bailey	 1929--1932
"	 Albert Harland	 1932--1933
"	 Alfred James Bailey	 1933--1944
"	 Thomas William Bridgeland
	 1944-- ?
Cllr.?	 S. J. Dyson	 ?	 ?	 (a)
General Managers 
Henry Mallyon	 1896--1900
Aubrey Llewellyn Coventry Fell	 1900--1903
Arthur Robinson Fearnley 	 1903--1936
Harris Watson	 1936--1945
Rowland Claude Moore 	 1945ff
SOURCE: S:T.D., Brief History, 2.
a. Since the above was published in 1946 it naturally does not give
subsequent information. There may have been other Chairmen between Bridge—
land and Dyson, but the latter was certainly Chairman in 1960 when the trams
closed; see S.T.D., Tramway Era, 2.
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S6: DONCASTER AND SHEFFIELD CORPORATION TRAMWAYS
COMPARISON OF RENEWAL AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
1919-20--1923-4
Table 1
Actual Expenditure on Track and Cars for Doncaster
(See Appendix S5 for Sheffield)
Year
Permanent Way and Overhead Tramcars
Total
£
Reserve
E
Capital
E.
Sub-Total
E
Reserve
E
Capital
E
Sub-Total
E.
1919-20 2,636 2,636 19,300 19,300 21,936
1920-1 2,847 2,847 1,033 1,033 3,880
1921-2 732 4,178 4,910 4,910
1922-3 674 5,247 5,921 5,921
1923-4 7,603 7,603 7,603
4,253 19,664 23,917 Nil 20,333 20,333 44,250
SOURCE: Doncaster Accounts, 1919-20--1923-4.
Table 2
Expenditure on Permanent Way & Overhead per Single Track Mile
Doncaster Sheffield
Year 'files Expenditure Miles Expenditure
1919-20 18.50 142 79.00 1,136
1920-1 154 79.25 1,903
1921-2 18.25 269 80.125 1,095
1922-3 It 324 82.50 907
1923-4 It 417 83.75 1,251
Table 3
Expenditure on Tramcars per Service Car
Doncaster	 She field
Year Cars Expenditure Cars Expenditure
1919-20 47 411 373 270
1920-1 It .	 22, 374 128
1921-2 It 394 181
1922-3 381 25
1923-4 Pt 371 5
SOURCE: data for Tables 2 and 3 from Doncaster and Sheffield Statistical
Information.
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S7: SHEFFIELD TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT MOTORBUS OPERATING COSTS
IN 1938-9 AND 1949-50 AND THE PERCENTAGE CHANGES BETWEEN
THOSE DATES (CATEGORY 'A' BUSES ONLY)
1938-9 1949-50 Percentage
Operating Costs per bus mile per bus mile Change
d. d.
Running Costs:-
Drivers' & Conductors' Wages 4.77 8.779 84.05
Uniforms 0.08 0.396 395.00
Power 2.03 2.206 8.67
Tyres 0.23 0.767 233.48
Licences 0.63 0.663 5.24
7.74 12.811 65.52
Traffic Costs:-
Traffic Supervision 0.60 1.270 111.67
Cleaning Passenger Vehicles 0.27 0.598 121.48
Other 0.16 0.050 68.75
1.03 1.918 86.21
Maintenance-Costs:-
Repairing PSVs & Lubrication 1.43 3.497 144.55
Establishment Costs:-
General Officers & Staff 0.23 0.304 32.17
Other 0.38 1.320 247.37
0.61 1.624 166.23
-
1Q.81 19.850 83.63
SOURCES:
1938-9: 'Economics of PSV Operation, 1939 compared with 1966', paper
in C. T. Humpidge's files.
1949-50: Sheffield Annual Report, 1950-1, Motorbus Revenue a/c.
Since the two sources do not use exactly the same categories, there may be
minor errors due to ascribing small items to different heads.
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S8: OPENING DATES OF ELECTRIC TRAMWAY TRACK AND ROUTE CLOSURES 
Route
	
Date
	
Section
TINSLEY
	
	
5 Sep 1899
20 Jun 1905
11 Dec 1948
8 Oct 1960
NhiHER
	
5 Sep 1899
EDGE
	
24 Nov 1934
WALKLEY
	
18 Sep 1899
7 Apr 1956
FIRTH PARKa 27 Sep 1899
(via	 25 Aug 1909
Barnsley	 18 Nov 1934
Road)
	
3 Apr 1960
INTAKE
	
	
10 Jan 1900
17 Apr 1902
2 Feb 1903
8 Feb 1935
29 Dec 1935
7 Apr 1956
6 Oct 1956
NETHER GREEN 13 Apr 1900
28 Oct 1901
14 May 1904
5 Jan 1952
MILLHOUSES 28 Jul 1900
(and Abbey	 1 Mar 1901
Lane) 17 Apr 1902
31 Jul 1926
14 Apr 1927
28 Feb 1959
8 Oct 1960
WOODSEATSb	1 Aug 1900
1 Nov 1900
1 Nov 1902
6 Apr 1903
19 May 1904
4 Nov 1904
22 Jan 1923
12 Jul 1928
3 Oct 1959
3 Apr 1960
BRIGHTSIDE 26 Nov 1900
6 Dec 1958
WADSLEY	 26 Jan 1901
BRIDGE	 12 Feb 1903
7 Jun 1924
3 Oct 1959
High St--Weedon St
Connected at Tinsley to Rotherham Corporation's
tracks; through service began 11 Sep 1905 and
ownership of tracks to Templeborough transferred
to Sheffield 1 Jan 1926.
Rotherham through service withdrawn
Closed throughout
High St--Nether Edge
Closed 
Church St--South Rd
Closed 
Wicker Arches--Bolsover Rd
Bolsover Rd--Firth Park (Bellhouse Rd bottom)
Firth Park--Sheffield Lane Top
Closed 
Wicker--Manor Lane via Blonk St
Manor Lane--Woodhouse Rd
Diversion via Commercial St & Sheaf St
Woodhouse Rd--Hollinsend Rd
Hollinsend Rd--Birley Vale
Closed (n.b. workmen's cars continued to operate
to Intake via Prince of Wales Rd)
Closed throughout
The Moor--Hunters Bar
Hunters Bar--Hangingwater Rd
Hangingwater Rd--Nether Green
Closed (i.e. Fulwood via Hunters Bar)
The Moor--Woodseats Rd
Woodseats Rd--Bannerdale Rd
Bannerdale Rd--Millhouses Rd
Millhouses Lane--Wagon & Horses
Wagon & Horses--Woodseats via Abbey Lane
Closed (Abbey Lane)
Closed (Millhouses and Beauchief)
Highfields--Lowfields, also Lowfields to Queen's
Rd Works, used only for access until 1 Nov 1900
Highfields--Albert Rd
Albert Rd--Woodbank Crescent
Woodbank Crescent--Chantrey Rd
Fitzalan Sq via Pond St & Shoreham St--Havelock
Bridge
Leadmill Rd--Queen's Rd Depot
Chantrey Rd--Abbey Lane
Abbey Lane--Meadowhead
Woodseats service closed 
Closed throughout.
Twelve O'Clock Junction--Brightside
Closed 
Wicker via Nursery St--Parkside Rd Top
West Bar--Hillfoot Bridge via Penistone Rd
Parkside Rd bottom--Wadsley Bridge
Closed 
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APPENDIX S8 continued 
Route
	
Date
	 Section
FULWOOD	 25 Mar 1901
(via	 1 Aug 1901
Broomhill) 12 Oct 1901
12 Jul 1923
22 Aug 1936
CROOKES
	 1 Apr 1901
28 Apr 1902
26 Nov 1913
4 May 1957
HANDSWORTH 11 Apr 1901
29 May 1909
7 Sep 1934
4 May 1957
FIRTH PARK 27 Dec 1901
(via 9 Aug 1902
Attercliffe) 18 Aug 1902
26 Oct 1957
MIDDLEWOOD 30 May 1903
8 Sep 1913
26 Nov 1913
27 Mar 1954
PETRE STREET 24 Sep 1903
19 Apr 1925
MALIN BRIDGE 19 May 1908
5 Jan 1952
ECCLESALL
	
	 1 Aug 1908
14 Apr 1922
27 Mar 1954
PRINCE OF	 24 Feb 1928
WALES ROAD 12 Apr 1958
OTHER LINES 29 Sep 1901
(closure	 19 May 1902
dates not	 25 Jan 1904
given)
30 May 1904
4 Aug 1904
25 Dec 1904
31 Aug 1908
21 Dec 1912
22 Sep 1924
20 Sep 1927
23 Oct 1928
Winter St--Manchester Rd
Manchester Rd--Ranmoor P.O.
Ranmoor P.0.--Storth Lane
Storth Lane--Canterbury Ave
Closed 
Crookes Junction--Lydgate Lane
Lydgate Lane--School Rd
School Rd--Heavygate Rd
Closed 
Staniforth Rd Junction--Darnall (Main Rd)
Darnall--Finchwell Rd
Finchwell Rd--Orgreave Lane
Closed 
Newhall Rd
Idsworth Rd--Reform Chapel
Hawke St--Reform Chapel
Closed (by then running to Sheffield Lane Top)
(but cars continued running via Saville St and
Newhall Rd until 28 Feb 1959)
Hoyle St--Parkside Rd
Parkside Rd--Catchbar Lane
Catchbar Lane--Middlewood
Closed 
Spital Hill--Canada St
Closed 
Holme Lane Junction--Malin Bridge
Closed 
Rustlings Road Junction--Banner Cross
Banner Cross--Millhouses Lane
Closed 
Elm Tree--Darnall
Closed 
Market Place siding
Moorhead siding
Sheaf St (from Commercial St), Paternoster Row &
Furnival St
Cherry St siding
Snig Hill & Bridge St
Wolseley Rd
Leopold St
Rustlings Rd turning loop
Exchange St
Vulcan Rd siding
West Bar Green (to Tenter St depot)
SOURCE: S.T.D., Tramway
sections and closing dat
to other routes may have
Era, 29-31; note that opening dates refer to track
es to routes, so in both cases other sections common
opened or closed earlier or later.
These routes were later known as: a. SHEFFIELD LANE TOP
b. MEADOWHEAD
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S9: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SHEFFIELD CORPORATION AND JOINT
OMNIBUS COMMI1TEE MOTOR BUS SERVICES 1913 - -1949
(1)
Date Service
Began
(2)
Type
(3)	 (4)
Earlier
Route
	 Service
(5)	 ( 6 )	 (7)
Joint
Service Ref. Notes
9 Feb 1913 T Broomhill--Lodge Moor 122
17 Mar 1913 T Brightside--Wincobank 123
31 May 1913 T Malin Bridge--Rivelin 124
7 Jul 1913 C Fitzalan Square--Heeley Green 124
27 Oct 1913 C Fitzalan Square--Upperthorpe 124	 a
7 Sep 1914 T Millhouses--Totley
	
P 128
21 Sep 1914 T Middlewood--Stocksbridge 128
14 Dec 1914 T Brightside--Tinsley 142	 b
26 Jul 1915 T Handsworth--Aston 143
29 Nov 1915 T Intake--Mosborough	 P 143
14 Feb 1916 T Firth Park--Ecclesfield
	 P 143
23 Jun 1919 E Mosborough--Eckington 155
31 Jul 1919 T Woodseats--Dronfield 155
30 Sep 1919 E Dronfield--Unstone 155
24 Nov 1919 E Ecclesfield--Chapeltown 155
12 Jan 1920 E Chapeltown--High Green 155
19 Jan 1920 C Midland Station--Brocco Bank 155
24 Feb 1920 C Above extended at both ends 155	 c
19 Apr 1920 T Intake--Woodhouse Mill 156
26 Mar 1921 E Aston--Kiveton Park via Dinnington 157
? ?	 192,1 T Intake--Killamarsh 157
21 May 1921 T Intake--Beighton 158
26 Jun 1923 E Unstone--Whittington Moor M 161	 e
28 Jan 1924 E High Green--Penistone 161
26 Apr 1924 E Lodge Moor--Wyming Brook 161	 f
7 Jun 1924 E Totley--Owler Bar 161	 f,g
16 Jun 1924 T/E Wincobank--Shiregreen--Firth Park 163
Summer 1924 E	 Stocksbridge--Langsett 163	 f
10 Oct 1924 T Millhouses--Bakewell via Baslow 	 P 162
27 Oct 1924 E High Green--Howbrook 164
1 Jan 1925 T Ecclesall--Dore	 P 163
20 Apr 1925 C Fitzalan Square--Petre Street 	 T 163
6 Jul 1925 C Moorhead--Bakewell via Calver	 P 162-3 g
1 Aug 1925 C Pond Street--Chesterfield M 164
26 Oct 1925 C Pond Street--Dronfield via 164
Abbey Lane
10 Nov 1925 C Exchange Street--Barnsley Y 164
11 Jan 1926 B Tinsley--Gleadless 164
13 Mar 1926 C Sheffield--Barnsley Y 165
8 Apr 1928 C Leopold Street--Rivelin Dams 167
? Jun 1926 C Exchange Street--Maltby 	 P 165
or Jul 1926 C Exchange Street--Holmsfield	 P 165
"	 1926 C Exchange Street--Worrall 	 P 165	 h
"	 1926 C Exchange Street--Barnsley 	 P
via Wadsley Bridge
165	 i
? ?	 1926 ? City?--Norwood 167	 j
15 Nov 1926 T Ecclesall--Bents Green 167
25 Jul 1927 C Sheffield--Rotherham--Doncaster M -	 k
25 Sep 1927 C Sheffield--Clowne	 P 167-8 1
10 Oct 1927 C Pond Street?--Cricket Inn Road STD	 g,m
13 Oct 1927 C Moorhead--Castleton	 P N 158/69 n
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APPENDIX S9 continued
(1)	 (2)	 (3)
	
(4)	 (5)	 ( 6 )	 (7)
Date Service	 Earlier Joint
Began	 Type
	
Route	 Service Service Ref. Notes
13 Oct 1927 C Moorhead--Buxton
	 P	 N 159/69 n
13 Oct 1927 C Moorhead--Ashopton
	 P	 169
14 May 1928 L Penistone--Huddersfield
	 Y	 168 g
? ? 1928 L Norwood--Southey Green
	 STD o
1 Jan 1929 C Sheffield=Gainsborough
	 J	 172 p
? ?	 1929 B. Norwood--Tinsley
	 STD
22 Apr 1929 L Heeley--Graves Park 	 STD q
? Jul 1929 B Inner Circle
	 219
25 Sep 1929 C Sheffield--Wombwell
	 J/Y 213 r
17 Oct 1929 C Sheffield--Manchester
	 J	 213
27 Jan 1930 T Dykes Hall Road--Worrall
	 J	 214
? ?	 1930 C Sheffield--Manchester via Snake
	 N	 213 s
? ? 1930 T Hillsborough--Wisewood	 STD t
27 Oct 1930 T Malin Bridge--Stannington
	 J	 216
? Jan 1931 C LMS Station--Wincobank
	 220
1 Aug 1931 B Outer Circle
	 220
? ? 1931 L Wombwell--Upton
	 J/Y STD u
? ? 1931 B Darnall--Shiregreen 	 STD v
? Apr 1932 T Malin Bridge--Bradfield
	 P	 216
13 May 1932 C Sheffield--Bradford
	 J/Y/W -
	
g,w
4 Jun 1932 C Sheffield--Ewden Valley
	
-	 x
30 Jul 1932 E Bents Green--Ringinglow 	 220 g,y
7 May 1933 C Sheffield--Chesterfield via Ford 	 E	 217
25 Mar 1934 C City--Nether Edge
	 T	 195
17 Apr 1934 C Sheffield--Treeton
	 P	 219
17 Apr 1934 C Sheffield--Thorpe Hesley
	 P	 M	 219
? ? 1934 E Stannington--Dungworth
	 STD z
27 Jan 1935 C Pond Street--Woodthorpe--
	
222
Handsworth'
? ? 1935 C Sheffield--Derwent
	 STD
5 Jul 1936 L Cricket Inn Road--Wybourn
	 STD aa,g
26 Aug 1936 C City--Pulwood via Broomhill
	 T	 195
29 Nov 1936 T Beighton--Handsworth
	 STD g
11 Jul 1937 C City--Gleadless via Arbourthorne
	 196 g
17 Oct 1937 C City--Shirecliffe
	 STD bb,g
9 Jul 1938 L Stocksbridge--Chapeltown via
	
-	 cc
High Green
14 Aug 1938 C City--Southey Green via Owlerton
	 196 dd,g
3 Sep 1938 E Stannington--Loadbrook
	 STD g,z
5 Mar 1939 B Attercliffe--Southey Green (peak)
	 222
31 May 1939 L Above & City--Southey Green
	 222 dd,g
extended to Buchanan Road
29 Jul 1939 L Extended again to Deerlands Ave
	 222 dd
(i.e. Parson Cross)
? ?	 1939 B Shirecliffe--Vulcan Road
	 222 ee
(Attercliffe)
? ? 1940 C City--Blackburn
	 M	 STD ff
? ?	 1941 B Parson Cross--Norfolk Bridge
	 STD
? ?	 1948 C City--Wordsworth Avenue
	
258
? ?	 1948 B Hillsborough--Firth Park
	
258
? ?	 1949 C Sheffield--Grenoside (circular)
	
258
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APPENDIX S9 continued 
Abbreviations used in the Table 
Column 2 
B: Belt route making more or less incidental connections with radial
tramways.
C: Route running into city centre without transferring passengers
to/from a tramway.
E: Extension of an existing bus route already starting from a
tramway.
L: Extension of an existing bus route not starting from a tramway.
T: Route running from an intermediate or terminal point on a tramway
(most later being extended into the city, becoming routesof type C; see
Appendix S12 for details).
Column 3 
Minor alterations to or temporary suspension of routes not included; where
the Sheffield terminus is not stated in the source, 'Sheffield' is used for
longer distance services and 'City' for urban ones (akin to bus destination
displays for many years).
Column 4 
P: Service taken over from a private operator (details in Appendix S10).
T: Service replacing a tram route.
Column 5 
A number of longer distance services were operated jointly with other
operators, as follows:
E: East Midland Motor Services Ltd.
J: Joint Omnibus Committee (see text for details of JOC scheme).
M: Municipal operator (various).
N: North Western Road Car Co.
W: Yorkshire Woollen District.
Y: Yorkshire Traction or predecessor companies.
Column 6 
This column gives a reference for the information preceding it.
Numbers: page number in Hall, Sheffield Transport.
STD: S.T.D., Brief History, 21.
- : None of these references, the source being given in the succeeding
note.
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APPENDIX S9 continued 
Notes to the Table: column 7 
These notes refer to the place cited in the preceding column except where
otherwise stated. If a reference is given, a number on its own refers
to a page in Hall, Sheffield Transport and 'STD' to S.T.D., Brief History,
21. Other references are given in full in the form used in the main text.
a. Never very successful and closed down in June 1918; 144.
b. An extension of the . Wincobank service, turning it into rather
more like a belt route.
c. Financially unsuccessful and withdrawn 3 Oct 1920.
d. The text does not make the date of opening clear, but buses were
running to Killamarsh by the summer.
e. A joint service by Chesterfield and Sheffield Corporations between
their respective tram termini.
f. Fine weekends only; according to STD the Wyming Brook service began
in 1923.
g. Full or part date from Sheffield Reports for the appropriate year,
always page 3 or 4.
h. Quickly abandonned and left to private enterprise; 167.
i. The B&DTC participated in the purchase of the operator of this and
the preceding three routes, G. T. Glossop, and it seems this last route was
also soon,eliminated in favour of existing services by the Corporation and
the Company; see Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 17.
j. Introduction of this service is not specifically mentioned by Hall,
but he does reproduce a list of bus routes as in August 1926 with it on
(167) and it also appears in STD.
k. A. Hilton, The Development of Rotherham Bus Services (Sheffield,
1980), 7.
1. Given up again by December as part of the long-running dispute with
the East Midlands Company, as were two other routes running from Cresswell
in the East Midlands (and whose fate is irrelevant here).
m. Hall, 222, dates this service to 1934, but this is contradicted by
both Sheffield Reports, 1927-8 and STD.
n. The Corporation operated on its own for nearly a year, joint ser-
vice beginning on 3 Sep 1928.
o. This seems to be an extension of the existing Norwood service
to Southey Green; see Sheffield Minutes, T&MC, 16 Oct 1928, 850.
p. Actually an extension under the auspices of the new JOC an existing
LNER route to Retford; see Cummings, Railway Buses 1, 97.
q. Confirmation that this was an extension of the Heeley service
and of the full date comes from Sheffield Minutes, T&MC, 16 Apr 1929, 456.
r. Actually wholly operated by the YTC, but regarded as a JOC route
for part of its length; 213.
s. Year from STD.
t. This appears to have been a service from Hillsborough, on the tram-
way, to Wisewood, although STD gives no details apart from the outer terminus;
see Sheffield Reports, 1930-1, 3.
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APPENDIX S9 continued 
u. Obviously a JOC route operated, or at least shared financially with
the YTC, and an extension of the earlier route to Wombwell. One can often
glean details of earlier services from later timetables, in which services
are often recognisably the same. In this case, see Sheffield Transport and
Joint Omnibus Committee, Tramways and Omnibus Timetable (3 Apr 1955), 139.
v. This was a belt line, being an extension of an existing Darnall--
Firth Park service; see Sheffield Reports, 1931-2, 3. Doubtless this was a
remnant of the Tinsley--Gleadless route, which must have been cut back to
Darnall once the Prince of Wales Road tramway opened in 1928. However
the new route was itself cut back to Brightside from 6 Nov 1932 and Shire-
green was served from Wincobank; see Sheffield Reports, 1932-3.
w. Sykes, Yorkshire Traction, 24 gives the details to add to the
destination given in STD.
x. Tuesdays and Saturdays only to Ewden Valley Waterworks Village;
full details from Sheffield Reports, 1932-2, 4.
y. Saturdays and Sundays only; as above.
z. Reference to the Timetable (cited above) makes it clear that these
were both rural extensions beyond Stannington, the two being largely dup-
licate services.
aa. The minutes supplement STD to show that this was an extension of
the existing Pond Street--Cricket Inn Road service to the Wybourn estate;
see Sheffield Minutes, TC, 21 Apr 1936, 517-8.
bb. It is assumed that this was a through service from City, which was
almost a certainty by this time, even though not specified in STD.
cc. Route as well as date from Sheffield Reports, 1938-9, 4.
dd. The exact course of events relating to bus services to Parson
Cross is most unclear. It was resolved in 1937 to serve the new estate by
two routes; see Sheffield Minutes, TC, 21 Dec 1937, 169. It appears that
one of these, via Owlerton, was established on 14 Aug 1938, but although
Hall quotes this as serving Parson Cross, it appears only to have run as far
as Southey Green at that time. Both this all-day service and a works ser-
vice to Vulcan Road were extended twice in 1939, so bringing them into
Parson Cross proper; for which see Sheffield Reports, 1939-40. STD also
gives 1939 as the year buses reached Parson Cross.
ee. Not mentioned in STD, but presumably this formed the basis for
service 194, which by 1955 was running to Templeborough via Tinsley; see
the Timetable cited above, 221.
ff. Not mentioned in Hall, but this must have become works service 29,
operated jointly with Rotherham Corporation; see the Timetable, 88.
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S10: INDEPENDENT AND AREA OPERATORS' MOTOR BUS SERVICES
IN AND AROUND SHEFFIELD 1914--1933
	
(1)
	
(2)
	
(3)
	
(4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)
	
' Date
	
Type
	
Route
	
Firm Taken Over Ref. Notes
Feb?1914 T
7 Mar 1914 T
May?1914 T
20 Jun 1914 T
4 Oct 1914 T
17 Jan 1921 T
? Jan 1921 T
4 Mar 1921 T
2 May 1921 C
May?1921 C
11 Aug 1921 T
3 Sep 1921 T
2 Oct 1921 T
24 Apr 1922 C
1 Jul 1922 C
28 Sep 1922 T
? Sep 1922 T
1922? T
1922? T
? ? 1922 T
9 Oct 1922 T
? May 1923 C
? ?	 1924 T
? Jun 1924 C
1 Aug 1924 T
1 Jan 1926 C
13 Feb 1926 C
17 Mar 1926 C
17 Mar 1926 C
? ?	 1926 T
4 Jun 1927 C
? Jul 1927 C
6 Oct 1927 C
25 Jun 1928 C
? Aug 1928 C
24 Sep 1928 C
15 Oct 1928 C
21 Nov 1928 C
1 Jan 1929 C
? ? 1929 C
24 May 1930 C
13 Sep 1930 C
Nov?1930 C
14 Nov 1932 C
3 Mar 1933 C
Intake--Mosborough
	
MS
Intake--Mosboro'--Eckington	 SD
Millhouses--Totley
	
DA
Firth Park--Mortomley
Owlerton--Chapeltown
Intake--Eckington
	 UD
Handsworth--Kiveton Park
	
UD
Intake--Killamarsh
	
UD
Staveley Road--Baslow
	 NW
Moorhead--Castleton
	
HN
Handsworth--Worksop
	 UD
Intake (Elm Tree)--Ford
Ecclesall--Dore
	 DN
Moorhead--Buxton
	
HN
Moorhead--Eyam
	 CD
Millhouses--Holmsfield
	
NW
Intake (Elm Tree)--Ford
	
BF
Malin Bridge--Bradfield
Malin Bridge--Stannington
Malin Bridge--Stannington
	 SK
Millhouses--Bakewell
	
BT
Moorhead---Chesterfield
	
MA
Tinsley--Maltby
	 UD
Moorhead--Bakewell
	
Mc
Intake--Harthill
	
UD
Exchange St--Barnsley
	
GL
Exchange St--Maltby
	
GL
Exchange St--Worrall
	
GL
Exchange St--Holmsfield
	
GL
Hillsborough--Worrall
	
SK
Sheffield--Clowne	 UN
Sheffield--Gainsborough
	
NP
Sheffield--Ashopton	 HN
Sheffield--Manchestr	 UE
Sheffield--Treeton via Tinsley T
Sheffield--Treeton via Intake K
Sheffield--Dinnington via
Tinsley
Sheffield--Retford
Above extended to Gainsborough J
Ellin St (Moor)--Killamarsh BO
Pond St--Holmfirth (two routes)BD
Sheffield--Retford
Sheffield--Retford	 BB
Exchange St--Thorpe Hesley
Sheffield--011erton	 HG
29 Nov 1915 125/43 a
29 Nov 1915 125/43 a
7 Sep 1915 125/8
14 Feb 1916 126/43 b
?1916 126/8	 c
	
157	 d
1 Oct 1930 157/215 d
	
157	 d
	
158	 f,h
13 Oct 1927 158/69
157
	
158	 e
1 Jan 1925 158/63
13 Oct 1927 159/69
	
159	 e,g
29 Jun 1927 159/67 h
7 May 1933 159/217 i
? Apr 1932 159/216 ivi
? Apr 1932 159/216 i,j
? Jul 1933 159/219 i
10 Oct 1924 159/62
	
(1923-4) 160	 k
161
Jul?1925 161/2
	
[1 Apr 19253 162 	 1
164
164
164-6
164-6
	
167	 in
25 Sep 1927 168
13 Feb 1929 170/2 i
13 Oct 1927 169
24 Feb 1930 170/214 i
[19321170/217 n
17 Apr 1934 170/219 i
170
172
172
213
[1932] 214/18 n
[1931] 215/18 n
[1932] 215/18 n
17 Apr 1934 217/19
219
? ? 1926
? ? 1926
? ? 1926
? ? 1926
?1926
Note: the table is taken up to 1933 only because after that there were
no more new entrants to the local bus scene for over thirty years; see
Hall, Sheffield Transport, 219.
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APPENDIX S10 continued 
Abbreviations used in the Table 
Column 2 
C: Route running into the city centre without transferring passengers
to/from the tramway.
T: Route running from an intermediate or terminal point on the tramway.
Column 4 
BB: Blue Bus
BD: Baddeley
BF: Barlow & Fisher
BO: Booth
BT: Battey
C: Coggan
DA: Dart Motor Transport Co.
DN: Dungworth
E: Ecclesfield & District Motor Bus Co.
GD: Goddard
GL: Glossop
HG: Hogg
HN: Hancock
J: Joint Omnibus Committee
K: Kitson
L: London & North Eastern Railway
MA: Machin
Mc: McKay
MS: Mosborough & District Motor Co.
NP: Ne Plus Ultra
NW: Newsome
P: Pioneer Motors
SD: A. Sedgewick & Co.
SF: Skinner & Woodhouse
T: Thrale
UE: Underwood Express
UD: W. T. Underwood Ltd., later East Midland Motor Services Ltd.
UN: Unity Motor Services
W: Wigmore
Column 5 
Dates are those on which the Corporation or later the JOC took over the
operation of a former private service. Dates in parentheses[ J refer
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APPENDIX S10 continued 
to services withdrawn without direct Corporation/JOC replacement. Blank
entries indicate similar services but without date or services which
were not taken over but remained in private hands.
Notes to Table: column 7 
Notes from page previously cited in Hall, Sheffield Transport, except for.
note (h), from ibid., 166.
a. Service ceased during World War II and was replaced by the Corpor-
ation after an interval.
b. Initially only replaced by Corporation buses between Firth Park and
Ecclesfield.
c. This service must have stopped about the same time as the previous
one.
d. These were the inner sections of services which ran further to
areas well outside Sheffield.
e. The takeover of this service is not specifically mentioned, but it
was eliminated or taken over at a later date.
f. Ran to Matlock for a few months; Staveley Road is just off London
Road and relatively close to the city centre.
g. Goddard had already been running from a garage in Ecclesall Road,
but for how long is not specified.
h. Newsome gave up his Baslow service when he started running to
Holmsfield. There were at least two other owners on this route, Evans and
Johnson, who were forced off the road in 1926.
i. Actually taken over after the formation of the JOC.
j. Thrale's services may well have started earlier than this.
k. Withdrawn at the turn of 1923-4 after prosecution for licence
evasion.
1. Route withdrawn by the operator by agreement rather than actually
being taken over by the Corporation.
m. May well never have operated.
n. Eventually eliminated or cut back to avoid competition through
decisions of the Traffic Commissioners.
o. Shortly came into the orbit of the JOC.
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S12: SHEFFIELD CORPORATION OR JOINT OMNIBUS COMMIllhE
M0fOR BUS SERVICES PROJECTED INTO THE CITY CENTRE
Date	 Bus Route	 Tram Route(s) Affected	 Notes
19 Feb 1925 Bakewell via Baslow	 Millhouses	 a
18 Mar 1925 Penistone 	 Wadsley Bridge
21 Mar 1925 High Green 	 Wadsley Bridge
1 Apr 1925 Mosborough etc.- 	 Intake	 a
I Aug 1925 Chesterfield	 Woodseats
26 Oct 1925 Dronfield 	 Woodseats & Millhouses
(late) 1925 Dinnington via Kiveton 	 Handsworth & Intake
25 Jul 1927 Rotherham & Doncaster	 Tinsley & Brightside
1927-8 Stocksbridge	 Middlewood
1927-8 Totley	 Millhouses
1927-8 Woodhouse 	 Intake	 g,h
1928-9 Beighton via Gleadless	 Intake
30 Sep 1929 Dinnington via Todwick	 Handsworth
1 Aug 1931 Wincobank	 Brightside
6 Nov 1932 Shiregreen	 Firth Park	 1
?1935 Wisewood	 Malin Bridge
27 Jan 1935 Handsworth via Woodthorpe Intake, Handsworth & Prince 	 n
of Wales Road
25 Oct 1936 Lodge Moor 	 Fulwood
6 Jan 1937 Bents Green & Ringinglow Ecclesall
11 Jul 1937 Gleadless via Arbourthorne Intake
17 Oct 1937 Shirecliffe
	 Firth Park
14 Aug 1938 Southey Green via Owlerton Wadsley Bridge
2 Oct 1938 Shiregreen	 Firth Park
Note: this list includes only services formerly terminating at a tramway
or else new services projected into the city and does not include routes
taken over from private operators (which were usually, though not always,
running into the city anyway); the aim is thus to pick out changes which
might adversely affect the tramways.
Other Notes and Sources 
a. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 162.
b. Ibid., 163.
c. Ibid., 1634.
d. Ibid., 164.
e. This change was agreed in May and probably implemented in the
autumn; see Sheffield Minutes, TUC, 26 May 1925, 499 and 22 Sep 1925, 770.
f. Sheffield Reports, 1927-8, 3.
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APPENDIX S12 continued 
g. These three routes were extended into the city during this fin-
ancial year, but a more precise date is not stated; see Sheffield Reports,
1927-8, 3.
h. This change was agreed in February 1928 and must have been implem-
ented shortly afterwards; see Sheffield Minutes, T&MC, 21 Feb 1928, 264.
i. Extended during this financial year; see Sheffield Reports,
1928-9, 3.
j. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 213.
k. Ibid., 220.
1. In 1931 the Darnall--Brightside service was described as being
extended to Shiregreen via Firth Park, but on 6 Nov 1932 this section, then
described as to Firth Park, was transferred to the Wincobank--City service,
so providing a direct Shiregreen--City service for the first time; see
Sheffield Reports, 1931-2, 3 and 1932-3, 4.
m. The extension of the Wisewood service to City was agreed in March
1934, and later ten six-axle Leyland buses were ordered for the route. If
no service could be offered until these particular vehicles arrived, then
the date must have been 1935, for they were not delivered until then; see
Minutes, T&MC, 20 Mar 1934, 384 and 10 Apr 1934, 454 and also Hall, Sheffield 
Transport, 305.
n. Hall, Sheffield Transport, 222.
o. Sheffield Reports, 1936-7, 4.
p. Ibid., 1937-8, 4.
q. Ibid., 1938-9, 4.
r. The area rather confusingly described as 'Shiregreen' since at
least 1924 when a bus route was first extended there was further developed
in the mid-1930s when it was served by a circular bus route from Firth
Park (see Hall, Sheffield Transport, 195-6), but in 1938 was given a direct
service to the city (see Sheffield Reports, 1938-9, 4). Presumably this
was a different part of the area to that served as described above in
note (1).
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S13:	 SHEFFIELD CORPORATION MOTOR BUS FLEET 1920-1961
Year Buses Year Buses
1920 37 1940 377
1921 40 1941-4 (not known)
1922 43 1945 448
1923 42 1946 461
1924 51 1947 456
1925 . 64 1948 466
1926 91 1949 540
1927 109 1950 559
1928 126 1951 537
1929a 142 1952 553
1930 162 1953 590
1931 177 1954 619
1932 191 1955 641
1933 186 1956 666
1934 200 1957 710
1935 231 1958 777
1936 247 1959 776
1937 284 1960 856
1938 308 1961 861
1939 351
SOURCE: Annual Reports, passim.
a. Joint Omnibus Committee buses would be in-
cluded in the totals from 1929 onwards.
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S14: SHEFFIELD TRANSPORT, FINANCIAL RESULTS OF TRAM
AND MOTOR BUS OPERATION 1939--1955
Year
end-
Balance	 after
Deductions
,
Renewals
t
Balance after
Renewals
Departmental
Balance
ing
31
Mar
Tram
£
Bus
£
Tram
£
Bus
£
Tram
£
Bus
£
Both
£ Notes
1939 102,435 95,243 63,111 54,635 39,324 40,608 79,932 a
1940 87,104 103,204 61,300 60,114 25,804 43,090 68,894 a
1941 59,253 b
1942 5,169 b
1943 176,178 b
1944 108,488 68,624 60,000 53,989 48,488 14,435 63,124
1945 70,088 66,327 60,000 47,653 10,088 18,674 28,762
1946 356 65,724 60,000 41,884 59,644 23,840 35,804
1947 67,769 44,169 60,000 62,817 127,769 18,648 146,416
1948 134,043 99,533 120,000 74,419 14,043 25014 39,157
1949 50,329 88,894 120,000 66,454 69,671 22,440 47,231
1950 22,985 103,306 120,000 61,962 97,015 41,344 55,671
1951 78,904 3,577 120,000 57,523 41,096 53,946 95,042
1952 132,609 10,388 120,000 56,401 12,609 66,789 54,180 c
1953 160,765 89,141 116,240 59,134 44,525 30,007 74,533
1954 80,269 86,703 106,065 16,534 25,7'6 70,169 44,372
1955 21,245 164,719 93,294 83,451 72,049 81,268 9,219
SOURCE: Sheffield Reports and Accounts, passim, Summary, 1-2.
a. Each Annual Report has a Table summarising past results. The
Net Surplus for 1939 and 1940 is given there as £83,043 and £70,662, not
the figures in the final column of this Table. The latter are, however,
the amounts in the full accounts for those years. There is no obvious
explanation for this discrepancy.
b. Wartime details not available; totals from the Table mentioned
in note (a).
c. This same Table shows the balance for 1952 as £74,180; this is
probably just a printing error which was carried forward from year to year
without being checked.
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Smeeton, Cyril S. 'The Coupled Car Experiments of the Metropolitan
Electric Tramways.' 14 (Spring--Summer 1982), 143-56, 180-94.
Webb, Stanley E. 'Gloucester Corporation Light Railways.' 14 (Winter
1982), 236-42 and 15 (Spring 1983), 3-24.
Tramway Review also consulted 3--17 (1956-87), passim. This Journal
normally has four issues a year, Spring, Summer, Autumn and Winter, with
two years per volume. Earlier issues are classified simply by number,
both methods being used above, as appropriate.
Transport History 
Heath, John E. 'A Bus Conductor between the Wars.' 12 (1981), 89-91.
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THESES 
Barker, T. C. 'The Social and Economic History of St. Helens
1830--1900.' Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1951.
Lee, G. A. 'The Tramways of Kingston-upon-Hull: a study in municipal
enterprise.' Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Sheffield, 1968.
An invaluable and detailed study of the tramway in relation to the
local economy and to other forms of transport.
Scrafton, D. 'An Analysis of Public Passenger Transport Services in
West Yorkshire 1896--1963.' Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London,
1968.
Not very useful in the present context, the subject being treated from
a geographical rather than an economic standpoint.
The following two theses, which clearly would have been relevant, were
not consulted because copies were unavailable for loan from the institutions
concerned.
Sleeman, J. F. 'An Economic Study of the British Tramway Industry.'
Unpublished B.Com . thesis, University of London, 1939.
The results of this research were fortunately later published in the
article cited above.
Stearn, W. A. 'The Development of Municipal Passenger Transport in the
United Kingdom.' Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Southampton, 1954.
PRINTED MUNICIPAL RECORDS 
Borough (later County Borough) of Doncaster 
Abstract of Accounts for the years ending 31st March, 1901--1936.
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Committees of the Council as a
Municipal Authority and as an Urban District Council, municipal years,
1904-5--1935-6.
City of Sheffield 
Minutes of the Council and Minutes and Reports of Committees, municipal
years, 1895-6--1960-1.
Tramways (later Transport) Annual Reports, 1898-9--1960-1.
TRANSPORT UNDERTAKINGS' RECORDS 
South Yorkshire Transport 
(as successors to Doncaster Corporation Transport)
Letter Books 1920--1932 (not a continuous series).
Tramways Department, Employees Register and Record.
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Yorkshire Traction Company 
(and predecessor companies)
Company Minutes, 1924--1930.
Dearne District [Feb 1951?]: statement of the cost to the Company of
the DDLR Agreement.
Dearne District Operation [Nov 1951?]: financial statement of pay-
ments made under the Agreement.
Dearne District Light Railways: historical summary of relationship
with the DDLR.
Letter from BET Head Office to R. W. Birch Esq. [Manager] (27 Oct 1944)
and giving details of purchase prices of pre-war buses.
Report of the Directors and Statement of Accounts for the years ended
31st Dec 1923--1932.
Reports of Mr. Robinson [Manager] to the Board December 1929 to Novem-
ber 1937.
Report (24 Apr 1934) on new vehicles delivered in 1933.
Reports of Revenue and Expenditure for the quarters ending 30 Jun 1930
to 31 Mar 1933.
Standing Joint Committee [with the railway companies], Minutes,
16 Nov 1931.
Statement in respect of services operating in Bolton-on-Dearne Area and
affected by the D. D. L. R. Agreement (1949).
ARCHIVE COLLECTIONS 
Doncaster Archives Department 
The material is listed below in accordance with the department's classific-
ation system. Each letter/number code often covers more than one item, and
in some cases quite a large number of documents. In such cases, the items
of present interest are listed below the code in alphabetical order.
AB2/2/1/11
Town Council Minutes 1 Jan 1895--4 Apr 1912.
AB2/2/2/6
Council-in-Committee Minutes 18 Jun 1897--20 Jun 1901.
AB2/2/16/2
Tramways Committee Minutes 7 May 1901--13 Nov 1905.
AB9/TC3/A44
Estimate of Proposed Light Railways.
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AB9/TC3/A45
(unless otherwise stated, items refer to the Doncaster Corporation Light
Railways, 1899)
Mr. Crabtree's Evidence.
Estimate of Proposed Light Railways.
Form of tender for rail (blank).
Light Railways (Extensions), November 1902.
Memorial of the Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of Doncaster in the
County of York, November 1901.
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Inquiry into the Doncaster and Dis-
trict Light Railways, 15 Jan 1899.
Notice of Application for a new Order, November 1901.
Order, Doncaster Corporation Light Railways, 1899.
Table of Population of Boroughs in the West Riding of Yorks. at the
Census of 1881 and 1891.
AB9/TC3/A46
The Barnsley and Doncaster'Light Railways Order, 1902.
AB9/TC3/A47
Doncaster Corporation Light Railways Order, 1902.
Evidence to be given . . . in support of the Barnsley & District Scheme.
AB9/TC3/A49
Doncaster Corporation Light Railways, Proposed Extension, Estimates.
AB9/TC3/A50
Contracts for Construction of Tramways, for Cars (with Dick, Kerr Ltd),
for Points and Crossings (with Hadfields) and for Rail (with a Belgian firm).
AB9/TC3/A52
Mr. Crabtree's Evidence, Doncaster Corporation Light Railways, 1902.
Estimates, Doncaster Corporation Light Railways, Proposed Deviation and
Extension, 1901.
Memorial of the Mayor etc of the Borough of Doncaster, November 1902.
Order, Doncaster and District Light Railways, 1899 (draft of BET scheme).
Order, Doncaster Corporation Light Railways, 1903.
Mr. Wyld's Evidence, Doncaster Corporation Light Railways, 1902.
AB9/TC3/A54
County Borough of Croydon, Tramways, Information obtained from other
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Towns, December 1905.
AB9/TC3/519
Doncaster Corporation (Trolley Vehicles) Order, 1929.
Plan of tram lines in depot area (1925).
AB9/TC5/78-81
Light Railways Committee, Letters, 1899--1903 (series continues beyond
these dates).
Goldthorpe Branch Library 
Dearne District Light Railways (hereafter, DDLR) Joint Committee Minute
Book, 1 Sep 1913--13 Jul 1922.
South Yorkshire Record Office 
This archive lost its independent existence with local government reorgan-
isation in 1985 and is now administered by Sheffield City Archives Depart-
ment (based in the Central Library). SYRO items are only available by
prior request, however. Since the SYRO collection is still separately
stored and indexed, items from it are still classified as such. Usually
each document is assigned a separate reference code, and so the list below
is in numerical order of code; multi-document files are noted accordingly.
All items have the prefix 8/UD.
1/10-18. Wombwell UDC, Minutes of Council and Committees,
1917-18--1925-6 (series extends beyond these dates, but only these were
consulted).
2/3-4. Wombwell UDC Committee Minutes, 5 Nov 1912--27 Jul 1915 (also a
longer series).
28/1. Brief for Applicants, 26 Feb 1914.
28/3. Minutes of Proceedings of the Light Railway Commissioners'
Inquiry, 26 Feb--10 Mar 1914.
28/4. Light Railway Commission, Proceedings, 21 Jul 1914.
28/8. Proof of Evidence to 1914 Inquiry: J. A. Yardley.
28/9. Ibid.: J. L. Hawksworth.
28/10. Ibid.: Miscellaneous.
28/12. Ibid.
28/14. DDLR Order, 1915.
28/15. Analysis of Messrs. Bury & Walker's Payments, Sep 1913--Feb 1916.
28/345. DDLR (Extension and Abandonment) Order, 1916.
28/346. Estimate of Expenses for Railways 14 and 15, 26 Nov 1915.
28/353. Objections to the 1915 Inquiry.
28/357. Copy Order of Board of Trade, 21 Nov 1918.
28/359-63. Estimate of Expense, Nov 1913, amended (by hand) to Aug
1919.
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28/461. DDLR (Amendment) Order [draft].
28/463. Objections to the 1919 Order.
28/465. Brief for Applicants at the Light Railway Commissioners'
Inquiry, 21 Jan 1920 (includes the Evidence of various witnesses, princip-
ally A. R. Hoare and H. England, with separate pagaination).
28/467. Minutes of Proceedings, Light Railway Commissioners, DDLR
(Amendment) Order, 21-22 Jan 1920.
28/471. Table shewing Collieries and Works, Aug 1919.
28/474. DDLR (Amendment) Order, 1920.
28/476. Objections of the Motor Legislation Committee to the Confirm-
ation of the Order, 6 Jul 1920.
28/478. Objections of the Railway Companies to the Confirmation of the
Order.
28/482. Notes on the Speech of Mr. Stanley of the Ministry of Trans-
port; Joint Committee, 15 Dec 1920.
28/484. Statement by Mr. Hoare to the Joint Committee, 3 Jan 1921.
28/487. Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 14 Mar 1921; Letter from the Gen-
eral Secretary of the Motor Legislation Committee (cutting).
28/488. Brief for the Applicants at the Inquiry into the Confirmation
of the DDLR (Amendment) Order, 16 Mar 1921.
28/495. DDLR (Amendment) Order 1921.
28/496. DDLR (Amendment) Order 1924.
28/498-9. Two versions of a Bill proposed in 1929.
28/500. Letter from the Secretary of the Yorkshire Traction Company
(at BET Head Office).
28/501. Short Statement of Facts and Evidence (in support of the 1933
Bill to abandon the line).
28/503,9-10. Draft versions of Agreement as to the Abandonment of
Light Railways and Substitution of Omnibus Services (1932).
28/534. Brief for the Yorkshire Traction Company.
28/539. The Dearne District Traction Act, 1933.
28/541. Copy Agreement for Electricity Supply, 31 Dec 1923.
28/544. Minutes of the Joint Committee, 30 Aug 1922--15 Dec 1932.
28/545. Reports of the Clerk to the Joint Committee, 16 Nov 1923--
21 Jul 1932.
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28/546. DDLR Works Committee Minutes, 1924--1933.
28/547. DDLR Finance Committee Minutes, 1925--1933.
28/548. Ledger.
28/558-82. Financial Statements, years ending 31st March, 1925-1949.
28/593. Joint Committee, 10 Jun 1948 (one of a few scattered minutes
surviving from the post-closure period).
28/604. Miscellaneous Papers, post-closure period.
28/605. Dearne UDC Treasurer's Report to Finance Committee, 29 Dec
1950.
28/607. The Yorkshire Traction Company Valuation of Plant, 1 Oct 1933.
28/608. List of Apparatus and Material for Disposal, 18 Aug 1933.
28/609. Miscellaneous Papers re. Abandonment (includes various meet-
ings, reports etc., some of which are cited in the footnotes above).
28/644. Plan of route (c.1920).
28/484/Z1. File of items donated by A. S. Denton.
PERSONAL PAPERS 
C. T. Humpidge 
Birmingham: Comparative Running Costs of Trolleybuses, Trams and
Motor Buses (1933).
Birmingham: Current Consumption of Cars 842 and 843 (experimental
lightweight cars).
Portsmouth: Comparative Expenses per Mile for Buses and Trolleybuses,
24 Jun 1939.
Sheffield: Economics of PSV Operation, 1939 compared with 1966.
(the file also included notes for various lectures, cited below)
LECTURES 
Hallpike, A. W. -The Development of Transport and Commercial Vehicles 
in Bristol (Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 18 Jun 1952; published by
the Institution).
Humpidge, C. T. 'Birmingham Corporation Tramways' (Light Railway
Transport League, Manchester, 30 Mar 1967: author's notes).
'Buses' (Omnibus Society, 18 Jun 1967: author's notes).
	 . 'The Development of the Public Service Vehicle as the Com-
plete Vehicle Concept' (Crompton-Lanchester Lecture of the Institution
of Mechanical Engineers, 21 Oct 1966: author's draft, but later published
by the Institution in Commercial Vehicles--Engineering and Operation [1968]).
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'Problems of Municipal Transport' (Institute of Transport
One Day Course: author's notes).
Marshall, Edward. 'The Llandudno and Colwyn Bay Electric Railway'
(Light Rail Transit Association, Sheffield Area, 16 Jan 1978: notes).
Yearsley, Ian. "Bus and Coach" and the Anti—tram Campaign' (Light
Rail Transit Association, Sheffield Area, 23 Feb 1981: notes).
Young, Dr. Tony. 'Manchester Light Rail Scheme' (Light Rail Transit
Association AGM, Manchester, 1986: notes).
